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Over the past two decades, protests and violence have become increasingly 
common ways for Chinese patients and families to settle their disputes with hospitals. 
There are likely hundreds of thousands of these incidents annually, and they have become 
so widely known that they have their own name in Chinese - yinao. 
This study posed three research questions about yinao. First, why and how did 
yinao become a nationwide social phenomenon? Second, how has the Chinese state and 
society responded to yinao and the sources that drive it? Lastly, what are the implications 
of how both the Chinese state and society have responded to yinao for how single-Party 
authoritarian systems can adapt to meet the challenges of their changing societies?  
I primarily relied on qualitative methods to answer these questions, though where 
possible I provided analysis on the limited quantitative data available for yinao. For data 
collection, I used interviews and participant observation in health care and legal settings. 
For data analysis, I used process tracing, counterfactual analysis, comparative analysis, 
and evaluation of policy and social variables.  
My first finding is that while many factors have contributed to the development of 
yinao, the key to its escalation into a national phenomenon in the early 2000s is likely 
due in large part to increasing Internet access. Second, I argue that while over time both 
the Chinese state and society have shown increasing capacity to manage complex policy 
problems, no matter how innovative policy production is, the unchanging underlying 
political system continually hampers policymaking, implementation, and social 
innovation.  
 iii 
From this second argument I build two concepts, “tetheredness” and “slack”, to 
answer the third research question. “Tetheredness” is whether or not institutions are tied 
to the Chinese Party-state system. The second concept is “slack”: even if an entity is tied 
to the system, its ability to move freely is influenced by how much “slack” the system has 
given it. My analysis suggests that giving institutions slack is not enough to realize 
necessary reforms, and that the real challenge facing China’s leaders will be deciding 
which institutions need to be completely untethered from the Party-state. 
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 1 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
It was almost midnight on September 11, 2016 in Kunming city when Mr. Huang 
was rushed to Yunnan Pingan Hospital after a night of excessive drinking. The 
Emergency Department later proclaimed him dead following attempts to revive him. Mr. 
Huang’s family questioned the timeliness of the care he had received and the types of 
medication the hospital had used, refusing to let the hospital remove his body from the 
scene. The next day, after some intervention by the police, the family decided to take the 
case to court and allowed the hospital to transport Mr. Huang’s body to the undertaker’s 
office. But the next evening, Mr. Huang’s family returned with 61 people and over 10 
cars to surround the hospital’s main entrance. They hung a banner in the hospital lobby, 
laid funeral wreaths, and demanded an explanation from the hospital for Mr. Huang’s 
death. Police detained all 61 people at the scene after they refused orders to stop their 
disruptive actions. According to police reports, Mr. Huang’s family had hired the cars to 
join the protest for RMB 500 ($71.88) each.
1
 
This is just one example of the tens of thousands and likely hundreds of 
thousands
2
 of yinao incidents – or “medical disturbances” that occur annually in China. 
Patients, families, and hired professional protesters use both violent and non-violent 
actions to demand explanations, apologies, or compensation from hospitals during 
medical disputes. Yinao incidents range in severity, from a few family members quietly 
holding a banner to high-profile incidents of patients murdering physicians. These events 
                                                 
1
The news story about this case did not explain more of the technical medical features of the case. Story 
translated and adapted from: “Kunming Yinao: Deceased Patient’s Family Call in 10 Cars to Surround the 
Hospital, 61 People Are Detained [昆明医闹：死者家属叫 10 多辆车围堵医院 61 人被拘留],” 
September 22, 2016, http://news.ifeng.com/a/20160922/50004802_0.shtml. 
2
 While data on yinao remain incomplete, estimates calculated in Chapter 5 on data on yinao suggest that 
the number of annual incidents exceeded 200,000 in 2012, the last period of time for which national survey 
data was available. 
 2 
have become common stories across Chinese news and social media over the past decade 
and have turned into a nationally known phenomenon – even President Xi Jinping has 
addressed yinao, stating it should be strictly punished in remarks during the 2014 annual 
“Two Meetings” (lianghui) of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC) and the National People’s Congress (NPC).
3
 
Broader Significance of Yinao  
Yinao lies at the intersection of three crucial systems of governance in China: 
health care, justice, and public security. Not only are these systems crucial to governance 
everywhere, but at this moment in China they are arguably new sources of the Chinese 
Communist Party’s (CCP) performance-based legitimacy, which in the past was derived 
from strong economic growth.  
China’s health care system is in the process of addressing various challenges 
stemming from the beginning of China’s economic reform era in 1978. During this time, 
government financing did not prioritize spending on China’s health care system, a 
decision that resulted in problems such as low health care insurance coverage for the 
Chinese population, price and salary regulation that incentivized physicians to 
overprescribe pharmaceuticals and diagnostic tests, and uneven distribution of advanced 
care facilities between rural and urban areas.
 4
 Under this system, Chinese patients faced 
high out-of-pocket costs in overcrowded facilities, while physicians in large urban 
hospitals faced high patient volumes and increasing reputational losses due to notorious 
                                                 
3
 “Xi Jinping: Violent Acts toward Physicians Should Be Severely Dealt with According to Law [习近平：
伤医行为要依法严肃处理],” Xinhua News, March 8, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/health/2014-
03/08/c_126237901.htm. 
4
 Karen Eggleston, “Health Care for 1.3 Billion: An Overview of China’s Health System,” 2012, 3, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2029952. 
 3 
corruption with the pharmaceutical industry.
5
 All of these factors have contributed to the 
deterioration of patient-physician trust in China.
6
 This is the context in which yinao 
began to emerge and continue to proliferate in. While there have been improvements to 
the Chinese health care system with reforms beginning in the early 2000s,
7
 it still faces 
many of these challenges today. In his 19
th
 Party Congress speech in October 2017, 
China’s supreme leader Xi Jinping reiterated the importance of deepening reform of the 
health care system to ensure a healthy Chinese population – a “key mark of a prosperous 
nation and strong country.”
8
 
In addition to health care, the development of China’s legal system represents 
another important basis for CCP legitimacy. At the 19
th
 Party Congress in October 2017, 
Xi Jinping repeatedly asserted the importance of pursuing “law-based governance” in 
China,
9
 which encompasses ensuring “sound lawmaking, strict law enforcement, 
impartial administration of justice, and observance of laws.”
10
 There has been a mix of 
opinions,
11
 however, regarding what rule of law or law-based governance actually means 
in practice in the Chinese context. In the area of dispute resolution, a primary focal point 
of this study, there has been increased official advocacy for mediation (as opposed to 
                                                 
5
 Waikeung Tam, “Organizational Corruption by Public Hospitals in China,” Crime, Law and Social 
Change 56, no. 3 (2011): 265–82. 
6
 Joseph D Tucker et al., “Patient–physician Mistrust and Violence against Physicians in Guangdong 
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adjudication) of civil disputes over the past two decades.
12
 In 2014 the Fourth Plenary 
Session of the Central Committee of the 18
th
 Party Congress, known for its focus 
specifically on advancing “law-based” governance, reiterated the importance of 




Yinao occurs when frustration with the health care system fails to be channeled 
through existing avenues for complaint and dispute resolution, ending in protest or 
violence. It therefore offers a unique opportunity to study how China’s health, justice, 
and public security systems are evolving to better address the needs of Chinese citizens. 
This study thus asks the following three central research questions: 
1. Why and how did yinao become a nationwide social phenomenon? 
 
2. How have the Chinese state (comprises policymakers, governing 
agencies, etc.) and society (NGOs, individuals, businesses, etc.) 
responded to yinao and the sources that drive it? 
 
3. What are the implications of how both the Chinese state and society 
have responded to yinao for how single-Party authoritarian systems can 
adapt to meet the challenges of their changing societies? 
 
These questions involve the idea of responsiveness, which can take two different 
forms. The first is responding to direct fallout from individual events. For example, if 
there were a series of yinao incidents, the state could condemn them through an 
announcement, and in society, thousands of social media users could engage in debate 
about these events. The second type of responsiveness aims to respond by solving 
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problems that contribute to yinao, not just to its immediate fallout. This is the type of 
responsiveness that I am most interested in for this study because it is related to another 
crucial idea – adaptation. This study defines adaptation as the extent to which responses 
to better address citizen concerns are internalized as either state or social institutions. As 
a starting point, I use the simple definition that Douglass North provides for institutions: 
“humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”
14
 to define this concept for 
both state and social institutions. As the analysis proceeds, I tend to focus on certain 
institutions, such as state policies and social organizations established to respond to yinao 
and its sources. 
Main Arguments and Theoretical Contributions 
I make the following arguments based on in-depth group and individual 
interviews, participant observation, secondary data collection of yinao incidents, and 
tracing the development of yinao through time. First, while many factors have 
contributed to the development of yinao, which was first documented by the People’s 
Daily in 1986,
15
 the key to its escalation into a national social phenomenon in the early 
2000s is likely due to the increase in Internet access and usage during this period of time. 
I argue that Internet access increased awareness of yinao as a socially legitimate and 
effective outlet for expression and as a way to elicit compensation from hospitals. While 
the Internet may have some stabilizing effects on the Chinese system by enabling the 
Party-state to efficiently collect information on citizen concerns and providing an outlet 
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for citizens to express themselves, my analysis suggests that in the age of Internet and 
social media, the costs of poor policy choices are exacerbated by the speed with which 
the Internet spreads news about them. 
Second, I argue that while over time both Chinese state and society have shown 
increasing capacity to manage complicated policy problems by adopting a diverse set of 
policy and entrepreneurial initiatives, ultimately, no matter how innovative policy 
production is, the unchanging underlying political system – the hardware
16
 on which the 
policy and society software runs – continually hampers policymaking, implementation, as 
well as social innovation. 
 From this second argument I build two concepts to help explain the mechanisms 
for understanding how China, and perhaps how single-party authoritarian governing 
systems more broadly, adapt in order to answer the third question. The first concept I 
develop is called “tetheredness”
 17
: the extent to which Chinese Party-state institutions are 
tied together. Imagine Chinese government and Party agencies as well as other affiliated 
organizations as people standing in a long line with their shoes tied together. The whole 
line can move forward without anyone tripping by making small, incremental steps 
forward, but if one individual wants to run out in front of the others to pursue a new or 
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progressive policy, he will be pulled back by the laces that tie him to the system. Thus, 
while components of an authoritarian system can exhibit incremental progress and 
innovation, ultimately the structure to which they are tied holds them back. This is a 
subtle but important point – reform and adaptation are often viewed as a choice the 
leaders and governing agencies in China are willing or unwilling to make, but my 
analysis shows that even when there are intentions and policies to make strides to better 
manage yinao, those strides cannot always be realized, not just because of regional 
variation, but also because the system by design inhibits policies from being fully and 
fairly realized. 
Tetheredness, however, represents only one dimension of the adaptation story. 
The other dimension I call “slack”: even if an entity is tied to the system, its ability to 
move is influenced by how much slack the system has given it. Again, imagine the line of 
individuals tied together. While some individuals may not have a lot of distance between 
them and the other actors in the system, others may have been given greater slack, so they 
can walk out significantly ahead of the line before being pulled back. This latter type of 
individual has more independence.  
A medical dispute mediation committee (MDMC), an institution created by local 
government entities in response to yinao, is a concrete example of tetheredness and slack. 
An MDMC is an officially sponsored institution, the daily activities of which are dictated 
by neither Party nor government agencies. So while it is tied to the Party-state system, it 
has also been given a lot of slack in conducting its work. Although this allows the 
MDMC to informally play some patient advocacy roles, this study shows that ultimately, 
its full potential as an NGO cannot be realized because the local political, legal, and 
 8 
health care systems it must interact with have structural biases that ultimately influence 
the way in which it conducts its work. In other words, while the MDMC has been given 
slack, its tetheredness to the governing system still restraints it from realizing its full 
potential.  
Thus, when authoritarians adapt, they can adapt on the dimensions of 
tetheredness, slack, or both. Along the lines of tetheredness, they can completely cut off 
entities to allow for complete institutional independence. What seems to be more 
common for authoritarian systems, however, is to adapt along the lines of slack – to give 
an entity some distance, but not total independence. The question facing Chinese leaders 
is whether changes along the lines of slack are enough to sustain the Party-state system or 
whether ultimately they need to let go of (untether) entire institutions in the current 
system. 
 Of course tetheredness and slack can move in more restrictive directions – an 
authoritarian system could conversely string more elements of its state and society 
together and give them little to no slack at all (or eliminate certain elements altogether), 
indicating a move towards totalitarianism. Some have argued that this is what has been 
occurring under Xi Jinping’s leadership, which has seen increasing restrictions on civil 
society,
18
 arrests of individuals expressing controversial views in private instant 
messaging groups,
19
 and a renewed focus on ideology and propaganda, reminiscent of 
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Chairman Mao’s leadership style.
20
 Both elements of tetheredness and slack are 
important for providing a nuanced understanding of the dimensions along which 
authoritarian systems can move. 
Chapter Overview 
 This dissertation develops the arguments outlined above in the chapters that 
follow in three parts. Part I contains the base upon which I build the substantive analysis 
of yinao: a discussion of the literature that has established the theoretical foundations and 
questions for this work in chapter 2 and my research design and methodology in chapter 
3. 
In Part II, chapters 4 through 6, I develop the argument for the first research 
question concerning why and how yinao became a national social phenomenon. In 
chapter 4, I provide a sketch of the entire complaint and dispute management system in 
Chinese hospitals in order to build a foundation for the proceeding analysis. In chapter 5, 
I develop a more rigorous definition of yinao and analyze available data on it to better 
understand trends in its evolution and its use over time relative to other forms of medical 
dispute resolution. In Chapter 6, I untangle the sources that have contributed to yinao in 
order to identify the factors that most likely led to its proliferation. In this chapter I also 
briefly compare China with other countries to begin to test the argument I developed for 
how yinao became a nationwide social phenomenon. 
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 In Part III, chapters 7 through 9, I address the second question, which in many 
ways represents the main question driving this dissertation about how the Chinese system 
has responded and adapted over time to yinao. Chapter 7 examines these questions from a 
high-level perspective, examining relevant national policies that address yinao over time 
as well as their implementation. Chapter 8 delves into the question of the quality of 
implementation by focusing on one particular policy response: the implementation of a 
medical dispute mediation committee (MDMC). Chapter 9 tackles the question of how 
society has responded to yinao, examining how physicians, citizens, entrepreneurs, and 
civil society organizations have responded and attempted to resolve problems 
contributing to yinao. Lastly, in the conclusion, chapter 10, I summarize the findings of 
















EXISTING LITERATURE  




CHAPTER 2: CHINESE PROTEST AND POLITICAL 
STABILITY IN ACADEMIC LITERATURE 
 
 The research agenda proposed by this study has the potential to contribute to 
many areas of existing scholarship, especially since it relates to both medicine and law. 
To the topic of yinao, I seek to add perspectives from the social sciences, specifically 
comparative politics and area studies. The three main sub-topics I touch upon within 
these fields are: political stability and authoritarian resilience, contentious politics as it 
relates to interest expression and state-society relations amidst protest, and the debate on 
China’s rule of law. I also briefly touch upon politics in China’s health care system, as it 
remains an understudied topic.
21
 This literature review is meant to be a broad overview, 
and each subsequent chapter in this dissertation provides even greater detail from the 
existing scholarship as it relates more specifically to each subtopic of this dissertation. In 
the following sections, I provide synopses of the debates in each of the broad areas of 
literature and then discuss how this dissertation both fits in and contributes to those 
debates. 
Political Stability and Authoritarian Resilience  
Much of how western academia views and debates China’s political trajectory 
stems from scholarship about the roles institution play in political transition and stability. 
Arguably the most common definition for institutions comes from Douglass North who 
                                                 
21
 While there have numerous studies on the issues within China’s health care system and its system 
reform, how politics affect and work within the system remain understudied. To my knowledge, the most 
recent book to broach the issue is Yanzhong Huang’s Governing Health in Contemporary China, see 
Yanzhong Huang, Governing Health in Contemporary China (Routledge, 2013)..For past studies of how 
politics relates to China’s health care system, see: David M. Lampton, The Politics of Medicine in China: 
The Policy Process 1949-1977, Westview Special Studies on China and East Asia (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1977); David M. Lampton, Health, Conflict and the Chinese Political System, vol. 18, Michigan 
Papers in Chinese Studies (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, 1974). 
 13 
defined them as “humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.”
22
 
Condoleezza Rice paraphrases his definition as the “rules of the game in society.”
23
  
In 1968 Samuel Huntington in Political Order in Changing Societies examined 
the relationship between political institutions and social development. He argued that 
instability and social disorder resulted from the lag between the development of political 
institutions and social and economic change: if the rates of social mobilization and 
expansion of political participation is high, but the rate of political organization and 
institutionalization is low, then this situation foments instability and disorder.
24
 In this 
argument, Huntington challenged modernization theory, which contends that economic 
development spurs democracy, by emphasizing that economic development does not lead 
to democratization in countries where political institutions are not sufficiently developed 
to meet the demands of their citizenries. 
Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel later revised modernization theory with a 
nod towards the role of institutions, arguing that socioeconomic development reduces 
external constraints on human choice by increasing people’s material, cognitive, and 
social resources, bringing a growing mass emphasis on self-expression values, which in 
turn increase demands for civil and political liberties, gender equality, and responsive 
government. As values become more oriented toward self-expression, this helps to 
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China’s Authoritarian Resilience 
Despite Inglehart’s and Welzel’s implication over a decade ago that China is on 
the path towards political transition, the Party-state remains intact – a phenomenon that 
scholars have called China’s “authoritarian resilience.” The concept of “authoritarian 
resilience” is difficult: the term “authoritarian” itself is conceptually vague, and the word 
“resilience” is often left undefined. James Reilly acknowledges that the term authoritarian 
is a “placeholder for a conceptual jumble of nondemocratic regimes that says more about 
what they are not than what they are.”
26
 Rice differentiates between totalitarians, China’s 
former regime-type under Mao, and authoritarians because unlike totalitarians, 
authoritarians leave “space for groups that are independent of them,” such as NGOs, 
businesses, universities, and labor groups, though they live in an “uncomfortable cold 
peace with their rulers” and often represent the leading element of change.
27
 
 As for the definition of authoritarian resilience, Cheng Li succinctly adapts a 
definition from an earlier piece written by Bruce Dixon: “the CCP’s resilient 
authoritarianism refers to a one-party political system that is able ‘to enhance the capacity 
of the state to govern effectively’ through institutional adaptations and policy 
adjustments.
28
 Yongshun Cai understands authoritarian resilience based on the state of 
Chinese society today, which is “characterized by the coexistence of numerous social 
conflicts and social stability.”
29
 Andrew Nathan, who authored the seminal article in 2003 
on China’s authoritarian resilience, rationalized the puzzle of China’s resilience as 
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stemming from regime theory, which recognizes that “authoritarian systems are 
inherently fragile because of weak legitimacy, overreliance on coercion, over-
centralization of decision making, and the predominance of personal power over 
institutional norms.”
30
 The causes of China’s resilience are complex, but Nathan argues 
that institutionalization is the most important concept behind understanding it. He 
highlights institutionalization in China’s norm-bound succession politics, meritocratic 
promotion of political elites, the differentiation and functional specialization within the 
institutions of the regime, and the establishment of institutions for political participation 
and appeal that strengthen the CCP’s legitimacy. Together, these elements help the 
regime adapt and survive.
31
 Even in his updated work on the regime’s ability to adapt a 
decade later, Nathan asserts that the “PRC regime as it stands today is more adaptive than 
other authoritarian regimes. The leadership proactively addresses the most neuralgic 
sources of popular dissatisfaction by making health and retirement insurance available, 
attacking corruption, cracking down on the worst polluters, and increasing the appearance 




Both Reilly and Kellee Tsai, albeit in different ways, articulate the idea that 
incremental institutional reforms over time reveal the regime’s ability to adapt and 
survive. In her work on adaptive, informal institutions in the economic sphere, Tsai 
agrees that the regime shows elements of institutional resilience.
33
 In investigating state 
responses to nationalist protest, Reilly too emphasizes the role of institutions, arguing that 
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a more telling explanation for authoritarian resilience may lie in “the innovative ways 
nondemocratic regimes have responded to the rise of new social forces with institutional 
innovation, policy shifts, and rhetorical persuasion, or propaganda.”
34
 He continues: “The 
Communist Party has responded to the rise of social and economic liberalization in 
incremental and instrumental fashion. Just as economic reforms developed by ‘feeling the 
stones while crossing the river,’ so too has the Party’s approach to social change emerged 
piecemeal over time through a gradual learning process. The response is thus 
incremental. It is also instrumental – designed to address the public’s demands for 
political participation in ways that blunt pressure for broader political change.”
35
 
Survey data often appears to support the idea of authoritarian resilience. Yongnian 
Zheng in 2007 argued that even though it is difficult to conduct public opinion surveys 
regarding institutions in China, “all available information points to a serious crisis in 
public confidence in government institutions.”
36
 Yet existing surveys such as those by 
scholar Marin King Whyte
37
 in 2009 and Pew Research Center in 2014
38
 show that in 
spite of corruption and social inequality among other top concerns,
39
 Chinese people – 
89% of them in the Pew poll – remain optimistic about their economy. Whyte’s work 
even shows that this optimism exists among rural villagers,
40
 casting doubt on the idea 
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that China’s citizenry would be disgruntled enough to protest the CCP’s governance of 
the country. Using the World Values Survey from 2012, Wenfang Tang analyzed how 
different subgroups of Chinese (by age, education level, socioeconomic class, etc.) felt 
about two areas that could potentially be linked to citizens calling for regime change: 
policy satisfaction and overall life happiness.
41
 Tang found mixed results: for example, 
some groups exhibited higher life happiness but low policy satisfaction. He argued that 
overall there was an increasing trend in policy satisfaction since 1989, but also noted that 
the evidence was not enough to entirely discount the “political crisis” view of so many 
scholars in western academia.
42
 
Scholars have continued to advance this “regime crisis” view into the Xi 
administration. In an article written in 2013, a decade after the publication of his 
influential article on China’s resilience, Nathan notes that despite the successes and 
survival of the Chinese regime, “the expectation of dramatic change persists,” adding that 
“there is a sense of impermanence that we do not find in mature political systems.”
43
 It is 
important to note that no data or evidence was offered specifically in support of these 
claims. Cheng Li argues that the CCP’s authoritarian resilience “is a stagnant system, 
both conceptually and empirically, because it resists much-needed democratic changes in 
the country.”
44
 He traces the problems of resilient authoritarianism to the “monolithic 
conceptualizing of China,” identifying three paradoxical trends that cast doubt on the 
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regime’s resilience: 1) weak leaders, strong factions; 2) weak government, strong interest 
groups; 3) weak Party, strong country.
45
 Li ultimately asserts that people should not 
“confuse China’s national resilience with the Party’s capacity and legitimacy to rule the 
country.”
46
 He proposes that the CCP adopt a plan for systematic democratic transition 




Scholar Minxin Pei has long challenged China’s resilience, arguing that the 
country lives in a “trapped transition.”
48
 More recently Pei has stated, “Despite the façade 
of impregnability, cracks in the regime’s foundation are beginning to emerge.”
49
 He 
identifies the problems of slowing economic growth, massive overcapacity, and 
unsustainable debt levels, and the lack of unity in the ruling elite.
50
 Pei further pushes 
back against the idea of incremental reforms as the saving grace of the CCP, asserting 
that “there is no distinction between regime and state in the party-state. Consequently, 
even incremental reforms could lead to the regime’s unraveling, as the party would find 
that its loss of control over the administrative state would instantly and drastically 
undercut its power and authority.”
51
 He also points out that the historical record so far 
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A closely related debate to China’s authoritarian resilience concerns the basis for 
China’s regime legitimacy. In the words of Yongshun Cai “legitimacy is about the 
political system’s worthiness to be recognized.”
53
 There is a general consensus in the 
literature on China’s regime legitimacy that the economic performance-based legitimacy 
that has provided the basis for the Party’s legitimacy is no longer sufficient. As early as 
2005, when China still had a double-digit GDP growth rate, Dickson recognized that in 
addition to deriving its legitimacy from economic growth, the party “also relies on 
patriotic/nationalist feelings and the CCP’s ability to maintain national unity to justify its 
rule.”
54
 Along similar lines, Shambaugh notes that a problem facing the party’s popular 
and political legitimacy is its lack of a convincing vision for leading the nation,
55
 though 
this has arguably changed under Xi Jinping with the “Chinese dream.”
56
 Yongnian Zheng 
emphasizes the continuing importance of scientific and technological development 
because it has been perceived as a foundation of economic rapid growth, so it is also tied 
to the survival of the Chinese communist state.
57
 
 Beyond economic growth, strengthening the legal system in China is also viewed 
as a basis for regime legitimacy. Rhetoric around this has been emphasized during the Xi 
administration.
58
 In the area of dispute resolution, Cai emphasizes that weak legal 
institutions and the resulting limited institutionalization of dispute resolution undermine 
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 Mary Gallagher noted that while some may argue that the CCP 
would never submit to laws limiting its discretion, the possibility exists that the Chinese 
party-state will gamble that the rule of law and its resulting benefits of increased 
legitimacy both at home and abroad are worth the risk of activating social forces and 
enlarging the role of new interest groups.
60
 Gallagher considered this possibility about a 
decade ago. While since then the CCP has turned its attention to establishing the “rule of 
law” (fazhi, 法治) and “law-based governance” (依法治国，yifa zhiguo) 61 under Xi, in 
practice it is not the type of “rule of law” that places limitations on the CCP
62
 or enables 
greater realization of individual rights.
63
 In 2016, Su Lin Han emphasized that a central 
concern for the CCP as it tries to make its own brand of “rule of law” part of its new basis 
for legitimacy is “how to improve the delivery and benefits of rule of law to its 
increasingly ‘rights-conscious’ population through better enforcement of individual rights 
protection promised by existing laws.”
64
 She notes the difficulty of realizing this, 
especially because following the Fourth Plenum of the 18
th
 Party Congress (which 
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specifically addressed law-based governance in China), it was clear that the CCP showed 
no signs of relinquishing power in areas related to maintaining social stability.
65
 
Though the literature often portrays legitimacy as a kind of massive underbelly of 
China’s CCP, Cai notes that it is not something that emanates solely from the center of 
the Party-state, arguing that there are differences between how China’s national and local 
governments perceive and interact around the issue of legitimacy. Because most conflicts 
are handled by local governments, they tend to lose legitimacy more rapidly than the 
central government and as a result, citizens tend to trust the central government more.
66
 
Tony Saich’s survey research spanning 2003 to 2011 also found that Chinese citizens 
tended to be more satisfied with the central government than with lower levels of 
government.
67
 Tang’s analysis of survey data (mentioned above) also supports these 
findings, showing that the lower the government level, the lower the satisfaction with the 
government and trust of officials.
68
 Cai points out that despite trust in the central 
government, the central government can still feel pressure from issues with local 
governments, especially when local citizens seek out the central government for 
redress.
69
 He further argues that this tension is important because the central government 
is more responsible for the operation of the political system and as a result, has a greater 
interest in protecting the regime’s legitimacy, in contrast to local officials.
70
 Legitimacy 
therefore cannot be defined solely by single issue-areas (rule of law, economic growth, 
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health care, etc.); legitimacy also involves the push and pull between central and local 
governments around various sets of social issues.  
Social Stability 
While Inglehart and Welzel discuss democratic institutions, Louis Coser 
emphasizes the role of “safety-valve” institutions, which are not necessarily democratic; 
they are grievance-expressing institutions that serve to drain off hostile and aggressive 
sentiments, thereby helping to maintain the system by preventing otherwise probable 
conflict or reducing its disruptive effect.
71
 Coser warns that while these institutions may 
help prevent conflict from erupting because they deflect anger away from modifying the 
system, they can also create dammed-up tension in individuals and potentialities for 
disruptive explosion.
72
 Along similar lines, Piven and Cloward echo the importance of 
institutions on political stability, asserting that institutional patterns shape the collectivity 
from which protest arises: “institutional life aggregates people or disperses them, molds 




Interest Articulation and Civil Society in Authoritarian Systems 
Tianjin Shi in his seminal work on interest articulation in China in the 1990s aptly 
noted that a central question facing students of communist participation is: how are the 
political activities of ordinary people linked to the policy-making process in communist 
societies?
74
 In other words, how can people articulate their interests in 
authoritarian/communist systems? Rice notes that civil societies are useful to 
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authoritarian regimes up to a certain point and it is a matter of balance to act before the 
groups become threatening, but not so brutally that cracking down on them would 
provoke backlash.
75
 But as Chinese society becomes increasingly liberal, Reilly noted in 
2012 that China presents “a curious case of liberalization without democratization.”
76
 As 
this study comes to an end six years after Reilly’s analysis, China may represent an even 
more extreme example of this: as Chinese citizens have become increasingly well-off and 
educated, the government, as mentioned above, has increasingly restricted individual 
rights, from use of the Internet to being able to engage in legal activism. 
 One of the reasons that this (western-driven) paradox may persist in China is 
because, as scholars have noted since the 1990s, the regime “has developed a series of 
input institutions that allow Chinese to believe that they have some influence on policy 
decisions and personnel choices at the local level.”
77
 These include both formal and 
informal channels, from the infamous and omnipresent xinfang system (also called 
Letters and Visits system) that allows citizens to issue formal complaints in both 
government and Party-run agencies to informal channels such as protest.
78
 Yet questions 
remain about whether or not these institutions are adequate. Cai notes that the “Party-
state faces serious pressure because of the magnitude of conflicts and the recurrence of 
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Why People Protest 
 As Cai’s analysis implies, people in China resort to extralegal forms of interest 
expression because existing institutions are inadequate. Yet other factors also influence 
whether or not people decide to protest. Goldstone and Tilly frame the decision to protest 
with the concepts of opportunity and threat, arguing that these factors combine to shape 
decisions regarding actions: “a group may decide to bear very high costs for protests if it 
believes the chances of success are high, but the same group may avoid even small costs 
of protest if it believes chances of success are low.”
80
 A group may also decide to risk 
protest, even when opportunities are seemingly absent, if the costs of acting are not too 
great.
81
 In the context of China’s environmental protests, Deng and Yang argue that the 
relationship between pollution and protest is context dependent: if the issue of pollution 
is effectively framed, Chinese villagers may protest; however, if the pollution is caused 
by other villagers, they may not protest due to concerns about community relations and 
economic dependency.
82
 Tang’s analysis shows that the level of government affects 
whether or not citizens protest: when pursuing grievances, citizens are far more likely to 
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Scholars specifically studying medical protests argue that health care and dispute 
resolution systems characterized by mistrust create the context through which protest 
emerges to resolve medical disputes. Because hospitals have often resolved these protests 
by paying off protesters, this mode of action has become further encouraged.
84
 While 
these current studies provide a rich analysis of the potential causes of yinao, in Chapter 6, 
I add to existing research a thorough analysis of variables leading to the proliferation of 
yinao. I also offer a comparison across space, time, and other countries to more precisely 
tease out why yinao erupted into a national phenomenon.  
How People Protest 
 Another important part of the protest literature concerning China centers around 
how people choose to protest and why some protests are successful while others are not. 
Kevin O’Brien and Lianjiang Li, in their seminal book Rightful Resistance in Rural 
China, develop the concept of “rightful resistance” to encompass four main ideas: “it 
operates near the boundary of authorized channels, employs the rhetoric and 
commitments of the powerful to curb the exercise of power, hinges on locating and 
exploiting divisions within the state, and relies on mobilizing support from the wider 
public.”
85
 Elizabeth Perry, however, rejects the idea that rightful resistance is new, 
arguing that local villagers employing official narratives to pursue their interests 
represents a practice dating back to imperial China.
86
 Mertha adds that protesters often 
                                                 
84
 Benjamin Liebman, “Malpractice Mobs: Medical Dispute Resolution in China,” Columbia Law Review 
113, no. 1 (2013); Sarah Biddulph, The Stability Imperative: Human Rights and Law in China (UBC Press, 
2015). 
85
 Kevin J. O’Brien and Lianjiang Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 2. 
86
 Elizabeth J Perry, “Chinese Conceptions of ‘Rights’: From Mencius to Mao—and Now,” Perspectives on 
Politics 6, no. 1 (2008): 37–50; Elizabeth J Perry, “A New Rights Consciousness?,” Journal of Democracy 
20, no. 3 (2009): 17–20; Elizabeth J. Perry, “Popular Protest: Playing by the Rules,” in China Today, China 
 26 
choose “issue frames” to pursue their causes, such as cultural or environmental.
87
 While 
all of this scholarship has been crucial to our understanding of protests, yinao protests use 
a wide range of strategies from banners to funeral rites, thus enabling us to understand 
how individuals, not just communities, choose to pursue and frame their grievances. 
Success of Protest 
Beyond the means by which protesters pursue their claims is how and whether 
they are ultimately successful in achieving their goals. Piven and Cloward hold a 
fatalistic view of why protests succeed or not, claiming that if protesters win, they win 
“what historical circumstance has already made ready to be conceded.”
88
 Cai, echoing 
Giugni and Tarrow, asserts that so many different factors and intervening variables 
combine to shape the outcomes of protest movements, making it exceedingly difficult to 
assess the impact of citizen resistance on policy changes and movement outcomes.
89
 Yet 
Mertha’s work on whether or not anti-dam protests succeed in China argues that several 
factors are important to whether or not protests succeed. He asserts that issue-framing, 
policy entrepreneurship (support by officials, media, or NGOs), and broad-based support 
are important factors for success.
90
 Cai echoes the importance of the media in Mertha’s 
work, claiming that “in China the media are perhaps the most crucial third party in 
citizen’s resistance, despite the party’s control.”
91
 In studying protests that spread across 
different administrative districts, Zhang argues that protest leaders play decisive roles in 
whether or not protests spread while at the same time, he also maintains that the state 
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molds and restricts the scale of protest diffusion.
92
 Liebman’s work on whether or not 
petitioners are successful in changing court decisions echoes the importance of obtaining 
the support of external actors, arguing that in some cases petitioners’ success was tied to 
their ability to attract the attention of senior party officials, people’s congress 
representatives, or the media.
93
 
 To this literature I add the importance of the Internet and social media not just as 
ways to make protest successful, but as part of the cycle that encourages protests to 
occur. Further, I trace the modes in which people pursue medical protests to broader 
social problems in today’s China in addition to other cultural and historical influences on 
how protests are carried out. 
Civil Society 
In addition to available institutional channels for political participation, citizens in 
China have increasingly participated in civil society organizations. In her reflection on 
how authoritarians generally interact with civil society, Rice notes that “up to a certain 
point, these organizations are useful to the regime…but there are limits to what the 
regime will tolerate.”
94
 Nathan notes that the Chinese governing system has become 
better funded, more technologically advanced, and more skillful in repression than other 
authoritarians. The Party-state keeps up with and uses social media to its advantage, an 
ability that also enables it to broadcast the punishment of potentially dangerous 
messengers like Liu Xiaobo and Ai Weiwei, so the rest of China’s citizenry has a 
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“frightening picture of the regime’s capacity and willingness to repress critics.”
95
 While 
the Chinese system has allowed for various types of NGOs to exist,
96
 under Xi Jinping, 
China has taken a more illiberal turn with the arrests of human rights lawyers and 
restrictions on NGOs,
97
 and increasing monitoring and collecting data on its citizens.
98
 
With this increasingly repressive context in mind, this study inquires into the state of civil 
society’s ability to respond to and address yinao and the issues that contribute to it.  
State Response to Protest 
 How states – China in particular – respond to protest has become a focal point for 
research. Much of the debate revolves around the extent to which concession and 
repression is used and the balance between them. Piven and Cloward asked why states 
withdraw some of their concessions to protesters while others become permanent 
institutional reforms. They conclude that those institutions that become more permanent 
are compatible with the interests of powerful economic groups, while other reforms 
granted during turmoil are not.
99
 McAdams and Tilly argue that for authoritarian regimes, 
concessions to any group challenging their monopoly of power is likely to be more costly 
than repression, so repression is more likely to dominate protest in authoritarian settings. 
However, they acknowledge that protests have costs as well and as a result, authoritarian 
regimes swing back and forth between concessions and repression as their cost estimates 
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 In the study of China, scholars often highlight this balance between 
concession and repression. Dickson characterizes the government’s response to protests 
as a mix of “carrots and sticks.” When the government deems the protests legitimate, it 
makes tangible and even monetary concessions, but in cases of illegitimate protests, it 
punishes a few protest leaders to warn others that protests are risky.
101
 Reilly articulates a 
cyclical model for China’s protest responsiveness to nationalist, anti-Japanese protests: 
“By combining tolerance and responsiveness with persuasion and repression, the CCP 
has developed a system of responsive authoritarianism based on accommodating popular 
pressures within its policy-making process in ways that shore up regime stability.”
102
Cai 
examines responsiveness at different levels of governance, arguing that different levels 
have different perceptions of the costs and benefits of addressing citizens’ resistance. The 
perceptions of each level shape its responses, thereby both determining the opportunities 
for resistance and outcomes.
103
 
 Another branch of research that more directly relates to this study discusses 
individual grievances. Han asserts that the Chinese government’s policy toward 
individual grievances concerning equal employment law is characterized by “top-down 
mobilizing of political and bureaucratic machinery as opposed to promoting individual 
assertion of rights and claims through existing judicial and administrative enforcement 
channels.”
104
 In his analysis of petitioning of courts, Liebman observes that individual 
grievances can be a focus of official concern, and courts can be swayed by individual 
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 Liebman also notes the dichotomy of over-responsiveness and under-
responsiveness of the Chinese Party-state particularly in medical disputes. While 
hospitals try to tame conflicts by quickly paying off protesters, at the same time there is 
also “widespread shirking” by state institutions like the public security and health bureaus 
because they do not want to get involved.
106
 
 The literature has largely discussed short-term responses to protest, but there is 
clearly a need for the CCP, and any government, to go beyond immediate responses to 
particular incidents, whether individual or group; there needs to be lasting institutional 
reforms for a more permanent solution to unrest. While many scholars agree that 
institutional reforms are important for the CCP to maintain lasting power, to my 
knowledge few studies actually look at how the Chinese state responds to protests with 
new institutions and further, how these institutions operate. This dissertation provides 
direct information on both of these dimensions. 
State-Society Interaction around Protest 
 State responsiveness to protest, however, is not linear – understanding how 
society interacts with state responsiveness is also important. Liebman has noted that state 
responsiveness to petitioning and protest encourages more petitioning and potential for 
unrest.
107
 Cai argues that in addition to influencing policy implementation, citizen 
resistance also contributes to policy adjustment by the government. Policy adjustment 
means “the revision or abolition of policies that have directly caused of failed to address 
citizens’ grievances, as well as the creation of new policies to address the problems that 
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have triggered resistance or to accommodate protesters’ demands.”
108
 In seeking to 
understand whether nationalist protest impacts Chinese foreign policy, Jessica Chen 
Weiss argues that the degree of popular influence on Chinese foreign policy is affected 
by the government’s management of anti-nationalist, anti-foreign protest; state and 
society influence and shape each other.
109
  
Analysis of state responsiveness to protest alone leaves out the role of society. 
Yongnian Zheng aptly captures the importance of understanding state-society 
interactions: “In any political setting, some dimension of state power has more to do with 
the state’s ability to work through and with other social actors, and a state’s apparent 
disconnection from social groups turns out to be associated in many cases with weakness 




State Responses to Yinao 
 Literature on yinao recognizes that it is a complicated, multifaceted problem that 
should be dealt with by various types of policy responses spanning both health care and 
law.
111
 One of the main arguments of the literature is the extent to which different types 
of solutions, such as health-care based, legal-based, or security-based are effective in 
addressing yinao. Some scholars focus more on policy initiatives and recommendations 
that increase hospital and public security measures as well as strengthen dispute 
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resolution mechanisms to address yinao.
112
 Other authors argue that legal and security 
measures alone will not resolve the issue and that health-care related solutions, especially 




 In addition to the type of response, Liebman has also discussed the degree of state 
responsiveness, citing that the in medical disputes, the state shows both qualities of over- 
responsiveness and under-responsiveness. While the Party-state has been over-responsive 
by encouraging the settlement of disputes by paying off protesters in order to preserve 
social stability, it has also been under-responsive because police and health bureaus have 
refused to get involved.
114
 
 I build on the existing literature of responsiveness to yinao in several ways. First, 
while most literature focuses on the responsiveness to yinao and medical disputes directly, 
I examine the entire system for managing both complaints and disputes, from the first 
time a patient or family member communicates or complains that something is wrong all 
the way through adjudication. This provides important context for yinao because disputes 
initially begin as complaints, so understanding how complaints are managed in their 
initial phases can provide insight into the path that led to their escalation.  
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Second, I trace state responses since 1986, when the first yinao incidents were 
reported in the People’s Daily. I show how events correspond with policy responses in 
addition to policy implementation to provide a full picture of responsiveness. I also dive 
specifically into the implementation of the newly created medical dispute mediation 
committees (more below), which critics write off as another institution that distracts from 
meaningful, legal dispute resolution. In the area of state-society relations, I look not only 
at society as responsible for protest and online criticism, but also the source of problem 
solving for many of the health care and legal system issues contributing to yinao. 
Chinese-Style Rule of Law 
In basic terms, rule of law means that “law distributes power to ordinary citizens 
against the state in subjecting state authority to legal rules and norms as any other 
citizen.”
115
 A system of rule of law must have “independent and impartial decision 
makers, transparent and open rules that apply uniformly to all (including government 
powers), and a process that ensures the protection of fundamental rights and interests.”
116
 
Gallagher points out that the majority of Western scholars are pessimistic regarding the 
rule of law in China, with a dominant concern being the CCP’s “unwillingness to submit 
to legal regulations and strictures that may reduce its political power.”
117
 This tension 
between promotion of the greater rule of law and one-party rule permeates China’s entire 
legal system. 
118
Jianfu Chen echoes Gallagher’s concerns a decade later, stating that the 
lack of judicial independence continues to be a major problem for rule of law in China 
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and “is unlikely to be resolved any time soon.”
119
 DeLisle agrees that under Xi “laws role 
in containing threats to the strategy for economic growth appears to include law’s 
longstanding function of addressing social disorder that could disrupt the economy.”
120
 
The concept of the rule of law has had a mixed reception in China, in part because 
historically China has not had a rule-of-law system, and Chinese scholars often have 
looked to western conceptions of law as a resource to create their own interpretation of 
it.
121
 Although western scholars have expressed concern about whether true “rule of law” 
can exist in a one-party state, for many Chinese scholars, rule of law does not detract 
from the Party’s leadership of the state and in fact, the CCP is supposed to help guide the 
process for establishing rule of law.
122
 
Procedural Justice and Mediation 
 One important aspect of the rule of law relevant to this study is procedural justice, 
which encompasses two main demands: 1) that government decisions are made under 
certain procedural principles established for the protection of those affected by those 
decisions; 2) that the resolution of disputes or administration of justice will be conducted 
under procedural safeguards against injustice.
123
 In traditional Chinese culture and in the 
early days of the PRC, procedural justice was mostly neglected and regarded with 
secondary importance.
124
 In post-Mao China, procedural laws were developed as working 
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procedures for implementing substantive laws; “notions of protection and safeguard were 
absent.”
125
 Martin King Whyte asserts that procedural injustices, rather than distributive 
injustices, may be the canary in the coalmine for China because procedural injustices 
have triggered unrest – unfairly burdensome rural taxes and fees until 2004, inability to 
block nearby enterprises from emitting pollution, or the confiscation of land for 
development without proper consultation or compensation.
126
 
 One concern regarding the development of procedural justice in China relates to 
China’s more recent push for mediation rather than adjudication, which occurred in the 
early 2000s following a period of civil justice reform that emphasized adjudication.
127
 
The issue that mediation presents for procedural justice as it relates to the rule of law is 
that it privatizes disputes, which carries three main issues: 1) it privatizes disputes and 
issues of social concern, blocking the development of general legal norms and the rule of 
law;
128
 2) it does not have the procedural protections that a trial affords, which is 
designed to protect parties against each other’s cheating by a watchful tribunal and a set 
of procedures designed to deter and expose lying;
129
 3) as a result of the lack of such 
safeguards in number two, parties sit down at a “poker table” and play hardball, so 
“complete candor is impossible in negotiation.”
130
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 There is a sticky debate about the role of mediation and the rule of law especially 
around medical disputes. Mediation is not necessarily in conflict with rule of law and in 
fact, in western scholarship, there is a growing consensus that mediation and other 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods might be best for resolving malpractice 
claims.
131
 However, in China mediation under Mao was infused with political ideology 
and coercion,
132
 pressuring parties to reach agreements they did not want. Though it has 
moved away from its ideological and normative roots in the post-Mao era,
133
 concerns 
remain that it is still coercive.
134
 For Chinese scholar Zhang Jing, mediation is not in 
conflict with the rule of law; the rule of law in fact provides legitimacy for “old” 
institutions like mediation.
135
 I contribute to and update this debate directly by shadowing 
and evaluating the procedures of one medical dispute mediation committee from 2015-
2016, in the era of Xi Jinping, to shed light on how mediation may have changed over 
time. While most literature debates mediation, procedural justice, and the rule of law in a 
general sense, I observe cases in real-time to uncover the extent to which procedures are 
followed, among other characteristics and roles of mediation committees. 
Rule of Law Paradox in Dispute Resolution 
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 Dispute settlement represents another indicator for whether rule of law has been 
established. As Gallagher and Woo assert: “A ‘rule of law’ state develops when the law 
gives context, legitimacy, a name, and a framework to disputes, even when the disputes 
involve powerful state actors.”
136
 Yet despite the ability of rule of law to lessen the 
political nature of disputes by legitimizing moral claims and providing a regulated 
process for debate, the Chinese system has shown reluctance in allowing law and legal 
procedures to play a dominant role in dispute resolution. This reluctance arises from the 
perceived tension and tradeoff between the Party-state’s interest in short-term stability 
and the long-term need for a rule-based system, a phenomenon Liebman calls the “law-
stability paradox.”
137
 Medical disputes provide an apt example of this: in order to 
preserve short-term stability, complainants have often been paid off, incentivizing protest 
so that now violence and protest are key aspects of how the system functions.
138
 As 
Liebman summarizes: “Despite three decades of emphasis on constructing a 
comprehensive legal framework, medical cases show that in many disputes in China the 
‘shadow of the law’ is weak or nonexistent.”
139
 Other authors have found tension 




Politics in China’s Health Care System and Hospitals 
 While the political nature of the court process has been well documented, the 
politics of China’s health care system remain understudied. There is a great amount of 
                                                 
136
 Woo and Gallagher, “Introduction,” 5. 
137
 Liebman, “China’s Law and Stability Paradox,” 175. 
138
 Liebman, “Malpractice Mobs: Medical Dispute Resolution in China,” 248. 
139
 Liebman, 247. 
140
 Su Lin Han, “Individual Rights Protection or Social Management? Equal Employment Laws and 
Policies in China,” 134; Fu Hualing and Richard Cullen, “From Mediatory to Adjudicatory Justice: The 
Limits of Civil Justice Reform in China,” 56. 
 38 
scholarly research dedicated to China’s health care reforms,
141
 development and 
governance,
142
 and organized corruption,
143
 but the politics and promotion of officials 
within the health care bureaucracy and public hospital system remain opportunities for 
further scholarship. Henderson and Cohen, in their pioneering fieldwork in a Chinese 
hospital in Wuhan during the 1980s, documented some of the political aspects of hospital 
life. During the Cultural Revolution, hospitals and physicians were subject to some of the 
greatest criticism, and physicians frequently went to political meetings.
144
 They reported, 
“The hospital danwei [work unit] is embedded in the Communist Party, the Health 
Ministry bureaucracy, and the cultural framework of health care and health behavior of 
China.”
145
 Although the communist work unit system is no longer as tightly knit as it was 
in the past, providing community and almost all cradle-to-grave services to its staff,
146
 the 
political nature of the health care system remains. Medical disputes offer an opportunity 
to tease out the political nature of the current health care system, and as Liebman 
highlights: “[Medical] review boards consist entirely of local doctors and are thus likely 
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to protect local doctors and hospitals. Local medical associations are overseen by local 
health departments – which also oversee hospitals and doctors.”
147
  
I build on these important studies, not only highlighting the issues of how local 
health care politics influences medical associations, but the broader issue of how the 
politicized nature of the health care system enables it to influence other aspects of the 
dispute resolution system, including media and broader provincial governance. This is 
important because it paints a full picture of the political nature of the health care system, 
which often foments injustice and impartiality, further contributing to mistrust in the 
health care system. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
I primarily use qualitative methods to study why yinao became a national 
phenomenon and how actors in both state and society have responded to it, though where 
possible I provide preliminary analysis on the limited quantitative data available for 
yinao. This study examines three dependent variables – the proliferation of yinao, 
Chinese Party-state responsiveness, and the responses of society. I dedicate the first part 
of the dissertation to establishing the context, definitions, and analysis for explaining the 
proliferation of yinao into a national phenomenon. The second part of the dissertation 
traces state and society responses. However, I hesitate to characterize state and society 
responsiveness in the sense of traditional dependent variables
148
 because my primary goal 
is not to explain the causal mechanisms behind why state and society are responding in 
the ways that they do; it is to understand how these entities – an authoritarian single 
Party-state and the society under its authority – manage to adapt and respond within the 
constraints of their environment and in response to each other. I find the “how” question 
in this case the more interesting question because we want to know how the process of 
adaptation occurs, if at all, as well as the challenges and advantages the Chinese system 
may have in doing so. In this chapter I explain how I designed and conducted the 
research for this dissertation. I first discuss the overall approach to the research design. 
Next I detail my methods for data collection and analysis. Lastly, I discuss some of the 
limitations of the methods used in this study. 
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Development of Research Design 
This study has two parts that build upon each other. The first part (chapters 4-6) 
attempts to explain why yinao became a social phenomenon. This part not only helps to 
explain why yinao took off, but also creates an important foundation for the second part 
of the study by identifying the multitude of factors contributing to yinao that responsive 
policies would need to address in order to effectively stop it. The design of the second 
part of the study (chapters 7-9) aims to analyze adaptation at both high levels and low 
levels of the Chinese system. Chapter 7 provides the “forest” view at the national level, 
while Chapter 8 explores the inside of a tree (inside of a single, local-level mediation 
institution). Chapter 9 on how society responds to yinao moderates between the tree and 
forest levels, examining national-level civil society organizations as well as individual 
and small community activities occurring online and offline. While imperfect, I hope that 
this design helps elucidate a picture of adaptation at both the national and local levels and 
at the group and individual levels. 
Fieldwork  
 Over the course of 12 months, I conducted fieldwork mainly across five large 
eastern Chinese cities: Beijing, Guangzhou, Nanjing, Shanghai, and Wuhan. Shanghai 
and Beijing are directly controlled municipalities, meaning they are on administrative par 
with provinces. Guangzhou, Wuhan, and Nanjing are all provincial capitals. All of these 
cities are some of the most modern and economically developed in China, with Shanghai, 
Beijing, and Guangzhou typically classified as first-tier cities and Nanjing and Wuhan as 
second tier,
149
 meaning that the places I am studying are relatively well-off, large urban 
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areas, so the conclusions of this study cannot necessarily be generalized to rural areas, 
smaller cities and counties, or western China. In Chapter 5, however, I briefly touch upon 
the dynamics of yinao in those parts of China. In the field, I spent time primarily at two 
types of field sites: hospitals and a medical dispute mediation committee.  
Hospital Sites 
I had access to two public tier 3-grade A hospitals
150
 (“3A hospitals”), one in in 
Guangzhou and one in Nanjing. “3A” means that the hospital is a tertiary facility, which 
is large (500 beds or more)
151
 and has the capacity (such as appropriate specialists and 
equipment)
152
 to perform medically advanced and complex procedures (e.g. cancer 
treatment and neurosurgery). Grade A means that they have been certified as a high-
quality facility.
153
 I purposely chose this type of facility for several reasons. First public 
3A hospitals in urban areas have a reputation for providing the best medical care in China, 
so they have high patient volumes. Second, they perform advanced procedures, so they 
manage riskier cases.
154
 Because of these two factors, they tend to be prone to medical 
disputes and therefore, yinao.
155
 For the purposes of methodology, I chose these types of 
facilities because they have often been on the front lines of medical disputes and yinao. 
This does not mean that more rural areas, counties, or smaller cities do not experience 
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yinao, as there have been reports in those areas as well.
156
 But due to time, budget, and 
access constraints, I was unable to perform research in these areas and encourage future 
research to focus on them. 
These two hospitals represent high-access sites because I was able to engage with 
many parts of the hospital staff and observe different hospital processes, though what I 
was able to observe in each hospital depended on the specific circumstances in each 
context.
157
 While I am able to conduct some comparison between them in chapter 7 when 
I discuss policy implementation on the hospital level, on the whole I am not conducting 
cross-hospital comparisons since I had different types of access in each. I also conducted 
interviews in hospital settings in Beijing and Shanghai, but do not count these as whole 
field sites as I was not able to engage in significant observation of the settings.  
Medical Dispute Mediation Committee (MDMC) 
 In addition to spending time at hospitals, another aspect of my fieldwork included 
spending time regularly at a Medical Dispute Mediation Committee (MDMC) in one of 
the cities. I document my experiences and interaction with this committee in detail in 
chapter 7. I was able to receive full access to the MDMC because its director, whom I 
had met through previous interviews, asked for and received permission from superiors at 
the associated Bureau of Justice to allow me to become a regular visitor.  
Methods for Data Collection 
 I use several different methods for data collection and analysis. I collected most of 
the data used for this dissertation during 12 months of fieldwork in China, where I 
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conducted in-depth individual and group interviews and engaged in participant 
observation. I also collected and translated primary documents, mostly government 
policies, to understand their evolution over time. Additionally, I also use Chinese 
academic research for secondary data collection and to see whether other studies verify or 
challenge my findings. For analysis, I use process tracing, comparative case studies, and 
structured evaluation of criteria that define adaptation. I describe these methods in more 
detail below. 
Interviews 
 The foundation of this study is information from interviews. I have a total of 92 
interview files that vary in type of interview and the number of individuals involved. The 
interview files contain in-depth interviews (1-2 people present), group interviews (3 or 
more people), and participant observation from shadowing the MDMC (not traditional 
interviews because I mainly observe). I received exemption from the Johns Hopkins 
University Homewood IRB for this 
study. All participants were aware of 
my study, and I have kept all 
interviewees’ identities confidential. I 
cite information they gave me with 
anonymous identifiers they 
specifically provided or titles I have 
chosen that do not make them readily 
identifiable. I explain the participants 
and types of interviews in detail in the following subsections. 
Table 1: Participant Type and Numbers 
Participant Type No. 
Physicians  35 
Nurses 10 
Hospital Administrators 23 
Patient/Family Complainants 11 
Mediators 7 
Officials 6 
Insurance Companies 6 
Journalists 3 
Scholars 3 
Hospital Security Personnel  3 





There were 115 participants involved in the interviewing. I have included the 
entire spectrum of interviewees in Table 1 above and in Figure 1 below. The largest 
proportion of interviewees came from hospitals (62% - physicians, nurses, hospital 
administrators, and security personnel). There is clearly a lack of patient interviews, 
which I discuss in the limitations section of this chapter.  
                                                     Figure 1: Percentage Breakdown of Participants 
Group Interviews 
 Between the two hospital 
sites, I conducted seven group 
interview sessions, each ranging 
from three to ten people. Six of 
these seven group interviews 
were integrated into a project for 
Johns Hopkins Medicine 
International (JHI). A partner 
hospital of JHI’s in China generously organized the group interviews according to my 
request to interview different stakeholders in medical disputes, from physicians with 
specific clinical specialties to local officials and security personnel. I am grateful to both 
JHI and their partner hospital for this opportunity, and many of my future contacts and 
experiences grew from this initial set of interviews.  
 The goal of these interviews was to understand how certain groups approached 
and identified with medical disputes, patient-doctor relationships, adverse events, and of 

















Gynecology and Obstetrics, Emergency Medicine, and Otolaryngology (aka ENT). I 
chose these clinical departments because they are high-risk departments for yinao in 
China (and for malpractice disputes most everywhere else, except ENT – see Chapter 5 
for discussion about high-risk departments).  
I also conducted group interviews with hospital administrators and local officials. 
One interview conducted with hospital administrators from both the hospital’s Medical 
Affairs Department and Party Department
158
 focused on recording adverse events, 
medical dispute management, and training medical personnel on doctor-patient 
communication. Another group interview was with stakeholders in resolving yinao in the 
hospital and local government, including an official from the local district’s Health and 
Family Planning Bureau, director of the local MDMC, and police stationed at the 
hospital. 
The interviews were semi-structured: prior to conducting them, I had a list of 
prepared questions, but I kept them open-ended and allowed the conversations to flow 
because I wanted to ensure I had not missed any hidden elements to the topics of study. 
While I had to tailor questions for each group I interviewed, generally the interviews 
began by having the participants discuss the nature and scope of their work broadly in 
their own words, their experiences with complaints, disputes, and yinao, sources of 
tension between doctors and patients, and their views on recent hospital and government 
policy initiatives to address these issues. I would also use these interviews to verify 
information I had gathered from other interviews and media reports. 
                                                 
158
 Under the Medical Affairs Department, this primarily included personnel from the Doctor Patient 
Communication Office. Under the Party Department, participants were from the Office of Complaints 
(Xinfang Ban， 信访办) and the Office of Work Morality (Hangfeng Ban, 行风办 – monitors behavior of 
hospital personnel).  
 47 
Individual Interviews 
 Individual interviews by design were quite different from group interviews, and 
there are several important strengths and weaknesses to both. Individual interviews 
allowed for depth and greater confidentiality. I had several individual interviews with the 
same individuals, and being able to interview the same person twice or more over a 
period of time I discovered was extremely important for building trust and obtaining 
more precise information as a result.  
Yet individual interviews are not as strong for understanding general trends and 
risks overemphasizing opinions of single individuals (called by Kapiszewski et al. 
“specificity of viewpoints”
159
). For example, there was group consensus consistently 
across all clinicians that the city-government phone call complaint system seriously 
interrupted their work, but if I had only done a single-physician interview, I would not 
have understood its degree of importance. While individual interviews have the potential 
to allow for greater accuracy and greater depth, the tradeoff is that more has to be done to 
calibrate the claims made by individuals in order to understand whether they are just 
individual points-of-views or part of a broader social consensus about a certain set of 
issues.  
Site-Intensive Method: Participant Observation 
 In addition to interviewing, this study also employed the “site-intensive method” 
in which the researcher observes and interacts with the setting she studies.
160
 I used this 
method in several settings, most prominently in the medical dispute mediation committee 
(MDMC) over the course of several months. I also did this for shorter periods of time 
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within hospitals - I shadowed a physician during his morning clinic hours and sat in a 
hospital complaints office, watching people come in and out to make complaints. In the 
complaint office, generally I was not allowed to be involved when situations were more 
chaotic or serious. When shadowing the physician, I was sometimes introduced, and I 
suspect the patients thought I was a medical student from abroad, since I was sitting with 
the doctor, wearing a mask, and he was explaining the interactions to me. No one in 
either setting contested my presence in the room. In chapter 8 on mediation, I launch into 
more specifics about shadowing the MDMC over an extended period of time, but here I 
outline information about my access to and how I approached observing this particular 
field site. 
Access 
  I initially met the director of the MDMC during one of the group interviews at a 
local hospital and asked if there would be any way to volunteer at the committee to learn 
more about it.  He consulted his superiors in the city-district’s justice department, and 
they welcomed me to observe the committee whenever I wanted, but could not offer me a 
formal volunteering role. I observed this MDMC on and off over the course of eight 
months since I was traveling to other parts of China for my fieldwork during this period 
of time as well.  
Even though I had full access, I also had to gauge the dynamics surrounding my 
presence at the committee as an observer. In the beginning, I took their warm welcome 
literally and would spend entire days there, but I soon realized that this may have been an 
imposition on them, and so eventually, I decided that on the days I wanted to go in, I 
would send them a message the morning of the day I planned to be there. There were no 
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problems in obtaining access. Having this access was a luxury because it enabled me to 
see random cases – none of them pre-chosen for me specifically to watch at a certain 
time.  
My Role, Interaction, and Potential Influence on the MDMC  
 As implied above, my role was purely observational. I did not really interact with 
parties to disputes or facilitate the mediation in any way, though during breaks and 
pauses, I was sometimes able to clarify information with mediators or quickly ask the 
participants a question – but this was rare. Due to concerns of confidentiality, I was not 
allowed to follow up with participants in the process. The MDMC operated in pre-lunch 
(9:00am-11:30am) and post-lunch sessions (2:30pm-5:00pm) for a total of about 5 
working hours per day (depending on schedules of parties to mediation, they would 
extend these hours). Some days I would go to all or both working sessions. Some days 
were empty and I would sit and chat with the staff. I do not classify these group 
interactions with the staff in the group interviews I discussed above because they were 
almost completely unstructured as people filed in and out. Below I discuss the primary 
types of interaction I had with the committee: 1) mediation observation; 2) consultation 
observation; 3) downtime with the staff. I recorded notes from these experiences by hand 
in a notebook. 
MEDIATION OBSERVATION 
 During mediations I would sit around an often-crowded conference table with a 
notebook, taking almost verbatim notes about the interactions. If I were notified about a 
mediation case beforehand, I would arrive early if possible to learn more about the case 
before it began. The mediation director would introduce me as a PhD from Johns 
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Hopkins University or the United States who wanted to study China’s mediation. It was 
something he said very proudly – that now even foreigners were paying attention to 
China’s mediation and specifically, their MDMC. No one ever questioned or opposed my 
presence. 
Mediation sessions would last for about 1-2 hours each. After the sessions, I 
would transcribe my notes onto a computer and then the next day or sometimes the day 
of, depending on the circumstances, I would double-check the information I had recorded 
with the MDMC staff to ensure I had not misunderstood any information about the cases. 
Later, once I had this data processed, I evaluated it based on several criteria: basic 
conditions of the cases, procedures, and outcomes to evaluate the performance of the 
institutions, the analysis of which is in Chapter 8 on the work of the MDMCs. 
DOWNTIME: CONSULTATIONS & BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS 
Mediation committees are not always mediating and often there can be a fair 
amount of downtime, especially during the weeks surrounding major holidays like the 
Chinese New Year and National Holiday. During this downtime, I discovered another 
crucial function mediation committees serve, which is providing consultation services for 
walk-ins or consultation appointments with people who may potentially be parties to 
disputes. These consultations were important because I was able to listen to people’s 
stories and questions about the dispute resolution process. It was a fantastic opportunity 
because existing data on mediation focuses on the mediations themselves and omits other 
potential hidden functions the committee has, such as providing advocacy, albeit limited, 
for patients.  
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Mediators would introduce me in these situations as well, and no one ever 
protested my presence, though it is important to note that they were never directly asked 
whether or not they would prefer me to leave. I believe this reflects a larger issue of more 
lax attitudes and awareness about confidentiality in China than patients feeling forced or 
afraid to protest my presence. Moreover, in China, ethnically non-Chinese foreigners 
such as myself often receive a lot of attention, but the work of this committee was so 
serious that people seemed to often forget that I was there, which was a relief since I did 
not want my presence to drastically affect the interactions I was trying to observe.  
 Additionally, downtime with the staff was incredibly useful for building 
relationships with the mediators and finding out additional information about their 
backgrounds, work environment, and other opinions related to medical disputes, yinao, 
and mediation. Again this also helped with the hidden data issue. For example, they 
advised me to pay attention to broader issues of social trust in Chinese society like pengci 
(the phenomenon in which people purposely cause accidents to claim compensation), 
which I ended up researching and writing about as a social context surrounding yinao. 
Other Sources: Primary and Secondary Documents and Data 
 I also rely on primary documents, such as laws and other types of government 
documents, as well as secondary documents, such as Chinese academic articles, to 
sharpen my analysis. I especially depend on primary policy documents in chapter 7 on 
state responses to yinao for developing my argument about institutional adaptation 
through the evolution of policies over time. Throughout the entire dissertation I include 
arguments and data from Chinese scholarly research in order to incorporate viewpoints 
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from China and also because Chinese scholars often have better data access and use these 
data in their writings. 
 I also use official data even though access to them is uneven over time, and they 
often seem inaccurate. I dedicate Chapter 5 entirely to analyzing official data on yinao. I 
tend to use data from the National Health and Family Planning Commission for yinao and 
other dispute resolution information and from the Ministry of Public Security for 
information on NGOs. I bolster official NGO data with other data from the China 
Development Brief (also an NGO).  
Methods for Data Analysis 
 Once I gathered the types of data above, I analyzed them according to several 
different methods depending on what was the best fit and goal of the chapter. I describe 
each of these methods below. 
Evaluation of Policy and Social Variables 
An important aspect of this dissertation, which, to my understanding, remains 
nameless in the world of academic language around methods, is tracking the adaptation 
(or lack thereof) of policies and social actors in their responses to yinao and its sources. I 
call this “evaluation of policy and social variables” because I am evaluating whether or 
not changes in a group of relevant variables reflect progress in adaptation or not. In 
chapter 7 on state responses to yinao, I identify the population of relevant policies to 
yinao and then I identify the variables whose changes would signify whether progress 
was being made on adaptation. These variables include changes in basic characteristics of 
policy documents as well as the evolution of their content. As I explain in more detail in 
chapter 7, if over time there are only weak policy documents supported by one ministry 
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responding to yinao, then this does not imply adaptation; but if over time policies become 
stronger, have authors from multiple relevant ministries, and cover a range of relevant 
issues contributing to yinao, then there is an increase in policy adaptation and 
sophistication over time. This method is important for understanding how and on what 
dimensions adaptation is occurring. Of course, policy inputs only represent one aspect of 
adaptation – implementation is also important, which I also include based on interviews 
and observations, as discussed above.   
I also use this method in Chapter 9 in order to understand whether society is 
responding to yinao and its sources in ways that would signal adaptation. For example, 
there are many mobile applications pertaining to medicine, and I evaluate whether or not 
their services tackle factors related to the sources of yinao. By using a standard set of 
criteria that contribute to a social phenomenon, I am able to evaluate progress on how 
state and society respond and adapt to it.  
Process Tracing & Shadow Case Studies 
Process tracing seeks to track how several independent variables may potentially 
influence a changing dependent variable. This is the main method I rely on in chapter 6 
on sources and development of yinao. I consider many variables potentially related to 
yinao and trace them over time as yinao incidents continue to rise and identify the 
variables that are most likely associated with the proliferation of yinao in the early 2000s.  
Shadow Comparative Case Studies to Test Hypotheses and for Future Research Agenda 
 In Chapters 5 and 6, I provide some shadow case studies to better understand why 
some countries (India, Vietnam, and possibly Mexico and Venezuela) have experienced 
more routine violence against health care workers while other countries have not. The 
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purpose of these comparisons is to begin the conversation on how factors like Internet 
access, rule of law, and government type may or may not influence the proliferation of 
violence against health care workers across countries. There are some clear limitations to 
this research as presented in this study, such as access to comparable data across 
countries on medical violence and my own ability to conduct research in the native 
languages of all of the countries analyzed. Further the types of medical violence may 
have important differences – violence in Latin American hospitals, for example, may in 
part be a spillover of general social disorder and violence over drugs into hospital 
settings.  
However, the analysis is still worthwhile because it enables testing of my 
argument on how yinao developed. I have not seen similar types of research for other 
countries, so I also hope the process leading to yinao and variables I have identified can 
provide a starting point for other researchers examining other countries to test and refine 
my argument in order to understand this problem in other contexts. Further, if yinao is a 
problem that occurs internationally, conducting cross-country comparisons may be 
informative in identifying the policy areas that are important to preventing and addressing 
this type of violence worldwide. Throughout chapter 9 on society’s response to yinao and 
its sources, I also draw comparisons both domestically and internationally to 
contextualize and evaluate the development of civil society in China. 
Limitations and Clarifications for this Study 
 There are some important methodological limitations to this study, which I group 
into the following two categories: 1) issues in generalizability and sample bias; and 2) 
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issues of cause and effect around defining state and society responsiveness. I explain 
these limitations in detail below. 
Generalizability and Sample Bias 
 As implied by the discussion above, the sample of interviewees was drawn 
primarily from eastern, urban cities and is biased toward hospital personnel working in 
3A public hospitals (62% of interviewees were employed by hospitals). On the 
geographic front, there should thus be caution in extending the conclusions of this study 
to western and more rural parts of China. Additionally, the conclusions also do not 
necessarily apply to primary and secondary care facilities and to private hospitals, which 
in contrast to the US only provide a small fraction of advanced care in China.
161
 I do, 
however, briefly discuss yinao in these other regional and hospital settings in chapter 5.  
While hospital personnel are well represented in the sample, there is an obvious 
lack of patient perspective. I only directly spoke with a small handful of patients and 
families with disputes. I was able to observe them in mediation and also in a hospital 
complaints office, but actual interviews were difficult to arrange since there are protocols 
around interviewing patients and families (this is not just China, but everywhere). I was 
also unable to have any interaction with those conducting yinao  – both paid and unpaid. 
This is an obvious limitation for answering my question on why people resort to yinao. It 
would have been ideal to access the subset of people who have resorted to yinao to better 
understand their perspective and rationale, but it was not possible for a few reasons. The 
illegal nature of yinao in addition to my obvious identity as a non-Chinese foreign person 
made studying acts of yinao in person extremely difficult. I had considered hiring a 
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 Though this is also changing with more private health care centers in China. See Chapter 5 on yinao for 
more information on different types of hospitals in China.   
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Chinese research assistant to interview professional yinao outside of hospitals; however, I 
was too concerned about endangering the career and safety of a potential research 
assistant because even though he or she would blend in, professional yinao are still 
potentially dangerous gang members. I supplement this lack of data with some 
undercover interviews from Chinese newspapers, but studying professional yinao remains 
an important albeit challenging and risky area for further future research. 
Identifying and Defining Responsiveness and Causality 
One of the greatest challenges in analyzing “responsiveness” is that it is difficult 
to ascertain what exactly initiates the phenomenon being studied. For example, how do 
we know that certain policies were in response to particular yinao events? It is almost 
impossible to disentangle all of the potential factors that influence policymaking, and so 
the primary concern of this study is not about ascertaining absolute causality in this 
regard; rather the goal is to understand the complexity and context around policies that 
address both yinao and its sources.  
I include not just direct responses to manage yinao, but also responses that 
address the sources of yinao, such as high out-of-pocket costs, poor health care access, 
poor patient-doctor communication, etc. Even though policy and business initiatives 
addressing this broader set of issues are not necessarily directly responding to yinao, I 
include them because adaptation is about changing underlying institutions to create 
lasting change, and so adaptation cannot be evaluated if the root causes of a problem are 
not being considered. In sum, when I use the word “responsiveness” in this study, I am 
not only using it to characterize a direct response to yinao, but also the context within 
which it occurs and based on the many factors that contribute to it.  
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Conclusion 
 This primarily qualitative study employs several different research methods for 
data collection and analysis. Most of the chapters of this dissertation use a combination of 
these different methods. While there are limitations to the methods used, I have done my 
best to temper my conclusions accordingly throughout the dissertation. Even though I 
cannot make broad generalizations about how yinao occurs and is managed across China, 
the concepts derived from analyzing state and society responsiveness to yinao – 
tetheredness and slack – can potentially inform analysis of institutional adaptation across 



















CHAPTER 4: COMPLAINT AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN 
CHINA’S HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
 
Medical dispute resolution is difficult everywhere. Many countries, including the 
US, struggle with how to resolve medical disputes due to the high degree of technical 
medical knowledge needed to evaluate them, the emotional nature of the cases, and the 
difficult task of trying to monetize physical and emotional damages. However, despite the 
controversy around how to manage medical disputes, most countries do not experience 
issues similar to China’s yinao phenomenon. If Chinese patients and their families resort 
to yinao, then presumably something in the available official channels for dispute 
resolution fails to deter it or even may encourage it. While existing literature has 
identified many of the main sources of medical disputes, to my knowledge, current 
research has not yet mapped out the entire medical complaint and dispute resolution 
process in China. This chapter lays out this process, beginning with complaints that 
originate in clinical departments and 
ending with the resolution of a 
dispute either through adjudication or 
mediation. Where useful, this chapter 
also provides some comparison to the 
US system for handling disputes in 
order to contextualize China’s case.  
 
 












Understanding complaint and dispute management is important because they are 
related to each other: grievances escalate to complaints, which escalate to disputes. 
Diamant, Lubman, and O’Brien illustrate this well in their disputing pyramid 
(Figure 2).
162
 A complaint as defined by this study is a grievance that has been expressed 
either formally through documentation or informally. In the health care setting, it can 
include anything from dissatisfaction with the “service attitude” of a health care worker 
to an accusation of malpractice. A dispute occurs when a complaint could not be resolved 
through additional explanation from the hospital and requires negotiation, mediation, or 
adjudication. 
Understanding how the management of both complaints and disputes fit together 
enables us to analyze the system as a whole. I use the word “system” here loosely to 
describe the institutions available for addressing complaints and disputes and how they 
coordinate with each other. When I asked a group of physicians how they would change 
the system in place, they felt there was not a really a “system,”
163
 suggesting that the idea 
of a coherent system may not be how people in China view the set of institutions 
involved in medical dispute resolution.  
 While there is no single path that all patients take, this chapter details the steps in 
the process level by level, from making a compliant via a government-run complaint 
hotline to suing the hospital in court. Of course some patients go directly to court, 
bypassing all first-stop complaint avenues, while others are satisfied with an explanation 
by the hospital or end up somewhere in the middle of the system. The choices patients 
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 Neil Jeffrey Diamant, Stanley B. Lubman, and Kevin J. O’Brien, Engaging The Law In China: State, 
Society, And Possibilities For Justice (Stanford University Press, 2005), 7. 
163
 ICU Group Interview, Interview No. 017, 2015. 
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make can depend on the severity of the complaint; for example, a complaint about a 
nurse’s attitude would not go to court, whereas a potentially serious case of malpractice 
may go directly to court. The vast majority of cases, “generally more than 90%” 
according to Benjamin Liebman, are still resolved within hospitals.
164
 Liebman notes that 
this is not unusual as most civil cases in China (and all over the world) are resolved 
outside the court system, though he notes that the degree to which protests influence the 
dispute resolution process in China makes it more unusual.
165
 Figure 3 “Complaint and 
Dispute Resolution System in Place” on page 62 shows the entire complaint and dispute 
process. 
A Note on Methodology  
The information in this chapter builds on the work of Benjamin Liebman and 
other scholars who have provided thorough analysis of the Chinese medical malpractice 
system. It adds and updates these analyses based on recent policy developments as well 
as interviews conducted from 2015-2016 with health care workers and administrators in 
two urban, public 3A
166
 hospitals in Nanjing and Guangzhou. Because I conducted most 
of the interviews with health care workers due to a higher level of access to them, it 
provides a particularly nuanced understanding of the hospital’s perspective. While I try to 
anticipate hurdles patients and their families might face throughout the dispute resolution 
process, some of their struggles may be omitted due to lack of access to patients. At the 
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 Liebman, “Malpractice Mobs: Medical Dispute Resolution in China,” 237. 
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 China has a tiered and graded hospital system. Depending on their size and capabilities, hospitals are 
ranked as level one, level two, or level three facilities. This ranking is similar to that used in the US, where 
primary facilities (level one) are smaller and provide more basic services and tertiary facilities (level three) 
are larger and provide more advanced procedures. Grades are also given based on the quality of the hospital, 
with A being the best, B being passing, and anything below being substandard. Private hospitals are not 
consistently given tiers and grades. As noted in the previous chapter, due to high patient volumes at 3A 
hospitals and handling riskier cases as advanced-level facilities, they are places that face higher numbers of 
health care disputes.  
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end of the chapter, I briefly include the perspective of one plaintiff in a medical 
malpractice case to provide a more balanced perspective. 
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医患矛盾发生时，一般来说患者或家属先向护士，医师，或科主任抱怨，投诉。 Disagreement occurs between patient 
and health care worker(s). Patients/family members usually complain directly to nurse, doctor, and/or department head.  
在科室里解决不了问题.If complaint is not immediately 
resolved within the department in which it occurs. 
 
Complain via the 
hospital’s Xinfang 
Office (Office of 
Letters and Visits) 
向医院信访办投诉。 
 
Complain to Medical 
Affairs Office within 
Hospital. 向医务处投
诉。(generally deals 




Complain via city 
government 










Xinfang Office or other administrative office such as the Medical Affairs Office collects the 
complaints and distributes them to the appropriate departments to be handled. 























Health Bureau.  
申请医疗事故
鉴定。 
File a case against the 
hospital in district court 
and in the process apply 
for a Medical Damages 






Consult, mediate at mediation 








Send letter to city-level 
Health Bureau Office 
of Letters and Visits or 
make complaint in 





















If dissatisfied with 




Making the initial complaint inside the clinical department (Level 1) 
Though how patients and their families choose to complain often depends on 
personal preferences and the nature of the complaint, in China as well as in health care 
systems worldwide, the first stop for complaints logically tends to be within the clinical 
department where it occurs. Nurses everywhere frequently receive these complaints 
because they interact with patients the most. In China nurses and doctors interviewed for 
this study both stated that patients do not generally respect nurses, with one head nurse 
stating that patients treat nurses like waitresses.
171
 The head of a clinical department at 
one hospital commented 
that patients do not 
respect nurses, often 
complaining about the 
nurses’ service attitudes 
more than the doctors’ 
abilities, and that people 
get upset with nurses very 
easily.
172
 One head nurse 
reported that even though patients at times doubt doctors, they still respect them more 
than nurses, so they will complain to the nurses instead.
173
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 Clinic Walk-through, Interview No. 012, 2015. 
170
 ENT Group Interview, Interview No. 016, 2015. Interview notes do not specify specifically whether 
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treatment process or the outcomes from that process.  
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Table 2: Examples of Typical Complaints in China 
 IV fluids received [吊的补液] 
 Nurses not coming fast enough when called [没有及时出现] 
 Poor needle skills of nurses [技术]  
 Bad attitudes of both nurses and doctors [态度不好] 
 Doubts about doctors’ intentions and abilities 
 Not changing bandages and medicine quickly enough [换药]167 
 Costs [收费] (also complain about costs indirectly by saying 
health care workers have bad attitudes [因为收费，会说态度不
好]168 
 Not understanding the medical treatment [医疗的情况不懂] 
 Employee service attitudes [会投诉到服务人员的态度] 
 Time spent waiting to see the doctor (esp. in ER/outpatient 
clinics) 
 The sequence of steps patients need to go through in order to see 
a doctor [看病的流程] 
 Not enough hospital beds [床位不够]169 
 Not satisfied with treatment [对治疗不满意]170 
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Table 2 shows examples of typical and relatively minor complaints by patients in 
hospitals in China (they are also likely typical in hospitals everywhere). When patients 
complain, departments try to resolve the complaint directly. If it concerns the nurse’s IV 
skills, the department might assign a new nurse to the patient. If the patient cannot 
understand his or her physician’s explanation about the treatment of an illness, the head 
of the department might step in to address the patient’s concerns. However, if the patient 
remains dissatisfied, then he or she can choose from a variety of offices both inside and 
outside the hospital to make a complaint. 
Making a Complaint outside the Department (Level 2) 
Some of the more striking aspects of the Chinese system for health care 
complaints are the involvement of the Chinese government in even minor complaints 
(such as those in Table 2) and the numerous options patients have to channel their 
complaints. Once the patient and/or his or her family decides to complain outside the 
relevant clinical department, they can call government hotlines for real-time assistance or 
they can directly complain to higher administrative levels of the hospital, or a 
combination of both. The director of one hospital’s administration said that there are too 
many avenues for complaints and no restrictions on how many patients can make, so 
patients will repeat them in multiple places.
174
 
City-level Citizen Hotline 12345 [12345 市民热线] 
 In many large cities in China, citizens can dial 12345 to immediately speak to a 
representative about almost any issue or they can submit their request online through the 
12345 website. City governments established 12345 in order to consolidate the collection 
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 Hospital Office of Letters and Visits (Xinfang Ban), Interview No. 067, 2016. 
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of complaints in one place and to provide a user-friendly, easy-to-remember platform for 
citizens to obtain information or make a complaint.
175
 Cities across China have set up 





Though not explicitly listed as a reason for establishing this hotline, 
this hotline also enables cities to collect data on various areas of concern for citizens. 
Shanghai’s hotline website publishes these data regularly.
178
 According to Shanghai’s 
Citizen Hotline website, the most commonly received calls by Shanghai’s hotline center 
concern public security, housing, labor security, industry and commerce, urban and rural 
construction, traffic and ports, health and family planning, organizational affairs 
management, greenification, environmental protection, and the postal service.
179
 Hotlines 
often receive thousands of phone calls a day, with Shanghai frequently receiving around 
10,000 calls per day at its 24-hour service center.
180
  
Patients and families also use 12345 to complain about issues they encounter 
within hospitals. For example, patients often call about waiting too long in the ER or 
about the availability of hospital beds, which are in high demand not necessarily due to 
need, but because national insurance plans tend to cover inpatient care at a higher rate 
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 “Simple Introduction about the City of Nanjing’s 12345 Government Service Hotline [南京市 12345 政
务热线简介],” China Nanjing, May 9, 2014, 
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 “Shanghai City 12345 Citizens Service Hotline Opens [上海市‘12345’市民服务热线电话开通试运行
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 Even if the complaint is unreasonable and the hospital is 
overwhelmed with other responsibilities, the hospital, whether private or public, still must 
address the complaint in a timely manner.
 182
 Administrative regulations dictate that 
within 24 hours, the office in the hospital responsible for receiving the complaint (such as 
the Office of Letters and Visits or the Office of Medical Affairs) must contact the patient 
and/or the patient’s family, and within four working days, the issue must be resolved, 
which means that the hospital must provide an answer or a next step to the patient.
183
 
When I asked a group of physicians and nurses from an obstetrics department their 
opinions on this hotline, one physician said it was “a very vicious thing,” and it was for 
patients to vent.
184
 A nurse felt that it was unfair, saying that one patient had called 12345 




Other City-level Government Bureau Hotlines  
 In addition to the city government’s 12345 hotline, citizens can also make 
complaints through the city-level Health and Family Planning Commission hotline 
(usually 12320) and the hotline for consumer complaints (usually 12315), which is 
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 Clinic Walk-through, Interview No. 012. Policies on national health insurance have tended to emphasize 
coverage of inpatient costs. Most recently on January 1, 2016, the State Council’s “Opinions on integrating 
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and not published openly for the public. There are however, general guidelines that have nationally been 
established for managing medical complaints – the 2009 national-level “Hospital Complaint Management 
Measures (Implementation).” Provinces also have their own measures as well, such as 2010 “Jiangsu 
Province Detailed Implementation Measures for Hospital Complaint Management.”  
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 OBGYN Group, Interview No. 014, 2015.“很恶性的事” and “为了出一口气,” p.3. 
185
 OBGYN Group. 
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administered by the State Administration for Industry and Commerce.
186
 The impetus for 
the health hotline 12320 came from an official notice by the National Ministry of Health 
in 2005 (now the Health and Family Planning Commission) to provide support for the 
implementation of the PRC Law for the Prevention of Infectious Diseases and the 
Regulations for Emergency Response to Sudden Public Health Incidents.
187
 It was also 
established to better address major public health concerns, and to meet the growing health 
demands of the Chinese populace.
188
 In 2012 the Ministry of Health required all health 
administrative bureaus to establish a hotline service.
189
  While the hotlines 12345 and 
12320 tend to be the main sources of health care-related complaints in cities, in 
Guangzhou one hospital also mentioned that patients use the Consumer Hotline 12315,
190
 
which is intended for consumer disputes, like complaints over counterfeit products.
191
 In 
Nanjing, however, hospital representatives said patients did not use this hotline for the 
purpose of making health care-related complaints.
192
  
District-level and Higher Level Government Departments (上面的部门) 
Additionally, patients can go in person to the city-level Health and Family 
Planning Commission to make a complaint during its designated reception day(s), an 
option for patients that the former Ministry of Health advised for all health bureaucracies 
at the county level and above to establish in 2007.
193
 For example, once per week in 
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Nanjing on Wednesday mornings (at the time of this writing), the city-level Health and 
Family Planning Commission holds its reception day [市卫生局接待日], during which 
patients and family members can make a complaint at these offices. Patients can also 
write letters to this office. This office then passes the complaints they receive to the 
appropriate hospital.
194
 Patients can also call district-level health bureaus, which will 
redirect the concern to appropriate hospital. 
The Hospital Xinfang Office (The Office of Letters and Visits) 
 The Xinfang Office or Office of Letters and Visits (“xin” 信 means letters and 
“fang” 访 means visits) within the hospital receives complaints from all of these different 
avenues. It is important to note that Xinfang offices are not unique to hospitals. They are 
distributed throughout nearly all Chinese government organs
195
 and have historical roots 
dating back to China’s imperial era.
196
 In hospitals, the Xinfang Office typically falls 
under the Party Department. While it may seem odd to those outside of China for Party 
departments to be involved in a hospital, in China, Party offices commonly exist in public 
institutions (事业单位) like schools and hospitals, as well as in state-owned enterprises 
and even in private companies.
197
 In hospitals, the Party Office primarily manages 
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education, personnel selection, and discipline for corruption.
198
 
Figure 4: Example of Xinfang Office Reception and Distribution of Complaints 
 
At the hospital-level, the Xinfang Office has the primary role of collecting 
information about health care complaints and distributing them to the appropriate 
departments to address them. Patients (病人), family members (家属) , and hospital 
employees (员工) all can make complaints at the Xinfang Office, but most complaints 
come from patients and their families and very few tend to come from the workers at the 
hospital.
199
 The diagram above (Figure 4) shows how the Xinfang Office in one of the 
hospitals interviewed for this study receives and distributes patient complaints. 
The Xinfang Office receives complaints submitted to hotlines through an online 
platform. Once the Xinfang Office receives complaints from 12345 or the other 
aforementioned sources, they distribute them (分配) in a timely manner to the 
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 Mostly complaints are funneled to one of the following offices: 
Medical Affairs Office  医务处 (for complaints concerning medical care and treatment), 
Nursing Department 护理部 (concerning nurses), the Department of Pharmacy 药剂科 
(concerning medications)，Finance 财务科 (concerning payments and fees), and 
Administrative Department 行政部 (concerning logistics, dining, sanitation, and other 
services).
201
 It is important to note that not all hospitals handle complaints in the same 
way. At another hospital, these complaints are directed to the Medical Affairs Office 
instead of the Xinfang Office.
202
 
A Xinfang Office employee said the hospital received a wide variety of 
complaints (“五花八门”203). The most common complaint is “disapproval of the medical 
care received” (“对医疗不认可”204). This means that patients are dissatisfied with their 
outcomes, often because their initial expectations were too high or perhaps due to a 
complication. 
205
 It can also mean that medical fees were higher than originally 
anticipated. For example, initially a procedure was said to cost RMB 10,000 ($1,453), but 
the final total was RMB 10,200 ($1,481).
206
 The second most common type of complaint 
centers around the doctors and nurses having “bad service attitudes” (服务态度不好207). 
According to a Xinfang Office employee, most of these service-type complaints concern 
the Outpatient Clinic (门诊部) because outpatient departments are overwhelmed, making 
it difficult to provide good service; some health care workers truly do have “bad service 
                                                 
200
 Xinfang Office, Interview No. 026, 2015. 
201
 Ibid.  
202
 Head of Medical Affairs Office, Interview No. 048, 2016. 
203
 Xinfang Office, Interview No. 026. 
204
 Ibid.  
205
 Ibid.  
206
 Xinfang Office, Interview No. 062, 2016. 
207




 However, the employee noted that some of the “bad service attitude” 
complaints were questionable, such as complaints about doctors who refuse to fill out a 
sick leave form for a patient healthy enough to work.
209
 
 Hospitals collect data on complaints, but one of the hospitals said it does not 
make this data available either publicly or via application.
210
 According to the hospital’s 
Xinfang Office director, the hospital uses the data internally and typically does not pass 
them beyond the hospital.
211
 One Xinfang Office holds quarterly meetings with all of the 
departments, showing the number of complaints received for each department and the 
satisfaction rate for the resolution of the complaint.
212
 The government hotlines that 
received the complaint collect data on caller satisfaction, calling back complainants to 
ask whether or not they were satisfied with the way the complaint was handled.
213
 In past 
years in Nanjing, the Health Bureau would assess how hospital offices manage 
complaints, give hospitals complaint management scores, and release the rankings of all 
the hospitals in the city based on these scores. However, due to recent changes in health 
administration in the city, these types of assessments and rankings have stopped at the 




                                                 
208
 In the outpatient clinic, physicians often have too many patients who take their numbers during their 
outpatient hours. For example, for the 8am-12pm time slot on a particular day, the time to take the 
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The Medical Affairs Office 医务处 or 医务科 (Levels 2 and 3) 
The Medical Affairs Office handles complaints about medical issues (not service, 
fees, corruption, etc.), and also oversees a number of different offices, often including the 
Office of Quality Management, Office of Doctor-Patient Communication, and the Office 
of Emergency Response, which is in charge of responding to infections and disasters. 
Former doctors and lawyers typically staff Medical Affairs Offices.
215
 The Office of 
Doctor-Patient Communication (or a variation of this office) handles complaints and 
manages disputes at every stage of the process, from the initial complaint to going to 




  There are two notable points about the role of the Medical Affairs Office. First, 
this is the office where complaints turn into disputes. If a patient makes a complaint 
accusing a doctor of malpractice and the doctor cannot provide a satisfactory explanation, 
then it turns into a dispute and this office manages it and continues to be the central office 
throughout the entire dispute resolution process. If the case ends up going to court, this 
office is also responsible for responding to court subpoenas, compiling and providing 




The second notable aspect of this office is that because this is where discussions 
and negotiations take place with patients, it is often here at this point in the dispute 
resolution process where patients and families resort to yinao to pressure hospitals into 
                                                 
215
 Observed through fieldwork in two hospitals. 
216
 Presentation made by the Doctor-Patient Communications Office, 2015. 
217
 Presentation made by the Doctor-Patient Communications Office, 2015; Medical Affairs Office 
Employee, Interview No. 063, 2016. 
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settling for a desired amount of compensation. The decisions of hospital administrators 
have arguably been critical for shaping the development of yinao, since as Liebman’s 
research reveals, hospital administrators often feel forced to compensate those who resort 
to yinao,
218
 creating a vicious cycle that rewards and encourages this behavior.
219
 
Dispute Resolution Outside the Hospital (Level 4) 
Liebman notes, “The legal framework governing medical disputes is characterized 
by confusion and controversy.”
220
As Figure 3 shows, at Level 4 the patients have several 
options outside the hospital: they can go to the relevant government Health 
Administrative body that oversees the hospital (such as a city-level Health and Family 
Commission), file for a Medical Accident Review as provisioned by the 2002 Medical 
Accident Regulations, go to the local Medical Mediation Committee for mediation, or sue 
the hospital in court.
221
 Patients can take all or a combination of these steps. For example 
a patient might attempt mediation, but then go to court. The patient might apply for a 
Medical Accident Review and then try to negotiate again with the hospital once they 
receive the results. The next few sections detail the processes of these different 
institutions and clarify their roles. 
Medical Accident Review by the Health Bureau 
To apply for a medical accident review, which is a formal evaluation and 
investigation of the case by the Chinese Medical Association, the patients or hospital 
must go to the district-level health bureau in the district where the hospital is located. The 
2002 Regulations on Handling Medical Accidents (from here on, referred to as the 
                                                 
218
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219
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 which sought to better define and manage medical accidents, established 
the medical accident review process.
223
 The Regulations separate accidents into four 
levels (in order of decreasing severity): 1) causing death or serious disability to the 
patient; 2) causing moderate disability, severe functional obstruction caused by organ 
damage; 3) causing light disability to the patient, moderate functional obstruction caused 
by organ damage; and 4) other results causing obvious harm to the patient.
224
 The 
Regulations also entrust the Chinese Medical Association to conduct these reviews.
225
 No 
matter the official rank of the hospital (some are provincial-level, while others might be 
city- or district-level), this process starts at the district-level health bureau in the district 
where the hospital is located.
226
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 I use the translations and shortened titles based on those used by Benjamin Liebman for consistency.  
223
 “Regulations for Handling Medical Accidents [医疗事故处理条例（2002 年 4 月 4 日国务院令第 351
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http://www.jswst.gov.cn/jsswshjhsywyh/ywgl/yzyg/zcwj/2003/08/2500000066524.html. 
224
 “Regulations for Handling Medical Accidents [医疗事故处理条例（2002 年 4 月 4 日国务院令第 351
号公布）],” Article 4. 
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 “Regulations for Handling Medical Accidents [医疗事故处理条例（2002 年 4 月 4 日国务院令第 351
号公布）],” Article 20. 
226
 District-level health and family planning official, Interview No. 060, 2016. 
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Figure 5: Medical Accident Review Process (医疗事故鉴定流程) 
 
According to a Nanjing health official, medical reviews cost between RMB 2,000 
($294.98) and RMB 3,000 ($442.47),
227
 and the fee for this is either fully covered by the 
patient, shared between the hospital and the patient, or sometimes the hospital may 
completely cover the cost.
228
 The Regulations leave the cost of reviews for the provinces 
to decide, and states that if it is decided that a medical accident occurred, hospitals should 
                                                 
227
 District-level health and family planning official. 
228
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absorb the cost for the review and if it did not occur, the party who applied for the review 
should assume the cost.
229
 According to a district level official, both patients and 
hospitals will apply for these reviews. About 90% of applicants are patients and 10% are 
hospitals.
230
 According to this same official, hospitals sometimes apply if patients or 
families begin to make disturbances in order to provide them with proof that the hospital 
is clear of fault.
231
 The Health Bureau then passes the case to the city-level chapter of the 
Chinese Medical Association and will also notify the city-level health bureau in 
particularly serious cases of disability or death. The Chinese Medical Association, 
according to its website, “is a nonprofit, academic association established for the public 
good. It is the bridge between the Party, government, and the medical community.”
232
 It 
is described on its website as a voluntarily established association by the medical 
community,
233
 but characterized by interviewees as associated with the government or “a 
civil organization with official background” (有官方背景的民间组织).234  
 Once the city-level Medical Association receives a case, it selects specialists to 
conduct a review of the case, and after the review, it submits the results back to the 
relevant district-level bureau, which then distributes the results to the parties involved 
(see gray arrows in Figure 5). The district-level bureau must report cases to the city-level 
health bureau if the case is particularly serious (death or serious disability).
235
 The results 
of this review can be used within the hospital for more discussions and negotiations in the 
                                                 
229
 “Regulations for Handling Medical Accidents [医疗事故处理条例（2002 年 4 月 4 日国务院令第 351
号公布）],” Article 34. 
230
District-level health and family planning official, Interview No. 064, 2016..  
231
 Interview Transcripts QWSJ, 2.  
232
 “Brief Introduction to the Chinese Medical Association [中华医学会简介],” Chinese Medical 
Association, October 26, 2010, http://www.cma.org.cn/gyxh/xhjj/20101115/1289827466990_1.html. 
233
 “Brief Introduction to the Chinese Medical Association [中华医学会简介].” 
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 Medical Affairs Office Employee, Interview No. 063. 
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 District-level health and family planning official, Interview No. 064. 
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hospital or it can also be admitted as evidence in court should a lawsuit be filed.
236
 If the 
patient is dissatisfied with the review process from the city-level Medical Review Board, 
he can then apply for another review from the provincial-level chapter of the Chinese 
Medical Association.
237
 Figure 5 shows how this process works (dotted arrow).  
There have been a few issues with the Medical Accident Reviews. Just before the 
Medical Accident Regulations that established them went into effect in September 2002, 
the Supreme People’s Court issued a Judicial Interpretation in April 2002 that reversed 
the burden of proof from plaintiffs in malpractice cases (as it is in the US
238
) to 
defendants (doctors and medical institutions),
239
 which has been a source of frustration 
for doctors. While the new Tort Liability Law (EIF 2010) places the burden of proof 
primarily back on the plaintiff, from roughly 2002-2010 the burden of proof was on 
defendants. Interestingly, during these years yinao began to develop into a common 
social phenomenon, and physicians have cited the “reverse burden of proof” as one of the 
factors contributing to yinao.
240
 Even though today the burden of proof is on the 
plaintiff,
241
 the period of time when it was on the defendant may have helped to establish 
a culture that has haunted health care workers and emboldened patients. The following 
chapter further explores the relationship between this issue and yinao.  
Despite the burden of proof issue, Liebman highlights that the Regulations 
actually favored defendants (hospitals) for two reasons. The first is that rewards available 
                                                 
236
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237
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 Hospital official and former hospital affairs office head, Interview No. 072, 2016; Prominent Professor 
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for damages in malpractice cases brought under the Regulations are significantly lower 
than in ordinary tort cases.
242
 In regular tort cases (discussed in the next section) plaintiffs 
can receive twenty times the average income in their jurisdiction for a wrongful death.
243
 
While the Regulations outline how plaintiffs should be compensated under a number of 
specific categories (such as medical fees, lost income, and disability subsidies),
244
 they do 
not include damages for death. As a result, plaintiffs pursuing a case for wrongful death 
receive hundreds of thousands of RMB fewer under the Regulations than they would 
under an ordinary tort case (discussed more in the next section).
245
 
Another reason the Regulations tend to favor medical institutions is that local 
medical review boards composed of local doctors make decisions favoring doctors in 
their community, a point confirmed by a district-level health official interviewed for this 
study.
246
As a result these reviews, patients believe that the reviews lack credibility (公信
力).247 One former doctor and hospital administrator noted that there is little advantage 
for physicians to participate in these types of reviews: “The compensation is low, it takes 
a lot of time, you need to take responsibility, and it is bad for professional 
relationships.”
248
 He likened the process to “muddy water” (浑水): “If you decide against 
the patient side, they might come looking for you. If you decide against the hospital’s 
                                                 
242
 Liebman, “Malpractice Mobs: Medical Dispute Resolution in China,” 194. 
243
 Supreme People’s Court, “Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court of Some Issues Concerning the 
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side, when your hospital has a problem in the future, it might affect how well the accused 
hospital will treat you [if they are selected to review you]. It is also not a good feeling to 
rule against someone else in your same profession.”
 249
 Physicians are not required to do 
the reviews if they are drawn for the job.
250
 Reviews by the provincial-level chapter of 
the China Medical Association tend to be more thorough than the city-level ones because 
they can draw from the entire provincial pool of doctors.
251
  
From a broader institutional standpoint, the way leadership appointments work in 
the health care bureaucracy would also naturally cast doubt on the reviews. The leaders 
of top hospitals, health bureaus, and local chapters of the Chinese Medical Association 
tend to come from the same institutions. For example, the current leaders of the Nanjing 
Medical Association are almost all from top hospitals in Nanjing (see Table 3).
252
 The 
heads of city-level and higher hospitals and the head of the city-level Health and Family 
Planning Commission both have provincial-level government ranks (ting zhang or futing 
zhang - see Figure 6 on page 81), so they regularly participate in high-level meetings at 
the provincial level with each other and other government leaders outside the health care 
bureaucracy.
253
 While not a perfect analogy, this would be like the president of the 
UCLA Hospital System being a cabinet-level official in the California state government; 
hospitals have direct access to state power. This creates a web of connections between the 
city and provincial governments, health bureaus, and public hospitals that make it 
seemingly difficult to produce an unbiased evaluation of medical malpractice cases. 
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 Hospital official and former hospital affairs office head. 
250
 Hospital official and former hospital affairs office head. 
251
 Hospital official and former hospital affairs office head, 72. 
252
 This is last year’s but still some of same people and gives info on their backgrounds. “Nanjing Medical 
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Table 3: Current Employment Positions of Nanjing Medical Association (NMA) 




Council Head Vice Mayor of Nanjing, former Gulou 
physician 
Yes 
Vice-head Professor at Nanjing University, former 
President of Gulou Hospital 
Yes 
Vice-head Party Secretary at Jiangsu Provincial 
Hospital 
Yes 
Vice-head President of Nanjing Military Region 
General Hospital 
Yes 
Vice-head Southeastern University Zhongda 
Hospital President 
Yes 
Vice-head President of Nanjing No. 1 Hospital Yes 
Vice-head Nanjing Medical University Party 
Secretary 
Yes 
Vice-head Party Secretary at Gulou Hospital Yes 
Vice-head/secretary Nanjing Medical Doctors Association (uncertain) 
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Figure 6: Health Bureaucracy (Jiangsu Province as Example) 
 
Mediation 
When patients go to their local health bureau to raise a dispute, either at the 
district or city level, they may be directed to the local medical dispute mediation 
committee (MDMC).
254
 MDMCs are bodies that have been created gradually over the 
past decade for the specific purpose of resolving medical disputes – they are an example 
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of a “responsive” institution to address issues in medical dispute resolution, and I delve 
into detail about them in Chapter 8. Shanghai’s Putuo district’s MDMC is often cited as 
the first of these bodies, created in 2006.
255
 By the end of 2014 most provincial capitals 
had established MDMCs.
256
 By the spring of 2015, all prefectural-level cities had 
established them and there are plans to establish them nationwide at the county-level in 
the future.
257
 These committees are “public institutions” (事业单位) and are independent 
in their work, though organized and financially supported by the Ministry of Justice and 
its affiliated local bureaus
258




Prior to the establishment of these committees, after attempting to negotiate with 
hospitals, patients had the options of applying for medical accident reviews, 
administrative mediation by the health bureau,
260
 and suing in court.
261
 Mediation offers 
the opportunity for dispute resolution in a third-party forum, and unlike the court process, 




 An article about the success of Guangdong’s 
committee highlighted that while on average it takes two years for lawsuits, the 
Guangdong provincial mediation committee mediates an average of five cases per day, an 
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 Despite the advantages of mediation, as one official 
noted, it does not resolve all issues in medical malpractice dispute resolution.
 265
 Chapter 
8 will further analyze some of the challenges of mediation and detail the procedures of an 
MDMC in an eastern provincial capital. 
Court process 司法途径 
As in many places, in China the court is generally seen as a last resort for patients 
given the time and expense of pursing a case. However, on rare occasions patients go 
directly to court without first raising the dispute directly with the hospital.
266
 This section 
traces the steps of a legal case according to an interview with the public 3A hospital in 
Nanjing. It is important to note that this process likely varies in different places, and that 
this is the perspective from the hospital, not the patient. At the end of this analysis, I 
include the perspective of a deceased patient’s family member about his experience with 
the medical dispute resolution process and also discuss other issues of patient concern. 
In order to file a lawsuit, the patient and/or his family first goes to the basic 
people’s court
267
 at the city-district level to file a case. Cases must pass through this level 
of court before going to an intermediate court at the city level, unless the requested 
compensation amount is over 30,000,000 RMB ($4.44 million), but it is rare for plaintiffs 
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People’s Daily Website, Guangdong Channel, May 5, 2015, http://gd.people.com.cn/n/2015/0505/c123932-
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to request such a high amount.
268
 The case is processed through the registration office (立
案庭) and then passed to one of the offices for civil cases (民庭).269 In accordance to the 
timelines outlined in the Civil Procedure Law,
270
 the relevant court issues a subpoena to 
the hospital usually within 15 to 20 days after registration of the case.
271
 The hospital 
then must provide requested materials, most importantly the medical records. After 
receiving the subpoena, the hospital organizes physicians and lawyers to assess and make 
presentations on the case. Then according to the date on the subpoena, all parties 
involved attend the first hearing, which usually lasts at most half a working day (about 
two to two and a half hours in China). If the hearing goes for three or four hours, it is 
considered to be an especially long case.
272
 A lawyer from the accused hospital and one 
or two doctors, one of whom is usually the implicated party, attend the hearing.
273
 A 
representative from the hospital’s Medical Affairs Office usually also attends the hearing 
as a representative or in the audience to keep track of the case’s progress. One director of 
Obstetrics at a hospital said that she does not allow her accused younger doctors go to 
court; she goes for them: “I protect the people under me.”
274
 She does this in order to 
                                                 
268
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270
 See Section 2, Chapter 12 for trial procedures of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of 
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the People’s Republic of China, August 31, 2012), 
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prevent physicians from quitting since they are already scarce and “fewer and fewer 
students from good economic backgrounds want to become doctors.”
275
  
After the first hearing, the judge makes a decision on the next step for the case. If 
the case is straightforward, not requiring any technical medical advice, he will offer the 
option to either make a decision or to mediate the conflict.
276
 In China, the court can also 
facilitate mediation, and judges are encouraged to offer this option throughout the court 
process.
277
 If the case requires further investigation, the judge will typically order a 
Medical Damages Review, a newer type of review based on China’s new Tort Liability 
Law, which entered into force in 2010.
278
 Prior to the new Tort Liability Law, cases could 
be evaluated using the Regulations on Handling Medical Accidents (mentioned above) or 
by using ordinary tort claims, which are based on the General Principles of the Civil Law 
and the Supreme People’s Court’s related interpretation.
279
 This was known as the “two-
track system” because it allowed evaluation of health care disputes to go through either of 
these paths, without any real clarity on which types of cases should go in which 
direction.
280
 In ordinary tort claims, determinations about negligence are made by judicial 
inspection agencies, which are “‘quasi-private entities’ retained by parties to 
litigation.”
281
  The legal medical experts who conduct these inspections are not practicing 
clinicians, so physicians often feel they neglect to consider whether a physician followed 
the standard of care, regardless of the patient’s outcome. Because this type of inspection 
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emphasizes whether there was a cause-effect relationship between the medical activity 
and the outcome, it more easily finds fault with physicians. As one physician put it:  
“Because they [the Judicial Review Boards]
 
consider [the case] more from a 
judicial angle, [using the] cause-effect relationship to evaluate whether or not you [the 
doctor] have a problem. [For example], this patient in the end died, and you did the 
surgery, and there was a complication, does it have a cause-effect relationship with this 
person’s death? If this cause-effect relationship is established, then you have a 
responsibility. Whether or not the way I handled the complication correctly, this is not in 
the [Judicial Review’s] consideration. [It] is more about using the cause-effect 
relationship to make a judgment. So this type of ruling will tend toward the patient’s 
favor. If you give us [hospitals] a choice, we probably would not be as willing to do this 
type. But if you give the option to the relatives, the relatives might select Judicial Review. 





In addition to the difference in the way the two different tracks evaluate the cases, 
there are also differences in compensation. For example, a case involving death brought 
under ordinary tort law allows for twenty times the annual salary in compensation,
283
 
which the Regulations does not allow. As a result, patients often prefer to pursue this 




The new Tort Liability Law in 2010 led to the establishment of Medical Damages 
Reviews.
285
 These reviews are ordered by the courts and conducted by the Chinese 
Medical Association, which still arguably has some of the same issues of protecting the 
interests of the medical community as in Medical Accident Reviews. However, plaintiffs 
receive compensation according to the Tort Liability Law, not the Medical Accident 
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Regulations, and cases are evaluated based on degree of responsibility,
286
 not cause and 
effect. The new Tort Liability Law also, as mentioned before, shifted the burden of proof 
to the plaintiff (innocent until proven guilty).
287
 If the patient or hospital disagrees with 
the assessment, they can apply to the provincial-level Chinese Medical Association for 
another review.
288
 Otherwise the judge will ask them whether or not they want to mediate. 
Mediation might take place during this hearing or another time will be arranged.
289
 
Whether or not a hospital decides to settle during mediation can depend on its financial 
status, and the difference between the desired amounts of the two parties. For example, if 
the plaintiff demands RMB 100,000, and the hospital is only willing to give RMB 50,000, 
it is harder to come to an agreement because the gap is so large. However, powerful and 
wealthier hospitals, such as provincial-level hospitals, sometimes agree to mediate in 
these types of cases and will agree to pay out as much as RMB 70,000 or RMB 80,000 
since they have more money.
290
 Other hospitals are usually not inclined to do so and will 
request that the judge decide the case instead.
291
  
If the parties cannot come to an agreement in mediation, the court will send its 
final decision within a month’s time about the result and compensation amount.
292
 If 
either side wants to challenge the ruling, they have 15 days to appeal to a higher court,
293
 
the next level being an intermediate court at the city level, and then a higher-level court at 
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the provincial level, and then the national-level Supreme People’s Court. Plaintiffs may 
also have their cases heard by another court or request for the removal of judges under 
special circumstances.
294
 For example, one case in Guangzhou against a famous doctor in 
the city was tried in Shanghai because the patient thought the doctor’s powerful influence 
in Guangzhou would influence the outcome of the case.
295
 
Differences between the different types of reviews and current enforcement 
There had been some discussion that with the passage of the new Tort Liability 
Law in 2009 that there would no longer be a two-track system for medical disputes, and 
all tracks would be merged into one.
296
 However, fieldwork in the spring of 2016 
revealed that Medical Damages Reviews (from the 2010 Tort Liability Law), Medical 
Accident Reviews (from the 2002 Medical Accident Regulations), and judicial 
inspections for ordinary torts were all still possible avenues for medical disputes. In 
Nanjing, Medical Damages Reviews and judicial inspections are under the purview of the 
courts, whereas the Medical Accident Review can only be applied for through the health 
bureaucracy. However, courts can admit the results of a Medical Accident Review as 
evidence.
297
 In Nanjing, it is rare for a judicial inspection to be used in a medical case 
because Jiangsu province requires that both sides agree to this type of review,
298
 and 
hospitals usually refuse it. 
299
 Courts in Jiangsu Province, regardless of opposition by the 
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plaintiff or defendant, can order a medical damages review,
300
 and there is rarely an 
objection to conducting this review.
301
  
In Guangzhou, some aspects of this process were reported differently. According 
to a physician in Guangzhou who frequently appears in court on behalf of his hospital, 
patients have the choice between the medical damages review or judicial inspection, most 
often choosing the Judicial Inspection because it tends to be more in the patient’s 
favor.
302
 It is unclear from my current research if hospitals can refuse this in Guangzhou, 
but based on the interview with this physician, it seemed that his hospital had to go 
through this process if the patient desired. However, despite the perceived unfairness of 
judicial inspections by hospitals in Guangzhou, in Guangdong province (the capital of 
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A note on resources for the poor to pursue cases 
 China has shown increasing attention to enabling poorer and disadvantaged 
groups in society to have better access to legal information and lawyers through its legal 
aid program, established in 2003 nationwide by the State Council,
304
 though the 
implementation of this program varies throughout China in scope and quality of services 
provided.
305
 The program provides lawyers those from difficult economic 
backgrounds.
306
 These plaintiffs are evaluated for eligibility according to the economic 
circumstances of the provincial-level areas they are from.
307
 In June 2015, the Ministry of 
Justice published “Opinions on Perfecting the Legal Aid System,”
308
 which aims to 
improve the system in several important ways:  making it available to additional 
disadvantaged groups (women, migrant workers, disabled persons, etc.), establishing 
legal aid for appeals and full coverage of legal aid counsel services, and restructuring the 
budget for the program at city and county levels.
309
 This program is important because, as 
discussed in the next chapter, there is some analysis that being poor can contribute to 
resorting to yinao, even though it eventually became a tool used beyond the poor. It 
seems that the Chinese government is trying to make legal avenues more available.  
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A plaintiff’s perspective in a medical malpractice dispute 
 While it was difficult to obtain access to plaintiffs or patients with disputes, I had 
an in-depth conversation with a plaintiff whose mother had passed away from a 
medication error. This plaintiff also happened to be a physician in a hospital department 
at one of the city’s most reputable hospitals and deals with malpractice cases for his own 
hospital, so unlike the average Chinese citizen, he not only understands the legal process, 
but as a doctor, he can evaluate the error in the dispute. The dispute occurred at a hospital 
where his mother had cataracts removed. While cataract removal is normally an 
outpatient procedure, because she had public government insurance (公费医疗), she was 
able to stay in the hospital with full coverage (staying in a hospital tends to be desirable 
in China). Her physician gave her aspirin, despite the fact that aspirin should not be 
administered after cataract surgery due to the risk of bleeding
310
 in addition to, according 
to her son (the plaintiff), her clearly documented history of an aspirin allergy. The patient 
died following a reaction to the medication.
311
  
 As this plaintiff pursued this case, he reported that thugs from the hospital’s 
Medical Affairs Office beat him up to deter him from pursuing this case any further since 
it could escalate to a high-profile issue for this hospital.
312
 He also accuses the hospital of 
tampering with and destroying evidence, which are prohibited by the Tort Liability 
Law.
313
 He went to the police to make a report of his injuries from assault and retains 
proof of it. None of the main media outlets have covered his story. While this study has 
so far portrayed patients as the parties more often resorting to violence, this brief 
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summary of one man’s case suggests that hospitals may also resort to violence and illegal 
behaviors during malpractice disputes. However, the influence of powerful hospitals and 
government media control makes it difficult to understand the extent of this issue. 
Analysis of the Complaint and Dispute Resolution Process from Start to Finish 
 This analysis of the complaint and dispute resolution process reveals several 
important aspects of it. This section identifies some of these points and where 
appropriate, draws a comparison with the United States to provide context to the Chinese 
system. 
1. Strong advocacy for complaints and little to no advocacy in disputes. In the 
complaint system, the government advocates for patients as they encounter issues, both 
trivial and serious, with the hospital. There are numerous avenues for complaining, there 
is no cost to do so, and further, the hospital is obliged by administrative regulations to 
handle all complaints in a timely manner, so patients are guaranteed to be heard. This 
gives patients the upper hand against health care workers and emboldens them to 
advocate for their rights while seeking medical care. Americans would be in awe if while 
waiting for hours in the ER, they could call the city government to put pressure on the ER 
to address their concerns in real time.  
However, advocacy stops almost completely for patients once complaints become 
disputes. During negotiations with the hospitals (Level 3) and mediation (Level 4), 
patients rarely have representation by lawyers,
314
 whereas doctors have an entire army of 
lawyers and a powerful hospital institution behind them. Like China, in the United States, 
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the vast majority of malpractice cases are also settled out of court,
315
 but patients in the 
US usually seek legal counsel to begin with as they contemplate taking their cases to 
court; both sides have legal representation. When asked why patients and families do not 
come with legal counsel, one hospital administrator said, “In China if something happens 
to you, you help yourself.”
316
 While this may be true for some people, there are likely 
other reasons for patients not hiring lawyers, such as lack of awareness or knowledge 
about how to choose them and costs.  
 2. The challenge of recruiting medical expertise to objectively evaluate cases. 
Another point, which has been made elsewhere,
317
 is that placing the responsibility of 
medical reviews within health bureaucracies on the local level automatically decreases 
the credibility of these evaluations. The system has been built in a way that creates 
incentives for doctors to not rule against their counterparts in the same city. In the United 
States, expert witnesses must show they have no conflict of interest,
318
 but in China, 
conflicts of interests are built into the system. In the relatively new medical mediation 
committees, the primary roles of the government health bureaucracy and the Chinese 
Medical Association have been removed. Even though creating a third-party mediation 
committee addresses concerns about bias in favor of doctors, committees that do not use 
expert witnesses carry the potential problem of not being able to evaluate whether a 
mistake occurred and the degree of severity of the mistake. The chapter dedicated to 
mediation further explores these issues. 
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Controversy over choosing expert witnesses in medical malpractice cases is not 
unique to China. As Johnston et al. describe the issue in the US: “Despite ethics codes, 
expert witness guidelines, and platitudes by the thousands about trials being the pursuit of 
truth and justice, a great many judges, jurors and lawyers perceive expert witnesses on 
both sides as biased partisans.”
319
 In a medical malpractice trial in the US, both plaintiff 
and defendant lawyers usually hire expert witnesses to provide their opinions on the case 
at hand; some states require expert opinions by statute in order for malpractice cases to 
succeed.
320
 In the United States juries decide the verdict when malpractice cases go to 
trial and because both sides will have expert witnesses supporting each of their respective 
opinions, it comes down to which side has the most credible opinion,
321
 which can be 
difficult for juries to decide. Interestingly, in theory the Chinese model of having an 
independent organization assign experts to the case not hired by the plaintiff or defendant 
seems like it would actually yield more impartial results than the US system.  
3. Length of court time is not comparatively long, but arguably has more 
dramatic effects on certain classes of people.  
 In China people frequently say the court system is too lengthy and arduous, but it 
seems that the Chinese judicial system handles cases in quite a timely manner – the 
subpoena is issued within a few weeks from the initial filing as is the final decision once 
the results of the Medical Damages Review are considered. The length of time for cases 
accrues primarily in waiting for the Medical Damages Review to be processed by the 
Chinese Medical Association.
322
 Time can also add up with admission of evidence to 
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court. Each time a new piece of evidence is contributed to the case, both parties have to 
attend a hearing to approve it.
323
 In total there are generally three or more hearings per 
case, though some have five or six if new evidence needs to be admitted several times.
324
  
The average time frame for the entire case according to a media source citing a 
Guangzhou government official is two years.
325
 An administrator in the Medical Affairs 
Office in Nanjing echoed a similar figure, saying it takes 1-2 years.
326
 If the average is 
two years, this is not very different than the American system, where according to a 
survey by Medscape, out of the physicians who had been involved in a lawsuit, 19% 
reported the entire process took less than a year, 36% reported from 1-2 years, 33% 
reported 3-5 years, and 12% reported more than five years.
327
 If cases in China typically 
average around two years, it is not abnormally long. Although the United States and 
China have significant differences in their legal systems, the time to process a 
malpractice case is similar.  
While comparatively the length of time for a case in China is not that long, the 
perception of this length may vary depending on the residence and socioeconomic 
statuses of the plaintiff. For a city resident, one to two years is arguably more palpable 
because they do not have to pay for travel. But for a poor rural family, traveling back and 
forth for one to two years would be expensive, and a huge loss of money especially if 
they lost their case. The analysis above also shows that the court process is difficult to 
understand and evolving, as there are still several different types of reviews that courts 
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can order, and it is implemented differently in different areas. For wealthy, educated 
people, this might be easier to figure out, but again, for poorer, rural people pursuing 
cases, this would presumably be difficult, though China’s legal aid may offer some 
guidance. Of course, in most places poorer people face challenges in using their country’s 
legal system when compared to the wealthy. In China until advocacy becomes stronger 
and the court process more accessible, yinao might still offer a faster, more effective way 
to obtain compensation. 
4. While there are some unique aspects to China’s political system that favor 
mediation,
328
 there is also consensus in academic research that alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) methods like mediation are often more favorable than 
adjudication for resolving medical disputes everywhere. 
 
Within the medical dispute resolution system (and in dispute resolution more 
generally), mediation is pushed at every step of the way – this is actually the official 
policy for medical disputes in China, it is called the “three mediations and one 
insurance.”
329
 The “three mediations” means first mediating at the hospital, then at the 
mediation committee, and then in court. In the last decade, there has been a general trend 
in the Chinese justice system that has favored mediation of conflicts over litigation for 
various political and social reasons;
330
 however, the Party-state’s choice to favor 
mediation for medical practice disputes also reflects consensus in the general literature 
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about medical malpractice that methods of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) like 
mediation are more effective in resolving malpractice cases.
331
  
In the United States, litigation for medical malpractice cases is seen by some to be 
“costly and irrational.”
332
 The US Department of Health and Human Services reports that 
the Federal Government spends $33.7-$56.2 billion per year for malpractice coverage 
and the costs of defensive medicine, which doctors practice out of fear of unlimited and 
unpredictable liability awards.
333
 Studies have shown that only 15% of malpractice cases 
actually involve medical negligence and in 80% of those cases, the patients or families 
leave the process without compensation.
334
 This means that more often than not, the 
uninjured sue, and when the injured sue, most of the time they are not compensated. 
Because both parties agree on the outcome of the case in mediation, there is the “greatest 
durability and satisfaction”
335
 of all the ADR methods. According to a study by Szmania 
et al. on the US, private mediators estimated that their cases were closed in 85 to 165 
days, with the actual meetings for mediation only lasting between one and three days,
336
 
whereas litigated cases can typically take years to resolve.
337
  
Many of the issues in the US legal system are echoed in the Chinese system, 
where pursuing legal cases is often seen as “strenuous and unrewarding” (费力不讨好) 
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 Therefore, the Chinese system’s emphasis on mediation may be good for 
medical dispute resolution; however, as will be discussed in the chapter on mediation, it 
still faces a number of challenges and has important differences from mediation in the US.  
5. Abuses by hospitals during medical malpractice cases can trigger a sense 
of injustice and frustration. 
 
As the sample plaintiff case demonstrates, hospitals can also be guilty of illegal 
behavior and violence in the complaint and dispute resolution process. Outside this case, 
doctors have developed a reputation for being corrupt (discussed further in Chapter 6) 
and have been known to tamper with evidence, such as editing medical records.
339
 It is 
difficult, however, to study this issue because empirically it is hard to see and the lack of 
free media reporting makes it difficult to understand the scope of how often hospitals 
resort to these behaviors.
340
 It is also easier for doctors to speak out against patient 
violence because they are fixed, organized groups of people. Even though patients can 
use social media to elicit sympathy for their cases, they are neither fixed nor organized 
groups of people, and there are few advocacy organizations for patients in China.
341
 
6. Where are the insurance companies? Like in China, the vast majority of 
malpractice cases are settled out of court in the United States – the analysis of 58,000 
medical malpractice cases resulting in paid claims showed that 96.9% of paid claims 
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were resolved out of court.
342
 However, the two countries differ in the role of the medical 
malpractice insurance companies in the settlement of cases. Physicians in the US 
typically have medical malpractice insurance, and insurers play a pivotal role in 
settlement decisions; in some types of plans, insurers have the final word in settlements, 




In China the government is in the process of implementing a nation-wide system 
of medical malpractice coverage, as part of its “three mediations, one insurance” policy, 
which seeks to decrease the burden on hospitals to provide compensation in malpractice 
cases.
344
 However, the implementation of this goal varies from place to place. Nationally, 
the Health and Family Planning Commission set the goal for all 3A hospitals to have 
medical liability insurance by the end of 2015, but fieldwork and news sources indicate 
that this has not yet been fully realized throughout China.
345
 Hospitals also have mixed 
views of medical malpractice insurers. A hospital lawyer in Wuhan said, “Hospitals are 
not very positive about this [medical malpractice insurance], currently the insurance 
companies’ primary goal is profit, and are [they] fighting to win over the support of the 
responsible government offices.”
346
 The Nanjing hospital also conveyed it was not 
satisfied with the government-provided medical malpractice insurance, expressing hope 
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the insurance provider would one day be able to join in on or share costs of the dispute 
resolution process.
347
 The Nanjing hospital also mentioned it was exploring authorizing 
the sale of a new type of insurance at its hospital (Surgery Accident Insurance – 手术意
外保险) that patients could buy prior to surgeries, so if a complication occurred, the 




 This chapter has laid out the complaint and dispute resolution process from start 
to finish. When looked at in its entirety, the system as a whole has sent Chinese citizens 
mixed messages about how to pursue justice in the health care system. Institutions 
created by governments ultimately regulate the interaction between different groups in 
society, and they teach citizens the acceptable ways to behave and express themselves. A 
system that hears every medical complaint combined with a burden of proof on accused 
healthcare workers (during 2002-2010) incentivizes complaining. But as complaints 
escalate to disputes, the institutions for dispute resolution (prior to medical mediation: 
health bureaus, courts, hospitals) have taught patients that the system is built in a way 
that automatically disfavors them. It could be hypothesized that a society of emboldened 
complainants with no credible channels for further recourse may resort to means outside 
official channels to settle their disputes, thus paving the way for yinao. With this context 
in mind, the following chapter delves into the data and definitions for yinao. 
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CHAPTER 5: YINAO DEFINITIONS AND DATA 
 
The shortcomings of the dispute resolution system described in the previous 
chapter created an opening for another method to pursue medical dispute resolution 
outside of the formal system – yinao. Recognized by the Ministry of Education as a word 
in 2006,
349
 yinao (Chinese: 医闹) can be translated into English as “medical disturbance” 
or “medical chaos.”
350
 The word combines the Chinese character for medicine or medical 
activity “yi” (医) and the Chinese character “nao” (闹), which means quarreling, causing 
a disturbance, or venting.
351
 In this chapter, I argue for a broad definition of yinao and at 
the same time recognize that its broad scope makes it a complicated policy problem. I 
also differentiate the concept of yinao from violence against health care workers globally 
by comparing the experiences of US and India with China’s. 
In this chapter, I will also show that available data suggest that over time yinao 
has become an increasingly socially legitimate method for medical dispute resolution. 
When something becomes socially legitimate, it becomes accepted into the fabric of 
social rules and standards. One basic indicator of social legitimacy is that something is 
used with frequency: if many people are using it, then it must be increasingly acceptable 
to do so. As this chapter will show, available data demonstrates that yinao has become 
increasingly common since the early 2000s. I also show that yinao has become an 
accepted form of dispute resolution by comparing data on yinao alongside available data 
on other forms of dispute resolution. These data show that yinao has been used at least as 
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often as adjudication and mediation in medical dispute resolution, making yinao a 
seemingly viable option for patients and their families. 
Towards a Definition of Yinao 
 Many existing definitions of yinao cast a negative connotation on it, portraying 
hospitals as victims and patients and families as perpetrators. For example, one such 
definition of yinao provided in a publication for hospitals is as follows: “Behaviors that 
use the pretext of a medical dispute to interfere with the hospital’s normal order, 
disparage its reputation, and other illegal means to compel the hospital to agree to 
irrational demands.”
352
 While this has become one of the dominant narratives of yinao, 
yinao is far more nuanced than this definition implies and includes a wide range of 
behaviors, motives, and groups of people subject to scholarly, policy, and media debate. 
 
The Wide Range of Yinao and Violent Behaviors against Health Care Workers 
 The conversation around yinao can include behaviors ranging from innocuous 
ones like hanging a banner to life-threatening ones such as attempted murder. While 
official documents do not use the word yinao, they commonly use the phrase “disturbing 
the normal order of medicine” (严重扰乱正常医疗秩序) to characterize behaviors 
associated with yinao.
 353
 A document released by five central government ministries in 
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 China Medical Doctor Association (中国医师协会), “Analytical Report of Yinao Survey in Several 
Provinces and Cities Nationwide （在全国部分省市调查‘医闹’的分析报告),” China Health Industry (中
国卫生产业), February 2007, 57. 
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 Liping Chen and Lin Zhu, “Medical Order Cannot Only Depend on Criminal Law to Be Maintained [医
疗秩序不能只靠刑法来维护],” Legal Daily via The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic 
of China, September 16, 2015, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/lfgz/lfdt/2015-
09/16/content_1946667.htm. 
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Liu and Huang argue that 
violent attacks like 
stabbings against health 
care workers should be 
separated from the term 
yinao since the act of 
stabbing someone is too 
serious to be included 
within the scope of a 
disturbance (nao).
355
 The head of a hospital’s Medical Affairs Office (typically where 
medical disputes are settled in hospitals) interviewed for this study also agreed that the 
goal of yinao generally is not intended to seriously hurt people; it is about creating a 
disturbance in order to get compensation.
356
 There are other terms that are used to 
describe more violent behaviors, such as baoli shangyi shijian (暴力伤医事件 ), which 
describes “violent incidents against health care workers,” and shayi an (杀医案), which 
means “murder cases of health care workers.”
357
 
                                                 
354
 The Supreme People’s Procuratorate of the PRC [中华人民共和国最高人民检察院], “Five Ministries’ 
Opinions on Illegal Criminal Activities Involving Medical Institutions and Protecting the Normal Order of 
Medical Care [五部门关于依法惩处涉医违法犯罪维护正常医疗秩序的意见],” April 28, 2014, 
http://www.spp.gov.cn/flfg/201404/t20140428_71374.shtml. 
355
 Liu and Huang, “‘Yinao’ Legal Issues Research [‘医闹’法律问题研究],” 153–54. 
356
 Head of Medical Affairs Office, Interview No. 048, 2016. 
357
 For examples of these terms in media reporting, see: Feng Kan, “Violent Attacks against Health Care 
Workers Continue Despite Repeated Prohibition: Nationwide in 20 Days There Have Been 12 Successive 
Table 4: Behaviors Associated with Yinao 
 Assaulting healthcare workers (殴打医务人员) 
 Deliberate murder of healthcare workers (故意杀害医务人员) 
 Setting up a funeral memorial in the hospital (在医疗机构私设灵
堂) 
 Placing funeral wreaths at the hospital (在医疗机构摆放花圈) 
 Burning paper funeral money at the hospital (在医疗机构焚烧纸
钱) 
 Hanging banners (often condemning hospital for killing a patient) 
(悬挂横幅) 
 Blocking the main door to the hospital (堵塞大门) 
 Placing a corpse in public areas of the hospital (在公共开放区域
违规停放尸体) 
 Impinging on the ability of health care workers to leave their 
workplace and other ways of limiting their personal freedom (以
不准离开工作场所等方式非法限制医务人员人身自由) 
 Public humiliation of healthcare workers (公然侮辱医务人员) 
 Threatening healthcare workers (恐吓医务人员) 
 Blackmail and extortion (实施敲诈勒索,寻衅滋事等行为) 
 Destroying property of the hospital (打砸医疗机构的财产) 
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In order to reflect the full range of behaviors associated with yinao, I place them 
along a continuum (shown in Figure 7 below) in order of increasing severity. I place 
murder and attempted murder outside the scope of yinao because I agree with scholars 
Liu and Huang that attempted murder is beyond the scope of creating a disturbance. 
However, it is important to include murder and attempted murder along the continuum 
because due to the severe nature of these crimes, they are often the impetus for policy 
changes and reactions in the media. 
Figure 7: Continuum of Yinao and Violent Behaviors in Medical Dispute Resolution 
Motive for Yinao and Attempted Murders 
With this range of behaviors comes a range of potential motives for them. Yet as 
highlighted above, existing definitions tend to define yinao by its “unreasonable” 
demands for economic compensation.
358
 I choose not to define yinao by a single motive 
                                                                                                                                                 
Attacks on Medical Personnel [暴力伤医事件屡禁不止:全国 20 天连发 12 起伤医案],” Xinhua News, 
June 18, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2015-06/18/c_127927895.htm; Heyan Wang et al., “The 
Tragedy of China’s Patient-Doctor Conflicts Behind the Harbin Doctor Murder [哈尔滨杀医案背后中国
的医患冲突悲剧],” Tengxun Xinwen, April 5, 2012, http://news.qq.com/a/20120405/000843.htm. 
358














































because there are many possible motives for yinao, such as emotional venting, seeking an 
apology, preservation of face, and revenge.  
Perpetrators of the most extreme behaviors at the end of the spectrum like 
attempted murder or murder are beyond seeking any economic compensation at all 
because they likely will be arrested, imprisoned, and perhaps sentenced to death for these 
types of crimes. Revenge is the main motive of these severe crimes, and in medical 
disputes it is likely driven by mental illness or hopelessness exacerbated by economic 
hardship or suffering from disease. Studies have often associated poor socioeconomic 
standing with the decision to take extremely violent measures: one analysis of some of 
the most high-profile murder cases of doctors in health care disputes observes that in all 
of the selected cases, patients were from poor, rural families.
359
 Another study examining 
severe incidents in media reports found that 70% of assailants came from poor family 
backgrounds, were unemployed, laid-off, or were temporary workers.
360
 Almost 40% of 
the assailants had introverted personalities and were reclusive and stubborn.
361
 Close to 
30% had a history of mental illness.
362
 
Unlike murder and attempted murder, yinao behaviors allow for the full range of 
motives, including revenge, economic compensation, the desire for an apology or 
attention, and emotional venting or grieving. The motives also likely vary as the 
behaviors become increasingly severe. For example, threatening health care workers and 
blocking doors are coercive behaviors that likely seek an economic benefit, whereas 
                                                 
359
 Guo Jingtao, “Lamentable, Who Is Supporting Medical Violence? [可悲，谁在支持医疗暴力？！],” 
Yixue Jie [医学界网站 ], May 27, 2015, http://www.yxj.org.cn/article-46228-1.html. 
360
 Xiaoli Jia et al., “Investigation on Hospital Violence during 2003-2012 in China,” Chinese Hospitals 18, 
no. 3 (2014): 3. 
361
 Jia et al., 3. 
362
 Jia et al., 3. 
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grieving and expression behaviors may include a combination of the need to vent and 
obtain an apology or compensation. Empirically it can be difficult to determine which 
motives are present when people resort to yinao. A Chinese pharmaceutical sales 
representative who frequently visits hospitals observed: A family could be making a 
scene grieving outside the hospital, demanding that the hospital bring back a child who 
died. The hospital might offer some money to the family, and some of these families 
might accept it, but ultimately the amount of money is not that important to the family. 
Yet in other circumstances, families might use this tragedy to demand an extremely high 
amount of compensation; it depends on the family and the situation.
363
 
There also are also cultural motives that drive yinao, such as preserving face for a 
patient’s family. A former hospital administrator described how the issue of preserving 
face for rural Chinese families influences dispute settlement: “In some Chinese villages, 
the whole village [may have only] three last names. So maybe the Wang clan last year 
had an issue with a hospital and were compensated RMB 180,000 ($25,878). And then 
the Chen clan has a dispute at the same hospital, and the Chen clan is a more powerful 
family, so they demand 200,000 ($28,753) because they want face.”
 364
  
Professional v. Non-Professional Yinao 
Debates about yinao also concern whether it only refers to actions by hired 
professional protesters and the size of the protest activities. In 2006, Ministry of Health 
spokesperson Mao Qunan emphasized the group and “professional” aspects (in the sense 
of a paid third party) of yinao: “Now inside medical institutions often there are groups 
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364
 Hospital official and former hospital affairs office head, Interview No. 072. 
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operating, they are not ticket peddlers,
365
 but they look for people who have medical 
disputes or who might encounter a medical accident, and in the name of these issues, go 
to the hospital and cause trouble to obtain an economic advantage. So, the media has 
called them ‘yinao,’ it is causing trouble.”
366
 These “professional” groups charge patients 
and their families based on the specific services they provide and/or based on a 
percentage of the final settlement amount if negotiations with hospitals are successful. 
For example, an yinao group in China’s southern province of Guangxi charged RMB 100 
($14.75) per day to have someone hang a banner and RMB 200 ($29.51) per day for a 
person crying and shouting.
367
 A professional yinao boss outside of Shanghai’s Huashan 
Hospital told undercover reporters that the standard price is RMB 300 (USD $44.26) for 
an elderly person for one full day of “hanging around” the hospital and performing 
activities like waiting outside the accused doctor’s office door and sleeping at the 
hospital’s main entrance (price does not include lunch).
368
 This same yinao boss charges 
RMB 500 per day ($73.76) for a young man to threaten doctors and to get into a fight, but 
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Weibo), receiving over 43,000 comments. For more information see: “Watch: Chinese Woman Screams 




 “Ministry of Health: ‘Yinao’ Severely Disrupts the Normal Order of Medicine [卫生部:‘医闹’严重扰乱
正常医疗秩序 坚决打击],” Xinhua News, July 11, 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-
07/11/content_4815714.htm. 
367
 Medical World Magazine, “The Thunder Sounds: The First Time an Yinao Group Has Been Destroyed 
in China [雷霆出击 中国首个医闹集团被覆灭],” September 29, 2014, 
http://www.bioon.com/trends/news/603927.shtml. 
368
 “Professional ‘Yinao’: However Much Money You Give Me Determines How Big of a Disturbance I 
Will Make [职业‘医闹’：你给多少钱我就闹多大事],” Beijing Youth Daily, November 7, 2013, 
http://epaper.ynet.com/html/2013-11/07/content_22039.htm?div=-1. 
 109 
this does not include medical fees if the young man is injured during the process; the 
patient and/or family who hired him would have to cover medical fees separately.
369
 
Other stories describing professional practitioners of yinao mention other types of ways 




Even though a thriving industry has revolved around yinao, yinao does not always 
involve professionals. Scholars Chen and Deng separate yinao into professional and 
nonprofessional yinao because families and patients also engage in it without 
professionals.
371
 In Chinese there is also a distinction between yinao and professional 
yinao, called zhiye yinao(职业医闹).372 
The Size of Yinao Incidents 
Some yinao events involve over 100 people,
373
 while others involve only a small 
handful of family members.
374
 Most accounts of yinao emphasize that groups conduct it, 
but a hospital security guard interviewed for this study disagreed with this, observing that 
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individuals can also resort to the spectrum of yinao behaviors as well.
375
 To him, yinao 
included patients or family members who refused to leave the hospital premises and 
continually harassed the Medical Affairs Office or departments where they received 
treatment.
376
 Similarly, a group of nurses recounted the story of a patient’s husband who 
lay down on the floor of the Obstetrics Department to protest paying NICU fees he could 
not afford for his premature child.
377
  
Towards a definition of Yinao 
 Considering these factors of yinao, I define yinao in the following way: 
Yinao represents a range of behaviors that can be innocuous or can threaten the 
operations of a hospital and endanger its staff. These behaviors are used in order 
to resolve medical disputes. A variety of motives drive yinao, including but not 
limited to revenge, emotional venting, economic compensation, preservation of 
face, and seeking an apology. Professional gangs, non-professional groups of 
friends and family, as well as individuals can all engage in yinao behaviors. 
Attempted murder and murder of health care workers do not constitute yinao. 
 
This definition differs greatly from the one presented in the beginning of this 
section and reflects the full range of behaviors, motives, and types of people yinao 
includes. The diversity of factors included under the umbrella of yinao increases the 
likelihood of policies mistakenly addressing it as one issue rather than several nuanced 
issues. But to address yinao effectively, policy responses must understand the complexity 
the term encompasses. For example, policies must contemplate whether a single person 
hanging a banner warrants a different response than a hired gang holding a banner in 
front of a hospital. Policies must also distinguish between dissatisfied family members 
hovering outside a doctor’s office waiting to have a conversation with him and family 
members harassing and interfering with activities of the hospital on behalf of their case; 
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 Midwives Group, Interview No. 053. 
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the former is not yinao while the latter is. Yet the lack of response to the former feasibly 
can provoke the latter situation.
378
 Therefore policies must not only attempt to define the 
fine lines between the various behaviors that constitute yinao and address them 
appropriately, but also consider the motives for escalation of behavior along the 
continuum. The next chapter explores this issue further by delving into the underlying 
sources of yinao in more detail. 
Assessing the Magnitude of Yinao and Serious Violent Assaults  
 This section compiles the available data on yinao and medical dispute-related 
violent assaults. Though these data are incomplete, they offer helpful suggestions for 
understanding the scope, distribution, and possible trends of yinao and more violent 
medical dispute-related assaults. I consider national and local survey data, data gleaned 
from media coverage of these events, as well as survey data on violence against health 
care workers more generally. 
Nationwide and Local Data on Yinao  
 Available nationwide data on yinao and violent assaults against doctors are 
incomplete, but by using available data quoted by official and media sources as well as 
from hospital surveys, I build ranges for the likely number of annual incidents for the 
years when data are available (Figure 8).  
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Figure 8: Available Nationwide Data on Yinao 
 
For the years 2002, 2004, and 2006, one news report states that “according to 
incomplete statistics,” nationwide there were 5,093 “incidents seriously disturbing 
medical order” in 2002; 8,093 in 2004; and 9,831 in 2006.
379
A statement by former 
Minister of Health Gao Qiang in 2007 further corroborates these numbers.
380
 Because 
official statements often use “incidents seriously disturbing medical order” to 
characterize yinao incidents, I use these data to represent the lower bounds for the 
number of yinao incidents for these years (lower bounds are represented in Figure 8 in 
orange). They are the lower bounds because the data are incomplete, and a Party official 
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 Liming Zeng, “Last Year China Had Close to 10,000 Grave Incidents Affecting the Order of the Health 
Care System [中国去年发生近万起扰乱医疗秩序事件 伤五千人],” Huashang Wang, April 18, 2007, 
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Insurance company figure 
Yinao  Violent attacks against doctors (does 
not include all forms of yinao) 
Author’s estimates based on per hospital averages 
scaled up to tertiary and secondary hospitals only  
Lower bound estimates based on official 
data  
Author’s estimates based on per hospital 
averages scaled up to all hospitals in China 
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interviewed for this study affirmed that official statistics on yinao should be interpreted 
as the least number of incidents for a given time period.
381
 
 There are also other data points available from 2004 to 2006 specifically on the 
number of yinao incidents per year per hospital for 48 hospitals in China that suggest an 
increasing trend in the number of incidents for this time period. One survey found that 
that on average, each hospital experienced 10.48 yinao incidents per year in 2004, 15.06 
incidents in 2005, and 15.31 incidents in 2006.
382
 By 2006, nearly all of the hospitals in 
the survey reported experiencing yinao.
383
 If these per-hospital averages were scaled up 
to represent the total number of hospitals in China for each of these years, then the 
number of yinao incidents would near or surpass 200,000 per year.
384
  The red lines in 
Figure 8 represent this potential maximum of the number of yinao incidents. 
However, hospitals in China are not all the same and, as will be explained in more 
detail in the following section, existing data suggest that yinao tends to occur more often 
in secondary and tertiary hospitals. In order to reflect this tendency, I also scale up the per 
hospital averages using only the number of secondary and tertiary hospitals in China, to 
provide another point of reference on the range.
385
 The blue lines in the figure represent 
these numbers. 
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 China Medical Doctor Association (中国医师协会), 57. 
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Yearbook《中国卫生统计年鉴 2005》 (Beijing: Peking Union Medical College Press, 2005), Table 1-3-2 
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The listed ranges provide a potential picture of the number of incidents that occur 
nationwide, the lower bounds represented in orange reflecting incomplete official data, 
the red lines representing a “worst case scenario” for the total number of potential 
incidents by scaling up per-hospital averages for the total number of hospitals in China, 
and the blue lines representing a more moderate number that only scales up the per-
hospital averages to the total number of secondary and tertiary hospitals in China, which 
usually represent around a third of the total number of hospitals. From 2004-2006 we see 
increases in the minimum, maximum, and more moderate numbers (secondary and 
tertiary hospitals) of yinao incidents, implying an upward trend.  
This trend likely continued from 2008 to 2010. Even though the only existing data 
for 2008 and 2010 come from a survey based on 350 hospitals (though the 2010 figure is 
often reported as a nationwide figure) and can only represent minimums for these years, 
just by looking at the minimum number of incidents from 2002 to 2010 in orange, we can 
see an increasing trend. One official noted that while the absolute numbers quoted in 
official reports may not be accurate, the trends they represent could be.
386
 
 The next available data are from a 2012 survey by the China Hospital Association 
of secondary and tertiary general and specialty hospitals nationwide, which found that in 
2012 hospitals on average experienced 27.3 violent incidents against health care workers 
per year (baoli shangyi shijian).
387
  Further, the proportion of hospitals experiencing 
                                                                                                                                                 
2004 Hospital Level Situation for Every Region, 
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计年鉴 2012》 (Beijing: Peking Union Medical College Press, 2012), Table 1-2-1 Number of Hospitals, 
http://tongji.cnki.net/kns55/Navi/YearBook.aspx?id=N2012090077&floor=1 
386
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more than 100 of these incidents per year nearly doubled over the past five years from 
when the survey was taken, amounting to 12.5%.
388
 Notably, these figures do not include 
all of the behaviors that comprise the range of yinao behaviors; they only include forms 
of violence directly harming health care workers, which is implied by a report on the 
survey to mean both verbal and physical threatening and abuse.
389
 Although violence in 
health care settings can be the result of a number of reasons, the survey found that direct 
reasons for these violent behaviors were related to differences between patients and 
physicians,
390
 making it appropriate to use these figures to gauge rates of violence 
stemming from medical disputes. 
Scaling up the per hospital averages to the total number of secondary and tertiary 
facilities as well as the total number of hospitals in China helps to provide potential 
bounds for the number of violent incidents against health care workers in 2012. In this 
case, scaling up the average to secondary and tertiary hospitals is especially apt since the 
hospitals used in the survey were this type. Using this method, the estimated number of 
violent incidents against health care workers nationwide in 2012 for secondary and 
tertiary hospitals would be 223,587.
391
 The maximum number, which scales up the 
                                                                                                                                                 
27 次 医患沟通难到位],” China Daily, August 16, 2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/dfpd/shehui/2013-
08/16/content_16898599.htm. 
388
 These differences include differences in expectations between patients and doctors, poor doctor-patient 






 There were 8,190 secondary and tertiary hospitals in China in 2012. This number multiplied by 27.3 is 
223, 587. For total number of secondary and tertiary hospitals in 2012, see: National Health and Family 
Planning Commission, China Health and Family Planning Statistics Yearbook 2016《中国卫生和计划生
育统计年鉴 2016》 (Beijing: Peking Union Medical College Press, 2016), Table 1-2-1 Number of 
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average to all hospitals in China in 2012,
392
 would be over 600,000, but because the 
average is already skewed toward facilities that have a higher number of incidents 
anyway, this 600,000 figure is likely exceedingly high. 
While data were unavailable during 2011 and 2013 nationally, data from tertiary 
and secondary hospitals from one anonymous province also help illuminate possible 
trends for yinao from 2011-2013. The study shows that there was a steady increase of 








 In 2016, Zhang Weiqun, the chairman Hangzhou’s Junwang Jiankang, 
purportedly China’s first company to specialize in medical malpractice insurance, 
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reported that in 2015 nationwide China saw 118,000 yinao incidents.
395
 The report 
implies that this figure includes both activities vandalizing hospital property and harming 
personnel.
396
 I represent this private company figure in purple in Figure 8. 
Although data have been unavailable for the past few years, official reports and 
interviews conducted in eastern Chinese cities concur that the number of yinao incidents 
decreased in 2015 and 2016. In 2016, NHFPC Medical Affairs and Governance Deputy 
Bureau Chief Jiao Yahui during a press conference said, “Serious incidents harming 
physicians and yinao in total have decreased.”
397
 Interviews with hospital administrators 
at 3A hospitals in Beijing, Guangzhou, and Nanjing all confirmed that there has been a 
decrease in yinao in 2015 and 2016.
 398
  
Data on Health Care Workers Experiencing Assault 
Surveys of health care workers indicate the pervasiveness of violence in hospital 
settings as well as the likely trend that it has been growing over the past decade. It is 
important to note that data on violence do not necessarily represent violent incidents 
exclusively incited by medical disputes (other reasons can include medication side effects, 
pain, and drunkenness); however, most of these Chinese surveys frame their data within 
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the contexts of medical disputes and tense patient-doctor relationships as important 
causes of the increase in violence towards health care workers.
399
  
According to the Chinese official press agency Xinhua, from 2008 to 2011, the 
percentage of physicians (does include not all health care workers) experiencing a violent 
attack rose from 3.7% to 4.5% and from 22.1% to 27.3% for verbal humiliation.
400
 A 
survey by Shi et al. conducted in 2013 with participants from 123 public hospitals in 
Shanghai, Hubei Province, and Gansu Province found high rates of exposure to 
workplace verbal and physical abuse. The rate of exposure (either directly to respondent 
or indirectly to a 
respondent’s colleague) of 
physicians to verbal abuse 
(VA) was 92.75%, threat of 
assault (TA) was 88.10%, 
and physical assault (PA) 




Figure 10: Number of Doctors in CMDA Survey Who  
Experienced Assault that Resulted in Physical Harm 
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According to the China Medical Doctor’s Association’s (CMDA) “White Paper 
on the State of the Medical Profession in China,” in 2014 59.79% of surveyed health care 
workers experienced verbal abuse, 13.07% suffered physical injuries, and only 27.14% of 
health care workers reported to have never encountered a violent incident.
402
 Based on 
CMDA’s survey statistics from 2009 to April 2015, the number of physicians reporting 
violent incidents has been rising every year since 2009 (see Figure 10). If the monthly 
average for the first four months of 2015 continued until the end of the year, then there 
would have been around 174 incidents by the end of 2015, indicating growth in the total 
number from the previous year. 
Yinao and Violent Incidents in the Media 
 While the survey data reported above generally suggest increasing trends in yinao 
and assaults against health care workers, data on media coverage of these events show 
more dramatic ebbs and flows in reporting on the incidents. Studies by both the China 
Youth Daily and by Zhao et al. compiled news reports and found similar trends in media 
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Figure 11: Reports of Violent Incidents against Health Care Workers 
 
Figure 11 shows peaks in reporting during 2005-2006 and 2009, and an upward 
trend in reporting beginning in 2011. Zhao et al.’s data provide the highest peak on the 
figure in 2013 and show a decreasing trend since. Despite the ebbs and flows, the total 
number of media reports based on these studies has overall risen from 2000 to 2015. 
These ebbs and flows of media coverage are important not because they reflect the reality 
of trends in the actual number of yinao incidents, but because, as one official explained, 
the more news about yinao and medical order in the official media, the more it indicates 
that authorities are giving more attention to yinao and are more decisive about 
implementing policies related to yinao.
404
  
Distribution of Yinao Incidents Throughout China 
This section examines available information on the distribution of yinao across 
different hospital levels, clinical departments, and geographic settings throughout China.  
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Yinao Distribution among Different Types of Hospitals 
Existing data, shown in Figure 12, suggest that yinao tends to occur most often at 
public secondary and tertiary hospitals.
405
 This is because these facilities face higher 
patient volumes due to their reputations for offering the best quality of care and because 
they handle riskier cases.
406
 Because they have such high patient volumes, by sheer 
numbers alone, they would have a greater opportunity for yinao.  
Figure 12: Percentage of Yinao Incidents Based on Hospital Type 
 
  
                                                 
405
 China has a tiered and graded hospital system. Depending on their size and capabilities, hospitals are 
labeled as primary, secondary, or tertiary. This ranking is similar to that used in the United States and other 
countries, where primary facilities are smaller and provide basic services and tertiary facilities are larger 
and provide more advanced procedures. In China hospitals also receive grades based on quality, with A 
being the best, B being passing, and anything below being substandard. Private hospitals are not 
consistently given tiers and grades across China. Until recently, the vast majority of hospitals in China were 
public: in 2005, private hospitals only accounted for 17.2% of all hospitals, but by 2015 they accounted for 
52.6% of all hospitals in China. This increase reflects the policies of the Chinese government to increase 
private investment in the health care sector. However, the vast majority of private hospitals are still primary 
care or unlabeled facilities. Despite this increase in private facilities, most people in China still prefer to 
seek care at public, tertiary, grade A facilities (known as 3A or sanjia hospitals), regardless of the 
seriousness of their illnesses, because these hospitals attract the best physicians and tend to have the best 
quality of care. Even as China’s health care reform attempts to push more patient volume down to lower-
level facilities by improving the quality of care at those levels, NHFPC’s explanation of its 2015 statistical 
report reveals that there was an increase in the proportion of patients seeking care at tertiary facilities, 
showing that patients still prefer them. 
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Yinao Distribution among Clinical Specialties 
Some clinical specialties and certain physical spaces of the hospital tend to face 
more yinao incidents and medical disputes than others. Data from media reports about 
these incidents suggest that they are most likely to occur in the emergency department 
(24.1% of media reports in the sample), outpatient reception area (21.4%), internal 
medicine (7.6%), administrative offices (6.2%), surgery (5.8%), and obstetrics and 
gynecology (3.1).
407
 Based on data from courts and medical mediation committees in 
Beijing, the Blue Book of China’s Medical Reform (2014-2015) observed that the 
departments with the most disputes are the following (in descending order): obstetrics 
and gynecology, orthopedic surgery, general surgery, and emergency medicine.
408
 
Cardiology and cardiovascular surgery as well as neurosurgery are also departments that 
encounter high numbers of medical disputes.
409
 These patterns for medical disputes are 
not unique to China as these clinical specialties are generally high-risk.
410
 
Although not generally listed as a high-risk department for medical disputes, in 
China otolaryngology (ENT) has seen some of the most high-profile murder cases against 
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 “Bluebook: Secondary and Tertiary Hospitals Are More Prone to Medica Disputes, Ob/Gyn Has the 
Most [蓝皮书：二三级医院更易发生医疗纠纷 妇产科最多]--时政--人民网.” 
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physicians, and has been dubbed a “high-risk zone.”
411
 One of these high-profile cases 
occurred in Wenling, Zhejiang Province in October 2012 when a man who had 
complained several times about the outcome of his sinus surgery stabbed three doctors, 
killing one.
412
 In Qiqihaer, Heilongjiang Province, a dissatisfied 19-year-old patient beat 
an ENT physician to death with an iron rod.
413
  
Chinese ENT physicians have offered several reasons for why their specialty may 
attract more violence. In a group interview with ENT physicians conducted for this study, 
the head of a 3A hospital’s ENT department also felt puzzled by ENT becoming an 
epicenter for conflict, especially because her own department at the most has ever had 
three disputes per year.
414
 She hypothesized that the reason for it becoming an issue 
elsewhere had to do with the clinical approach to treatment, conjecturing that other ENT 
departments likely performed unnecessary surgeries on patients, whereas her department 
was more conservative in decisions to perform surgery.
415
  
In an interview with Xinhua News, Director Xu Ping of the ENT Department of 
the Fourth Affiliated Hospital of Harbin Medical University offered several additional 
reasons to explain why ENT may encounter more violence. One reason is that the nasal 
area is a relatively sensitive part of the body – when comparing it to other parts of the 
body, the nerves on the face are more sensitive and developed, and so even slight 
discomfort can have significant impact on someone’s daily life and can cause a patient’s 
                                                 
411
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mood to change. Dr. Xu also said that many ENT patients tend to be younger men, and 
that because men in the 20- to 30-year-old age group tend to become more easily agitated, 
it increases the danger for ENT clinicians. Another reason involves the gap between 
successful outcomes from a clinical standpoint versus success from the patient’s 
standpoint. He said that many patients still feel that their nose is obstructed after surgery, 




Yinao in Urban v. Rural Areas 
Yinao occurs in both urban and rural areas. Professional yinao protesters, however, 
tend to operate in larger urban areas because in smaller areas gangs are more easily 
recognizable to local authorities.
417
 Considering the data above suggesting that secondary 
and tertiary hospitals experience more of these incidents and that these types of hospitals 
tend to be located in urban areas
418
, urban areas likely experience more yinao than rural 
areas. However, these patterns may also have changed over the past few years. For 
example, a Nanjing hospital official noted in 2015 that even though his hospital still sees 
yinao every month, there have been fewer incidents in the past couple of years, and areas 
outside of the city see more professional yinao protesters.
419
 A report from 2013 on yinao 
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in clinics in rural Shandong Province highlights that yinao has “gone to the countryside,” 
resulting in the closing down of several clinics in rural areas.
420
 
Geographic Distribution of Yinao across China 
 Yinao occurs nationwide and likely more often in Eastern China. This is because 
as inferred above, if yinao events tend to occur in secondary and tertiary hospitals and 
these facilities tend to be more concentrated in Eastern China, Eastern China presumably 
experiences more yinao. Data on media reporting on violent incidents against health care 
workers support this hypothesis, showing that the provinces with the greatest number of 
media reports on these incidents are Guangdong, Jiangsu, Sichuan, Zhejiang, and 
Beijing.
421
 A map of the density of 3A hospitals (Figure 13) throughout China’s 
provinces corresponds closely with these results, with these five provinces showing the 
highest density of 3A facilities. Therefore, the figure below provides a possible picture of 
what the distribution of yinao incidents may look like across China. 
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Figure 13: 3A Hospital Density 
There are very few publications on yinao on the western Chinese provinces of 
Xinjiang and Tibet.
422
 While this in part may be because reporting and research in these 
areas are limited due to their political sensitivity, there may be other reasons why they are 
experiencing fewer yinao incidents. A Chinese surgeon volunteering in Xinjiang 
observed that Xinjiang’s lack of yinao may be due to a lower level of overall 
development, religious beliefs, the level of media reporting on these incidents, and 
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Yinao Compared to Other Dispute Resolution Institutions  
Not only has yinao become a national phenomenon, but also it has become a 
viable dispute resolution institution when compared to other options. Just as data on 
yinao are incomplete, so are the data on other dispute resolution methods. But comparing 
the available yinao data to available data on adjudication and mediation of medical 
disputes suggests that yinao is a viable dispute resolution method against these other 
options. Figure 14 combines data on medical cases received by courts and medical 
dispute mediation committees as well as yinao data from official and media sources and 
the author’s own calculations for yinao (explained in the first section of this chapter). 
Regardless of whether the incomplete official figures or the author’s hypothesized 
estimates are used for yinao, the data suggest that when compared to the other dispute 
resolution methods, yinao has been used just as often, if not more often than the other 
dispute resolution methods. The data suggest that from 2004-2006, resorting to yinao far 
outweighed using the court system. Comparing the official figure on yinao for 2006 to 
the official figure for medical dispute cases received by courts implies that yinao was 
used as often as the courts, and 2008 data suggest a similar conclusion. Beginning in 
2012, mediation begins to appear as another possible dispute resolution method next to 
the other options. However, if we compare mediation figures to available 2015 figures on 
yinao, yinao still represents a viable option for medical dispute resolution. 
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Figure 14: Use of Yinao Compared to Other Medical Dispute Resolution Methods 
 
A counterargument might oppose using this method of assessing yinao because it 
does not include figures on the total numbers of medical disputes, especially privately 
settled disputes with hospitals, which as stated above, make up the vast majority of 
medical disputes. Therefore, if this analysis were to consider the total number of medical 
disputes (the data are not available), yinao only may constitute a small fraction of the 
entire population of medical disputes and thus does not represent such a 
disproportionately popular form of dispute resolution method as the data I have provided 
in the figure above imply. This is an important point. Although nationwide data for the 
total number of medical disputes are unavailable except for 2013, and that data point is 
extremely vague, one of the 3A hospitals in this study gave some helpful figures to 
clarify the proportion of yinao to the total number of medical disputes. The Medical 
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200 medical disputes per year and about half of these disputes seeks compensation.
424
 In 
2015, the Medical Affairs Office reported that there were 10 to 20 yinao incidents per 
year or around one to two incidents per month.
425
 These numbers suggest that somewhere 
between a minimum of 5% (10/200) and a maximum of 20% (20/100) of medical 
disputes facing this hospital resorted to yinao in 2015. 
At the height of this hospital’s experience with yinao in 2010, it saw an estimated 
20 to 30 yinao incidents per year, suggesting that a minimum of 10% (20/200) to a 
maximum of 30% (30/100) of medical disputes used yinao. These ranges are wide, but 
regardless, they indicate even in the worst of times for yinao, the majority of 
complainants did not resort to it; however, for a portion of complainants yinao has been 
an important method in the dispute resolution process. Further, regardless of absolute 
numbers and proportions, yinao has had a larger social impact on the medical field and on 
society more generally, as Chapter 9 later discusses. 
Yinao and Violence against Health Care Workers Globally 
It would be inaccurate to pinpoint China’s health care system as uniquely violent; 
violence and aggression characterize health care settings worldwide, including both 
developed and developing countries.
426
 According to WHO statistics, between 8% and 38% 
of health care workers globally experience physical violence at some point in their 
careers and even more are threatened or exposed to verbal aggression.
427
 Spector et al. 
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estimate overall exposure rates of nurses worldwide to be 36.4% for physical violence, 
66.9% for nonphysical violence, 39.7% for bullying, and 25% for sexual harassment.
428
  
This section explores violence against health care workers in both the United 
States and in India to compare violent behaviors in these contexts to highlight some 
unique aspects of the Chinese case. I chose the United States because it is often a point of 
reference for China as it develops both its health care and legal systems, even though the 
two systems differ greatly between the two countries. I chose India because the Indian 
health care system faces many of the same challenges that Chinese hospitals face, such as 
overcrowding of hospitals, uneven development between urban and rural areas, and the 
predominance of violent incidents occurring at public hospitals. 
United States of America: Health Care Violence but No Yinao 
In the United States, employees in health care experience relatively high rates of 
violence compared to other occupations: The most recent data from the United States 
Bureau of Labor Statistics reveal the rate of injuries and illness from violence in the 
health care and social assistance industry “was more than three times greater than the 
violence rate for all private industries,”
 429
 with an incidence rate of 14.4 per 10,000 full 
time workers.
430
 The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 2015 
Guidelines for Preventing Workplace Violence for Healthcare and Social Service 
Workers reported, “While under 20% of all workplace injuries happen to health care 
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workers, healthcare workers suffer 50% of all assaults.”
431
 The International Healthcare 
Security and Safety Foundation’s (IHSSF) 2015 Crime Survey found that patient/client-
on-staff crime in hospitals accounted for 75% of aggravated assaults
432
 and 90% of all 
assaults
433
 at US hospitals.
434
 A unique aspect to the US context is the presence of guns in 
hospital violence. A 2012 study identified 154 hospital-related shootings from 2000-
2011.
435
 The most common victims of these incidents were the perpetrators (45%), while 
hospital employees accounted for 20% of the victims, physicians for 3%, and nurses for 
5%. However, shootings are a relatively rare form of hospital workplace violence when 
compared to other forms.
436
 
Research about hospital-based assault against health care workers in the US often 
focuses on nurses and physicians in emergency departments and psychiatric settings 
because they practice in high-risk environments.
437
 There is a general lack of research on 
violence against health care workers in the US,
438
 with much of the available data not 
being from within the past decade.
439
 The Minnesota Nurses’ Study shows that nurses 
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face an annual incidence rate of 39% for verbal assaults and 13% for physical assaults.
440
 
Another study reports that 46% of nurses reported some type of workplace violence 
during their five most recent shifts and of these nurses one third were physically 
assaulted.
441
 Emergency nurses have reported experiencing verbal assault at a rate of 100% 
and physical assault at a rate of 82.1% during the previous year.
442
 In a 2011 survey of 
ED physicians, 78% reported a violent incident in the past 12 months.
443
 In another study 
40% of psychiatrists reported having experienced assault.
444
  
No single factor determines violence in the workplace: the U.S. Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) reports that among the riskiest settings for 
work-related assault for healthcare and social workers include inpatient and acute 
psychiatric services, geriatric long-term care settings, high-volume emergency 
departments, and residential and day social services.
445
 Other factors of violence include 
pain, devastating prognoses, unfamiliar surroundings, mind and mood altering drugs, and 
disease progression.
446
 Through a review of the literature on the topic, James P. Phillips 
finds that the most common characteristic among perpetrators of workplace violence in 
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health care settings is “altered mental status associated with dementia, delirium, 
substance intoxication, or decompensated mental illness.”
447
 
While US health care settings are relatively violent when compared to other 
workplace settings, research and data do not show that using violence for reasons of 
dispute resolution is common; in other words yinao does not exist and is not seen as a 
viable way to resolve disputes with hospitals in the US. Of course in the US, questionable 
practices certainly occur within medical malpractice litigation, such as the phenomenon 
of “ambulance chasers.” Even though yinao is not a social phenomenon in the US, in 
recent years there has been a small handful of murders of physicians by patients or family 
members of patients who have had disputes with doctors. One of the most well-known of 
these incidents occurred in January 2015 when a man who blamed a surgeon at Brigham 
and Women’s Hospital in Boston for his mother’s death shot and killed the surgeon at the 
hospital and then killed himself.
448
 This incident has led to increased discussion about 
violence against physicians in the American medical community, with the American 
Medical Association in 2015 calling for more research on violence against physicians.
449
 
But as Phillips notes, even though this incident received a lot of media attention, the 
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India: Burgeoning yinao? 
 In the last couple of years, there have been increasing reports of patients and their 
families becoming violent in Indian health care settings. According to a study by the 
Indian Medical Association, three out of four doctors in India report that they have been 
attacked at work by disgruntled attendants (usually referring to family members of 
patients).
451
 Many of the stories of violence in India read like the ones in China. In 
September 2015, three resident doctors were assaulted at a hospital in Mumbai following 
the death of a three-year-old child from dengue fever. Family members proceeded to beat 
three doctors with wooden sticks and hospital chairs, and as a result, 4,500 resident 
doctors across Maharashtra state went on strike with a list of demands for better security 
at hospitals.
452
 Less than a month later, a mob of 250 people attacked a hospital following 
the death of a patient who had been admitted after a road accident.
453
 A doctor of the 
hospital under attack said: “The incidents of attacks on doctors are increasing at an 
alarming rate. This must stop or else the doctors would lose confidence in treating 
patients. No doctor would take risk to treat critically ill patients.”
454
  
The factors attributed to this violence are similar to those in China. According to a 
Times of India article, doctors say government hospitals suffer the majority of attacks 
because they deal with high volumes of patients who typically come from poverty and 
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have little or no knowledge of health care.
455
 One doctor recounts: “They feel that if their 
patient has been admitted to the ICU, then no matter what the condition, the doctors will 
cure him or her.”
456
 Another reason is corporatization of health care. According to a 
spokesperson from the Indian Medical Association: “People have now started equating 
money with good medical care. They get agitated if their patient doesn’t survive or 
improve despite spending on treatment.”
457
  Additionally doctors are overworked from 
high patient volumes and are admitted to medical school via entrance examination only; 
attitude and ethics are not part of the process.
458
 The lack of security personnel, corrupt 
police force, lack of faith in the judicial system, and no laws to protect the medical 
community are also seen as contributing factors.
459
 
 While the Indian health care system
460
 differs substantially from China’s, the two 
cases share some similar challenges: rural patients with little education and high 
expectations for health care,
461
unbalanced distribution of and access to quality health care 
facilities between urban and rural areas,
462
 lack of emphasis on ethics education for 
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 high out-of-pocket expenditures,
464
 and low public investment.
465
 There are 
also similar patterns for violence – it often follows the death of a patient. It is unclear 
from the stories above whether this is about momentary anger or if families actually see 
violence as a viable way for dispute resolution. Dr. Paurush Ambesh’s analysis implies a 
combination of both: “The common public has complete lack of faith in the judicial 
system and feels it is only the rich who obtain justice. Thus in instances of patient death, 
people believe that exacting immediate revenge, seeking their pound of flesh using 
physical means rather than filing a case in court.”
466
 If this analysis is true there is a slight 
different between yinao and the violence in India – Ambesh implies in India patients and 
families use violence for the purpose of revenge, but in China violent behaviors also 
represent an effective means for soliciting payment from hospitals. This study so far has 
not found any Indian cases using other forms of yinao aside from assault and has found 
no evidence of professional third-party groups resorting to violence on behalf of families.  
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I argue that yinao encompasses a broad range of both disruptive 
and non-disruptive behaviors, stemming from many possible motives, and committed by 
different groups of people. I argue against the simple definition often used officially that 
portrays yinao as destructive groups using medical disputes as excuses to obtain 
unrealistic amounts of money because empirically it is not evident that this is always the 
case. This point is particularly important because adaptive policies addressing yinao must 
respond to the spectrum of nuances it encompasses.  
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By using available data, this chapter also suggests that yinao has seen rising 
trends over the past two decades and that it represents a viable option in the medical 
dispute resolution process compared to the other options available. This bolsters the idea 
that yinao has become an increasingly socially legitimate dispute resolution option. 
Lastly, in this chapter I showed that while violence against health care workers occurs 
worldwide, the violence is not necessarily within the context of dispute resolution, though 
some countries like India are showing similar trends to China; however, many of the 
ways in which yinao are carried out in China are unique. The following chapter delves 
further into the deeper sources of yinao that policies to address it must further 




CHAPTER 6: YINAO’S DEVELOPMENT INTO A SOCIAL 
PHENOMENON 
 
The previous chapters have provided the foundation for the central question asked 
by this chapter: why and how did yinao become a social phenomenon nationwide? 
Chapter 5 documented yinao’s growth over time using available data, showing that it has 
become a large-scale social phenomenon and is used at least as often as other channels 
for medical dispute resolution. Chapter 4 revealed the many issues within China’s 
medical complaint and dispute resolution systems, hypothesizing that in a society that 
breeds its citizenry to complain (“emboldened complainants”) yet at the same offers no 
credible channels for further recourse, people may be more inclined to resort to means 
outside of official channels (like yinao) to settle their disputes. 
 However, only examining the dispute resolution system fails to consider 
important social, cultural, health, economic, and development factors that have arguably 
contributed to yinao. This chapter identifies and evaluates these factors in order to 
explore their possible relationship to yinao as it developed into a nationwide social 
phenomenon over time. It argues that while there are multiple variables that contribute to 
yinao, the increase of Internet usage in China beginning in the 2000s is one of the main 
reasons for yinao’s development into a social phenomenon because Internet access 
enabled increased awareness of yinao as potentially legitimate and effective means for 
medical dispute resolution.  
In order to make this argument, I first identify, analyze, and untangle the many 
social, cultural, health, law enforcement, and development variables that have been 
associated with yinao. As I analyze these variables, I place them in a process that I argue 
leads to yinao (see below). This model shows that while health care variables foment 
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disputes and frustration, other variables intervene to influence the choice of how patients 
and families may choose to settle those disputes. I build my argument by first defining 
the period of time when yinao become a social phenomenon. I then proceed to analyze 
the following sets of variables: health care system factors, law enforcement, Chinese 
traditional and political culture, Internet, and media. After analyzing these variables and 
developing their relationship to yinao, I draw some cross-national comparisons and do a 
counterfactual analysis to test the process I have developed.  
Yinao’s Development as a Social Phenomenon Over Time 
 In order to assess how different variables may have impacted the development of 
yinao over time, it is important to identify when yinao roughly began and when it started 
to become a social phenomenon. I define a social phenomenon as a behavior occurring 
frequently nationwide to the point it has become officially recognized and widely known 
(see the previous chapter for trends in data over time). Though not officially called yinao 
in the 1980s, existing evidence shows that yinao was a cross-province phenomenon as 
early as 1986. An excerpt from a People’s Daily article from 1986 reads:  
“Recently reporters have received many letters from readers, reacting to events of 
disorderly behavior, vandalism in hospitals, shaming and assault of health care 
workers repeatedly occurring. Through investigation, we have found that this year 
from February through July, Beijing, Hubei, Henan, Hunan, Yunnan, Shandong, 
etc. have seen 31 of these incidents, both large and small. The city of Wuhan 
within the last month has seen 18 incidents, seriously disrupting hospitals’ normal 
work order. The physical security of medical personnel has been seriously 
threatened. According to current understanding, these incidents are mostly dealt 




Despite the existence of yinao in 1986, between 1986 and 2004, online archive 
searches of China’s leading Party newspaper, the People’s Daily, for the term yinao and 
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other terms associated with it
468
 produce no results; it is unclear whether this is because 
yinao behaviors decreased, stopped, or if they were not being reported on. Stories about 
yinao resumed in the People’s Daily in 2004
469
 and the Ministry of Education recognized 
yinao as a word in 2006.
470
 The resurgence of yinao in the early 2000s is somewhat 
surprising given the silence about it in the People’s Daily for almost two decades. Of 
course, this is only one national media outlet, and there may have been local news about 
these incidents; however, because I am interested in yinao’s emergence as a national 
phenomenon, focusing on the People’s Daily coverage of it is appropriate.  
Further, fieldwork interviews repeatedly demonstrated the view that yinao is a 
more recent phenomenon developing around the early 2000s, though perhaps with some 
variation from region to region. For example, when asked about when yinao began, a 
hospital administrator in Beijing approximated that it began around 1997-1998, recalling 
that when he went to study abroad in 1992, yinao did not exist, but when he came back in 
1997, it existed.
471
 A hospital administrator in Nanjing reported that around 2002-2003, 
yinao incidents began to accelerate.
472
 A nurse recalled that when she began her 
internship in 2001 in the northeastern province of Jilin, the doctor-patient relationship 
was not tense and patients respected doctors.
473
 A daughter of a physician in Guangzhou 
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recalled frequently spending time in a hospital as a young child with her father in the 
1980s and 1990s, noting that during those years, the hospital was a safe place where 
people listened and respected doctors
474
; it was not a place to fear patient violence. 
Based on the evidence above, the timeline for the development of yinao can be 
sketched out as follows: yinao began to emerge in the 1980s and to take off as a social 
phenomenon around the early 2000s, to eventually become coined as a term in 2006. 
Incomplete official and survey data from the previous chapter suggest that since early 
2002 (when data is first available for yinao), the number of yinao incidents has continued 
to climb (see figure below developed based on analysis in Chapter 5). This chapter is thus 
interested in understanding what happened in the early 2000s that turned yinao into a 
social phenomenon and what made yinao incidents continue to increase.  
Figure 8: Available Nationwide Data on Yinao 
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Figure 15: Development of Yinao Over Time 
 
With the above timeline in mind, I proceed to assess a number of potential causal 
variables – both for yinao and its proliferation. I use “process tracing” in this chapter, 
meaning I analyze how variables change over time. I do not use quantitative data analysis 
because I do not have adequate data on the dependent variable (yinao) to do so (see 
chapter 5 for more information about available data on yinao). 
Health Care System Variables 
 Issues in China’s health care system are undoubtedly responsible for the 
development of yinao; without issues in China’s health care system, there would not be 
any medical disputes at all since this is their place of origin. This section explores four 
important variables that have contributed to yinao: 1) high out-of-pocket costs; 2) 
corruption due to public hospital financing; 3) healthcare workers’ weak interpersonal 
communication skills; and 4) patient health education and awareness.  
High Out-of-Pocket Costs for Healthcare 
High out-of-pocket costs for healthcare in China correspond with the beginning of 
yinao as a social phenomenon in the early 2000s when average out-of-pocket costs as a 
percentage of total health care expenditure reached its peak at nearly 60%.
475
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Figure 16: Out-of-Pocket Health Expenditure (% of total expenditure on health) 
Source: The World Bank 
 
China’s high-out-of pocket costs are due to changes in China’s health care 
insurance coverage over time and the financing of public hospitals. In the first few years 
of the fledgling People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
sought to establish health care coverage for both urban and rural residents, though 
coverage varied widely between these two groups. In 1952 the State Council introduced 
the Labor Insurance System
476
 and the Government Insurance System,
477
 which covered 
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China’s small but growing urban population.
478
 Health insurance programs for urban 
residents combined contributions from work units (called danwei) and the central 
government.
479
 Towards the end of the 1950s, the nation’s vast countryside launched 
health campaigns,
480
establishing cooperative medical schemes managed by agricultural 
communes that provided basic health care services.
481
 Although the agricultural 
collectives during the Mao era (1949-1976) are notorious for creating famine and 
inefficiency, they also were fundamental units for delivering health care services, 
providing training to millions of midwives, barefoot doctors, and medics.
482
 Eggleston 
notes that even though barefoot doctors were not well educated, “the widespread 
availability and use of basic medicines, including traditional Chinese medicines, and 




As China opened its economy to the world and began market reforms in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, the government largely withdrew its investment from the health 
care sector. In urban areas, as public funding declined, urban residents saw the 
implementation of user fees for health care.
484
 In rural areas, the implementation of the 
new household responsibility system, which organized farms around families instead of 
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communes, dissolved both the agricultural collectives and the health services they 
provided.
485
 Village doctors became fee-for-service private providers as a result.
486
 The 
rate of rural health care coverage via cooperatives dropped from about 70-80% of the 
rural population in the 1970s to less than 10% in the 1980s.
487
 By 1999, insurance levels 
in rural areas dropped to 7% of counties.
488
 Eggleston notes that between 1980 and 2000, 
the majority of China’s population did not have health insurance.
489
 Government 
subsidies for health care service providers covered less than 10% of their expenses, with 
the remainder earned through fee-for-service payment from uninsured patients.
490
  
 This history highlights that starting in the 1980s, the period when yinao began, 
many Chinese citizens lost their health care insurance, increasing their out-of-pocket 
costs. Out-of-pocket costs as a percentage of total health expenditure reached its 
maximum in the early 2000s, when yinao began to take off; these two events are 
correlated. Although, out-of-pocket costs as a percentage of total expenditure on 
healthcare decreased over time, in absolute terms, health care was still expensive as total 
out-of-pocket costs and per capita costs continued to rise.
491
 Thus high out-of-pocket 
costs have accompanied yinao since it first appeared in the 1980s and has been a 
continuing context for yinao’s beginnings in the 1980s until the present.  
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 High out-of-pocket costs alone, however, do not cause people to choose various 
forms of protest and violence, though they can cause financial distress, heightened 
expectations, and if exceedingly high, can raise suspicion about the intentions of 
caregivers. All of these factors can lead to frustration and disagreement, but the choice of 
how to settle this disagreement and vent this frustration must involve additional factors. 
Corruption Fueled by Financial Structure of Public Hospitals 
China’s shift away from a publicly sponsored health care system during the 
reform period beginning in the late 1970s not only hurt patients, but also had damaging 
effects on public hospitals and their staffs as well. As a result of the shift to a more 
market-oriented economy, health care in China also became market-oriented, and the 
government made hospitals responsible for their own revenue.
492
 This led to profit-driven 
behavior, such as dependence on higher priced drugs and tests for income, the denial of 




Doctors’ incomes became directly tied to their clinical department’s profits each 
month as well as pharmaceutical bribes. In public hospitals, doctors’ total income is 
comprised of three components: 1) the official fixed government salary they receive 
based on their rank, which tends to be low, and as one physician noted, much of it goes 
directly to social security; 2) bonuses based on their clinical department’s profit for the 
month and their rank (an attending physician would get a higher bonus than a resident); 3) 
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 The majority of their income comes from the latter two 
components, so doctors have a direct incentive to generate income for their departments 
and themselves by ordering more diagnostic and laboratory tests for their patients and to 
prescribe more medicines from certain pharmaceutical companies to receive kickbacks. 
Until recently, hospitals have been allowed to mark up drugs by as much as by 
15%
495
 to generate income, so doctors were incentivized to unnecessarily or 
overprescribe medication,
496
 creating the phenomenon of “using medicine [sales] to 
support hospitals” (以药补医), a phrase indicating that pharmaceutical profits represent a 
significant source of income that hospitals rely on to remain solvent. The figure below 
shows the proportion of different income sources (government subsidy, pharmaceutical 
sales income, other income from inpatient and outpatient services) for public hospitals 
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Figure 17: Chinese Public Hospital Income Sources (averages for each category) 
Source: Health Statistics Yearbook 2013 
 
As a result of reliance on income from pharmaceuticals and diagnostic testing, 
hospitals gained a reputation for organizational corruption, and patients increasingly 
distrusted them due to these practices and others like “arbitrarily and illicitly charging 
patients” (luan shoufei), taking bribes from pharmaceutical companies, using substandard 
and fake medicines (jialieyao) to treat patients, and doctors accepting red envelopes
497
 of 
cash from patients prior to procedures.
498
 In addition to the Chinese government’s 
reduced financial commitment to the health care sector since the 1980s, Weikeung Tam 
also attributes burgeoning organizational corruption to the “excessive and chaotic 
development” of the pharmaceutical sector that competes for hospital orders by bribing 
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them and a failed state regulatory infrastructure to check corrupt behavior.
499
 Tam 
observes that “instead of providing efficient, safe and affordable treatment for patients, 




Evidence from studies on prescribing behaviors in China confirms that Chinese 
physicians prescribe medicine at alarming rates. In a 2008-2011 study, Chinese 
physicians averaged an exceptionally high prescription rate for outpatients, averaging 62% 
of visits resulting in antibiotic prescription and 39% of visits when patients questioned 
the use of the antibiotic.
501
 By contrast in the US, outpatient visits resulting in antibiotic 
prescription have been declining from an average of 18% of outpatient visits resulting in 
an antibiotic prescription from 1995-1996 to 15% in 2001-2002
502
; a new US study since 
shows that overall rates of prescribing for adults have not changed from 2000-2010.
503
 
To summarize, as health insurance coverage decreased, prices for health care 
increased. This trend set up the patient-doctor relationship to become tense as patients 
had high expectations for the expensive care they were receiving and doctors had to 
charge patients for unnecessary medicines and tests in order for their hospitals to remain 
solvent. Interviews with physicians confirmed this information. One physician exclaimed, 
“I give you five tests, but you only need two. The hospital needs to survive.”
504
  Another 
doctor candidly admitted that while tending to the patient’s illness is always his most 
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important consideration, in order to reap benefits from drug companies, he also prescribes 
additional unnecessary medicines, such as those that will have no effect on patients’ 
health and Chinese medicines, which he implied are also harmless.
505
  
Though implied by the analysis above, it is worth noting that doctors do not make 
additional money from consultation fees: whether they see 10 or 70 patients in a day 
makes no direct difference in their income (excluding, of course, the degree to which they 
charge for tests and medications). One physician said, although he is only required to 
have three outpatient sessions per week, he has five because of demand, but he makes no 
extra money from this directly, and promotions of physicians are also not based on how 
many consultations they have;
506
 in other words, the compensation does not reward the 
time he spends with his patients. Consultation fees are also exceptionally low. For 
example, while shadowing an attending physician who was also the director of his 
clinical department in a 3A public hospital in the southeastern city of Guangzhou, the 
author also requested a consultation with him, which cost RMB 7 – just a little over US 
$1. However, the author left with over RMB 500 (USD $74.11) in prescribed medications. 
One possible explanation given for low consultation fees in public hospitals is the 
government does not want to make it appear as if poor citizens would be unable to see the 
best doctors. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and National 
Health and Family Planning Commission (NHFPC) are seeking to adjust the high prices 
of drugs and the low price of medical services over time.
507
 The next chapter on state 
responses addresses these policies in more detail. 
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Hospital financing creates a context of mistrust because physicians are 
incentivized to overcharge patients. If patients feel that as soon as their interactions with 
healthcare workers begin, they are being cheated, presumably there is a greater likelihood 
that frustration and disputes will emerge. Even though hospital dependence on profits 
from pharmaceutical sales and lab tests began in the 1980s, as interviews and lack of 
news reporting on yinao during this time period imply, through the 1980s and 1990s, 
patient-physician relations were not yet so dire that yinao was emerging as a regular 
pattern of behavior. Like out of-pocket costs, tension created due to known corruption in 
the healthcare system can contribute to frustration, disputes, and can even be used to 
justify violent actions against corrupt physicians, but corruption itself does not create 
society-wide violence and protest against health care workers. 
Lack of Emphasis on Interpersonal Skills for Healthcare Workers  
 In addition to the poor incentives created by the pricing system for medical goods 
and services, the selection of health care professionals as well as the incentives created by 
the system for their promotion also do not motivate providing quality care and effective 
communication to patients, increasing the likelihood for disagreements with patients. In 
China, students begin studying medicine as their primary major at the undergraduate 
level and are admitted based on their college entrance examination scores. When they 
receive their exam scores, they rank colleges and preferred majors based on how 
competitive their exam scores are – students might have a high enough score to be 
admitted into a top school, but not high enough to be admitted into the department they 
want. Moreover, because only some schools have a separate code for health care majors, 
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unfortunately this system places a number of students in health care professions who did 
not choose them to begin with: one study found that in universities that do not have a 
separate code for health-care related majors, 17% of medical students had not chosen 
medicine as their first choice.
508
 As Hou et al. observe, “Patients presumably would 
rather be cared for by a professional who has expressed preference for a health service 
career rather than a professional who expressed preferences for other occupations but 
were involuntarily assigned to health services.”
509
 
Once students begin attending medical school, the curriculum often fails to equip 
them with skills that would facilitate positive relationships with their patients. While 
students receive an education with a heavy emphasis on basic biomedicine, medical 
technology, and clinical medicine, they have little exposure to the humanities, social 
sciences, communication skills, ethics, population studies, or public health.
510
 A survey 
of physicians confirmed that physician training in China lacks “core humanistic 
components that nurture empathy and caregiving.”
511
  
Interviews conducted for this study found that the impact of this lack of training 
lasts throughout physicians’ careers: a group of gynecologists and nurses readily admitted 
that they needed to strengthen their communication skills.
512
 Communication skills 
matter especially to gynecologists because they manage high patient volumes that give 
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them little time to communicate with patients in situations with especially sensitive 
medical and family issues involving women and infants.
513
 
Not only do the admissions and education processes predispose physicians to not 
focus on their relationships with their patients, but incentives for their career progression 
also fail to motivate patient satisfaction. The main indicator for career evaluation for 
physicians is their publications in China’s Science Citation Index,
514
 not patient 
satisfaction or the quality of care they provide. Because doctors are under considerable 
pressure to publish each year, they spend less time treating patients, affecting both the 
quality of treatment and the patient-doctor relationship.
515
 The pressure has also led to 
physicians falsifying data and the rise of ghostwriting companies, which have all 
damaged the credibility of Chinese medical research.
516
 Other authors feel that while 
promotion criteria for physicians needs to be reevaluated, ultimately the bigger issue is 
time; physicians waste a lot of time seeing illnesses that they do not need to see because 
there is no gatekeeping system in China that prevents someone with a common cold from 
going to a well-equipped hospital.
517
  
 The analysis above shows that China’s health care admission, education, and 
promotion systems do not equip physicians with the interpersonal skills and time needed 
for strong doctor-patient relationships. While these factors may exacerbate conflict 
between doctors and patients, again they cannot explain why patients may choose yinao 
to settle their conflicts. 
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Issues in Patient Education and Awareness  
Issues in patient education and awareness about health and legal contracts also 
may contribute to frustration and conflict. Interviews with physicians found that there 
were two main issues regarding patients’ knowledge about health. The first is that many 
people lack a basic understanding of healthcare. As one doctor said, “Health care is not 
safe, and a lot of people do not understand [this.] [They] don’t understand risk. Medicine, 
this thing, is not safe.”
518
 Lack of patient health knowledge coupled with high out-of-
pocket costs makes it especially difficult for patients and families to accept bad health 
outcomes.   
 Yet on the other hand, information available online also has contributed to 
patients mistrusting doctors – clinicians in the ER said when patients read about medical 
illnesses on Baidu (Chinese Google equivalent), it makes them more anxious about their 
condition.
519
 Other physicians said patients doubt them because they are overconfident 
about what they have read on Baidu  – the phenomenon in Chinese is called “seeing the 
doctor on Baidu” (百度看病). One clinical department director estimated for every 30 
patients she sees, there are 1-2 patients that think they know more than the doctor because 
of what they have read on Baidu.
520
 While increasingly accessible medical information 
has impacted the patient-physician relationship globally and at times has represented a 
source of concern for physicians,
521
 increased information does not necessarily have a 
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negative impact on patients as it can empower them and relieve the burden on physicians 
to be the sole provider of information.
522
  
An additional issue related to patient knowledge concerns general social 
awareness about the meaning of contracts. When I asked a Medical Affairs Office about 
whether there was informed consent prior to surgery, they said the family members must 
sign an informed consent agreement, and they even record the entire interaction of 
explaining the medical procedure; however, when something goes wrong, according to 
the Medical Affairs Office, the contract that patients and their families had signed does 
not seem to matter.
523
 One interviewee said this reflects a more general problem in China 
with the “spirit regarding contracts” (heyue jingshen, 合约精神) and noted it was not just 
in health care, but in real estate, there are also violent behaviors used around contract-
related issues as well.
524
 
Even though patient issues in healthcare knowledge and disregard for legal 
contracts may contribute to frustration and conflict between patients and doctors, neither 
of these phenomena explain why patients may resolve their conflicts through yinao. 
Again, like many of the health care variables above, these are all sources of doctor-
patient tension and potential disputes, but do not explain the choice to resort to yinao. 
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Building Diagram to Yinao 
Based on this analysis, I build the beginning of the process leading to yinao 
(below). Any of the health care system issues mentioned above can lead to or exacerbate 
frustration. For example, more corruption and greater out-of-pocket costs could make 
patients and families more frustrated with health care. But as the analysis above noted, 
while these health care system issues cause frustration, the channeling of frustration to 
yinao cannot be explained by these health care system variables alone.  
 
Figure 18: Health Care System Variables in the Process to Yinao 
 
Public Security and Law Enforcement Factors 
 While issues in the healthcare system may drive frustration and possible conflicts 
between patients and physicians, they cannot explain how yinao became a widespread 
social phenomenon. For yinao to have become a nationwide social phenomenon, it would 
have needed the ability to grow – this is where public security and law enforcement play 
a crucial role. In the Chinese government, the Ministry of Public Security governs the 
policing and law enforcement system. In the fall of 2014, a frustrated hospital Party 












Figure 2: Health Care System Variables in the Process to Yinao 
 157 
instances of violence but not this type [yinao]?”
525
 This question is difficult to answer 
definitively, but potential answers include the existing laws related to punishing yinao 
and the political contexts surrounding law enforcement. This section first reviews laws 
relevant to hospital security prior to the explicit criminalization of group-led yinao in 
2015 and then examines other contexts that may have affected their enforcement. 
An Uncertain Legal Framework Surrounding Yinao?  
A common explanation for why police do not intervene revolves around the claim 
that the laws and regulations are unclear about how to handle yinao. In a comprehensive 
review of the laws and regulations surrounding law enforcement for yinao, Liu Weining 
argues that legislation is incomplete, enforcement is difficult, and the system for 
accountability is unclear.
526
 Two main issues he highlights that inhibit police from 
decisively controlling yinao are the following: 1) police recognize yinao as part of civil 
disputes, so do not treat yinao behaviors like crimes
527
; and 2) there is a lack of clarity of 
the definition for yinao within existing laws.
528
 He cites Article 46 of the 2002 Medical 
Accident Regulations as the reason police regard medical disputes as civil disputes: 
“Patients and hospitals can discuss and resolve compensation and other civil disputes for 
medical accidents that have occurred.”
529
 This allows for private settlement between 
patients and doctors, and as Liu argues, this created a dilemma as to whether or not police 
should intervene: if police intervene, then there is an issue of violating the right of 
doctors and patients to autonomously manage their conflicts; if police ignore it, then they 
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might be failing to carry out appropriate legal and administrative duties.
530
 In most cases, 
police choose not to intervene, which has further encouraged practitioners of yinao to 
create disturbances at hospitals since there has been no harsh punishment for it.
531
 When I 
posed Liu’s argument to a former head of a Medical Affairs Office, he said there have 
always been laws to handle yinao, and confirmed that the police view yinao as a type of 
civil dispute. Then he added, “ I think this is an excuse.”
532
  
Both of Liu’s arguments are problematic. First, the logic that police intervention 
interferes with private dispute resolution is weak because it assumes that intervening to 
stop yinao behaviors is mutually exclusive with private dispute settlement. For example, 
if police detain a group of people with a malpractice claim for blocking an ambulance 
from a hospital entrance, this does not by definition hinder the hospital and the family 
from settling the dispute privately, aside from the practical issue that detainment may 
result in delaying dispute resolution. The key issue is that regardless of the backdrop of a 
medical dispute, blocking an ambulance is still a crime,
533
 and the context of the medical 
dispute should not be the reason for police to refuse to take action. This would be like 
saying during a divorce, a husband vandalized his wife’s property, but the police will not 
intervene when she calls them because a divorce is a civil dispute; clearly crimes can 
happen within the process of civil dispute settlement. Further, the Public Security 
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Administration Punishment Law’s Article 5 (1986 version)
534
 and Article 9 (2005 
version)
535
 state that in civil disputes violating public security like those involving 
fighting or destruction of property, public security authorities can intervene to mediate 
the conflict if the situation is not horribly serious. The 2005 version further adds that if 
the situation cannot be resolved through mediation or an agreement was not carried out, 
police can otherwise punish violators of public security according to law in the context of 
civil disputes. These legal articles clearly indicate that public security authorities can 
intervene in civil dispute resolution, whether it is to help mediate or hold people 
accountable for illegal public security violations, so the excuse that police cannot 
intervene in civil disputes, according to law, is simply untrue. 
Second, despite the claims of the uncertainty of the legal framework specifically 
for managing yinao and yinao’s definition, the legal framework for managing yinao is 
actually surprisingly clear and was quite comprehensive from as early as 1986. Since that 
time, there have been a number of laws, regulations, and circulars by central ministries 
directly and indirectly addressing yinao,
536
 even prior to formal criminalization of group-
led yinao in 2015.
537
 For the remainder of the section, I focus my analysis on the Public 
Security Administration Punishments Law as well as the on the “Joint Notice on 
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Protecting Hospital Order” because they are most directly relevant for addressing yinao 
as it started to turn into a social phenomenon in the early 2000s.
538
 
Table 5 on page 160 below shows that by 2005 nearly all types of behaviors that 
constitute yinao had been prohibited by laws or policy documents. As early as 1986, the 
Health Ministry and Public Security Ministry issued a joint statement specifically on 
maintaining order in hospitals that prohibited funeral offerings on hospital premises, 
placing corpses in public areas, vandalizing hospital property, and shaming and 
assaulting health care workers.
539
 While the Public Security Administration Punishments 
Law in 1986 did not as specifically prohibit as many yinao behaviors, it prohibited 
“disturbing the order of medical institutions” and specifically prohibited threatening and 
shaming others, limiting another person’s freedom, and assaulting someone.
540
 In fact by 
1986, all but two yinao behaviors (hanging condemnatory banners and blocking doors 
and offices) were explicitly prohibited between these two documents. By 2005, when the 
Public Security Administration Punishments Law, was redrafted, even more yinao 
behaviors were added to this law: a condemnatory, setting out corpses, hindering 
ambulance mobility, and vandalizing both private and public property (see Table 5 for 
specific article references in each document).  
 Given that there was no lack of documentation prohibiting yinao, then why have 
police tended to not respond to yinao incidents? Another argument is that the terms 
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within the legal framework are unclear. For example, the term “public place” is often 
unclear or left undefined by laws.
541
 Liu Weining asks, when someone leaves a corpse 
out, what parts of a hospital does “public place” apply to?
542
 If yinao occurs in the 
hospital’s main courtyard, lobby, waiting room, or individual sickroom, what law should 
be used? Again, the logic here is weak, especially with regards to public hospitals 
because they are classified as “public institutions” (shiye danwei, 事业单位), so by 
definition they are institutions created by the government for public service. One 
interview also implied it did not matter whether it was public or private property: “In 
other types of crimes, like robbing a bank, the police will come, no questions asked. It 
seems like in all other acts of violence, protest, they will come, but not for yinao. Why is 
it that they respond to other instances of violence but not this type?”
543
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Law Enforcement under Zhou Yongkang and President Hu Jintao 
 The laws themselves are insufficient for explaining why they were not enforced; 
they are not as unclear as they are often characterized to be. However, there are other 
important political contexts surrounding these laws that may have contributed to yinao’s 
ability to flourish: the directives of former Minister of Public Security Zhou Yongkang 
and the weiwen (stability maintenance) policy of Hu Jintao.  
The now imprisoned but formerly powerful Zhou Yongkang was Minister of 
Public Security (governs police in China) from 2002-2007. He then became a member of 




 and also became 
the head of the powerful Central Party Political-Legal Committee, where he continued to 
have power over China’s legal and public security systems until 2012.
545
 An interview 
with a hospital administrator revealed the connection of Zhou Yongkang to yinao, saying 
that Zhou Yongkang’s handling of yinao was a mistake – he treated medical disputes as 
“civil issues,” “causing our administration of justice to fall back.”
546
 When I asked this 
interviewee how he knew this, he said that this is what the police told him - that this 
policy (to treat yinao as part of civil disputes and to not intervene) was a policy of the 
national Ministry of Public Safety,
547
 which Zhou Yongkong led during the rise of yinao 
in the early 2000s. When this interviewee led his hospital’s Medical Affairs Office, the 
police would only respond in the most serious of cases, but not in cases, for example, 
such as placing the corpse in the hospital public areas. He said, “[If] no one has hit you, 
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they won’t handle it.”
548
 He mentioned hanging banners, setting up funeral altars and 
wreaths, blocking doors, and even some violent behaviors could all be seen in the context 
of civil disputes.
549
 While I have not further validated this claim, if true, it explains why 
the claim of yinao behaviors being civil disputes worked as a valid explanation for police 
non-intervention despite clarity in the law for police to handle civil disputes: the public 
security tsar Zhou Yongkang had said so, supporting the well-known fact that often 
powerful leaders in China ultimately wield enforcement power. 
In the broader political context of Zhou Yongkang’s alleged policy on yinao was 
former President Hu Jintao’s (General Secretary of CCP from 2002-2012) overarching 
policy of building a “socialist harmonious society,” with “stability maintenance” (weiwen) 
as an important way to achieve this.
550
 Although the bureaucratic infrastructure to enforce 
social stability arguably began following the Tiananmen democracy movement of 
1989,
551
 enforcement of stability maintenance during the early and mid 2000s under the 
Hu Jintao administration saw some changes in enforcing public security.
552
 During this 
time, the framework for police enforcement around stability maintenance became 
increasingly based on Mao Zedong’s view of criminal justice built on his “theory of 
social contradictions.”
553
 This theory differentiates between “contradictions” (conflicts) 
among the people (like yinao) and those that threaten the CCP (this latter type of 
contradiction can be broadly defined, but the highly organized spiritual group Falun 
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Gong is a clear example of this).
554
 As a result of this mindset, the majority of people 
were to be treated with more lenience because their conflicts were just amongst 




Another possible reason for this shift in police force policy may have also been in 
part due to the controversial 2003 Sun Zhigang case. Sun Zhigang was a 27-year-old 
college graduate from Wuhan who was taken into custody in Guangzhou for not having a 
residence permit and was brutally beaten to death while in detention.
556
 The news 
exploded online, and netizens called upon the government to severely punish the 
perpetrators of the crime and to handle the case openly and publicly, forming a large, 
powerful wave of public opinion.
557
 This led to a reputation crisis for Chinese police, 
especially those in Guangzhou,
558
 and according to one interviewee, “After this, all of 
China’s police dared not to fully perform the tasks of their job” (“全中国的警察不敢做
到位”).559  Before this incident, “law enforcement had been too strong” (“执法的权利 以
前太强”).560 
Social Stability Policy Bleeding into Hospital Governance 
Notably, the timing of Hu Jintao’s leadership, the more lenient management of 
crime via social stability policy, as well as the Sun Zhigang case all occurred in the early 
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2000s - right around the beginnings of yinao’s turn into a social phenomenon. Interviews 
suggest that the combined lack of police force to manage yinao in addition to 
employment incentives for officials to maintain social stability
561
 put hospitals in a 
difficult position. A surgeon commented that a mission of social stability policy (weiwen) 
is to control issues like yinao, adding, “On the surface, [weiwen] looks tranquil, but 
beneath, there are undercurrents surging.”
562
 
A hospital administrator explained that weiwen also exists in the United States, 
but maintaining public security in the US is based on law; China, however, “depends on 
people to maintain social stability” (kaoren lai weiwen, 靠人来为维稳).563 As a result, it 
becomes a vicious cycle: “Patients will threaten the hospital, [saying] ‘If you don’t give 
me money, I’ll make trouble.’ They threaten you, they will leave the corpse out 
somewhere, set up wreaths, burn funeral money, [threaten] to go to Tiananmen.”
564
 When 
asked if patients would really go to Tiananmen for medical disputes, the interviewee 
exclaimed, “It doesn’t matter if it is real or not, we have to regard it as if it were true.”
565
  
He explained how the internal reporting process for public hospitals worked: 
hospitals have to report yinao and other incidents to their superiors in their overseeing 
governing agency, and the higher authorities will say to them, “this [incident] cannot 
leave the hospital.”
566
 The hospitals then give the threatening patients money to make the 
issue disappear: “one person gets money, the next person gets money,”
567
 so it becomes a 
pattern of behavior. The authorities want to ensure the “earlier to not have something 
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562
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happen” (早点别出事). The interviewee concluded, “This is not maintaining stability 
according to law. They [the patients] will threaten, and the way we have [carried out] 
weiwen has contributed to this. China’s social stability maintenance is very 
complicated.”
568
 He added that the overall situation has improved since Xi Jinping has 
come to power and especially since 2015 when yinao was criminalized. These responses 
will be dealt with in the next chapter. 
Adding to the Diagram to Yinao 
 In the last section I established how health care issues could lead to frustration. 
This section analyzes how that frustration may be channeled in the decision to use yinao. 
When police do not respond to yinao incidents, this tacitly legitimatizes yinao behaviors. 
When hospitals pay off protesters as a result of weiwen policies, they make yinao 
effective. If complainants see that yinao is both a legitimate and effective way for settling 
claims, then they are likely more willing to use yinao to resolve disputes. 
Figure 19: Addition of Law Enforcement and Social Stability Variables 
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The Media: Negative Media Coverage of Physicians 
 Healthcare workers often note that negative media coverage of notorious medical 
dispute cases has fomented tense doctor-patient relations, contributing to the 
development of yinao.
569
 Two famous cases that are particularly notorious are “the 
postpartum woman whose anus was sown up” (产妇肛门北缝事件).570 and “eight cents-
gate” (八宝们),571 both which accused doctors of malpractice and ended up being false. 
However, other stories, like “doctors fleeing” (yi paopao), in which health care workers 
fled an operating room on fire without saving the patient, were true.
572
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While these viral stories about corruption and malpractice in China’s hospitals 
may not directly cause yinao incidents, they generate a culture of bias against healthcare 
workers, which may help justify violence and protest against them. For this reason, I also 
add them as a legitimatizing factor for yinao in the diagram. The Internet plays a crucial 
role in this process because it enables these stories to go viral in the first place. The next 
section exclusively discusses the role of Internet in aiding yinao to become a social 
phenomenon. 




 While yinao incidents started to accelerate around the early 2000s, China’s 
Internet usage per 100 people was also increasing at the same time (see graph below). 
While the Internet could not have caused yinao, it arguably has made it possible for more 
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Figure 4: Addition of Negative News Coverage of Physicians 
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Even though there is evidence that yinao was occurring during the 1980s and 1990s, the 
Internet was not widely available during that time, so news did not travel as fast as it did 
in the 2000s – when yinao also started to accelerate. 
 
Figure 21: Internet Penetration in China 
Source: The World Bank 
 
 
Data from Internet searches using Google Trends and Baidu Index bolster the 
argument above that increasing Internet access influenced the level attention to yinao 
received by society. These tools show the popularity of search terms during certain 
periods of times. I first used Google Trends to search yinao and a couple terms often 
related to and included in conversations about yinao (“doctor-patient relationship” and 




 to assess interest in the topic (see page 170 for graph). I start with 
2004 because it is the earliest available date for which this data can be pulled.  
In Google Trends, the peaks and valleys show the trends in relative popularity 
among the three terms. These search terms are measured in “interest over time,” which is 
measured on a scale of 0 to 100. A value of 100 represents the peak popularity for a term; 
while a value of 50 means that it is half as popular as the highest peak on the graph. The 
numbers on the chart are relative, so for example a score of around 50 in 2004 for patient-
doctor relationship means that at that point in time it was half as popular as yinao was as 
a search term in 2012 (the highest point on the graph). The peaks most likely correspond 
with high-profile events. For example, the spike in June/July of 2009 likely is related to a 
high-profile yinao incident in Nanping.
574
 Shayi (杀医) saw a peak in March 2012, which 
likely due to a high-profile killing of a doctor in Harbin at that time.
575
 This is important 
because it provides evidence that the Internet has enabled interest in yinao incidents. 
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 In addition to searching yinao, I also use 医患关系  (yihuan guanxi or “the patient-doctor relationship”) 
because it is a common phrase in China, especially in the context of the saying yihuan guanxi jinzhang or 
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occurs on the continuum of violent behaviors associated with yinao (see Chapter Five). Further, because 
these murder cases are so dramatic, they often receive a high level of media attention.  
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However, Google Trends is limited for understanding popularity of search terms 
because Baidu (the Google of China) is more widely used in China, especially because in 
2010 Google left China,
576
 and in 2012 Google was blocked in China
577
 (and is still 
blocked today). Baidu Index displays trends in the absolute number of searches across all 
types of electronic devices, as well as for PCs and cellular phones, separately. The data 
are displayed in the three figures below. Like the Google Trends data, data from Baidu 
Index show that increased search popularity correlates with yinao events, suggesting that 
Internet coverage has enabled greater attention to yinao. It is important to note that this 
type of data is incomplete, however, because it displays active searching, not passive 
following:
578
 we are seeing how many people actively searched yinao, but not seeing how 
many people read about it or forwarded messages about it. As a result, the attention to 
yinao could be even greater than this data suggests. 
Figure 23: Baidu Trends for Yinao and Related Terms via PCs, 2006-2016 
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Figure 24: Baidu Trends for Yinao and Related Terms via Mobile Phone, 2011-2016 
 
Figure 25: Overall Baidu Trends for Yinao and Related Terms, 2011-2016 
 
Baidu Index provides additional information on the peaks in the third graph 
(overall data across all device types) by linking the peaks with news articles associated 
with them. These data help further corroborate the claim above the Internet enabled 
increased attention to yinao. Table 6 below shows the associated events with the peaks 
for yinao. For yinao, all peaks except one are associated with actual yinao incidents. 
Interestingly, Peak B is associated with a depiction of yinao on a TV show that generated 
online discussion about the corruption of physicians. The two labeled peaks for “killing 
doctor” are linked to two murder cases in 2014 (described further in Chapter 7). The 
peaks for “doctor-patient relationship” turned out not to be good indicators for studying 





















Table 6: Events and Articles Linked with Peak Yinao Searches on Baidu 
Peaks Date Article Event 
Peak A 08/26/2011 医院对付医闹岂能使用“丛林法
则”以暴制暴？ 
When hospitals handle yinao how 
can they use “the law of the jungle”: 
use violence against violence?  
Jiangxi Nanchang First Hospital Armed 
Assault Incident: More than 30 of the 
patient’s relatives and 50 employees of 
the hospital. 15 people injured, three 
vans destroyed.  
Peak B 05/17/2012 《心术》上演医闹持久战 引发热
议红包论 
“Xinshu” Screening Yinao Long 
War of Attrition, Triggers 
Commentary on Red Envelopes 
Internet discussion of an episode of the 
popular television show “Xinshu” takes 
off as patients and doctors share their 
experiences – the episode is about how 
a physician is accused by a family for 
not taking the patient’s surgery 
seriously, which they believe to be true 
because the physician refused to take a 
red envelope of money before the 
surgery. When the patient suffered 
complications following the surgery, 
the family resorted to yinao.  
Peak C 10/30/2013 广东医调委:五成现场医闹为“医
闹组织”策划鼓动 
Guangdong Mediation Committee: 
“50% of on-site yinao” are 
encouraged by “Yinao 
organizations” 
5 vicious doctor-patient incidents 
(yinao) in the past week, from 
Guangzhou to Shenyang, from 
Nanchang to Wenling 
Peak D 8/20/2014 如何让化解“医闹”回归法律轨道  
How to make ameliorating “yinao” 
go back to legal track?  
When still reeling from the Hunan 
Pregnant Woman Death incident, in 
Beijing there is the incident of a car 
driving to steal a dead body hitting 
police (both examples of yinao 
incidents) 
Peak E 1/18/2016 北京卫计委：坚决反对一切形式
的医闹 
Beijing Health and Family Planning 
Commission: Resolutely Opposing 
All Forms of Yinao 
On January 11, 2016, a postpartum 
woman at Beijing Third Hospital died, 
causing a an yinao event that received 
attention nationally.  
Peak F 04/25/2016 警方鸣枪震慑医闹 辣椒水驱散无
效 果断明枪示警震慑全场 
Police fire warning shots to 
intimidate yinao, using pepper spray 
to clear the area was ineffective, 
decisive warning shots clear the 
area 
Police fire warning shots during an 
yinao incident at Henan Province, 
Linying County People’s Hospital.  
 
Analysis and Limitations 
The data on increasing Internet usage in the 2000s, attentiveness to yinao via 
online searches, and increasing yinao incidents beginning in the 2000s strongly suggest 
that increasing internet access helped spread news about yinao in society. Even though 
yinao clearly existed in 1986, the difference between the periods of 1986 to the early 
2000s and from the early 2000s to the present is Internet access – prior to the early 2000s, 
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there was very little Internet access in China. The increased attention to yinao via the 
Internet arguably helped solidify its place as a social phenomenon and also legitimized it 
as a known way for people to resolve medical disputes. As people became aware of this 
option, the lax police responses to it, hospitals appeasing it with money, and saw it 
becoming increasingly used over time, this may have led to increased adoption of it. 
While I cannot prove that increased online attention to yinao directly influenced 
individual decision-making in medical dispute cases that employed yinao, the logic above 
provides a sound argument for how increased Internet access likely influenced the 
development of yinao in society as a whole and nationwide.  
One could also question this analysis with the following counterfactual: if there 
were no Internet, would yinao still have become a widespread social phenomenon? The 
answer is maybe; it is possible, but less likely for two reasons. The first is pace – while 
yinao in theory could have spread through more traditional news outlets (newspaper, TV), 
the pace would have been much slower without the speed of the Internet. Second, the 
Internet empowers individuals to share their own stories and to also spread news through 
social media and mobile applications. This means that without the Internet, the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) would have had greater ability to control reporting on yinao 
through newspapers and TV broadcasting, decreasing the likelihood of more people 
becoming aware of it if it chose not to report on yinao. Interestingly, before the internet 
took off in the early 2000s, we saw the lack of reporting on yinao during the 1980s and 
1990s before it spread. Therefore, while any mode of communication that enables 
awareness can potentially foment yinao’s escalation into a national phenomenon, the 
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speed and relative freedom the Internet offers was likely able to help catapult yinao into a 
social phenomenon in the 2000s. The diagram below adds the role of the Internet.  
Figure 26:The Role of the Internet in Fomenting Yinao 
 
Is Yinao Uniquely Chinese? Culture, Traditions, and Yinao Elsewhere 
 This section considers Chinese traditional and political cultures as potential 
causes of yinao, and argues that while Chinese traditional and political cultures influence 
the unique ways in which yinao is carried out in China, evidence of violence occurring 
against physicians in medical disputes in other countries demonstrates that the 
phenomenon of violence against physicians due to medical disputes is not uniquely 
Chinese. 
Chinese Funerary Rituals in Yinao 
It is important not to isolate yinao as a strange, contemporary phenomenon 
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Figure 5: The Role of the Internet in  Fomenting Yinao 
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professionals to create a ritual funeral performance has characterized Chinese funerals 
since imperial times.
579
 In traditional Chinese culture, weeping represents a display of 
filial piety;
580
 the harder one cries, the more filial piety displayed. As Huwy-min Liu 
highlights, “The obligatory aspect of outward expressions of grief and mourning is why 
traditionally people hired professional weepers if the bereaved felt that they were unable 
to cry for the full socially expected length and strength.”
581
 Liu finds in her research that 
professional funeral weepers are still “alive and well” in China today, even though in the 
more urban areas of cities like Shanghai, they no longer exist.
582
 
Other aspects of yinao also echo traditional funeral practices in China. For 
example, families and yinao professionals sometimes wear hemp or white cloth,
583
 which 
is the garb for mourning in traditional Chinese culture.
584
 Also in China, people 
traditionally have believed that burning items such as paper money transmits the money 
to their deceased relative to support them in their afterlife.
585
 All of these rituals can be 
seen in yinao activities performed at hospitals today. 
The ritual of disposal and burial of the body also has had cultural significance in 
China, even though today most bodies in urban China must be cremated.
586
 Reputation 
after death is also important, not just traditionally and culturally, but also politically. In 
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an interesting account by Martin Whyte, he mentions the case of a deceased museum 
curator who was shamed politically and after he died, his family would not remove the 
body from the museum until the government revived his name.
587
 The use of corpses as a 
bargaining point in disputes is thus not unique to yinao.  
Culture of big character posters and banners with official slogans 
The other cultural and historical aspect commonly seen in yinao is the hanging of 
banners criticizing hospitals – this is called la hengfu (拉横幅) in Chinese.  Examples of 
la hengfu in yinao include the banner messages in Table 7 on the following page.  
  
                                                 
587
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Table 7: Examples of Yinao Banner Messages 
Banner (English) Banner (Chinese) Hospital Location City 
“Murder-hospital, doesn’t take 
responsibility, where is divine justice! 







Across front doors Kunming 
“Murder- hospital, treat human life as 












 黑心医院 Carrying in protest Kunming 




人民医院，还我公道 Across the front 




“Only a tiny cold and dies in one day, 










“Twins Misdiagnosed as Uterine 
Fibroids, Give me back my sons, Give 
me back my grandsons.” (accompanied 







Hand held stretched 
across within the 
hospital lobby 
Yunnan province, 
prefectural level city 
of Yuxi 




血债医生杀人 Front door Haifeng county, 
Shandong province 
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Banners expressing political opinions or grievances became a popular form of 
political expression under communism in China and are called dazibao “big character 
posters.” Dazibao “are a form of speech unique to China. They are created by writing 
large characters on pieces of paper or old newspaper then pasting the paper up in public 
areas. No special skill or equipment is required. Dazibao are used to communicate a 
broad range of ideas in a variety of forms including essays, news reports, poems, cartoons, 
slogans, and even novels.”
595
  
Traditionally, posters written with large characters had been used for business 
advertising, public notices, and good news, but rarely for expressing political opinions.
596
 
A CCP member during the Yan’an period
597
 first used big character posters for political 
reasons to “criticize party leaders for their arbitrary and repressive treatment of political 
dissent.”
598
 The Party has since had a mixed relationship with dazibao; while they 
beheaded the author of the first dazibao in 1947 and became furious over their use to 
criticize the CCP during the “Hundred Flowers Movement,” Mao later encouraged 
dazibao that favored his opinions to promote his political goals and used them to initiate 
the Cultural Revolution.  
Dazibao ranged from containing political slogans and short sentences to entire 
essays laid out in several posters. Mao officially approved dazibao, and they were known 
as one of the four great freedoms of political expression, though they were always subject 
to official interpretation and control.
 599
 According to Sheng Hua, “despite the 
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leadership’s control and censorship efforts over three decades, dazibao had contributed 
significantly toward a more mature political mentality in China.”
600
  
Use of dazibao became powerful during the Democracy Wall Movement (1978-
1980) following Mao’s death. The most famous dazibao of this time by 28-year-old Wei 
Jingsheng indirectly criticized Deng Xiaoping’s four modernizations by arguing that to 
achieve true modernization, China must have a fifth modernization – democracy.
601
 The 
1979 criminal law introduced during this time criminalized the use of dazibao that 
publicly insult another person or fabricates facts to defame him and even sanctions 
imprisonment for it. During spring 1989 university students used dazibao at university 
campuses and Tiananmen Square.
602
 
 In a hospital field study in 1979-1980, American authors observed the use of 
dazibao in protest to a hospital that resembles yinao. The authors reported the following:  
“In one case we were told about, the parents of a girl who had died of 
hepatitis offered her body to the hospital in exchange for 400 yuan and a 
job for the girl’s mother. When the hospital leaders refused this proposal, 
her parents hung a large poster (dazibao), complete with cartoon, on the 
hospital entrance saying that the physician taking care of their daughter 
had killed her by giving an incorrect injection. After a visit from the head 





 This brief historical analysis shows that interest expression through banners has 
been a way in which Chinese citizens have become socialized to air their grievances, 
which gives us context to understand why banners are so apparent in yinao 
demonstrations today. 
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Pengci and Trickery in Today’s China 
 An interesting general cultural context of today’s China is the idea of using 
trickery to make money. One method of doing this is called pengci (碰瓷), which literally 
means to “bump into porcelain.” The origin of the word comes from the idea of an owner 
of a porcelain store knocking over a piece of porcelain to make it look like a customer 
broke it and then to demand compensation for it. Today this refers to deliberately 
crashing into someone to make money off him or her. One interviewee gave an example 
of a pengci event she had witnessed before:  an old man driving a motorcycle would 
crash into someone at every block and demand compensation; while most people knew 
this was pengci and ignored the man every time he fell, a group of foreigners, not 
knowing that he was faking it, rushed over to try to help him.
604
  
An attending physician said, “Pengci and suing a doctor have the same reasoning 
[behind them.]”
605
 Of course this is just the opinion of one person biased towards the 
view of physicians, and it would be unfair to say every yinao practitioner is trying to 
cheat the hospital for money; however, the context of taking advantage of people to make 
money certainly resonates with trends in Chinese society today. 
Yinao Elsewhere 
 There is evidence of yinao in other countries, showing that yinao is not unique to 
China, so variables like its traditional and political cultures are weak when attempting to 
explain how yinao became a social phenomenon. India and Vietnam are experiencing 
yinao similar to China’s. I cover India more extensively in Chapter 5, but to summarize 
here, India, has seen increasing violence towards physicians similar to that in China, 
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though the ways in which this violence appear do not appear in the unique Chinese 
cultural ways as discussed above. News about yinao in India (it is not called yinao in 
India), began to appear around 2009-2010 (in English language news publications),
606
 
and the state of Maharashtra invoked penalties for violence against physicians in 2008.
607
 




In the past few years, stories of yinao-like incidents have emerged from Latin 
America as well. In Mexico, an analyst reported that shortages of medical professionals, 
available appointments, supplies, as well as organized crime contribute to increased 
violence towards physicians.
609
 For example, if a physician is treating an assassin and 
dissatisfies him, the physician may become a victim of violence as well.
610
 In Venezuela, 
violence has also increased against the backdrop of the daily violence and instability 
occurring in the country. According to one expert, the lack of supplies to treat patients 
make patients and families angry at healthcare personnel, and “in many cases the doctors 
are insulted, beaten, and even threatened with death because of the inefficiency of the 
national government in matters of health.”
611
  Thus, despite the varying contexts of this 
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group of countries, all of them have experienced yinao, making it more of a functional 
and systemic issue rather than a cultural one.  
Social and Cultural Variables in the Yinao Process  
  As the above analysis demonstrates, social and cultural variables do not directly 
explain yinao, but provide a backdrop around which yinao emerged. Cultural variables 
like funeral rituals and big character posters illuminate why yinao takes on certain forms 
in China, but is not part of the causal process. Pengci is not directly related to yinao, but 
because it is also phenomenon in Chinese society today, it is perhaps more likely that in a 
society where trickery is already a broader practice, a phenomenon like yinao would be 
more likely to emerge because trickery is seen as an effective way of extracting money. 
For this reason, I depict the role of pengci and possibly other related social phenomena as 
“similar social phenomena” with a dotted line (since it is an indirect influence) towards 
the perceived legitimacy and effectiveness circle. I also connect it to the Internet since the 
Internet also spreads news about pengci and other social phenomena as well.  
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Figure 27: Including Broader Social Context 
 
Towards a Theory of Yinao’s Development 
This chapter has identified, analyzed, and placed various factors of yinao that play 
different roles in the development of yinao. The process begins with initial conditions in 
the health care system as discussed above:  high-out-of pocket costs, systemic corruption, 
poor doctor-patient communication skills, poor quality of care, and poor access to health 
care. These factors create the context around which disputes occur and heighten 
frustration. Then patients and families are faced with a choice of how to channel that 
frustration, from the formal options in China’s complaint and dispute resolution system 
outlined in chapter 4 to the various shades of yinao and murder as the most extreme form 
of action. Important factors that contribute to the adoption of yinao include awareness of 
it, negative news about physicians, the lack of police response to it, and hospitals paying 
protesters. I argue that the takeoff of the Internet of the early 2000s and the social 
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Figure 6: Including Broader Social Context 
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Internet coverage of these yinao cases – is what led to yinao’s development as a social 
phenomenon. 
This model remains incomplete, however, without bringing in the factors 
discussed in the previous two chapters. In addition to perceived effectiveness and 
legitimacy of options as a driver in the decision to use yinao, other important factors 
include type of dispute and individual experiences and motives. I broached the topic of 
type of dispute in Chapter 4, and to briefly summarize here: complaints that are relatively 
minor (bad attitudes, food, service, etc.) would likely not turn into a court case or to yinao, 
whereas those that are more serious (unexpected health outcome, death) would. Another 
factor covered in chapter 5 is the personal experiences of complainants. While there are 
insufficient data on perpetrators of yinao to make sweeping generalizations, existing 
evidence suggests that men with a low socioeconomic status tend to commit murder of 
healthcare workers (see Chapter 5).  
Further, the dispute resolution system itself influences the perceived effectiveness 
and legitimacy of options available for dispute resolution. As discussed in chapter 4, 
China’s current medical dispute resolution system suffers from a lack of credibility, 
which also can make yinao appear more attractive. I add these additional contexts to 
complete the diagram. 
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Figure 28: The Path to Yinao's Development as a Social Phenomenon 
 
Implications of this Process for Policy Management of Yinao 
This model helps us understand how different policy choices may resolve the 
yinao issue. The more issues in China’s heath care system, the greater the frustration, and 
assuming no changes in other parts of the model, the use of yinao to resolve these issues 
would also likely increase. If policy aims to tackle health care system conditions and 
reduce frustration, disputes and behaviors like yinao that stem from them would then 
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Figure 29: Relationship of Health Care System Issues to Yinao 
 
But as the model shows, this is not just about frustration and dissatisfaction with 
China’s health care system; policy also needs to address yinao from many different 
angles in order to be successful at eradicating yinao: public security, law enforcement, 
dispute resolution, and social assistance programs, etc. This depiction of how different 
factors influence the development of yinao represents the basis for analysis in the next 
chapter on policy responses.  
A Brief International Comparative Perspective for Model Testing 
 This chapter examined some of the basic variables behind violence and protest 
against health care workers and placed these variables in a process that leads to yinao and 
propagated it as a social phenomenon. Many of these variables exist in other countries, so 
this process may have implications for other contexts. Hopefully, it offers a guide for 
issues countries should be aware of in order to prevent widespread violence against 
health care workers. In this section, I briefly test parts of this process in other 
Frustration Healthcare 







international contexts that vary in their experiences with yinao and some of the other 
identified independent and intervening variables. 
These general variables can also be considered in and refined further based on 
other contexts. I choose a sample of countries that both experience and do not experience 
widespread violence against health care workers in medical disputes in order to tease out 
which variables may be most critical. While it is beyond the purview of this paper to do 
in-depth cross-country analysis, I consider a few variables below: regime type, out-of-
pocket costs, civil justice system, order and security, and Internet coverage of population. 





 Venezuela, and Mexico all experience some form of 
yinao. Automatically, this group of countries indicates that broad regime type is not 
necessary for yinao to occur, as India and Mexico are broadly categorized democracies 
(albeit flawed
614
), and China and Vietnam are communist authoritarian systems. 




High Out-of-Pocket Costs 
Since high out-of-pocket costs are a common source of frustration and often used 
as an explanation for yinao in China and because data is available across countries 
worldwide for this variable, I consider whether it matters in other country contexts. I find 
that a variable all of the countries with yinao share is relatively high out-of-pocket costs 
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in health care as compared to world and OECD averages (see diagram below). Vietnam 
and India also experience especially high out-of-pocket costs during this period of time. 
Figure 30: Out-of Pocket Health Expenditure (% of total expenditure) for Yinao Countries 
 
However, other countries also have high-out-of-pocket costs and no yinao, so 
there are other certainly other variables at play that may interact with high-out-of pocket 
costs to produce yinao on a mass scale. I have provided some examples of other countries 
from various regions with high-out-of pocket costs (Egypt, Myanmar, Cambodia, Russia) 
and no yinao (to my knowledge) in the graph below. Defining “high-out-of pocket costs” 
for this analysis can be difficult, but I decided to include those countries that have 
touched China’s maximum at almost 60% of total expenditure on health accounting for 
out-of-pocket costs (yellow line in graph). I also include Russia since it is commonly 
compared to China in this regard and shows a trend toward this point. Some interesting 
cases are Myanmar and Cambodia, which have mostly remained far above China’s 


























































Figure 31: China and Non-Yinao Countries with High Out-of-Pocket Costs 
 
Rule of Law – Civil Justice 
 Another important variable I discussed was the credibility of the civil justice 
system. While this variable is difficult to measure across countries, the World Justice 
Project’s (WJP) Rule of Law Index provides a cross-country measure for strength of the 
civil justice system. Although methodology changes slightly from year to year, WJP 
generally measures civil justice based on “whether people can resolve their grievances 
peacefully and effectively through the civil justice system.”
616
 They consider a number of 
variables in deciding on how to measure the strength of civil justice in each country: 
accessible and affordable, free of discrimination and corruption, timeliness, enforcement 
of decisions, and the accessibility, impartiality, and efficiency of Alternative Dispute 
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 The countries are given a number on a 0 to 1 scale, 1 
indicating a high score (as in high level of civil justice) and 0 a lower score 
performance.
618
 Data for the sample of countries in the previous section are below. All of 
them do not have robust civil justice systems, with most of them basically staying 
between 0.4 and 0.5 and with Cambodia and Venezuela performing even worse in these 
categories. This data does not indicate that civil justice is irrelevant, but that it cannot 
explain whether yinao appears or not. 
 
Figure 32: Civil Justice Performance 
 
Order and Security 
 I also argue in this chapter that the lack of police involvement in controlling yinao 
encouraged it to grow. It is difficult to measure this across international contexts, 
especially because countries like China generally perform high in social control because 
of its strong police force and coercive power; in the case of yinao, however, the police 
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force did not respond, so a general measure of public security fails to capture this nuance. 
With this in mind, however, general public security may influence the emergence of 
yinao in other countries. I have used WJP’s “order and security” measure to examine this 
factor among the sample group of countries in Figure 33. Order and Security “measures 
how well the society assures the security of persons and property,” and includes three 




China and Vietnam perform highly in order and security, but again, this may fail 
to capture individual policies toward medical violence, and still may be relevant in 
explaining contexts elsewhere. Cambodia has had poor civil justice and high out of 
pocket costs, but here it also has a relatively high level of order and security, so it could 
indicate that police strength is too strong to allow for “disorder” like yinao.  
In Mexico and Venezuela, lower levels of order and security could certainly be a 
factor contributing to the fomenting of violence of health care workers, especially as 
organized crime related to drugs bleeds into the hospital system. Poor public order may 
also explain why yinao has become an issue in India. Egypt had a high level of security 
until its recent drop in this variable, so this may become relevant for possible 
development of yinao in Egypt in the future. Russia has also fluctuated on public order 
significantly over time, so it is difficult to tell how such fluctuations over a short period 
of time would matter. More research needs to be done on the nuances of public security 
in each country, but based on this broad cross-national data, general order and public 
security are not enough to explain why yinao may or may not occur. 
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Figure 33: Order and Security 
 
Internet Access 
  My main argument of this chapter revolves around the role of the Internet – the 
Internet is what spread the idea in the 2000s that yinao was an effective and legitimate 
form of health care dispute resolution and thus helped facilitated yinao’s growth into a 
nationwide social phenomenon. I would expect that other countries that have yinao like 
Mexico, Vietnam, Venezuela, and India, would all show similar trends and rates of 
Internet coverage. Based on the graph below, they basically do share the same levels and 
trends in Internet coverage; India, however, is lower. I have not studied India’s case to 
the extent to which I have studied China’s, but from what I have gathered in India this 
takes places among people in rural areas, where Internet coverage may be less. The idea 
that the information spreads though may still be valid, but perhaps more so through rural 
networks than the Internet. Future research can examine other mechanisms for spreading 
information, but the idea of the importance of the spread of the information for something 
to turn into a social phenomenon still likely holds. 
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Figure 34: Individuals Using the Internet (% of population) 
 
 Non-yinao countries like Myanmar and Cambodia share in common with yinao 
countries expensive health care and poor civil justice systems, but here they differ in 
Internet coverage of the population, being lower in Internet coverage than yinao countries. 
Based on the model I have laid out thus far, I would predict that with increasing Internet 
coverage and poor law enforcement in the area of medical violence, there is a greater 
likelihood that people may resort to more violence towards physicians in these countries. 
Conclusion to Cross-Country Analysis 
This cross-country analysis has been brief and even though I cannot decisively 
conclude that the model I have developed for China patently applies worldwide, it does 
help to bolster some of the conclusions in my analysis. All of the countries experiencing 
yinao share high out-of-pocket costs, poorly performing civil justice systems, and with 
the exception of India, similar levels of Internet access. Internet is what separates non-
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yinao countries Cambodia and Myanmar from the yinao countries, and perhaps as 
Internet increases and assuming there are no significant changes in other variables, yinao 
may appear in those countries as well. These same factors hold true for Egypt as well, 
which has higher Internet coverage than Myanmar and Cambodia, but lower than the 
other yinao countries besides India. There may be a level of coverage for which yinao is 
more likely, though it is difficult to tell without data on yinao. Russia has seen has 
performed differently in each of the variables (generally lower out-of-pocket costs, poor 
but still slightly better civil justice system, and very high Internet access), so it is not 
unsurprising yinao has not developed into a notable national phenomenon there.  
This short analysis has several limitations. First the author’s inability to perform 
research in the native languages of many of these countries makes it difficult to assert 
that yinao does not exist in those place, so this is something further research must 
ascertain. Also, understanding the nuances of law enforcement and public security in 
each individual country context also matters for yinao, so more in-depth research needs to 
be done on the relationship between police and hospitals because general data on security 
is not enough. Lastly, even though I have found evidence of yinao existing in other 
contexts, in cases like Venezuela and Mexico, more attention should be dedicated to the 
extent to which more specific circumstances like organized crime and drug cartels matter 
for yinao in those countries. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has identified and evaluated multiple factors that have contributed to 
yinao. It argued that while there are multiple variables that contribute to yinao, the 
increase of Internet usage in China beginning in the 2000s is one of the main reasons for 
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yinao’s development into a social phenomenon because Internet access enabled increased 
awareness of yinao as a potentially legitimate and effective means for medical dispute 
resolution. Despite some possible challenges from cross-national comparisons, the model 
I have developed not only potentially can predict yinao elsewhere, but perhaps even more 
importantly, also identifies the policy areas that need to be addressed in order to truly 
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CHAPTER 7: STATE RESPONSE TO YINAO 
 
 In order to assess state responsiveness to yinao, this chapter examines national-
level laws and policies related to yinao against four criteria: 1) the type of policy tool 
employed; 2) the policy document type; 3) agencies involved in issuing policies; and 4) 
implementation and outcomes of the policy. Below I explain each of these criteria. In 
order to simplify the analysis, this chapter focuses on national laws and ministerial-level 
policies only. It is important to note, however, that there have also been local-level 
regulations and policies to address legal issues for medical disputes and to directly 
combat yinao, often preceding national policies.
620
 While the central government often 
bases national policies off local-level policy models, national-level policies also influence 
the direction of local governance. National-level policies are administered from the top-
down in China through the vertical ministerial agencies that stretch from the national-
level to the local level (called xitong). So for example, the National Health and Family 
Planning Commission (NHFPC) oversees the Health and Family Planning Commissions 
(HFPCs) at the provincial levels, which oversee the health departments at the city level 
and so on. When a national policy is approved, provincial-level governments or relevant 
agencies issue a supporting document (配套文件, peitao wenjian) for their locality and 
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1. The Policy Toolkit of Agencies Managing Yinao 
 While yinao offers us a window through which to look at state responsiveness, 
there is no one clear-cut “response” to yinao, as Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and 
government institutions have many different tools to address it that span the jurisdictions 
of multiple government ministries, CCP departments, and hospitals. Some tools represent 
more direct responses to deal immediately with yinao like police campaigns against 
professional yinao protesters (third parties that receive money from families in exchange 
for protesting on behalf of their medical dispute), while other tools attack the sources that 
contribute to the problem, such as a distorted health care pricing system that incentivizes 
physicians to overprescribe medication, contributing to a culture of patients mistrusting 
physicians. Table 8 on the following page shows many of the policy tools available to 
respond to yinao. 
 The types of tools used to respond to yinao help elucidate the adaptive capacity of 
the Chinese state. For example, if the Chinese government only relies on police 
campaigns against yinao, then it fails to address both the dispute resolution and health 
care system issues that drive yinao. A more sophisticated, adaptive system would employ 
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Table 8: Policy Tools for Managing Yinao 
 
2. Types of Laws and Policies  
In addition to the policy tools used to address yinao and medical disputes, the 
types of policies and laws in which these tools are contained signal their degree of 
importance to governing agencies. Both the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the 
Chinese government issue policy documents. They exist in a variety of forms – circulars, 
opinions, decisions, etc. There are also national laws, which only are issued by the 
government’s National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Standing Committee of the 
NPC. In theory, laws are the most authoritative documents, but in practice, documents 
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 Illustration provided by Chinese government official.  
Language Tools Official language prohibiting yinao 
Security Tools 
Police crackdown (targeted policing programs at arresting those engaging 
in yinao) 
Increased hospital security capabilities 
Justice Tools 
Procedural reform - rules and procedures for filing, receiving, 
evaluating, and facilitating resolution of medical disputes 
Official petitioning (xinfang) and internal hospital complaint systems 
Legal reform (Tort and Criminal) 
Dispute mediation reform 
Health Care System 
Tools 
Pricing of Health Care Goods and Services 
Malpractice Insurance Reform 
Health Care Insurance Reform 
Better health care access, especially for rural areas 
Anti-corruption campaign 
Improving education for physicians on doctor-patient communication 
Propaganda Tools 
TV shows and media reporting emphasizing the dedication and hard 
work of health care workers so Chinese citizens can better understand 
their perspective 
 203 
Figure 35: Authoritativeness of Official Documents of China 
 
Unfortunately, the CCP and its departments tend not to make many of its policy 
documents (left side of figure) available to the public, whereas the central government 
and its ministries (right side of figure) often publicize their policy documents. This is true 
in the case of yinao and medical disputes – most of the documents publicly available on 
the subject are government policy documents and laws. Often laws represent stances the 
CCP has already adopted, which is why China’s legislative body, the National People’s 
Congress, is often dubbed the “rubber stamp” for the CCP.  
In order to understand the changing responsiveness of the Chinese governing 
system over time using available policy documents, this chapter considers the type of 
agency that sponsors them, the number of agencies that sponsor them, and the number of 
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documents dedicated to addressing the issues relevant to yinao in a given time period. For 
example, if a Party agency sponsors a document, then the document and the problem it 
addresses carry a high degree of importance. If the State Council issues a document, it is 
more authoritative than ministerial directives. Yet not only does the rank of the issuing 
agency matter, but also the degree of cooperativeness between agencies. This is because 
yinao is a multifaceted issue that requires a joint effort by relevant ministries to resolve it, 
so if only one ministry like the Ministry of Health (or later, the National Health and 
Family Planning Commission) repeatedly authors policies to manage yinao, then this 
indicates a limited response from the state. If multiple relevant agencies jointly author a 
document, then the response shows that Chinese state agencies are working together to 
resolve complicated social issues.  
The number of documents is also important because if there are many documents 
focusing on a particular issue, then this indicates an increasing emphasis on it; however, 
if a period of time goes by without any documentation, then the issue is clearly not a 
priority. Additionally, the content of documents is important. According to one source, 
the greater the amount of detail and content in a document, the likelier agencies with 
higher authority created it.
623
  
3. Relevant Party and Ministerial Level Players 
 There are many bureaucratic players that manage the policy tools listed above. 
Table 9 below summarizes their roles in the yinao issue. 
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Table 9: Governing Agencies Involved with Managing Yinao and Its Sources 
Party Agencies Function 
CCMPS Commission for 
Comprehensive 
Management of Public 
Security 
Responsible for coordinating and guiding implementation of State Council and 
Party policies for public security.624 It reportedly includes representatives from a 
broad range of agencies such as justice, education, and health departments.625 
Relevant to yinao, it is responsible for coordinating special action plans to tackle 
the issue with multiple ministries.626 
– Publicity (or Propaganda) 
Department 
Guides ideological thought and education in China and oversees the work of 
China’s news media agencies.627 In medical disputes, it is responsible for guiding 
public opinion, disseminating information about health and respect for health care 
workers628, and ensuring that media agencies do not sensationalize medical 
dispute stories.629 
CALSG Office of the Central 
Leading Group of 
Cyberspace Affairs 
Coordinates strategy on internet and informationization strategy and policy.630 In 
yinao, it is supposed to work with the Publicity Department to coordinate the 
monitoring of broadcasts on violence against doctors and to prohibit 
sensationalization of news stories.631 It also has the responsibility of deleting 
advertisements related to ticket peddlers (illegal markups of appointments) and 
medical introducers (illegal referrals).632  
Ministerial-level Agencies Function 
NHFPC National Health and 
Family Planning 
Commission 
(Ministry of Health until 
2013) 
NHFPC governs China’s health care system, including epidemic management, 
health care system reform, rural health care, medical education, hospital 
administration, and family planning.633 As the leading ministerial body for 
policies related to yinao and medical disputes, it develops regulations, collects 
data, and leads related special action plans.634   
MPS Ministry of Public Safety MPS oversees the police force and public security in China as well as related 
                                                 
624
 Juan Xu, “After Three Years, the Central Commission for Comrephensive Social Management Changes 
Its Name Back to the Original [ 3 年后中央综治委改回原名],” People’s Daily Online, October 10, 2014, 
http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/1010/c1001-25807059.html. 
625
 Liebman, “China’s Law and Stability Paradox,” 168. 
626
 “About the Special Action Program to Protect Medical Order, Strike Illegal Crimes Interfering with 
Medicine [关于印发维护医疗秩序打击涉医违法犯罪专项行动方案的通知],” National Health and 
Family Planning Commission Bureau of Health Governance and Administraton, December 20, 2013, 4.3, 
http://www.nhfpc.gov.cn/yzygj/s3589/201312/46ce2b7c0b974391b8f8bf308f2784f8.shtml. 
627
 Dictionary of Communist Party’s Organizational Work, “Main Functions of the China Communist Party 
Central Publicity Department,” News of the Communist Party of China, accessed November 22, 2017, 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64114/75332/5230610.html. 
628
 “About the Special Action Program to Protect Medical Order, Strike Illegal Crimes Interfering with 
Medicine [关于印发维护医疗秩序打击涉医违法犯罪专项行动方案的通知],” 4.4. 
629
 National Health and Family Planning Commission, “Circular on Publication of Special Action Plan for 
Strict Crackdown on Illegal Crimes Interfering with Medical Institutions  [关于印发严厉打击涉医违法犯
罪专项行动方案的通知],” 4.3. 
630
 “Xi Jinping: From Cyber Power Construction, Make China a Cyber Power [ 习近平:把我国从网络大国
建设成为网络强国],” Xinhua, February 27, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-
02/27/c_119538788.htm. 
631
 National Health and Family Planning Commission, “Circular on Publication of Special Action Plan for 
Strict Crackdown on Illegal Crimes Interfering with Medical Institutions  [关于印发严厉打击涉医违法犯
罪专项行动方案的通知],” 4.3. 
632
 “Circular on Issuing the Special Action Plan Focusing on Punishing ‘Ticket Peddlers’ and ‘Internet 
Medical Scalpers’[关于印发集中整治‘号贩子’和‘网络医托’专项行动方案的通知],” National Health 
and Family Planning Commission Comprehensive Supervision Bureau, May 3, 2016, 4.3, 
http://www.nhfpc.gov.cn/zhjcj/s3577/201605/870ebfb0f7b848a59803626ec8a401e9.shtml. 
633
 “Institution Functions [机构职能],” National Health and Family Planning Commission, December 23, 
2016, http://www.nhfpc.gov.cn/zhuz/jgzn/lmtt.shtml. 
634
 As this chapter will show, NHFPC (or its predecessor the Ministry of Health) has been involved as the 
leading agency on almost all policy related to yinao and medical disputes.  
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areas such as traffic administration, entry and exit, border defense, firefighting, 
identify cards, visas and residency permits.635 For yinao, MPS helps define police 
responsibility for responding to it and is a frequent sponsor of policies related to 
managing yinao as crimes.636   
MOJ Ministry of Justice Oversees mediation in China through the People’s Mediation Office of its Office 
for Guiding Grassroots Work.637 Local justice bureaus oversee Medical Dispute 
Mediation Committees (MDMCs), but do not directly manage their daily 
activities.638 
MCA Ministry of Civil Affairs Oversees civil society organizations (CSOs),639 including registration of MDMCs 
classified as CSOs.640 In special action plans, MCA agencies are charged with 
providing aid to economically strained groups641 - likely inferring to those that 
commit yinao out of economic distress.   
NDRC National Development and 
Reform Commission 
Agency charged with China’s overall development trajectory, most known for its 
drafting of five-year plans. Related to the topic of yinao and more broadly 
patient-doctor mistrust, NDRC’s Pricing Department regulates prices on 
pharmaceuticals and medical services. Pharmaceuticals have traditionally been 
priced too high and services too low, though both of these pricing systems are 
currently under reform.642 
SPC  Supreme People’s Court Highest supervising institution over China’s court system.643 One of its roles is to 
offer explanations for concrete application of laws644, so relevant to medical 
disputes, it offers explanations on how existing laws should be applied in tort or 
personal injury cases645 and also contributes to how courts define yinao crimes 
under existing law.646  
SPP Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate 
China’s national public prosecutor’s office, which also oversees procuratorates at 
the local levels. SPP initiates and supervises public prosecution of criminal 
cases,647 such as those for yinao.  
SAIC State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce 
“SAIC functions in maintaining market order and protecting the legitimate rights 
and interests of businesses and consumers by carrying out regulations in the fields 
                                                 
635
 “People’s Republic of China Ministry of Public Security [中华人民共和国公安部],” Ministry of Public 
Security, accessed November 22, 2017, http://www.mps.gov.cn/. 
636
 These policies are covered throughout the chapter in each policy cycle.  
637
 “Office of Guiding Grassroots Work,” Ministry of Justice of the People’s Republic of China, 2017, 
http://www.moj.gov.cn/organization/node_jcgzzds.html. 
638
 See chapter 8 for full description of MDMCs and they related to justice bureaus. 
639
 “Ministry of Civil Affairs - Structure,” Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 
accessed November 22, 2017, http://www.mca.gov.cn/article/jg/. 
640
 To search for MDMCs classified as social organizations, go to: “Nationwide Social Organization Search 
[全国社会组织查询],” accessed November 22, 2017, http://www.chinanpo.gov.cn/search/orgindex.html. 
641
 “About the Special Action Program to Protect Medical Order, Strike Illegal Crimes Interfering with 
Medicine [关于印发维护医疗秩序打击涉医违法犯罪专项行动方案的通知],” 4.3. 
642
 “Attack and Overcome Difficulties, Strive to Make Progress, Fully Implement Medical Price Reform - 
Since the 18th Party Congress Medical Price Reform Record [攻坚克难 奋力前行 全面实施医药价格改
革——党的十八大以来医药价格改革纪实],” National Development and Reform Commission, 
November 3, 2017, http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fzgggz/jggl/zhdt/201711/t20171103_866240.html. 
643





 Supreme People’s Court, “Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court of Some Issues Concerning the 
Application of Law for the Trial of Cases on Compensation for Personal Injury [最高人民法院关于审理
人身损害赔偿案件适用法律若干问题的解释].” 
646
 The Supreme People’s Procuratorate of the PRC [中华人民共和国最高人民检察院], “Five Ministries’ 
Opinions on Illegal Criminal Activities Involving Medical Institutions and Protecting the Normal Order of 
Medical Care [五部门关于依法惩处涉医违法犯罪维护正常医疗秩序的意见].” 
647
 “Judicial System - Introduction to the People’s Procuratorates of the People’s Republic of China,” The 
Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China, May 14, 2002, 
http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=44. 
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of enterprise registration, competition, consumer protection, trademark protection 
and combating economic illegalities.”648  For medical disputes, it has been 
charged with the responsibility of eradicating illegal medical advertisements.649  
CIRC China Insurance 
Regulatory Commission 
Conduct administration, supervision and regulation of the Chinese insurance 
market, and to ensure that the insurance industry operates stably in compliance 
with law.650 Responsible for promoting medical liability insurance.651  
SATCM  State Administration of 
Traditional Chinese 
Medicine  
Collects data on TCM, examines and approves advertising for TCM, approves 
TCMs, and oversees TCM hospitals.652 Though a sponsor of a special action plan 
against yinao653, its responsibilities are indirectly defined, but SATCM 
responsibilities likely pertain to yinao as TCM and TCM hospitals encounter it.   
 
4. Policy Outcomes and Implementation 
There are different ways to view outcomes of policies – the immediate 
implementation of the policy itself (whether or not, for example, police offices were truly 
installed in all hospitals as a result of a policy) as well as the ultimate goal of reducing 
yinao incidents. This chapter uses both of these ways to evaluate outcomes, though the 
difficulty in obtaining good data on outcomes makes it difficult to do this systematically.  
I rely on news and government reports as well as fieldwork observations and 
interview data to evaluate the outcomes of policies where possible. I analyze the available 
statistics on implementation by comparing them to other data from previous years as well 
as macro-level data about China’s health system to better contextualize them. Even 
though the exact numbers do not always make sense, the general trends of the data can 
demonstrate general trends in outcomes that the Party is trying to convey.
654
  
                                                 
648
 “Mission,” State Administration For Industry & Commerce (SAIC) People’s Republic of China, 2009, 
http://www.saic.gov.cn/english/aboutus/Mission/index.html. 
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 “About the Special Action Program to Protect Medical Order, Strike Illegal Crimes Interfering with 
Medicine [关于印发维护医疗秩序打击涉医违法犯罪专项行动方案的通知],” 4.3. 
650
 “China Insurance Regulatory Commission > Home,” CIRC China Insurance Regulatory Commission, 
accessed November 25, 2017, http://www.circ.gov.cn/web/site45/. 
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 “About the Special Action Program to Protect Medical Order, Strike Illegal Crimes Interfering with 
Medicine [关于印发维护医疗秩序打击涉医违法犯罪专项行动方案的通知],” 4.3. 
652
 “State Administration for Industry and Commerce of the People’s Republic of China [中华人民共和国
国家工商行政管理总局].” 
653
 “About the Special Action Program to Protect Medical Order, Strike Illegal Crimes Interfering with 
Medicine [关于印发维护医疗秩序打击涉医违法犯罪专项行动方案的通知].” 
654
 Shanghai Legal Expert, Interview No. 87. 
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While news reports cannot provide comprehensive data, due to the fact that the 
Party controls the official media, if the media emphasizes yinao incidents, then this 
indicates that the authorities are giving the issue more attention and that the policies 
about yinao will likely become more decisive in their implementation.
655
 High profile 
incidents reported in the media also help to contextualize policy responses: they are at 
once outcomes of previous policies (or the absence of) that have failed to quell the 
problem, and they also can represent events to which new policies respond. Some 
policies, like circulars, do not necessarily require implementation, so I often do not 
provide information on implementation for these types of documents, though I still may 
include some context about important events surrounding these types of documents.   
Policy Selection and Analysis 
I track and analyze the policy tools and types over time based on these criteria 
using 21 national laws and policies (see Appendix for full list) that have addressed yinao 
and medical dispute resolution since 1986, when, to my knowledge, the first reports of 
and policy responses to yinao began to appear.
656
 I chose these policies based on their 
direct relevance to yinao, medical disputes, and healthcare-related complaints. The list is 
intended to be a basically complete list of national laws and policies related to these areas. 
Often these policies or laws cover more than just yinao or medical disputes, so within 
these policies or laws, I focus on the parts that are most relevant to yinao, medical 
complaints, and medical disputes. 
  
                                                 
655
 Shanghai Legal Expert, 87. 
656
 “The Ministry of Health and Ministry of Public Security Publish ‘Joint Notice’ Prohibiting Any Person 
Using Any Excuse to Disrupt the Order of Hospitals 卫生部公安部发出《联合通告》 禁止任何人医任
何借口骚乱医院秩序.” 
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1986 Policy Cycle 1: Weak Responses and Preference for Private Resolution  
The first signs of yinao as a national phenomenon appear in 1986, when an article 
in the People’s Daily reported that these incidents were occurring across China and 
highlighted the lack of appropriate response from relevant government departments. 
“Recently reporters have received many letters from readers, reacting to 
repeatedly occurring events of disorderly behavior, vandalism in hospitals, and 
the shaming and beating up of health care workers. Through investigation, we 
have found that this year from February through July, Beijing, Hubei, Henan, 
Hunan, Yunnan, Shandong, among other provinces, have seen 31 of these 
incidents, both large and small. The city of Wuhan within the last month has seen 
18 incidents, seriously disrupting hospitals’ normal work order. The physical 
security of medical personnel has been seriously threatened. According to current 
understanding, these incidents are mostly dealt with inappropriately, sometimes 




The thrust of the article was that these violent incidents were growing, but not 
being handled appropriately by responsible government departments. In the same year 
this article appeared, the Ministry of Health
658
 and Ministry of Public Security released 
“Joint Notice on Protecting Hospital Order,”
659
 which appears to be the first notice 
addressing how to respond to yinao (though at this point it was not called yinao). The 
document prohibits the following yinao actions: performing funeral rites in hospitals, 
placing the corpses anywhere outside the hospital morgue, and using a medical accident 
as an excuse to cause trouble.
660
 It also made clear that in cases in which people caused 
                                                 
657
 Huang, “These Past Few Years Some Places Have Seen Doctor-Patient Conflicts Become Extreme, 
Vandalizing Hospitals Repeatedly Occur, after the Event Occurs No Questions Asked [进来一些地方医患
矛盾激化 打砸医院率发生 事发之后无人问].” 
658
 The Ministry of Health was the predecessor to the National Health and Family Planning Commission, 
which was created in 2013. The change from a Ministry to a Commission raises its status and Family 
Planning governance was also assumed under the new body’s portfolio. 
659
 “The Ministry of Health and Ministry of Public Security Publish ‘Joint Notice’ Prohibiting Any Person 
Using Any Excuse to Disrupt the Order of Hospitals 卫生部公安部发出《联合通告》 禁止任何人医任
何借口骚乱医院秩序.” 
660
 “The Ministry of Health and Ministry of Public Security Publish ‘Joint Notice’ Prohibiting Any Person 
Using Any Excuse to Disrupt the Order of Hospitals 卫生部公安部发出《联合通告》 禁止任何人医任
何借口骚乱医院秩序.” 
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trouble, destroyed hospital property, beat up and humiliated medical personnel, the public 
security organs (police) could address them with relevant public security regulations and 
also pursue criminal liability in particularly serious instances.
661
 
1987 Medical Accident Management Measures 
The next year in 1987 the Ministry of Health issued the Medical Accident 
Management Measures, establishing the foundation for administrative procedures on 
health care dispute resolution, asserting that patients and doctors both have legal rights 
and benefits, defining and categorizing medical accidents,
662
 and creating the process by 
which they could be investigated.
663
 There are several important aspects of the Measures 
that highlight the initial stance of the Chinese health care system towards medical 
disputes. 
Dispute Resolution Avenues: Preference for Private Settlement. The Medical 
Accident Management Measures implies that there are three main avenues: private 
settlement between patients and doctors, review of the case by the corresponding local 
health bureaucracy, or pursuing a court case. It clearly favors private settlement within 
hospitals, saying that if private settlement does not work, only then should patients seek 
review of the case outside the hospital.
664
  
Managing Disputes: Preference for Keeping Them within the Health Care 
Bureaucracy. These measures also created Medical Accident Technical Review 
                                                 
661
 “The Ministry of Health and Ministry of Public Security Publish ‘Joint Notice’ Prohibiting Any Person 
Using Any Excuse to Disrupt the Order of Hospitals 卫生部公安部发出《联合通告》 禁止任何人医任
何借口骚乱医院秩序,” Point 8. 
662
 “Medical Accident Management Measures [医疗事故处理办法],” Ministry of Health, June 29, 1987, 
Chapter 2, http://www.moh.gov.cn/mohyzs/s3576/200804/29362.shtml. 
663
 “Medical Accident Management Measures [医疗事故处理办法],” Chapter 4. 
664
 “Medical Accident Management Measures [医疗事故处理办法],” Article 11 and Chapter 6 Article 
29.3.1. 
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Committees, which comprised of health care workers chosen by the Ministry of Health 
bureaucracies and approved by the local people’s government.
665
 Patients, their families, 
and hospitals could apply for a Medical Technical Review from the committee when a 
dispute occurred. These reviews were later accused of being biased towards the hospitals 
because the government’s health bureaucracy not only oversaw the technical reviews but 
also the hospitals themselves, casting doubt on the neutrality of the reviews since it 
would be in the health bureaucracy’s best interest for the hospitals under their 
administration to perform well.
666
 
Evidence - Prohibiting Tampering: The Medical Accident Management Measures 
further lays out measures for collecting evidence, managing cadavers, and prohibiting 
health care workers from tampering with documents and destroying evidence for medical 
disputes,
667
 the latter of which is still a concern today.
668
  
Establishing Accountability for Medical Personnel Involved in Negligence: There 
are also administrative punishments in the document for medical personnel responsible 
for medical accidents – such as demotion or dismissal depending on the severity of the 
incident among other factors.
669
  
Compensation: Little Guidance for Localities: The document leaves standards for 
compensation at the discretion of provincial-level units.
670
 This is important because 
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 “Medical Accident Management Measures [医疗事故处理办法],” Article 12. 
666
 National Health and Family Planning Commission Official, Interview No. 69, 2016.  
667
 “Medical Accident Management Measures [医疗事故处理办法],” Article 8. 
668
 Chuan Wang, “Judicial Inspections Difficult to Initiate, Undue Medical Treatment Difficult to Decide, 
Medical Records Difficult to Monitor [司法鉴定难启 过度医疗难定 病历书写难管],” Shanghai Law 
Journal, May 23, 2012, sec. A02, http://newspaper.jfdaily.com/shfzb/html/2012-
05/23/content_809771.htm. 
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 “Medical Accident Management Measures [医疗事故处理办法],” Article 20. 
670
 “Medical Accident Management Measures [医疗事故处理办法],” Article 18. 
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compensation standards are one of the most important issues in medical dispute 
resolution. 
Yinao: Clear desire and permission for police intervention in yinao incidents: The 
measures contain two clauses directly alluding to yinao, one prohibiting these behaviors 
against the health bureaucracy’s medical technical review committee and the other 
directly reflects yinao: “On the pretext that a medical accident occurred in a medical 
work unit, no one is allowed to pick a fight and cause trouble, and disturb the normal 
order of medicine. Violators will be given punishment according to relevant regulations 
of the Ministry of Public Security’s ‘People’s Republic of China’s Public Security 
Administration Management Principles.’ In serious circumstances constituting a criminal 
offense, the justice institutions should pursue the case according to criminal liability.”
671
 
The statements against yinao resemble those in the 1986 joint MOH and MPS notice – 
using language to prohibit it and state that public security organs have the ability to 
punish the behaviors. 
Establishing the Health Care Bureaucracy Petitioning System 
While the dispute system had been established in 1987, there still lacked a 
coherent system for collecting complaints about the health care system, so in 1993 and 
1996, the Ministry of Health passed measures for its system of letters and visits – part of 
the xinfang system
672
 – to standardize the collection of health-related complaints, which 
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 “Medical Accident Management Measures [医疗事故处理办法],” Article 25. 
672
 The xinfang system stems from a long tradition in China of submitting citizen complaints through 
“letters and visits” at local level government offices and is not unique to the health care bureaucracies – 
virtually every bureaucracy has a letters and visits system at all levels (bottom-up: village, township, 
county, prefecture, province/special administrative region/provincial-level municipality, national-level) 
(See: Minzer, “Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Institutions.”. If the lower-level office does not 
resolve the complaint, then the complainant(s) can go to the next higher level to make the complaint, and if 
the matter still remains unresolved at each successive level, the complainant(s) can go to the relevant 
central government agency in Beijing, though local governments try to prevent complainants from 
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cover anything from complaints about national health care policy to individual 
complaints about a hospital.  
Condemning Yinao Behaviors and Requesting Police Assistance: In 1993 the 
Ministry of Health published “Health Ministry Xinfang Work Measures”
673
 to lay out the 
procedures for the complaint management process and then followed with the 1996 
“Management Measures for Mass Petitioning Up Levels and Health Ministry Receiving 
Cases at Different Levels.”
674
 While neither of these measures explicitly addresses yinao, 
both measures have articles specifically aimed at identifying and addressing inappropriate 
behaviors similar to yinao. Both, notably, use weak language for handling these 
behaviors. For example, Article 20 of the 1993 Measures states the following about how 
to handle people causing disturbances at xinfang offices: “Request [qing, 请] the local 
police department, according to law, to handle or to remove [the individuals] and send 
[them] back to their locality.”
675
 Article 20 of the 1996 Measures states, “If the visitor has 
one of the following behaviors [attacking, blocking doors, occupying the work area, 
causing disturbances, hanging signs, abandoning an old person or infant to threaten 
employees, blocking employees from work, etc.], it shall be reported to and requested 
                                                                                                                                                 
escalating their complaints up the bureaucratic ladder (See: Jianxing Yu and Biao Huang, “Dampening 
Rather than Resolving Popular Contention in China: Strategies Used by Local Governments [地方政府在
社会抗争事件中的‘摆平’策略],” CASS Journal of Political Science [政治学研究] 2 (2016): 26–28.. 
673
 Ministry of Health, “Ministry of Health Xinfang Work Measures (Annulled) Full Text [卫生部门信访
工作办法(废止)_全文],” Law Library [法律图书馆], June 29, 1993, http://www.law-
lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=56390. 
674
 Ministry of Health, “Management Measures for Mass Petitioning Up Levels and Health Ministry 
Receiving Cases at Different Levels  [群众逐级走访和卫生部门分级受理管理办法_全文],” Law Library 
[法律图书馆], November 11, 1996, http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=302610. 
675
 Ministry of Health, “Ministry of Health Xinfang Work Measures (Annulled) Full Text [卫生部门信访
工作办法(废止)_全文],” Article 20. 
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[baoqing, 报请] that the public security organs handle [the situation].”676 This document 
cannot oblige police to respond since it is not within the purview of the MOH to do so, so 
instead they can only ask that the xinfang offices report the incidents to the police.  
Analysis of Policy Cycle 1 
 Weak policy documents, meaning documents with a low level of authoritativeness 
and with few authors, characterize the policies of the first policy cycle (see Table 10 for 
full summary below). Despite the weakness of the documents, at the same time they 
established the foundational procedures for complaint and dispute management. The 
primary policy tools used during this period were language, justice, and security tools. 
Policy documents used language to define the scope of and to prohibit yinao behaviors in 
addition to explicitly permitting police intervention in serious cases. All of the policy 
documents during this time invited police intervention to handle disturbances. 
Importantly, these documents established official complaints and dispute resolution for 
the health care bureaucracy – a first attempt to provide a system through which patients 
can seek justice in instances when they feel wronged. 
Notably the preliminary system for dispute resolution favors in-hospital dispute 
resolution, which is also reflected by the dominance of the Ministry of Health in 
authoring these documents. Only in one document - a circular, the weakest type – do the 
Health and Security Ministries tackle the issue jointly. MPS is not obliged to obey any 
document that another ministry issues that crosses over into the realm of issues within its 
jurisdiction, which includes police intervention. Further, even though MPS supported one 
of these documents, its weak degree of authoritativeness does not oblige implementation.  
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 Ministry of Health, “Management Measures for Mass Petitioning Up Levels and Health Ministry 
Receiving Cases at Different Levels  [群众逐级走访和卫生部门分级受理管理办法_全文],” Article 20. 
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The concentration of documents in the Ministry of Health in addition to the lack 
of authority of the one jointly issued document makes the resulting outcomes of this 
policy cycle unsurprising: there has been a well-known lack of police response to 
yinao
677
 incidents in spite of explicit permission to do so, and further, the maintenance of 
dispute resolution within the health care bureaucracy itself without a third party 
evaluation of cases further fomented distrust of the system. 
Table 10: Policy Cycle 1, 1986-2000 
                                                 
677
 News reports, academic articles, and interviews in late 2014 all emphasized the lack of police response. 
See Chapter Six on Sources of Yinao for more information.  
678
 The issue of tampering with evidence and editing medical records is a well-known phenomenon. It is 
discussed in many research articles and was even featured in a scene on the 12
th
 episode the popular TV 
show depicting doctors Xinshu. Tampering with medical records (篡改病历) produces 82 search results in 
CNKI since 1985. The years 2012 and 2013 saw the highest number of results, with 11 and 13 results 
respectively. The number is even greater with broader searches. See also: Lilac Garden, “Netizens Discuss 
Xinshu: A Doctor Edits a Medical Record to Protect Himself, Making People Feel No Shame or Sympathy 
网友评心术：医生为自保改病历 让人不耻又同情-搜狐健康,” Sohu Health, May 9, 2012, 
http://health.sohu.com/20120509/n342763849.shtml. 
Date Title of Document (EN) Tool(s) - Content Type Agencies Outcomes of Policy Cycle 
1 
1986.10.30 Joint Notice On 
Protecting Hospital 
Order 
Language - prohibiting yinao 
behaviors 
Language/Security - 




2. MPS intervention  
1987.06.29 Medical Accident 
Management Measures 
Justice - procedural 
establishment of dispute 
management system, creation 
of technical review 
committees, favoring in-
hospital resolution 
Security - permitting police to 
punish yinao under existing 
regulations for public security  
Healthcare System - prohibits 
tampering of 
documents/destroying 
evidence by health care 
workers, administrative 
discipline for health care 





and interest in protecting 







1993.6.29 Ministry of Health 
Xinfang Work Measures 
Justice - procedural 
establishment of complaint 
system for health care 
Language/Security - 
ask/report yinao behaviors to 
police 
Measures 1. MOH 
implemented 
Lack of  police 
intervention (but not 
obliged by document) 
1996.11.4 Mass Petitioning at 
Levels of Government 
and the Measures for 
Accepting and Managing 
at Different Levels  
Justice - Procedural reform of 
complaint system 
Language/Security - 
ask/report yinao behaviors to 
police 
Measures 1. MOH 
implemented 
intervention (but not 
obliged by document) 
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2001-2002 Policy Cycle 2: Reforming the Regulations for Dispute Resolution 
Against the backdrop of the lack of police response to yinao and general distrust 
of the dispute resolution system, the number of violent medical dispute cases broadcast 
by media almost doubling from 2000 to 2001.
679
 One of these cases occurred in 2001 
when the son of a deceased patient used a glass object to attack Dr. Wang Renzhi, 
Director of Neurology at Beijing’s prestigious Peking Union Medical College Hospital. 
The attack resulted in an 8cm gash on Dr. Wang’s arm that needed 25 stitches.
680
 About a 
week after the incident, MOH and MPS issued a joint statement, identifying several yinao 
behaviors as explicitly constituting a violation of public security.
681
 The statement said 
that public security organs should handle these incidents according to the “Public 
Security Administration Regulations” and further investigate acts with criminal liability 
according to law.
682
 This notice not only identifies how specific behaviors should be 
punished like the previous 1986 notice, but it also addresses other factors that contribute 
to yinao, recognizing that this is not simply a problem of patients being violent, but that 
there are clear sources of patient discontent. It states that medical institutions must 
increase the transparency of fees and prohibit arbitrary fees, illegal use of medicine, and 
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 Zhao et al., “The Pain of an Era: Big Data Records the Trajectory of 16 Years of Violence against 
Doctors [时代之痛！大数据记录 16 年暴力伤医轨迹]”; “Taking Stock of Despicable Patient Doctor 
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 Shenghuo Shibao (now Xin Jingbao), “Beijing Xiehe Yiyuan Yisheng Bei Da An Yue Shen Yue Liqi (
北京协和医院医生被打案越审越离奇)The Case of Assault against A Doctor at Beijing Xiehe Hospital 
Becomes More Bizarre the More It Is Investigated,” People’s Daily Online, accessed August 4, 2017, 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/44/20020312/685387.html. 
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 “The Ministry of Health, The Ministry of Public Security Notice [卫生部公安部通告],” National 
Health and Family Planning Commission Bureau of Health Governance and Health Management, 
November 22, 2001, 
http://www.nhfpc.gov.cn/yzygj/s3585u/200804/90d25a53b7ca40c08dca7252ba93e376.shtml#. 
682
 “The Ministry of Health, The Ministry of Public Security Notice [卫生部公安部通告].” 
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refusal of patients in need of emergency care.
683
 It also details how to handle corpses, 
prohibiting the placement of corpses anywhere outside a hospital’s morgue
684
 – this is an 
important issue because placing dead bodies in public areas is a one of the behaviors of 
yinao. 
2002 Medical Accident Management Regulations 
The next year in 2002 the Medical Accident Management Measures were 
repealed and the State Council passed the Medical Accident Management Regulations
685
 
to replace it. The Medical Accident Management Regulations made several important 
changes, explained below and summarized in Table 11: 
  
                                                 
683
 “The Ministry of Health, The Ministry of Public Security Notice [卫生部公安部通告],” Articles 6 & 7. 
684
 “The Ministry of Health, The Ministry of Public Security Notice [卫生部公安部通告],” Article 8. 
685
 State Council fo the People’s Republic of China, “Medical Accident Management Regulations [医疗事
故处理条例],” 2002, http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2002/content_61445.htm. 
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Table 11: Health Care Dispute Resolution Changes Over Time 
 
New emphasis on prevention not just management of medical accidents
686
. Unlike 
its predecessor, the Regulations has a section that focuses on preventing medical 
accidents and strengthening the monitoring of quality control,
 687
 an important step for 
reducing accidents, and therefore, disputes in hospital settings. 
Dispute Resolution Avenues: Introduction of Mediation by Health Bureaucracy. 
The avenues for dispute resolution (in-house negotiation with hospital, technical review, 
                                                 
686
 Thanks to an NHFPC official for this insight. National Health and Family Planning Commission 
Official, Interview No. 69. 
687
 State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “Medical Accident Management Regulations [医疗事
故处理条例],” Chapter 2 Prevention and Handling of Medical Accidents. 
Key Characteristics 
of System 
1987 Measures 2002 Regulations Main Change 
Official Avenues 
Available 
Private settlement*, Court Private settlement, Mediation 
by Health Bureaucracy, Court 
Adds additional option of 
mediation by health 
bureaucracy 
Bottom Line: Maintains dispute 
resolution within health care 
bureaucracy 
Review Process       
Body Charged with 
Reviewing Cases 
Medical Accident Technical 
Review organized by Health 
Bureaucracy 
Medical Accident Technical 
Review organized by China 
Medical Association 
Moves responsibility of reviews 
to China Medical Association 
Bottom Line: Maintains dispute 
resolution within health care 
bureaucracy 
Burden of Proof On patients/families (plaintiffs) On physicians/hospitals 
(defendants) 
Reversed the burden of proof (
举证倒置) 
Stance on tampering 
with evidence 
Preserve evidence from the 
scene and medical records, 
forbidden to tamper with 
Preserve evidence from the 
scene and medical records, 
forbidden to tamper with 
No change, maintains strong 






Yes - identifies punishments 
based on level of accident and 
other factors characterizing 
responsible personnel  
Yes - less specific punishment 
than previous law, instead 
refers punishment to 
administrative punishment laws 
and Party discipline 




No guidance, leaves to 
provinces to decide 
Yes - provides general 
guidelines for areas under 
which patients and/or their 
families should be compensated 
in the case of a medical 
accident 
Identified scope of issues that 
compensation should cover 
Explicit Messages on 
Yinao 
Yes  Yes - adds that people who use 
yinao can be charged with the 
crime of disturbing social order 
Stronger verbal stance by 
identifying yinao behaviors as a 
specific crime - the crime of 
disturbing social order (扰乱社
会秩序罪) 
*Avenue policies explicitly endorse as preferred 
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court) remained intact, but Regulations explicitly gave the administrative bureaucracies 




Dispute Resolution Procedure: Moving Technical reviews to the Chinese Medical 
Association. Regulations also, very importantly, moved Medical Accident Technical 
Reviews (performed under the Medical Accident Management Regulations) out of the 
health administrative bureaucracy, where there had been a clear conflict of interest in 
conducting the reviews for the hospitals that they administered. Instead, the medical 
accident technical reviews were given to the Chinese Medical Association (CMA),
689
 
which is a “civic organization with official background,”
690
 so it is not a truly 
independent civic organization. Transferring the medical accident technical reviews to 
the CMA was an attempt to increase both the professional and third-party nature of the 
reviews,
 691
 but its attachment to local networks of physicians and its close administrative 
relationship with the health care bureaucracy continued to cast doubt on its objectivity.
692
 
Evidence: Continued Policy on No Tampering, but Reversing Burden of Proof 
The Regulations continued, like the 1987 Procedures, to prohibit tampering with 
evidence, a continuing concern since doctors have been known to tamper with medical 
records. However, importantly, as mentioned in Chapter Three, Regulations also reversed 
the burden of proof from the plaintiff (patient) side to the defendant (doctor) side, 
creating a “guilty until proven innocent” culture in settling medical malpractice disputes 
                                                 
688
 State Council fo the People’s Republic of China, Article 48. 
689
 State Council fo the People’s Republic of China, Article 20. 
690
 Medical Affairs Office Employee, Interview No. 063. 
691
 National Health and Family Planning Commission Official, Interview No. 69. 
692




 though in reality, this did not make the medical malpractice dispute 
resolution process more in favor of patients.
694
 
More Specific Compensation Guidelines. The new 2002 Regulations, unlike its 
predecessor, which left compensation standards to the provinces to decide, laid out more 
specific guidelines for compensation. These guidelines cover accident-related medical 
fees, workers compensation, subsidies for meals at hospitals, fees for accompanying 
relatives, compensation for those disabled, equipment needed to support disability, 
funeral and burial, compensation for dependents, transportation reimbursement, hotel 
reimbursement, pain and suffering, etc.
695
 It also outlines acts that incur disciplinary 
measures for health care personnel directly related to the accident.
696
 These guidelines 
aimed to standardize compensation and procedures in order to reduce arbitrariness in 
those decisions. However, in practice, as highlighted in Chapter 3 and more in the 
proceeding sections, these standards compensated less than allowed under the Tort 
Liability Law, and ultimately having the choice between claiming damages under both 
the Regulations and the Tort Liability ultimately encouraged arbitrariness in choosing 
criteria to evaluate compensation.
697
 
Provide greater specification on which crime yinao entails. Unlike the 1987 
Measures, the 2002 Regulations point directly to a specific crime in the Criminal Law of 
the People’s Republic of China by which serious yinao-type behaviors should be 
                                                 
693
 See analysis in Chapter 3 and also: Hospital official and former hospital affairs office head, Interview 
No. 072. 
694
 Liebman, “Malpractice Mobs: Medical Dispute Resolution in China,” 194–96. 
695
 State Council fo the People’s Republic of China, “Medical Accident Management Regulations [医疗事
故处理条例],” Chapter 5. 
696
 State Council fo the People’s Republic of China, Articles 55 & 56. 
697
 Liebman, “Malpractice Mobs: Medical Dispute Resolution in China,” 198. 
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punished - the Crime of Disturbing Social Order (扰乱社会秩序罪).698 It further states 
that in less serious yinao events, perpetrators are to be punished according to public 
security administration regulations.
699
  While the 1987 Measures mentions that the 
criminal law or public security laws can be used to punish persons disturbing the order of 
hospitals, the document does not identify a specific crime for yinao-type behaviors to be 
categorized and punished under.
700
 This change between the 1987 Measures and 2002 
Regulations demonstrates a small move towards a more formal criminal categorization of 
yinao, though because MPS has not signed onto this document and it is not a law, MPS is 
not technically required to follow it.
701
 
Analysis of Policy Cycle 2: Small, Incremental Changes in Justice, Security 
 The second policy cycle contains significant though small, incremental changes in 
policies relevant to yinao (see Table 12 for summary of policies). 
Table 12: Policy Cycle 2, 2001-2002 
Date Title of 
Document 
(EN) 
Tool(s) - Content Type Agencies Outcomes of 
Era 






Language - prohibiting yinao 
Language/Security - permitting police 
intervention under existing regulations 
Language/Healthcare System - 
transparency issues, arbitrary fees, 
illegal use of medicine, patient refusal 














Justice - Procedural establishment of 
dispute management system  
Justice -  Identifying specific crime in 














                                                 
698
 State Council fo the People’s Republic of China, “Medical Accident Management Regulations [医疗事
故处理条例],” Article 59. 
699
 State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “Medical Accident Management Regulations [医疗事
故处理条例],” Article 59. 
700
 “Medical Accident Management Measures [医疗事故处理办法],” Article 25. 
701
 “Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China [中华人民共和国立法法],” The National People’s 
Congress of the People’s Republic of China, March 18, 2015, Articles 81, 91, 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/dbdhhy/12_3/2015-03/18/content_1930713.htm. 
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The first significant change is that the joint notice between MPS and MOH is the 
first explicit joint document tying together the violence against health care workers with 
the endemic issues of transparency and corruption in the health care system, showing that 
from a policy perspective, the acknowledgement that the health care system, not just 
patients and their families, are in part responsible for yinao. This is important because a 
response to yinao that truly aims to resolve it needs to address the underlying issues in the 
healthcare system that contribute to patients’ frustrations. 
Another significant change is the elevation of medical dispute resolution measures 
to Regulations adopted by the State Council, showing its rise in importance with an 
increase in authoritativeness in its document type and issuing agency. One of the themes 
that emerges when examining the group of changes in the dispute resolution process by 
the Regulations, as outlined in the section above and summarized in Table 12, is that they 
are small, incremental changes within the health care bureaucracy itself: Regulations 
allows for administrative mediation of disputes and entrusts the CMA with technical 
reviews for medical accidents, but both of these changes occur within its administrative 
jurisdiction.  
As far as explicit messaging on yinao, there is more specific linking of yinao with 
crimes under China’s Criminal Law; however, just as in past documents, the absence of 
both the MPS’ endorsement in addition to the lack of authoritativeness on the documents 
makes them weaker in their ability to enforce. 
Outcomes of Era Two: No Apparent Improvement with Increasing Yinao Cases 
Available data on yinao and medical disputes show that unfortunately, despite the 
incremental changes made in the second policy cycle between 2001 and 2002, high-
 223 
profile attacks against health care workers increased in the years following these policies. 
Estimates made using available data on the average number of incidents per hospital per 
year suggest that the total number of yinao incidents in 2006 was around 94,861, up from 
around an estimated 66,000 incidents two years earlier.
702
 Not only were the numbers of 
yinao incidents increasing, but media attention to it also grew: according to one study, 
media reports on violent attacks against doctors more than tripled from eight reported in 
2002 to 27 reported in 2005
703
 – about one report every two weeks for that year.  
 The worsening of yinao in the period following the passage of the Regulations 
was not necessarily caused by the Regulations and of course, there is usually a lag period 
between policy adoption and implementation. But at the same time, the worsening of the 
yinao situation also suggests that the incremental changes that characterized policy cycle 
two were insufficient for addressing yinao. Preserving the primary role of the health care 
bureaucracy in dispute resolution failed to build credibility. Further, not having MPS, and 
more importantly, any Party body endorse the policies also continued to enable a lack of 
a strong police response to disruptive behaviors; the explicit acknowledgment of yinao as 
a crime, even by a policy (the Regulations) adopted by China’s highest-ranking 
government body, the State Council, was not enough. 
  
                                                 
702
 See Chapter 5 for more information regarding calculating data estimates for yinao, but briefly 
summarized here: This figure was calculated using the number of average yinao incidents according to a 
survey conducted by the China Medical Doctor Association (CMDA), whose survey revealed on average 
hospitals in China experienced 15.31 yinao incidents per year in 2006. While it is unclear which types of 
hospitals were included in the survey, I conservatively estimate a total figure by multiplying the 2006 
number of second and third level hospitals in China (6,300), since these are facilities where yinao accidents 
tend to occur more often due their size, popularity with patients, and more advanced and therefore riskier 
procedures done in these facilities. For 2006, I get a total yinao estimate of 94,861. I repeat this calculation 
for 2004, when hospitals experienced on average 10.48 incidents per year, producing a total of about 
66,000 incidents. See 2007 China Health Statistics Yearbook and 2005 Health Statistics Yearbook.  
703
 Zhao et al., “The Pain of an Era: Big Data Records the Trajectory of 16 Years of Violence against 
Doctors [时代之痛！大数据记录 16 年暴力伤医轨迹].” 
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Policy Cycle 3: 2005-2010 Establishing “Secure Hospitals” and the New Tort Law 
 Within the context of the early 2000s seeing violent incidents continue to arise 
from medical disputes, discussion about establishing “secure hospitals” began to circulate 
in the Chinese academic literature mainly from hospitals in Jiangsu and Zhejiang 
provinces attempting to establish more secure environments during 2005 and 2006.
704
 
These initiatives to establish “secure hospitals” followed the 2005 nationwide launch of 
“Opinions of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission and the Central 
Committee for Comprehensive Management of Public Security on Deepening the 
Launching of Secure Construction.”
705
 Jiangsu Province was developing these “secure” 
initiatives as early a 2003.
706
 It spread all over China, resulting in a plethora of initiatives 
nationwide to establish “secure Shaanxi,” “secure Jiangsu,” and “secure Fujian.”
707
 
In April 2007, Jiangsu Province Comprehensive Security Commission, Public 
Security Department, Justice Department, and Department of Health jointly issued 
“Opinions on Launching Secure Hospitals Establishment Activity.”
708
 A month later in 
                                                 
704
 Chen Jianrong et al., “Gouzhu Yiyuan Zhian Fangkong Tixi de Tansuo Yu Shijian (构筑医院治安防控
体系的探索与实践) [On Construction and Practice of Hospital Security, Prevention and Control System],” 
Jiangsu Weisheng Shiye Guanli (江苏卫生事业管理) [Jiangsu Management of Health Care] 9, no. 3 
(March 2005); Ye Xinmin, “Zhuahao Yiliao Anquan Chuangjian Pingan Yiyuan (抓好医疗安全 创建平安
医院) [Grasp Medical Safety, Establish Secure Hospitals],” Zhongguo Nongmin Weisheng Shiye Guanli (
中国农村卫生事业管理) [Chinese Rural Health Service Administration] 1 (2006). 
705
 “Zhongban Guoban Zhuanfa 《Zhongyang Zhengfa Weiyuanhui、Zhongyang Shehui Zhian Zonghe 
Zhili Weiyuanhui Guanyu Shenru Kaizhan Pingan Jianshe de Yijian》(中办国办转发《中央政法委员会
、中央社会治安综合治理委员会关于深入开展平安建设的意见》) [Opinions of the Central Political 
and Legal Affairs Commission and the Central Committee for Comprehensive Management of Public 
Security on Deepening the Launching of Secure Construction],” People’s Daily, December 5, 2005. 
706
 Jindong Ge et al., “Putting into Practice the ‘Three Represents’ to Establish a ‘Secure Jiangsu’ 践行‘三
个代表’ 建设‘平安江苏,’” China Police Daily, June 25, 2003. 
707
 Search for news results in CNKI best illustrate how the “secure” initiatives picked up following the 
national policy adoption of “Opinions of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission and the 
Central Committee for Comprehensive Management of Public Security on Deepening the Launching of 
Secure Construction” in 2005. Beginning in 2006, for example, there are 34 news articles on “peaceful 
Shaanxi” for that year. There were 3 for “secure Fujian” in 2005 and then 16 in 2006.  
708
 Provincial Committee for Comprehensive Management of Public Security et al., “Shengzhengfu 
Bangong Ting Zhuanfa Sheng Zongzhiban Deng Bumen Guanyu Kaizhan Pingan Yiyuan Chuangjian 
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direct response to the worsening yinao situation and other concerns about the security and 
quality of hospitals,
709
 seven central departments of the government and CCP (Ministry 
of Health, Central Public Security Comprehensive Management Commission, the 
Propaganda Department, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Civil Affairs, the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce, and the State Administration of Traditional 
Chinese Medicine) released “Guiding Opinions on Launching the Establishment of 
‘Secure Hospitals’ Activity” and declared the creation of a leading small group (LSG)
710
 
to assess the progress and achievements of the initiative.
711
 
Implementation Measures for Establishing “Secure Hospitals” Nationwide 
The following year in 2008, these seven responsible departments released the 
implementation measures for launching the “Secure Hospitals” initiative.
 712
 There are 
several important points to note about this document. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Huodong Yijian de Tongzhi(省政府办公厅转发省综治办等部门关于开展平安医院创建活动意见的通
知) [Provincial Government Office Transmits Notice from Provincial Committee for Comprehensive 
Management of Public Security and Other Departments on Opinions on Launching Secure Hospitals 
Establishment Activity]” (Jiangsu Government Office, April 9, 2007). 
709
 “Seven Departments: In the Health Care System Launch Activity for Establishing Secure Hospitals [七
部门：在卫生系统开展创建平安医院活动],” National People’s Congress, May 10, 2007, 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/fztd/yfxz/2007-05/10/content_365190.htm#. 
710
 A Leading Small Group (LSG) is a consulting and coordination body established to coordinate 
policymaking on specific issue areas; while it is not a decision-making body, it can have an important sway 
on how policies are decided. They cover a broad range of areas from Foreign Affairs like the Foreign 
Affairs Leadership Small Group to domestic affairs like the Leadership Small Group for Deepening 
Comprehensive Economic Reform. They are composed of leading members of relevant government, party, 
and, military ministerial ranking agencies.  The LSGs conduct meetings on their dedicated area and vary in 
size and importance and often do not have permanent staff. They are important because many policy 
initiatives fall under the roles of various ministries and LSGs give the ministries a forum to coordinate their 
efforts. In the case of the LSG for the Secure Hospitals initiative, its role would be to coordinate the work 
of the relevant ministries to the initiative among other obligations such as responsibilities for assessing 
nationwide progress on the initiative. For more information about LSGs, see Ning Lu, “The Central 
Leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council Ministries, and Party Departments,” in The 
Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000, ed. David M Lampton 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 45–46. 
711
 “Seven Departments: In the Health Care System Launch Activity for Establishing Secure Hospitals [七
部门：在卫生系统开展创建平安医院活动].” 
712
 “Notice on the Publication of ‘Nationwide 'Secure Hospitals’ Establishment Work Assessment 
Measures and Assessment Standards (Implementation) [关于印发《全国‘平安医院’创建工作考核办法及
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Establishment of a National Coordinating Group for Enforcement, but no LSG: 
Notably, the implementation measures no longer mentions an LSG, the creation of which 
would have signaled a possibly higher level of importance and attention by the 
leadership.
713
 Instead, the document charges an inter-ministerial national small group (the 
Nationwide Establishing Secure Hospitals Activity Working Group) with the 
responsibility of coordinating the campaign and assessing the performance of relevant 
provincial-level institutions to implement the initiative.
714
 Even though this coordination 
body is not as prestigious as an LSG, the creation of a coordination group shows priority 
in coordinating the interdisciplinary nature of resolving issues related to yinao and other 
security issues within hospitals. 
Continued broadening scope of policy issues: These implementation measures 
evaluate the progress of hospitals and health bureaucracies in establishing “secure 
hospitals” based on a 100-point based system that includes both direct and indirect 
sources of yinao, such as improving both security
715
 and quality of care.
716
 One of the 
sections is specifically dedicated to the patient-doctor relationship and explicitly 
evaluates hospitals based on transparency of fees, whether or not they collect 
inappropriate fees, and price management – all cost related issues that kindle a tense 
                                                                                                                                                 
考核标准（试行）》的通知],” Ministry of Health, March 25, 2008, 
http://www.moh.gov.cn/mohbgt/s2906/200806/36724.shtml. 
713
 “Conversation with Chinese Think Tank Employee,” February 2017. 
714
 “Notice on the Publication of ‘Nationwide 'Peaceful Hospitals’ Establishment Work Assssment 
Measures and Assessment Standards (Implementation) [关于印发《全国‘平安医院’创建工作考核办法及
考核标准（试行）》的通知],” Ministry of Health, March 25, 2008, 1.3, 
http://www.moh.gov.cn/mohbgt/s2906/200806/36724.shtml. 
715
 “Notice on the Publication of ‘Nationwide 'Peaceful Hospitals’ Establishment Work Assssment 
Measures and Assessment Standards (Implementation) [关于印发《全国‘平安医院’创建工作考核办法及
考核标准（试行）》的通知],” Assessment Section 3. 
716
 “Notice on the Publication of ‘Nationwide 'Peaceful Hospitals’ Establishment Work Assssment 
Measures and Assessment Standards (Implementation) [关于印发《全国‘平安医院’创建工作考核办法及




 This section also places emphasis on health departments 
collecting information about patient satisfaction
718
 and ensuring that complaint 
management procedures are standardized and unobstructed.
719
  
Rewarding initiatives for mediation. While these evaluation criteria did not 
introduce new institutions for dispute resolution, they reward provinces that explore 
third-party mediation methods for medical dispute resolution.
720
 By 2008 mediation had 
already been established in several cities throughout China (see next chapter for details 
on development of mediation), but to my knowledge, this is one of the first, if not the first 
national document that endorses it.  
Deducting points for lack of attention to yinao. Yinao appears explicitly in the 
evaluation as a criterion for losing points – if an investigation finds evidence of only 
weak attempts to crackdown on yinao or medical introducers (yituo),
721
 up to ten points, 
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 “Notice on the Publication of ‘Nationwide 'Peaceful Hospitals’ Establishment Work Assssment 
Measures and Assessment Standards (Implementation) [关于印发《全国‘平安医院’创建工作考核办法及
考核标准（试行）》的通知],” Assessment Section 5. 
718
 “Notice on the Publication of ‘Nationwide 'Peaceful Hospitals’ Establishment Work Assssment 
Measures and Assessment Standards (Implementation) [关于印发《全国‘平安医院’创建工作考核办法及
考核标准（试行）》的通知],” Assessment Section 5, Part 3. 
719
 “Notice on the Publication of ‘Nationwide 'Peaceful Hospitals’ Establishment Work Assssment 
Measures and Assessment Standards (Implementation) [关于印发《全国‘平安医院’创建工作考核办法及
考核标准（试行）》的通知],” Assessment Section 5, Part 4. 
720
 “Notice on the Publication of ‘Nationwide 'Peaceful Hospitals’ Establishment Work Assssment 
Measures and Assessment Standards (Implementation) [关于印发《全国‘平安医院’创建工作考核办法及
考核标准（试行）》的通知],” Assessment Section 6, Part 5. 
721
 Yituo are “medical introducers” or “medical scalpers” occupy various public spaces in and around large 
hospitals to coax patients into going to other hospitals that are often illegal or substandard. They also 
operate online and have been the recent target of government crackdowns. See: Liebman, “Malpractice 
Mobs: Medical Dispute Resolution in China,” 205–6; Guanxing Zhu, Meilao Shen, and Xuliang Zhang, 
“Legal Exploration for Rectifying ‘Yituo’ [整治”医托“的法律探讨],” China Health Service Management 
Editorial Email, no. 4 (2008). 
722
 “Notice on the Publication of ‘Nationwide 'Secure Hospitals’ Establishment Work Assssment Measures 
and Assessment Standards (Implementation) [关于印发《全国‘平安医院’创建工作考核办法及考核标准
（试行）》的通知].” 
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2009 Hospital Complaint Management Procedures 
 Even though the implementation measures for establishing “secure hospitals” 
emphasized standardized complaint procedures, there were no existing national 
guidelines specifically on hospital complaint management systems, though hospitals were 
supposed to look to the petitioning system in the health care bureaucracy established 
during the first policy cycle era (1986-2000) for guidance.
 723
 This changed in 2009 when 
the Ministry of Health issued the Hospital Complaint Management Procedures.
724
 
Expanding procedural standards to the hospital level is important for yinao because, as 
noted in Chapter Four, disputes can escalate from initial complaints, and it is at this point 
in the process that hospitals have the potential to defuse conflict. 
Standardization of Procedures to Address Complaints in Timely Manner: The 
2009 Procedures standardized the reception and management of medical complaints by 
outlining requirements for complaint management personnel,
725
 appropriate management 
of complaint records,
726
 and time limits for how long hospitals should take to resolve 
complaints, depending on the type of complaint.
727
  
Defining Hospital Complaint Department Purview, Not to Include Mass Incidents: 
The Complaint Management Procedures also defines the scope of responsibility for 
complaint management departments at hospitals. For example, complaints that result in 
                                                 
723
 “Health Xinfang Work Measures [卫生信访工作办法 (卫生部令第 54 号)],” Ministry of Health Policy 
and Regulations Department, February 16, 2007, Article 37, 
http://www.moh.gov.cn/mohzcfgs/pgz/201207/7858fe06203746cd8625bc36026b361f.shtml. 
724
 “Notice on ‘Hospital Complaint Management Measures (Implementation)’ [关于印发《医院投诉管理
办法（试行）》的通知],” Office of the Ministry of Health, November 26, 2009, 
http://www.moh.gov.cn/mohbgt/s10695/200912/44756.shtml. 
725
 “Notice on ‘Hospital Complaint Management Measures (Implementation)’ [关于印发《医院投诉管理
办法（试行）》的通知],” Chapter 3. 
726
 “Notice on ‘Hospital Complaint Management Measures (Implementation)’ [关于印发《医院投诉管理
办法（试行）》的通知],” Part Five. 
727
 “Notice on ‘Hospital Complaint Management Measures (Implementation)’ [关于印发《医院投诉管理
办法（试行）》的通知],” Chapter 4. 
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mass incidents, such as a possible yinao situation, are beyond the purview of the 
guidelines and are to be handled according to the 2002 Medical Accident Regulations.
728
  
Advocacy of People’s Medical Dispute Mediation Committees: The regulations 
further encourage linking hospital complaint management with the people’s medical 
dispute mediation committees,
729
 not only implying that this new institution for dispute 
resolution was starting to take shape throughout China at this time, but also showing the 
recognition that the resolution of complaints and disputes needed an integrated, systemic 
solution.  
Integrating Complaints, Quality, and Safety: The Procedures also integrate the 
complaint management system with medical quality and safety management as well as 
interdepartmental communication systems in order to raise quality and ensure safety.
730
 
The guidelines are broad and administrative regions are encouraged to write their own 
detailed measures for enforcement.
731
  
Passage of Tort Liability Law of the PRC Includes Medical Damages Liability 
In the same year that MOH issued regulations for complaints at the grassroots 
level at hospitals, the National People’s Congress passed the Tort Liability Law with an 
entire section on medical liability,732 addressing the legal obligations for health care 
workers and hospitals during treatment and disputes.  
                                                 
728
 “Notice on ‘Hospital Complaint Management Measures (Implementation)’ [关于印发《医院投诉管理
办法（试行）》的通知],” Article 37. 
729
 “Notice on ‘Hospital Complaint Management Measures (Implementation)’ [关于印发《医院投诉管理
办法（试行）》的通知],” Article 9. 
730
 “Notice on ‘Hospital Complaint Management Measures (Implementation)’ [关于印发《医院投诉管理
办法（试行）》的通知],” Chapter 5. 
731
 “Notice on ‘Hospital Complaint Management Measures (Implementation)’ [关于印发《医院投诉管理
办法（试行）》的通知].” 
732
 “The People’s Republic of China Tort Liability Law (Order of the President of the People’s Republic of 
China No. 21) [中华人民共和国侵权责任法（主席令第二十一号)],” Section 7. 
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Giving legal weight to medical dispute resolution, but vague on procedures: The 
Tort Liability Law addressed important problems in medical damages liability, such as 





 But it did not address the details for conducting the technical 
reviews to determine fault in medical liability cases (called the Medical Damages 
Review), such as which organizations could be entrusted to conduct the reviews and the 
procedures that they should follow.
735
 Even though before the Tort Liability Law went 
into effect, a legal explanation by the Supreme People’s Court made it clear that the 
judicial inspection agencies could review these cases,
736
 it failed to differentiate which 
cases should go to the Medical Associations for evaluation and which should go to the 
Judicial Inspection Agencies, the process by which these cases should be evaluated, and 
the division of labor between these two types of agencies.
737
 In 2011, some of these 
issues were addressed in the drafted “Supreme People’s Court Explanation of Several 
Issues in Applying the Law in Hearing Medical Damages Liability Dispute Cases (Draft 




                                                 
733
 The Standing Committee of the 11th National People’s Congress [第十一届全国人民代表大会常务委
员会], “The People’s Republic of China Tort Liability Law 中华人民共和国侵权责任法,” Article 55. 
734
 Ibid., Articles 55, 57-58; Shihao Jiang, “Exploring China Medical Association’s Role as the Main Body 
for Conducting Medical Damages Reviews [医学会作为医疗损害主体之探讨],” ACTA Universitatis 
Medicinalis Nanjing (Social Sciences) 2 (April 2013): 128. 
735
 Jiang, 128. 
736
 “Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of the Tort Law of 
the People’s Republic of China [最高人民法院关于适用《中华人民共和国侵权责任法》若干问题的通
知],” June 30, 2010, http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Gid=134591&Db=chl. 
737
 “Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of the Tort Law of 
the People’s Republic of China [最高人民法院关于适用《中华人民共和国侵权责任法》若干问题的通
知]”; Jiang, “Exploring China Medical Association’s Role as the Main Body for Conducting Medical 
Damages Reviews [医学会作为医疗损害主体之探讨],” 127. 
738
 Liebman, “Malpractice Mobs: Medical Dispute Resolution in China,” 201–2. Since Liebman’s writing 
on this matter in 2013, the author has still not found any evidence that this Notice was formally adopted. 
 231 
Implies Yinao is Prohibited (Again): While the Tort Liability Law does not 
specifically address yinao, it implies it is prohibited: “The legitimate rights and interests 
of medical organizations and their medical personnel are protected by law. Anyone who 
interferes in medical administration and hinders the work or lives of medical personnel 
shall bear legal liability in accordance with the law.”739 
Analysis of Policy Cycle 3 
 There are some significant changes in this third policy cycle (see summary Table 
13 below). 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
Even finding an official version of its release online has been difficult. For an unofficial version, see: 
“Explanation on Legal Application for Hearing Medical Damages Liability Dispute Cases [关于审理医疗
损害责任纠纷案件适用法律的解释],” Findlaw.Cn, June 5, 2014, 
http://china.findlaw.cn/yiliao/ylsgql/yiliaochulifagui/1110214.html. 
739
 The Standing Committee of the 11th National People’s Congress [第十一届全国人民代表大会常务委
员会], “The People’s Republic of China Tort Liability Law 中华人民共和国侵权责任法,” Article 64. 
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Table 13: Policy Cycle 3, 2007-2010 
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* Strong in the sense of authoritativeness of document, but not necessarily in implementation 
 
Increasing Coordination between Multiple Government and Party Organizations: 
The first obvious change is that policies during this era begin to integrate the roles of 
more than just the Ministry of Health. The “Peaceful Hospital” initiatives involved seven 
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ministries and created a coordinating body to connect and evaluate their reforms. This 
type of policy demonstrates that the Chinese state is acknowledging the complexity of 
yinao and beginning to adopt a holistic, joint approach to resolving it.  
Continued expansion of policy tools used to address the issue, with an increase in 
attention in patient-doctor communication as well as mediation: The Implementation 
Measures for “Secure Hospitals” and the Tort Liability Law notably place emphasis on 
the communication obligations doctors have to their patients. While the 2002 Regulations 
in the last cycle emphasized quality and safety, in this era, the implementation measures 
for “secure hospitals” actually establishes a formal system for evaluating the 
improvement in quality and safety, potentially strengthening enforcement. This era 
further places emphasis on complaint management – three out of the four relevant 
documents to yinao emphasize standardized and timely management of complaints, 
suggesting a clear recognition on the instrumental role that addressing complaints may 
have for defusing disputes. Further, both the Implementation Measures and the Hospital 
Complaint Procedures endorse using MDMCs to resolve complaints and conflict, and as 
will be seen in the following policy cycle, MDMCs will continue to receive increasing 
attention for their effectiveness in dispute resolution.  
Elevation of medical malpractice liability into law: Another major change in 
addition to the “secure hospitals” initiative during this era was the introduction of law 
into medical disputes with the Tort Liability Law.
740
 This is important because laws are 
technically more powerful than the other forms of documentation used in the past to 
respond to medical disputes and yinao; previously regulations, procedures, notices, 
circulars, and announcements had governed these issues. The Tort Liability Law also 
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 Liebman, “Malpractice Mobs: Medical Dispute Resolution in China,” 193. 
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clearly states that people disturbing the order of medical institutions, like practitioners of 
yinao, will also be held accountable according to law for their actions. Of course, this last 
statement about holding those accountable for disturbing the order of medicine is not 
different from previous documents stating the same thing; the main change is that this 
statement appears in a more authoritative type of document. The elevation of legal status 
of medical liability as well as an anti-yinao stance, however, does not necessarily mean it 
has improved the dispute resolution process or decreased the occurrence of yinao. 
Outcomes of Policy Cycle 3 
Available data suggest that yinao incidents continued to rise in the immediate 
years following this 2005-2010 policy cycle, with the number of estimated incidents in 
secondary and tertiary hospitals in 2012 reaching as many as 223,587 incidents per year, 
an increase from an estimated 94,861 incidents in 2006.
741
 Again, there is lag between 
policy adoption and implementation, but it is suffice to say that in the immediate period 
after this period, the situation of violence in health care setting did not improve. The 
sections below highlight some of the features of implementation of the “secure hospitals” 
initiative and the Tort Liability within this context of worsening yinao incidents. 
“SECURE HOSPITALS”: PUBLICITY UPFRONT, FADING INTO THE BACKGROUND 
Available documents and articles as well as interviews show that the national 
coordination body for the “secure hospitals” initiative has met periodically,
742
 and that 
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 The group met in 2012 and 2014 Guiyang, and also compiled the 2016 Circular on work to protect 
hospital order nationwide. See: “Nationwide Medical Dispute People’s Mediation Work On-Site Meeting 
Convenes in Tianjin [全国医疗纠纷人民调解工作现场会在天津召开 - 中华人民共和国国家卫生和计
划生育委员会],” National Health and Family Planning Commission of the People’s Republic of China, 
May 5, 2014, 
http://www.nhfpc.gov.cn/mxwgrwz/pldhd/201405/9801d4c22bad4457839c3a4ca3f984e6.shtml; “News 
Brief - National Establishing ‘Peaceful Hospitals’ Activity Work Group Office Meeting Opens in Guiyang 
[全国创建”平安医院“活动工作小组办公室会议在贵阳召开],” People’s Mediation 12 (2014); “National 
 235 
the initiative has been enforced at the local level. A publicized list of the leadership of the 
Nationwide Establishing Secure Hospitals Activity Working Group in 2011 reveals the 
group’s level of importance to and the roles of participating ministries.
743
 The Group 
Leader was the Ministry of Health’s Party Secretary Zhang Mao, and the Vice-leaders 
were the director of the CCP’s Central Public Security Comprehensive Management 
Commission (CPSCMC) and the Vice Minister of the Ministry of Public Security, 
indicating the importance of the group’s work for social stability in China. Other 
members were also mostly vice-ministers of the other participating ministries or Party 
departments.
 744
 This arrangement shows that while this was a top priority for the 
Ministry of Health with its highest-ranking leader overseeing the working group and for 
the CPSCMC with its Director (highest position) as a vice leader, for other ministries it 
was not of utmost priority because otherwise their highest-ranking members would have 
likely been on this coordination group. This does not mean its work did not matter, but 
this helps us gauge its importance and prioritization to actors involved. But even if it was 
not a top priority for every ministry involved, the scope of the group’s work notably 
expanded in 2011, with the number of participating ministries rising from seven to ten,
745
 
further demonstrating an increasing awareness for the need to address yinao and other 
hospital security issues with an interdisciplinary approach. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Health and Family Planning Commission Circular on the 2016 Work Situation for Protecting Medical 
Order [国家卫生计生委办公厅关于 2016 年维护医疗秩序工作情况的通报],” National Health and 
Family Planning Health Affairs and Governance Bureau, (February 27, 2017), 
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Information Publication on Special Topics, December 21, 2011, 
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As far as this group’s meetings, (more on this will be covered in the next policy 
cycle as well), the national-level group met in Tianjin on June 29, 2012.
746
 While it is 
likely that the group would have met more than this one time during this era, so far this 
study has not found other documentation of the meetings. The 2012 meeting emphasized 
the effectiveness of medical dispute people’s mediation committees (MDMCs) in several 
areas of the country, including Tianjin.
747
 It also emphasized then-Vice Premier Li 
Keqiang’s recognition of the effectiveness of these committees in Tianjin, Henan, and 
Hainan.
748
 In light of the success of these committees, at this meeting it was concluded 
that Tianjin’s experience with MDMCs could be studied and replicated elsewhere, and 
that MDMCs represented an effective method for advancing the establishment of “secure 
hospitals.”
749
 The recognition of mediation as an important aspect of the initiative 
represents a change from when it was initially established four years prior, when 
assessment criteria for peaceful hospitals regarded mediation as an area for bonus points, 
but not an essential part of the program. Also, the fact that top-level leader Li Keqiang 
recognized and approved of medical mediation efforts across the country signals the 
rising importance of the issue.
750
 As noted in the previous chapter, during 2012 yinao 
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received a relatively high level of public attention compared to previous years.
751
 The 
next chapter provides greater detail on the implementation of MDMCs.  
Regarding the implementation of the “secure hospitals” initiative at the local 
level, the provinces also created their own working groups to coordinate the peaceful 
hospitals initiative,
752
 which is required by the 2008 assessment standards.
753
 In 2017 
when asked about the status of this initiative nearly a decade after its adoption, a hospital 
official explained that this initiative is a type of program that initially receives a high 
amount of attention but over time becomes a long-term form of work, noting that 
launching special program activities and campaigns are traditional ways that the Ministry 
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TORT LIABILITY LAW: EXPECTED FRAGMENTED AUTHORITARIANISM IN IMPLEMENTATION 
Implementation of the Tort Liability Law has varied at the local level due to the 
lack of guidance from the national level regarding how medical damages reviews are to 
be conducted, providing little clarification on whether judicial inspection committees, the 
CMA, or both should conduct these reviews.
 755
 As a result, the provinces themselves 
have formulated policies for implementing the new Tort Liability Law. For example, 
Jiangsu Province has released documents to clarify that medical associations (local 
branches of the CMA) carry the primary responsibility for conducting Medical Damages 
Reviews and have also laid out more specific details on how the Medical Damages 
Reviews should be conducted.
756
 As a result in Jiangsu Province, it is rare for a judicial 
inspection to be used in a medical malpractice case because Jiangsu province requires 
that both sides agree to this type of review,
757
 and hospitals usually refuse it.
758
 Further, 
courts in Jiangsu Province, regardless of opposition by the plaintiff or defendant, can 
order a Medical Damages Review,
759




The situation, however, differs in Guangzhou Province. A white paper on 
Guangzhou’s medical dispute lawsuit situation by Guangzhou’s Intermediate People’s 
Court stated in May 2015 that at that point in time, the Guangzhou Medical Association 
did not have a program to conduct Medical Damages Reviews and medical associations 
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throughout Guangzhou Province also did not perform these types of reviews.
761
 The 
white paper reports that in Guangzhou there are no uniform standards for the judicial 
inspection companies for conducting the medical accident reviews, leaving important 
decisions to the discretion of individual judicial inspection companies, such as decisions 
regarding holding hearings with both plaintiffs and defendants, consulting with clinical 
experts about cases, and choosing the expertise level of consulted clinical experts.
762
 This 
is important because without rules regulating these decisions, there is greater room for 
corruption in deciding cases, which potentially further decreases the credibility of the 
dispute resolution system to both plaintiffs and defendants. 
The Tort Liability Law also did not explicitly address the issue of two tracks for 
medical reviews, but there is evidence that in practice some provinces have eliminated 
the two tracks. In Jiangsu Province courts only evaluate cases under the Tort Liability 
Law, only order Medical Damages Reviews (not Medical Accident Reviews),
763
 and 
compensate according to the standards set by the 2003 judicial interpretation for 
compensating personal injury (not according to the standards in the Medical Accident 
Regulations).
764
 While the courts neither order Medical Accident Reviews nor 
compensate according to the corresponding Medical Accident Regulations, medical 
accident reviews still may be permitted as evidence in a court case if previously 
conducted.
765
 In Jiangsu Province, Medical Accident Reviews are only pursued 
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separately through the health administrative bureaucracy,
766
 and these are becoming 
increasingly rare.
767
 In Guangdong province the Medical Accident Reviews no longer 
have legal basis for deciding medical accident disputes,
768
 but as discussed above, 
Guangzhou is still in the process of establishing a system to enforce the new Tort 
Liability Law. 
Policy Cycle 4, 2012-2017: Heightened Security Amidst High-Profile Incidents 
 Despite the progress made during the third policy cycle with the creation of 
measures for more accountability for hospitals and the Tort Liability Law, high-profile 
cases of violence against health care workers continued to emerge. Baidu Trend data 
shows increased attention by society to yinao with 2012 being a peak year for Internet 
searches (via PCs) for yinao.
769
  
2012 The Li Mengnan Incident and Heightening Hospital Security 
One of the most well-known incidents of violence occurred in March 2012, when 
17-year-old spine inflammation patient Li Mengnan went into a hospital in the northern 
city of Harbin and stabbed several doctors, killing one young 28-year-old resident. The 
case received national and international coverage. The New Yorker wrote a poignant 
article, humanizing the young man who committed the murder by balancing out his 
terrifying acts with the excruciating pain of his condition, poverty, and despair when the 
hospital refused to treat him for having a history of tuberculosis and despite the fact that 
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he had been travelling to the hospital for two years on 10-hour train rides from his home 
in Inner Mongolia.
770
  In October 2012, Li was sentenced to life imprisonment.
771
 
Shortly after the Li Mengnan incident, on April 30, 2012 the Ministry of Health 
and the Ministry of Public Security released “Announcement on Protecting the Order of 
Medical Institutions.”
772
 This seven-point document is similar to the documents 
following high-profile events in the past: it reiterates the rights and roles of both health 
care workers and patients, prohibits disturbing the normal order of medicine, asserts that 
cadavers are to be properly handled, and provides a list of behaviors (including yinao 
behaviors) to be punished strictly according to the “People’s Republic of China Public 
Security Administration Punishment Laws.”
773
 
 A few days following the publication of this announcement, the Ministry of 
Health released “Urgent Notice on the Implementation of the “Ministry of Health and 
Ministry of Public Security Announcement on Protecting the Order of Medical 
Institutions.”
774
 There were two important policies introduced by this notice aimed at 
strengthening hospital security:  
Requirement for installing security offices in higher-tier hospitals: The Notice 
required all hospitals at the secondary level and above as well as other key health 
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institutions to coordinate with public security organs to establish police affairs offices 
within these hospitals.
775
 These offices provide a direct point of contact with police and a 
space for them to work in hospitals.
776
  
Introduction of the “three safeguards” policy: Another important aspect of this 
urgent notice is to ensure the “three safeguards” of hospital security: personnel- based 
security (security guards), material-based security (communication and security 
equipment), and technology-based security (video surveillance).
777
 This policy sets the 
foundation for required security personnel, their required activities, and the surveillance 
technology to monitor hospitals.
778
  
2013 Wave of High-Profile Incidents and Opinions to Strengthen Hospital Security  
Despite the call for increased hospital security, the year 2013 continued to see 
high-profile violent incidents targeting health care workers – according to one study, it 
was the peak year from 2000-2015 for news reporting on violent incidents against health 
care workers.
779
 A wave of six such attacks occurred within a ten-day period in 
October,
780
 and in the midst of this ten-day period, NHFPC and MPS jointly released 
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“Guiding Opinions on Strengthening Hospital Security Systems,” which explicitly 
recognized cases of “disturbing medical order” and “harming medical personnel” as a 
continuing challenge for hospital security.
781
  
The document emphasized the “three safeguards” and provided more detail on 
how they should be enforced by the health departments, public security, and hospitals. 
For “personnel-based security” (renfang, 人防), “Guiding Opinions” gave hospitals 
guidelines for the number of security guards they should have, requirements for their 
training, rules for patrolling, and guidance for disseminating information about relevant 
laws in public areas.
782
 For “materials-based” security, “Guiding Opinions” provided 
specific guidelines for communication devices, equipment, and confiscating dangerous 
items.
783
 “Technology-based” security includes rules for using video surveillance to 
monitor key areas of the hospital, establishing a security control center, and installing 
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2013 Wenling Incident, 18
th
 Party Congress, and First Special Action Plan to Crackdown 
on Yinao 
But just three days after NHFPC and MPS released “Guiding Opinions,” one of 
the most nationally infamous cases of an attack on physicians occurred: On October 25, 
2013, a patient who felt unwell following a minimally invasive nasal surgery stabbed 
three doctors, killing one.
785
 After the event, Premier Li Keqiang called upon all relevant 
ministries to place a high degree of importance on violent incidents arising from patient-
doctor conflicts and to adopt actions to maintain order in medicine.
786
 MPS also 
demanded a “zero-tolerance” policy for violent acts against medical personnel.
787
 
By mid-December 2013 twelve ministries jointly had released the “Special Action 
Plan for Maintaining Medical Order and Combating Illegal Activity Interfering with 
Medicine.”
788
 The Special Action Plan for Maintaining Order in Medicine sought to 
protect social harmony and stability, guarantee the legal rights and interests of both 
patients and health care workers, and to construct a favorable medical environment 
                                                 
785
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December 20, 2013, 
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Influence of the 18
th
 Party Congress Focus on Resolving Social Conflicts: It is 
important to note that this plan followed shortly after and occurred within the context of 
the Third Plenum of the Eighteenth Party Congress.
790
 The Third Plenum recognized the 
growing discontent in Chinese society, including in the area of health care, as a result of 
economic development,
791
 and emphasized innovating ways to prevent and respond to 
social conflicts among a wide array of goals for system-wide development.
792
  
Reaffirming interdisciplinary approach to addressing yinao: It set goals for a 
wide range of issues: reaffirming strengthening security through the “three safeguards 
system,”
793
 improving medical service quality and patient-doctor communication,
794
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improving health care system reform and service quality,
 795
 strengthening the role of 
people’s mediation in medical disputes, improving the work environment for doctors by 
reducing pressure on them,
796
 encouraging the establishment and monitoring of medical 
liability insurance systems at the local level,
797
 and monitoring people with mental 
disabilities as well as those who might threaten social stability.
798
  
Reiteration of the obligation of police to respond to incidents: The policy begins 
by asserting that people performing criminal acts in hospitals should be promptly arrested 
and prosecuted.
799
 It explicitly states that public security organs must immediately 
respond to calls about yinao behaviors, which police had often failed to respond to in the 
past: “After public security organs receive an emergency call, they should immediately 
adopt decisive measures, immediately controlling the scene, protecting normal medical 
order.”
800
 The announcement also specifically aims to crack down on professional, third-
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 Adoption of people’s mediation as premier medical dispute resolution institution: 
Unlike policy documents in the past that simply encouraged Medical Dispute People’s 
Mediation Committees (MDMCs), this document set goals for national coverage of 
MDMCs – here it was to increase coverage to 75% of county-level administrative 
districts by the end of 2014.
803
 It also outlines the minimum number of personnel that 
should be hired and explicitly charges local governments with the financial responsibility 
for supporting the medical dispute mediation committees with the personnel and supplies 
they need to operate.
804
 The following chapter exclusively deals with these mediation 
committees and offers analysis on the implications of their establishment. 
2014: Wave of High-Profile Incidents Amidst Crackdown and Path to Criminalize Yinao 
Despite the comprehensive goals of the Special Action Plan to crack down on 
yinao during 2014, media reports from 2014 implied that doctor-patient relations 
continued to deteriorate: in the month of February alone, a nurse was beaten to the point 
of paralysis in Nanjing by a patient’s angry parents, a patient in Hebei province slit the 
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throat of his doctor,
805
 and a dissatisfied 19-year old patient took revenge on his doctor by 
beating him to death with an iron rod.
806
 The yinao problem was becoming so prominent 
that during the “two meetings” in March 2014, Xi Jinping commented on the issue while 
attending one of provincial delegation meetings during the event: “It is necessary to 
maintain the normal order of hospitals, protect the safety of health care workers; any 




MPS Strengthens its Response to Yinao: In March 2014, the Ministry of Public 
Security issued “Six Measures for Public Security Organs to Maintain the Public Security 
of Medical Institutions,” to which NHFPC followed with a complementary notice to 
enforce it.
 808
 This document is important because it is the first time that MPS has issued 
its own document with measures for implementation, signaling that internally MPS was 
taking steps to prioritize controlling crime in hospitals.  
The six measures require public security organs to dispatch police in cases of 
humiliation, threatening assault, and infringing upon personal freedom.
809
 They also 
clarify that yinao behaviors (burning funeral money, setting up wreaths, blocking 
entrances, disturbing medical order, and placing corpses in public areas) must be 
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dispersed and punished according to law if preliminary warnings are ineffective.
810
 The 
six steps also require police to make hospitals at the second tier and above regular stops 
on their patrols, demand that all level three hospitals establish police affairs offices, and 
suggest that those at level two and above establish these offices as well should they have 
the available resources to do so.
811
 
Linking Specific Yinao Behaviors to Specific Crimes: In April 2014 the Supreme 
People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security, the 
Ministry of Justice, and the National Health and Family Planning Commission issued 
“Opinions on Punishing Illegal Crimes Interfering with Medicine According to Law and 
Protecting the Normal Medical Order.”
812
 Unlike past documents stating yinao behaviors 
generally should be punished according to law, this document links the specific types of 
yinao behaviors to articles in the laws by which they should be punished. For example, 
setting up funeral altars, placing wreaths, burning paper funeral money, hanging a banner, 
and other disruptive behaviors can be punished according to Article 23 of the Public 
Security Administration Law.
813
 Serious cases of using violence or other methods to 
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2015: 12 Incidents in 20 Days and the Criminalization of Yinao 
Despite the crackdown on yinao and increased security measures, 2015 continued 
to see high-profile incidents heavily covered by the media. China saw another wave of 
high-profile incidents – 12 in 20 days from May 28 to June 16, 2015.
815
 Officials had 
been discussing criminalization of yinao at least since the previous year,
816
 and finally 
this happened on August 29, 2015, with the ninth amended version of the Criminal Law 
of the People’s Republic of China, which entered into force in November 2015.
817
 Article 
290 of the revised version of the Criminal Law officially criminalized crowds gathering 
to disrupt the functioning of medical activity, a crime punishable by three to seven years 
of imprisonment for main offenders and up to three years of imprisonment, short term 
detention, supervision, or deprivation of political rights to other active participants.
818
 
Redrafting the Medical Accident Regulations and “Three Mediations, One Insurance” 
 In November 2015, NHFPC released a draft version of “Medical Dispute 
Prevention and Management Regulations.”
819
 If passed, these regulations would replace 
the 2002 Medical Accident Regulations to address problems that have arisen since the 
passage of the 2002 Regulations, namely the inconsistency between the 2009 Tort 
Liability Law and the original Regulations on compensation, concerns about the fairness 
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of the NHFPC/CMA role in resolving medical disputes, and the problem of yinao.
820
 
Notably, the terminology in the title of the new Regulations is entirely different than its 
predecessors (Medical Accident Regulations): it not only covers medical accidents, but 
covers medical disputes more broadly, which can include medical accidents among other 
disputes that occur in health care settings. The title also implies that prevention continues 
to be a central objective for these new regulations. The table below captures changes in 
Regulations for medical disputes over time, and the sections below discuss some of the 
main changes. 
  
                                                 
820
 “Explanation of Draft of ‘Medical Dispute Prevention and Management Regulations (Draft)’ [关于《医
疗纠纷预防与处理条例（送审稿）》的起草说明].” 
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Table 14: Health Care Dispute Resolution Over Time 
 
Adopting the “Three Mediations, One Insurance Policy”: The new regulations 
seek to enshrine the policy “three mediations, one insurance,” which emerged following a 
high-level work meeting on national people’s mediation for medical disputes in 2014.
822
 
“Three mediations” refers to a policy that provides three channels for mediating medical 
                                                 
821
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822
 Meng Sun, “Establishing ‘Three Mediations, One Insurance’ Prevention Management System [建立‘三
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disputes (mediation between parties at hospitals, people’s mediation, and court 
mediation), with people’s mediation being the preferred type.
823
 “One insurance” means 
that medical liability insurance companies, instead of hospitals, should directly 
compensate the families and patients for damages.
824
 The policy ultimately seeks to push 
the settlement of conflicts outside the hospital,
825
 to standardize mediation and to 
encourage medical institutions to have medical liability insurance and for medical 
liability insurance companies to timely and appropriately cooperate with medical 
institutions as well as people’s medical mediation committees.
826
  
Explicit shift away from preference to resolve disputes within hospitals: There is 
also a clear difference and reversal in attitude toward channels to dispute resolution. In 
1987, the Ministry of Health explicitly endorsed prioritizing resolving disputes within the 
hospital. The 2002 Regulations made no explicit statement about preferred dispute 
resolution avenues, but the vast majority of disputes were resolved within hospitals, as 
much as 95%, according to one estimate, by negotiation and protest,
827
 and hospitals 
often compensated regardless of fault in order to stop protestors from destructive 
behavior.
828
 However, the official explanation of the 2015 drafted regulations explicitly 
states that now the goal is to move these conflicts out of hospitals.
829
 This is an important 
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step to addressing yinao because it physically removes heated dispute resolution out of 
the hospital, potentially reducing the use of yinao at hospitals in the midst of conflict 
resolution. 
Potentially eliminating inconsistencies between 2002 Regulations and Tort 
Liability Law: The new regulations, if passed, would importantly eliminate the two-track 
system for compensation.
 830
 As explained previously, medical malpractice cases could be 
compensated using the standards promulgated under the 2002 Medical Accident 
Regulations or the more generous compensation allowed under the Tort Liability Law.
831
 
By eliminating the standards under the Medical Accident Regulations, there is no longer 
a competing set of standards that enable arbitrariness in decisions about compensation.
832
  
Even though the two-track system for compensation would be removed by this 
law, the new Regulations still preserves two types of medical reviews for medical 
disputes – the Medical Damages Reviews (医疗损害技术鉴定) and Medical Accident 
Technical Review (医疗事故技术鉴定). The procedural details for the newer Medical 
Damages Reviews remain unclear with the new Regulations, which delegates the 
responsibilities of forming medical damages review institutions and management 
measures to the NHFPC and MOJ.
833
 However, procedures for reviews have been created 
at the local level.
834
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Maintaining the of Role of CMA in Review Process: NHFPC’s official 
explanation of the new Regulations praises the success of the CMA in conducting 
medical reviews, implying that the system of using the CMA will be maintained.
835
 This 
response is tone-deaf to complaints that the CMA and NHFPC make biased decisions that 
protect their colleagues in the health care sector by taking control of the medical review 
process. If the final document does not address this concern regarding expert reviews of 
medical dispute cases, then the State has not responded in a way that would increase 
credibility of the system. 
Continued Condemnation of Yinao: As far as directly addressing yinao in the new 
drafted Regulations, like many previous documents before, strictly prohibits yinao 
behavior
836
 at any stage in the medical dispute process and states that the public security 
organs (police) should quickly stop extreme behaviors and punish them according to 
law.
837
 However, these regulations do not have any direct bearing on the actions of public 
security and represents more of an affirmation on a strong stance against yinao. 
2016 Special Action Program to Crack Down Criminal Activity in Medical Institutions  
 In July 2016, the State Council launched another yearlong special action program 
resembling the one conducted in 2014 aimed to crack down on illegal criminal activity 
                                                                                                                                                 
]”; “Jiangsu Province Medical Dispute Prevention and Management Regulations [江苏省医疗纠纷预防与
处理条例]” (Nanjing Medical Association, Nanjing Medical Doctor Association, March 30, 2017), 
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 This special action program acknowledged that while progress 
had been made by the previous campaign in 2014, nevertheless some places still 
successively experienced attacks against medical personnel.
839
 The campaign began in 
July 2016 and will end in May 2017.
840
 It resembles the 2013 program, focusing on an 
array of policy areas from using police force to crack down on illegal activity to 
improving the quality and safety of medicine.
841
 Like the 2013 plan, it promotes people’s 
mediation and insurance, but does so under the “three mediations, one insurance” 
policy
842
, which had not quite emerged at the time when the previous campaign was 
launched. Interestingly, unlike the last campaign, this one enlists the support of the CCP’s 
Office of the Central Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs, presumably to help achieve 
the goal of “strengthening online media standardization and guidance.”
843
 
Analysis of Policy Cycle 4 
  The summary table below (Table 15) shows the group of policies during this 
fourth era (2013-2017). Some notable points for this period are the following: 
Policy Tools - Increase in security measures, coercive power: From 2012 to the 
present, there has been a notable policy shift towards special action programs aimed at 
combating yinao and the criminalization of yinao. In other words, there has been an 
increase in the amount of coercive power used to solve the problem. Perhaps this is 
because despite efforts to improve the complaint and dispute resolution systems and 
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 National Health and Family Planning Commission, “Circular on Publication of Special Action Plan for 
Strict Crackdown on Illegal Crimes Interfering with Medical Institutions  [关于印发严厉打击涉医违法犯
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 National Health and Family Planning Commission, “Circular on Publication of Special Action Plan for 
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strong language against yinao in the past, hospitals continued to struggle with yinao 
incidents. There were also other notable policy tools used during this period, such as 
formally placing mediation and malpractice liability insurance into the dispute resolution 
system itself with the “three mediation, one insurance” policy.  
Continued multidisciplinary approach to yinao: In multiple policy documents, 
there are many ministries taking part in policy initiatives to address yinao, again showing 
the increased awareness and acknowledgement in policy-making that yinao requires a 
multidimensional approach for resolution. Superficially, the new type of policy 
introduced to manage yinao, the yearlong crackdown campaigns, look like temporary 
campaigns to arrest practitioners of yinao, which they indeed seek to achieve, but these 
campaigns (or action programs) also set goals for insurance, education, mediation, and 
hospital security.
844
 This expansive set of goals reflects the large number of ministries, 
commissions, and party departments involved in the campaigns – in the 2014 campaign, 
there were twelve
845
 and in the 2016-2017 campaign, there were nine.
846
  
Increasing authoritativeness of documents to manage yinao: During this period, 
there were also only two notices, the weakest form of policy response, and more 
authoritative types of policies like regulations and laws adopted to address yinao. Further, 
the increasing presence of Party institutions also represents an important factor in the 
                                                 
844
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increasing authoritativeness of the documents during this period, with the Central Public 
Security Comprehensive Management Commission, Propaganda Department, and the 
Office of the Central Leading Group of Cyber Space Affairs involved in the special 
action programs. 
Table 15: Yinao-Relevant Policies in Policy Cycle 4, 2012-Present 
 
Date Title of Document Tool(s) Used Type  Agencies 
2012.04.30 Ministry of Health, 
Ministry of Public 
Security Notice on 
Protecting the Order of 
Medical Institutions 
Language prohibiting yinao Announceme
nt (weak) 
1. MOH 2. MPS 
2012.05.03 General Office of the 
Ministry of Public Health 
Urgent Notice on 
"Ministry of Health, 
Ministry of Public 
Security Notice on 
Protecting the Order of 
Medical Institutions 
Increasing hospital security 
capabilities - surveillance and 
installing police affairs offices in 
hospitals 






2013.10.22 Guiding Opinion on 
Strengthening the 
Construction of the 
Hospital Safety System 





1. National Health and 
Family Planning 
Commission (NHFPC, 
formerly MOH) 2. MPS 
2013.12.20 About the Special Action 
Program to Protect 
Medical Order, Strike 
Illegal Crimes Interfering 
with Medicine 
Crackdown on violent crime 
Increased presence and 
participation of law enforcement 




Improving Education and Skills of 
Health Care Personnel 
Establishes goals for national 
coverage of Medical Dispute 
People's Mediation Committees 
Encourages implementation of 






1. National Health and 
Family Planning 
Commission (NHFPC) 2. 
Central Public Security 
Comprehensive 
Management Commission 
(Party) 3. Propaganda 
Department (Party) 4. 
Supreme People's Court 5. 
Supreme People's 
Procuratorate 6. Ministry of 
Public Security (MPS) 7. 
Ministry of Civil Affairs 8. 
Ministry of Justice (MOJ)  
9. State Administration for 
Industry & Commerce of 
the People's Republic of 
China (SAIC) 11. China 
Insurance Regulatory 
Commission (CIRC) 12. 
State Administration of 
Traditional Chinese 
Medicine 
2014.3.15 Six Measures for Public 
Security Organs to 
Maintain the Public 
Security of Medical 
Institutions 
Demands that police be dispatched 
for more serious crimes in medical 
institutions and also requires them 
to charge those committing yinao 
Also requires police making 
second level and above hospitals 
part of their patrolling and requires 
a police affairs office at all Level 3 
hospitals 
Measures 1. MPS 
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2014.04.21 Notice on Seriously 
Enforcing Six Measures 
for Public Security 
Organs to Maintain the 
Public Security of 
Medical Institutions  
Requires hospitals at Level 3 to 
have Police Affairs Offices and 
Level 2 and above to become parts 
of regular police patrolling and if 
the hospitals have the ability, 
should also install police affairs 
offices 
Notice 1. NHFPC 
2014.04.28 Opinion on According to 
Law Punish Illegal 
Crimes Interfering with 
Medicine  
Preliminary legal 
reform/clarification - links yinao to 
crimes in existing laws 
Opinions  1. Supreme People's Court 
2. Supreme People's 
Procuratorate 3. Ministry of 
Public Security 4. Ministry 
of Justice 5.NHFPC 
2015.08.29 Criminal Law of the 
People's Republic of 
China 9th Amended 
Version 2015 
Criminalized yinao committed by 
groups, serious offenses get 3-7 
years than prison, less serious 
offenses, up to 3 years in prison 
Law 1. National People's 
Congress (NPC) 




Procedural reform in dispute 
resolution to make system fairer 
and more consistent with law 
Regulations 1. National Health and 
Family Planning 
Commission (NHFPC) 
2016.03.30 Notice on Moving 
Forward the Work to 
Accomplish Protecting 
the Order of Medicine 
Reiterates handling yinao 
according to law. 
Reiterates linking health and 
public security systems 
Advocates increasing hospital 
security capabilities 
Advocates improving quality and 
safety 
Notice 1.NHFPC 2. Central Public 
Security Comprehensive 
Management Commission 
3.MPS 4. MOJ 
2016.06.30 About the Special 
Program of Action for 
Cracking Down on 
Illegal Crimes Interfering 
with Medicine 
Crackdown on violent crime 
increased presence and 
participation of law enforcement 




Improving Education and Skills of 
Health Care Personnel 
Establishes goals for national 
coverage of Medical Dispute 
People's Mediation Committees 
Encourages implementation of 
medical malpractice insurance 
Campaign 1. NHFPC 2. Central Public 
Security Comprehensive 
Management Commission 
(Party) 3. Central 
Propaganda Department 
(Party) 4. Office of the 
Central Leading Group of 
Cyber Space Affairs 
(Party) 5. Supreme People's 
Court 6. Supreme People's 
Procuratorate 7. Ministry of 
Public Security 8. Ministry 




Outcomes of Policy Era 4: Increased Security Focus and Likely Decreasing Yinao in 
Large Cities 
IMPLEMENTATION OF 2014 CRACKDOWN: INSUFFICIENT PROGRESS 
While, official reports imply that the 2014 special action program was successful 
on many fronts – the title of a People’s Daily article about the progress made in 2014 
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reads, “Harmony between Patients and Doctors is Mainstream,”
847
 the first crackdown’s 
progress was questionable and the implementation of a second crackdown in 2016 in 
itself suggests that the first was one insufficient for resolving yinao issues.
 848
 
Official media praise police response, other data cast doubt on it: During this 
crackdown year, reportedly for the first time an yinao gang had been dissolved in 
China.
849
 Further according to official data for 2014, police broke 1,349 criminal cases 
involving medical institutions, detained 1,425 people for criminal activities, transferred 
347 people for prosecution, investigated 4,599 cases of interference with security in 
medical institutions, and curbed 8,342 incidents of illegal behaviors in hospitals.
850
 The 
number of cases of infringing upon citizen’s personal rights occurring at hospitals 
decreased by 10%, and 80% of hospitals at level two and above had installed police 
affairs offices.
851
  At the local level, Shanghai, Shaanxi, and many other places 
formulated detailed measures on how to handle incidents interfering with medicine.
852
 
However, fieldwork and data work cast doubt on progress made in policing yinao. 
First, the numbers on police activity above are small in comparison to the likely overall 
number of yinao incidents. As stated previously, data suggests that there was an 
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 Jianfeng Bai, “Harmony between Patients and Physicians Is Mainstream [亿元和谐是主流],” People’s 
Daily, January 22, 2015, sec. 9, http://58.68.145.22/directLogin.do?target=101. 
848
 A news report on another special action program that would be launched several years later 
acknowledged that even though the special campaign in 2013 had sought to address violence against 
physicians and yinao, in 2016, “crimes involving medical disputes [were] still common in hospitals across 
the country.” See: “Beijing Police Get Green Light to Use Weapons to Protect Doctors from Attackers in 




 Medical World Magazine, “The Thunder Sounds: The First Time an Yinao Group Has Been Destroyed 
in China [雷霆出击 中国首个医闹集团被覆灭].” 
850








 violent attacks annually just at secondary and tertiary hospitals 
alone. Although the official figures above do not provide us specific reasons for the 
arrests and prosecutions (they could include other crimes like arresting ticket peddlers), if 
there are over 200,000 of violent attacks against health care workers per year, the 
numbers reported above seem quite low – none of the figures on solved cases, arrests, or 
security incidents involving hospitals broke 10,000. At face value these low numbers may 
indicate a glaring policy failure since it looks like law enforcement is hardly making 
progress given the magnitude of the issue. But it is more likely that the true totals for 
each of these numbers are not being reported to conceal the magnitude of the issue.  
The second reason to doubt progress on this campaigns initiative to increase 
police activity to hold criminal yinao accountable is that interviews with hospital leaders 
from China’s cities did not corroborate this progress. A hospital administrator at a 3A 
hospital in Beijing in October 2014 reported that police still were not responding when 
hospitals called for help with these incidents, and he said that he believed the doctor-
patient relationship was getting worse.
854
 An administrator in Guangzhou at a 3A hospital 




Progress on Complaint Management Emphasized, but Incomplete Data Casts 
Doubt on True Progress: Nationwide in 2014, medical institutions received and resolved 
                                                 
853
 According to 2013 China Health Statistics Yearbook, in 2012 there were 8,190 secondary and tertiary 
hospitals (Table 1-2-1). If on average each of these hospitals experienced 27 violent attacks per year, then 
that would amount to an estimate of 221,130 violent attacks in total for these facilities that year. See: 2013 
China Health Statistics Yearbook [2013 中国卫生统计年鉴] (National Health and Family Planning 
Commission of the People’s Republic of China, 2013), 
http://www.nhfpc.gov.cn/htmlfiles/zwgkzt/ptjnj/year2013/index2013.html. 
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 Hospital Party Secretary, Interview No. 003. 
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 and by the beginning of 2015, 80% of hospitals at level two 
and above had established dedicated institutions for managing medical complaints.
857
  
But again, the statistics on progress for complaint management like those on police 
activity are problematic. According to fieldwork for this study, one of the employees who 
manages complaints at a 3A hospital said typically the hospital receives six to seven 
complaints per day, and on particularly bad days, this number is in the teens.
858
 If using 
the lower number of six complaints per day and applying this to all 3A hospitals (there 
are only 989 3A hospitals in China according to most recently available statistics
859
), that 
would amount to 5,934 complaints per day in China’s 3A hospitals alone. Over the 
course of a year, if counting five days per week for 52 weeks, this number would amount 
to 1,542,840 complaints alone for 3A hospitals. Therefore, reporting that hospitals 
handled over 108,000 complaints in 2014 is not very useful. If this figure truly represents 
the total number of complaints successfully resolved, then the policy would not have 
been very successful in practice at all. As stated about the statistics for law enforcement, 
these figures are likely purposely low in order to avoid revealing the magnitude of the 
issue. If the headlines in newspapers read, “Chinese hospitals successfully resolved over 
one million complaints last year,” this might raise questions about the level of discontent 
with hospitals among the population; even though when considering the number of 
hospitals and patient volume, this number does not seem so outrageous, at face value it 
may not appear to be a positive development, which the Chinese government would 
likely not want to advertise. 
                                                 
856




 Xinfang Office, Interview No. 026. 
859
 “2013 China Health Statistics Yearbook [2013 中国卫生统计年鉴],” Table 1-3-1. 
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Police Affairs Offices Established, but Implementation Differs: Police Affairs 
Offices in Hospitals Established, but Vary in Important Ways: According to the work 
report, the area of increasing security capabilities also showed progress with over 85%
860
 
of second level and higher hospitals establishing a Police Affairs Office (up from 80% in 
2014
861
) and over 6,000 level two and above hospitals linking their emergency response 
systems with local public security offices.
862
  Nationwide, over 85% of hospitals had 
established a security system.
863
  
It is important to note that implementation of Police Affairs Offices vary from 
hospital to hospital and this variation carries important implications for the roles that 
police play in hospitals. The two field site hospitals observed by this study both had 
Police Affairs Offices, though with some important differences. One of them had two 
full-time police officers in the Police Affairs Office at all times, while the other only had 
police officers part time. In the latter case the police who staffed the office part time were 
the police assigned to the district patrol zone that the hospital was located in.
864
 They 
would come in once per week or as needed; otherwise security guards hired from a 
private company would staff the office.
865
  
The location of the Police Affairs Office also varied between the two hospitals. In 
the first hospital with the full-time police, the office was in the same building and on the 
                                                 
860
 “National Health and Family Planning Commission Circular on the 2016 Work Situation for Protecting 
Medical Order [国家卫生计生委办公厅关于 2016 年维护医疗秩序工作情况的通报],” 1.3. 
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 Hospital Security Guard, Interview No. 055. 
865
 Hospital Security Guard. 
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same floor as the Petitioning (Complaints) Office and the Office of Doctor-Patient 
Communication, a branch of the Medical Affairs Office, which was also right next door. 
Largely in part due to this setup, the police officers were close to the hospital staff and 
helped assuage patients that proved to be difficult for the Petitioning Office.
866
 The 
closeness of the hospital staff to the police raises the question of whether the police are 
objective in their intervention in cases; it seemed that police intervened on the hospital’s 
behalf, not necessarily as a third party. 
 In the second hospital with the part-time police, the office had its standalone unit 
within the main outpatient building and not connected to the Medical Affairs Office or 
physicians’ offices. Because the office was not attached to the Medical Affairs Office and 
the police officers were not full-time, they had less interaction with the hospital staff and 
perhaps a decreased likelihood of being so biased towards them. A security guard at this 
hospital commented that in China, “Police are like nannies and can help you with 
anything”.
867
  He said when police come, it is better because it is a third party and in 
situations with patients, sometimes just having the police there reassures them.
868
 These 
two field sites show that Police Affairs Offices can help hospitals ensure better security 
of their environment and potentially provide a third-party to help ease tense situations. 
However, depending on the location of the office and frequency of contact with hospital 
staff, the Police Affairs Office may potentially skew the power between patients and 
physicians in disputes to favor hospitals instead of providing an objective party meant to 
serve both patients and physicians.  
                                                 
866
 Xinfang Office, Interview No. 026. 
867
 Hospital Security Guard, Interview No. 055, 55. 
868
 Hospital Security Guard, Interview No. 055. 
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People’s Mediation Spreads Throughout China, but Implementation Differs: 
People’s Mediation handled 66,000 cases, almost 60% of the number of medical disputes 
in total, up about 5% from the previous year.
869
 The medical dispute meditation 
committees reported success rates of over 85%.
870
  
Medical Malpractice Liability Insurance Adopted Across China, Mixed Reviews: 
In 2014, 50,000 medical institutions joined medical liability insurance, among them 
6,100 at the second level and above.
871
 Close to 6,000 medical institutions joined risk-
sharing funds.
872
 The following section on concurrent influences in policy responses 
presents a more in-depth analysis of the progress of medical malpractice insurance in 
China.  
OUTCOMES OF 2015 CRIMINALIZATION OF YINAO AND THE PATH TOWARDS IT 
 Something had changed by 2015 – the police started to truly crack down on yinao. 
This is something interviews resoundingly reflected at 3A hospitals in Beijing, 
Guangzhou, and Nanjing,
 873
 though the different reasons behind it may vary. The Beijing 
hospital administrator who had said the situation was worsening in the fall of 2014 and 
felt so pessimistic that he told the author to not pursue this study acknowledged in an 
interview in the Spring of 2016 that criminalizing yinao had been effective: he observed 
that now the police “dared” to handle these issues, whereas in the past they would not 
handle them because of the weiwen (stability maintenance) policy.
874
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 Bai, “Harmony between Patients and Physicians Is Mainstream [亿元和谐是主流].” 
870
 “Explanation of Draft of ‘Medical Dispute Prevention and Management Regulations (Draft)’ [关于《医
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 Beijing, Nanjing, Shanghai, Guangzhou field interviews all reflected this trend. Hospital official, 
Interview No. 070.Head of Medical Affairs Office, Interview No. 048, 2016, 48.Shanghai Legal Expert, 
Interview No. 87. 
874
 Hospital official, Interview No. 070. 
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It is important to note, however, that the law itself was likely not the original 
impetus for this change in police behavior; an official stated that the amended criminal 
law formalized an internal party directive to police to handle these situations; the law did 
not cause the increase in law enforcement.
 875
 Another hospital official in Guangdong 
added that the reason there had been an improvement in law enforcement against yinao in 
Guangdong in particular was because top Party Leader Ma Xingrui (Vice Party Secretary 
of Guangdong’s Party Committee and the Secretary of Guangdong’s Political and Legal 
Affairs Commission) placed a great deal of importance on this issue following the 2014 
policy document from five ministerial-level government agencies associating specific 
yinao behaviors with crimes.
 876
 A hospital administrator in 2015 reported that 
professional yinao had improved from 2013-2015, suggesting the possibility that police 
efforts may have also started earlier there.  
These interviews reveal that Party directives and individual leaders in provinces 
still drive both policymaking and implementation, not the formal government institutions. 
This is important because as the preceding analysis on policymaking shows, even as the 
authoritativeness of documents increases and more government agencies become more 
involved in the policy process surrounding yinao, ultimately these factors are not 
decisive. Further, after years of calling for more police action since the 1980s and years 
of linking the Public Security Law and Criminal Law with yinao, only in 2015 has there 
been evidence of authorities actually addressing this issue. 
Implementation of Policy Crackdown 2: 2016-2017 
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 Head of Medical Affairs Office, Interview No. 048, 2016. 
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The 2016-2017 action program was still underway at the time of this writing, so 
understanding its full impact is not yet possible. However, in February 2017, NHFPC 
published a Circular on the 2016 Work Situation of Maintaining Order in Medicine.
877
 
The report is not only about the progress of the special action program launched in 2016, 
but also about general progress on initiatives to maintain the order of medicine, such as 
the “secure hospitals” project and improvements on institutions for medical dispute 
resolution.
878
 Unlike past reports that tout the success of programs, this one highlights 
problems and areas for improvement.  
Inconsistent emphasis and enforcement throughout provinces: In evaluating the 
degree of interdepartmental coordination in enforcing relevant policy initiatives, the 
report found that 19 provinces had provincial-level leaders in charge of the institutions 
responsible for the “secure hospitals” initiative, helping to strengthen interdepartmental 
linkages to coordinate their work related to protecting the order of medicine.
879
 The level 
of the leader in charge is important because it indicates the degree of importance the 
province is giving to the initiative, though within provincial-level leaders, rank and power 
vary. However, the report also acknowledges that coordination has not been even across 
provinces; while some places have done well, others like Guangdong have failed to 
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 “National Health and Family Planning Commission Circular on the 2016 Work Situation for Protecting 
Medical Order [国家卫生计生委办公厅关于 2016 年维护医疗秩序工作情况的通报].” 
878
 “National Health and Family Planning Commission Circular on the 2016 Work Situation for Protecting 
Medical Order [国家卫生计生委办公厅关于 2016 年维护医疗秩序工作情况的通报].” 
879
 National Health and Family Planning Commission, “Circular on Publication of Special Action Plan for 
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adequately coordinate between relevant government departments to carry out policies 
relevant to maintaining order in hospitals.
880
 
Linking provincial action to decreasing medical disputes: The report also 
evaluates progress of pursuing the rule of law based on the degree to which governments 
at local levels adopt regulations and measures to achieve maintaining order in hospitals. It 
notes a general trend of local-level governments using regulations, particularly Tianjin, 
Shanghai, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan, and Guangxi, for medical dispute prevention 
and resolution, implying that these measures have led to successful outcomes by citing 





 Supreme People’s Court Official Ma Yan in a press conference 
further added that in 2016 cases for medical damages compensation received by people’s 
courts decreased by 7.5%.
883
 He also reported that in 2016 nationwide, courts altogether 
concluded 20,833 cases for medical damages compensation, among them 6,489 were 
mediated and 3,572 were dropped.
884
  
However, despite this progress, the report observes that while some places 
exhibited strengthening in passing laws to better resolve conflicts, other places due to 
concerns about conflicts intensifying, delayed the immediate resolution of medical 
                                                 
880
 “National Health and Family Planning Commission Circular on the 2016 Work Situation for Protecting 
Medical Order [国家卫生计生委办公厅关于 2016 年维护医疗秩序工作情况的通报],” 2.1. 
881
 “National Health and Family Planning Commission Circular on the 2016 Work Situation for Protecting 
Medical Order [国家卫生计生委办公厅关于 2016 年维护医疗秩序工作情况的通报],” 1.2. 
882
 Juan Xu, “Supreme People’s Court: Crimes Interfering with Medicine Last Year Dropped by 14.1% [最
高法：涉医违法犯罪案去年下降 14.1% ],” The People’s Daily, February 24, 2017, 4 edition. 
883
 Juan Xu, “Supreme People’s Court: Crimes Interfering with Medicine Last Year Dropped by 14.1% [最






 The assessment gives an example of an incident in Hunan in which 
government departments involved instructed a hospital to compensate people engaging in 
yinao, condoning the behavior.
886
  
Decrease in public security cases related to medicine: The report explicitly 
mentions the 2016-2017 crackdown and states that in 2016 the number of public security 
cases involving medicine has decreased by 14.1%.
887
 Liaoning, Jilin, Guangxi are among 
twelve provinces that have seen a decrease of over 20% in criminal cases involving 
medical institutions.
888
 In the area of medical dispute resolution, there were over 60,000 
medical cases mediated nationwide with a satisfaction rate of over 85%,
889
 the definition 
and data collection of which is unknown.  
Increasing coverage of medical liability coverage for hospitals: By 2016, 70,000 
medical institutions had joined medical liability insurance.
890
  
Uneven enforcement in mediation: However, the report also observed issues in 
enforcement of mediation, using Hebei as an example of poor performance because its 
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Continued evidence of barriers between hospitals and police: In the area of 
communication and disseminating information, the report notes that barriers in 
communication of information between hospitals and police can lead to mass incidents, 
recognizing that some cases are not handled in a timely and resolute manner and that 
those involved often fail to foresee the consequences of these events. The report uses 
examples from Shandong and Anhui to illustrate that failure to have a timely response to 
public opinion can lead to the sensationalization of yinao events.
892
 
Uncertainty Regarding Use of Dispute Resolution Institutions: The data about 
dispute resolution institutions and medical disputes convey mixed messages about the 
degree to which the public uses them. If the statistics gathered by the author are correct, 





 mediated cases in 2016, which is about 15% decrease in the number of 
mediated cases. While this decreasing trend may signal that improvements in the health 
care system (better quality, better communication, etc.) have decreased the number of 
disputes, these improvements tend to take years to implement and so their effects would 
likely be less drastic between two years. If mediation decreased, then perhaps other 
avenues were being increasingly used such as the court, but medical liability cases in the 
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court system also decreased from 2015 to 2016. The decrease in both mediation and 
adjudication may indicate that people are still settling within the hospitals or resorting to 
yinao. The former is harder to attain data for, and the latter may have decreased if since 
the number of public security incidents involving hospitals decreased by 14.1% 
(according to official statistics), though public security incidents in hospital settings can 
include more than just yinao, so true trends are still unknown. A decrease in the absolute 
number of medical disputes could help explain the decrease in these dispute resolution 
figures, but this figure is nonexistent and when it is published, it is rarely defined and 
vague – in this report the number of medical disputes decreased by 6.7%.  
It is difficult to imagine that quality would have improved so quickly to deter 
medical disputes. Likely the Chinese system wants to convey that medical disputes are 
overall decreasing by publishing these statistics. Even though an increase in the number 
of adjudicated and mediated cases may have implied that there are more medical disputes, 
it also may have shown an increase in the use of these institutions, which would have 
been a positive affirmation of the dispute resolution institutions created to handle these 
disputes. Decreases so early on may on the surface appear to show that the Chinese health 
care system is becoming less contentious, but it is unlikely that improvements could have 
been implemented that quickly, so the decreasing numbers may instead indicate that 
people are increasingly discouraged about the official avenues offered and also are seeing 
protests as less viable, so they ultimately may be discouraged to pursue their cases at all.  
Overall conclusion of crackdown period: The thrust of this report can be 
summarized in the following way: While locally implementation may vary, when looking 
at the national, macro prospective, overall progress is occurring on all indicators. There is 
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increased leadership and interdepartmental coordination to carry out relevant initiatives, 
there are more regulations being passed at the local level to address the issue, and all 
statistics about conflict – whether it be criminal cases or medical disputes in courts, are 
falling. By providing this report, the government is saying overall, despite problems, 
there is a net improvement. This finding is not particularly unique to this issue because 
China is well known for having varying levels of implementation at the local level
895
, 
which can be expected due to the vast differences among its provincial-level units. 
Concurrent Influences Occurring During Policy Cycles  
 Assessing in detail the breadth of policy tools relevant to yinao is beyond the 
purview of this study, but understanding basic trends in relevant areas to resolving some 
of the root causes of yinao is important for understanding the full context of the 
responsiveness of the state. The next few sections review the progress made in medical 
malpractice insurance reform, general health care reform, and media coverage of yinao 
events.  
Establishing a Medical Malpractice Insurance System 
Beginning in 2014, nationwide public hospitals at level two and above were 
supposed to purchase medical liability insurance,
896
 and coverage is supposed to reach 
over 90% of level two and above hospitals by the end of 2017.
897
 However, this broad 
coverage belies issues in the quality and implementation of the insurance system. 
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Because the medical malpractice insurance industry is a relatively new industry, 
insurance companies lack data on important variables used to set competitive insurance 
rates.
898
 Further, these insurance companies do not offer a diverse set of policies that fit 
the needs of different types of hospitals and different types of risks.
899
 Insurance 
companies also still tend to lack qualified personnel in underwriting and compensation.
900
 
Localities are adopting their own insurance policies, and results have been mixed. 
In one of the cities researched in this study, all 3A hospitals had to purchase the same 
medical malpractice insurance provided by the People’s Insurance Company of China 
(PICC).
901
 Hospital administrators from 3A facilities expressed some discontent with the 
current state of malpractice insurance – one expressing that he wished insurance 
companies would participate directly in negotiations with patients,
902
 which is often done 
in the US with the insurance company taking a large role in estimating the costs of 
litigation and deciding whether to settle in or out of court.
903
 In China at the present time, 
hospitals still mainly negotiate with the patients, either in the hospital or mediation, 
reimburse the patient, and then they apply for compensation from the insurance 
companies later.
904
 As one mediator put it, the hospitals have to pay twice: first they have 
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 A lawyer from another 3A hospital in a different city reported that hospitals were 
not enthusiastic about these new insurance policies because it seemed like the insurance 
companies were primarily focused on winning the favor of relevant local government 




The “three mediations, one insurance” policy also indicates that the insurance 
company should directly compensate the amounts decided in mediation.
907
 Insurance 
companies have been invited into and also been involved in establishing medical 
mediation committees in order to hasten the process by which insurance companies 
compensate patients;
908
 but there are different views about the fairness of involving the 
insurance companies in the mediation process and even when they are present at 
mediation committees, fast compensation has remained a challenge.
909
 The next chapter 
on mediation will continue to explore this issue.  
In the National People’s Congress of 2017, representative Yao Yuanzhen spoke 
about addressing challenges in establishing a medical malpractice insurance system. She 
called for the establishment of a compulsory insurance system.
910
 Yao further remarked 
that the insurance industry was not being effective for hospitals, advocating a different 
system whereby the government, hospitals, and patients together buy what was termed to 
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be “social medical liability insurance,”
911
 though it is unclear how exactly this would 
work. She also advocated for legislation to establish a medical risk fund system through 
which medical damages could be compensated.
912
 Yao further supported the 
establishment of other types of more specialized insurance and also insurance that 
patients could purchase prior to serious procedures.
913
 This type of insurance, called 
Surgery Accident Insurance, can compensate patients directly for costs for the costs 
incurred by complications and malpractice.
914
  
This fledging model of insurance is interesting because the patients would pay 
into the risk pool for potential claims that could be the fault of physicians. The existence 
of this type of insurance conveys the idea that patients should be willing to bear the risk 
of surgery to the point that they will insure themselves against possible mistakes 
physicians make. One of the field hospitals used in this study was contemplating making 
Surgery Accident Insurance available for purchase at the hospital. Though this type of 
insurance may save on costs of medical disputes, at the same time, presenting patients 
with Surgery Accident Insurance prior to surgery may increase their distrust of their 
physicians. 
Health Care System Reform 
 Many of the measures useful for addressing yinao and medical disputes have to 
do with the ongoing massive health care reform,
915
 which touches upon increasing 
insurance coverage to reduce out-of-pocket costs, decreasing the gap in quality and 
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accessibility of care between rural and urban areas to reduce overcrowding of tertiary 
urban hospitals, and the adjusting the pricing of health care goods and services. While the 
performance of the reform has been mixed,
916
 it has made progress in or intends to 
address each of these areas. As noted elsewhere, the vast majority of the Chinese 
population had no insurance when the agricultural collectives and work unit systems were 
dismantled beginning in the late 1970s.
917
 However, by 2011, two years after the reform, 
the government boasted nearly 95% insurance coverage. 
918
 On paper, nearly the entire 
population is covered, but this coverage is still shallow, with the average annual subsidy 
for a rural resident being only RMB 490.3 ($71.38) as of 2015.
919
 
 Although the reform is attempting to improve quality of rural care and encourage 
the use of grassroots health organizations, the 2015 work report still showed an increase 
in the use of tertiary care facilities.
920
 Corruption and pricing of health care goods and 
services also remain important challenges in the health care system.
921
 The State Council 
took a step towards resolving issues of high-priced drugs in 2015 when it announced it 
would begin phasing out China’s 15% drug mark-up policies, which allows hospitals to 
charge 15% markup in drugs in order to profit from them.
922
 However, issues of 
enforcing better drug policies remain. One physician candidly admitted that he monthly 
                                                 
916
 Yip et al., “Early Appraisal of China’s Huge and Complex Health-Care Reforms.” 
917
 Eggleston, “Health Care for 1.3 Billion.” 
918
 Yip et al., “Early Appraisal of China’s Huge and Complex Health-Care Reforms.” 
919
 “2015 China Health and Family Planning Activity Development [2015 年我国卫生和计划生育事业发




 “Explanation of Relevant Statistics from ‘2015 Health and Family Planning Commission Institutional 
Development Statistics Announcement’ 关于《2015 年我国卫生和计划生育事业发展统计公报》有关
数据的说明 - 中华人民共和国国家卫生和计划生育委员会,” July 20, 2016, 201, 
http://www.nhfpc.gov.cn/zhuzhan/zcjd/201607/573fe91db64b45d3add70429b8680775.shtml. 
921
 Tam, “Organizational Corruption by Public Hospitals in China.” Trends identified by Tam in 2011 were 
confirmed by interviews in 2016 in both Nanjing and Guangzhou: Chinese Attending Physician, Interview 
No. 054; Doctor of Internal Medicine, Interview No. 077. 
922
 “China Scraps 15% Drug Markup at 100 Hospitals, to Move Nationwide by 2017 | FiercePharma.” 
 277 
took bribes from eight or nine pharmaceutical companies, constituting over a third of his 
income.
923
 A consultant for a foreign company in China reflected that even though the 
prosecution of GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) in China reverberated across the foreign 
pharmaceutical community, the reality is that the system has not really changed: “the 




Despite these challenges, the long-term goals of China’s health care reform show 
that it seeks to increase the depth of insurance coverage, improve rural and grassroots-
level health care, and balance out the artificially low prices for health care services and 
exceptionally high prices of pharmaceuticals and laboratory tests.
925
 The table below 
(Table 16) highlights the indicators the government agencies are using for making 
improvements in the health care system, as outlined in the 2015 “Notice About the 
Publication of Opinions on Controlling the Unreasonable Growth in Health Care 
Fees.”
926
 In February 2017, the State Council released “Several Opinions of the State 
Council on Taking a Step Forward to Improve Policies for Pharmaceutical Production, 
Distribution, and Usage,” which limits growth of pharmaceutical costs at public hospitals 
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Table 16: Main Monitoring Indicators for Public Hospital Medical Fee Control 
 
Media and Propaganda 
 Media responsiveness means both how official media handles reporting yinao 
incidents as well as how state propaganda attempts to address yinao. First, because heads 
of top public hospitals hold government rank on par with the heads of TV networks, they 
frequently attend provincial-level meetings with each other and know each other.
928
 As a 
result, if there are stories that a hospital head does not want covered about his or her 
hospital, he or she has access to the top person at the TV network who decides which 
stories are ultimately published. Of course, while this does not automatically guarantee 
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protection of hospitals in media coverage, it increases the likelihood that these types of 
stories may be censored. If a provincial-level hospital head and the head of the local 
media disagree about whether a medical dispute story should be covered, then the head of 
the Provincial Level Propaganda Department would make the final decision on whether a 
specific news story would be published about a hospital.
929
  
 The second point about the media is its ability to spread propaganda to further 
state interests by changing public opinion on contentious issues. For yinao, there have 
been several popular television programs that have sought to increase the reputability of 
physicians by showing their hard work and dedication. Perhaps the most famous of these 
TV shows is Xinshu (心术) (2012), which features top Chinese celebrities as physicians 
and nurses who must handle a variety of challenging issues with patients, including 
yinao.
930
 Other TV shows include Renjianshi (人间事) (2016) and Jizhenshi Gushi( 急诊
室故事) (2015-2016). Both are reality TV shows depicting real-life medical situations. A 
notable point about all of these shows is that they are all from the perspective of the 
physicians. While they show patients experiencing difficult situations, the shows are not 
about how hard it is for patients to navigate the Chinese health care system, but rather 
how heroic health care workers are. Without survey data, it is unclear whether these 
shows have improved the patient-doctor relationship in China.  
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Analysis and Conclusion 
The above analysis implies that the adaptability of the Chinese state to respond to 
social conflict can be viewed in terms of the adaptability of the policies as well as the 
adaptability of the system needed to enforce the policies.  
Adaptive policymaking: In the sense of adapting policies, laws, and regulations to 
address complicated issues like yinao, the Chinese system has performed well: it has 
moved from ministerial documents relying on a couple of policy tools to detailed policies 
that address many different direct and indirect aspects of the issue and have the support 
of multiple ministries and Party departments. Table 17 below illustrates this point, 
showing the number of documents, policy tools, and types of policies increasing over the 
past four decades to address yinao. I use decades instead of policy cycles here to 
highlight the frequency of responsive documents for the same amount of time. 
Table 17: Summary of Policies from 1986-2017 
Decade 
Total No. of 
Docs 
Policy tools 
1980-1990 2 Prohibiting language, procedural reform for complaints 
and disputes 
Party-Govt Docs 0 
NPC Laws 0 
State Council Docs 1 
Ministerial-level Docs 1 
1990-2000 2 Procedural reform for complaints 
Party-Govt Docs 0 
NPC Laws 0 
State Council Docs 0 
Ministerial-level Docs 2 
2000-2010 6 Prohibiting language, procedural reform of dispute 
management system, hospital security capabilities, 
doctor-patient communication, safety and quality, 
better education and training for health care workers, 
legal reform, mediation 
Party-Govt Docs 1 
NPC Laws 1 
State Council Docs 1 
Ministerial-level Docs 3 
2010-present 11 Prohibiting language, procedural reform of dispute 
management system, hospital security capabilities, 
doctor-patient communication, safety and quality, 
better education and training for health care workers, 
legal reform, mediation, police crackdown, medical 
malpractice insurance 
Party-Govt Docs 3 
NPC Laws 1 




At the same time, the above policies and their implementation reveal two points 
about the lack of systemic change: 1) the continuing power of the Party and individual 
leaders as decisive elements for implementation and; 2) the challenge to achieve the 
increasingly sophisticated set of policy goals due to the interlocking interests of for-profit 
public hospitals, physicians and their medical associations, local governments and their 
health bureaucracies, and SOEs selling drugs, medical equipment, and insurance – a 




The crackdown and criminalization of yinao demonstrate the continuing pivotal 
role of Party institutions and directives for enforcement. Official data on enforcement 
reported above also confirm this by implying that decreases in both public security 
incidents at hospitals and in the overall number of medical disputes correlate with the 
increasing involvement of the Party in crackdowns and policies in the fourth era. This 
ultimately means that while functional bureaucracies may fully understand and seek to 
resolve policy issues, they ultimately have to wait until they receive enough attention 
from the Party to pursue meaningful change. This potentially creates a lag between the 
realization and resolution of issues. If yinao could have been addressed as it began and 
the early policy documents of the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Public Security 
could have been enforced without the need for Party attention, yinao may not have 
become as severe as it is today. 
Not surprisingly, state responsiveness to social conflict also correlates with the 
objectives of China’s top Party leaders. Not only did interviews show that priorities of 
local leaders determine the attention to enforcing policies, but also the eras chosen to 
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narrate the development of these policies coincidentally (or not coincidentally) 
correspond closely with changes in leadership and broad policy themes pursued by 
China’s presidents. For example the “secure hospitals” initiative mirrors President Hu 
Jintao‘s “harmonious society” initiative.
932
 His emphasis on a harmonious society and 
social stability (weiwen) incentivized hospitals to end medical disputes quickly and did 
not strongly encourage using police power to intervene in medical disputes.
933
 But when 
President Xi Jinping took full power by the beginning of 2013, he began an anti-
corruption campaign. This focus on crime and crackdown is also mirrored in the policies 
toward yinao. While these leaders may not have caused the policies to respond to yinao, 
their influence may have been their impetus for enforcement. For example, government 
ministries had long called for increasing use of police force against yinao, but it was not 
until Xi Jinping came to power that the policy was actually enforced. 
The medical-professional-industrial complex creates issues for the adoption of 
much-needed policy changes and enforcement. The revised regulations for medical 
disputes, enforcement of the health care reform, and fledgling medical malpractice 
insurance system demonstrate this challenge. The newest version of the regulations on 
medical disputes (the drafted Medical Dispute Prevention and Management Regulations) 
shows that while the Chinese system can adapt to make its regulations and laws more 
consistent with each other, at the same time the failure to change the role of the Medical 
Associations in the controversial case review process likely demonstrates the inability to 
overcome the interests of hospitals and medical professionals in the system.  
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China’s health care reform goals face a similar challenge of embedded interests.  
The policy goals are good – if achieved, they would drastically improve the health care 
system in the areas of pricing, insurance coverage, and access; however, realizing these 
goals require deeper changes in the incentives created by the financing of health care, 
salary structure for physicians, and cracking down not just foreign pharmaceuticals but 
the SOEs and other Chinese companies involved in bribing. Increasing quality and safety 
as well as ensuring that medical professionals do not accept bribes likely would 
necessitate removing the health care bureaucracy as both the overseeing and evaluating 
agency for the country’s public hospitals.  
 This chapter began by emphasizing that medical disputes are endemic and 
recurring and so will require long-term institutional responses. The Chinese state has 
shown its capacity to respond to the issue of contentious medical disputes specifically by 
creating a new medical dispute resolution institution: the medical dispute people’s 
mediation committees. While statistics on implementation have revealed that the Chinese 
system can quickly set up these mediation offices, what remains to be seen is the quality 
of their implementation. The following chapter dives into the details of the 
implementation of a medical dispute mediation committee shadowed for this study. 
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CHAPTER 8: MEDICAL DISPUTE PEOPLE’S MEDIATION 
COMMITTEES 
 
The previous chapter demonstrated the rise of mediation as the state’s preferred 
form of medical malpractice dispute resolution. This chapter delves into the inner 
workings of one Medical Dispute People’s Mediation Committee (MDMC) in order to 
evaluate China’s progress towards achieving rule of law and to assess the impact these 
MDMCs may have on improving China’s health care system. The Chinese Party-state 
sees itself responsible for providing functional legal and health care systems, so 
performance in these areas helps to illuminate its efforts to maintain legitimacy. 
Scholars stress that emphasizing mediation over adjudication can detract from 
establishing rule of law because mediation represents a private settlement that does not 
distinguish between right and wrong for society, and therefore its results do not 
contribute to building a legal framework.
934
 However, there are several reasons why 
mediation should still be considered in evaluating China’s progress toward building a 
rule-of-law system. First, mediation is not necessarily in conflict with the rule of law – 
many countries such as the US have established a reputable rule of law system that 
includes mediation operating alongside its courts; though, as I explain below, China’s 
mediation system is rooted in very different traditions, ideologies, and sometimes-
controversial coercive practices, so it is not quite the same as it is in western countries. 
Second, there is increasing consensus in the medical malpractice literature that alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR) such as mediation might be a more optimal way to resolve 
medical malpractice disputes because it can allow for a variety of solutions beyond 
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compensation tailored to the needs of specific cases, such as apologies, establishment of 
new safety protocols, donations to charities, and even memorials for deceased patients.
935
 
China’s emphasis on pushing many of its medical disputes to mediation may therefore 
actually be a positive move for its legal system. Third, while the definition of the rule of 
law in Xi Jinping’s China remains ambiguous,
936
 in China mediation is often seen as an 
integral part of China’s rule of law framework,
937
 so it cannot be omitted from the 
discussion. 
Yet the concept of the rule of law even outside of the Chinese context is vague 
and has been subject to scholarly debate. At its most basic form, rule of law often 
characterizes a system that makes law known to the public and holds everyone, including 
a country’s highest leaders, accountable to the law.
938
 Scholars contemplating rule of law 
both in the Chinese and American contexts also consider other aspects such as an 
independent judiciary, fair procedures, the ways in which laws are interpreted and applied, 
and upholding principles such as liberty, justice, and equality.
939
 While medical dispute 
mediation cannot provide insight into all of the relevant aspects of the rule of law, it can 
demonstrate the degree to which procedures in mediation are followed, the accessibility 
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of legal dispute resolution institutions, and whether the principles of equality and 
voluntariness, two important values of mediation in China
940
, are upheld.  
Medical dispute resolution through mediation also provides an opportunity to 
understand how this process may contribute to health care system improvement. Medical 
disputes help expose problems in any health care system from issues in communication to 
technical issues in the procedures performed by health care workers. This chapter 
therefore also inquires into whether mediation reveals any systemic issues in and 
provides feedback to China’s health care system to improve the quality of care. 
This chapter analyzes the impact of MDMCs on rule of law and health care based 
on fieldwork conducted through shadowing one MDMC in a city district (District X) of a 
large city in Eastern China (from here on referred to as Eastern City). The author 
shadowed the committee over the course of several visits from September 2015 through 
April 2016. Based on this work, this chapter provides and analyzes the transcripts of three 
full mediations as well as three consultations (other types of interactions that mediators 
have with potential complainants or hospitals).   
This chapter begins by briefly providing a broader context of the development of 
mediation throughout Chinese history. It then outlines the development of medical 
dispute mediation from its beginning in various local-level experiments to its adoption 
into national policy. It also considers the literature analyzing various differences between 
and challenges facing these committees. Next, this chapter launches into the specifics of 
the committee observed for this study – the procedures it followed and how it handled 
several cases of mediation and consultation in order to assess the actual implementation 
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of MDMCs. Finally, this chapter analyzes the broader implications of these committees 
for rule of law, quality of care, and regime legitimacy in China. 
Historical Context of People’s Mediation in the People’s Republic of China 
The practice of mediation dates back to imperial China. Traditionally mediation 
by local magistrates encouraged compromise, urging parties to “yield” a little to each 
other and emphasizing the importance of maintaining harmonious relationships.
941
 The 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has continued to promote mediation through 
neighborhood-based people’s mediation committees as well as through judges in its court 
system (judicial mediation).
942
 However, initially the CCP had an aversion towards 
traditional mediation methods performed just for the sake of compromise and instead 
attempted to politicize the process by using it to guide and correct ideological thinking.
943
  
Maoist style mediation dates back to the CCP revolutionary period in the 1930s 
and 1940s.
944
 Mediation during this time had several important functions: it enabled on-
the-spot dispute resolution, thereby facilitating reconciliation and unity among the 
masses;
945
 it was a tool to “bring people around to the correct attitude,” so they 
understood the principles of Communist ideology
946
; and it encouraged mass 
participation in dispute resolution, thereby helping to educate more people about Party 
policies and showing the masses that the Party understood them and had their interests in 
mind.
947
 One example of bringing people around to the right attitude is denying an 
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adulterous woman’s request for divorce and convincing her of the “badness” of her 
adulterous relations.
948
 In the post-1949 period following the CCP’s victory, mediation 
committees became an integral part of urban residential communities, resolving a variety 
of disputes from rent payment issues to divorce.
949
 While mediators were lauded by the 
CCP for heroically rushing to the scenes of neighborhood disputes and resolving them,
950
 
there were also reports of mediators coercing settlements and threatening to inhibit 
parties from pursuing their conflicts in court. In addition to residence-based extralegal 
mediation, courts also practiced and favored judicial mediation,
951




Mediation, along with many other legal institutions, came to a halt during the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).
953
 During the post-1978 reform era, the number of 
mediators and mediation committees expanded greatly, resolving millions of disputes per 
year.
954
 The Ministry of Justice, the government ministry charged with managing the 
committees, also adopted procedures to make mediation committees more rule-based and 
less politicized.
955
 New regulations and laws also reiterated the importance of 
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In the court system during the 1980s and 1990s, there was a retreat from 
mediation as an increasingly educated cohort of legal professionals and judges pushed 
legal reforms toward strengthening the adjudication process.
957
 However the beginning of 
the 2000s saw an increase in the number of petitions
958
 to central authorities, a large 
portion of which were related to the legal system.
959
 Central authorities blamed 
adjudication for destabilizing society and as a result, the Supreme People’s Court began 
to reemphasize mediation.
960
 This is because in mediation, parties agree to the outcomes, 
so its results are often perceived to better promote social harmony and stability.
961
 
Mediation also has some advantages for judges because they are not accountable for 
wrong decisions and protected from appeals of their decisions.
962
 
During this time the policy of “Grand Mediation” (da tiaojie - GM) also began to 
emerge and was officially adopted nationwide by 2010.
963
 GM emphasizes the linkage 
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between government departments, courts, mediation committees, and Party institutions to 
immediately resolve social conflict when it arises at the grassroots level.
964
 The high 
degree of state involvement in GM also raises questions about the degree to which it is 
coercive, though the superficial goal of GM is to be less coercive.
965
 It is within this 
greater context of mediation being pushed as the premier method for dispute resolution 
nationally that MDMCs began to emerge. 
Development of Medical Dispute People’s Mediation 
 In this context of a renewed emphasis on mediation combined with rising 
instances of yinao, medical dispute mediation committees began to appear across China. 
Following a typical pattern of policymaking and implementation in China that fosters 
regional experimentation with new policies, people’s medical dispute mediation 
committees grew organically at the grassroots level and were implemented in a variety of 












 Tianjin, for example, initially emphasized the use of arbitration 
committees, which ran into struggles with attracting disputants since it charged 10% of 
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the patient’s final compensation award.
971
 Nanjing initially experimented with for-profit 
mediation, in which a company set up the mediation committees and charged fees for 
mediation and reviews up front, but the idea of paying before the work was done was 
unappealing for both patients and physicians.
972
   
After several years of experimentation, medical dispute people’s mediation 
committees that offered free services and were under the guidance of local Justice 
Departments emerged as the preferred model, though of course there still exists some 
variation. In 2010, the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Health, and the Chinese Insurance 
Regulatory Commission issued “Opinions on Strengthening Medical Dispute People’s 
Mediation Committee Work.”
973
 “Opinions” established guidelines and principles for the 
provinces to develop their committees and reiterated principles of the mediation law to 
guide medical dispute people’s mediation. Provinces, Special Administrative Regions, 
and directly controlled municipalities soon after followed with their own rules and 
regulations on people’s mediation committees. 
By October 2016, 3,917 MDMCs staffed by 25,000 people’s mediators had been 
established nationwide, from the provincial level down to the county level, covering 80% 
of counties in China by the end of 2016.
974
 According to official statistics, in 2015 
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nationwide these committees resolved 71,000 medical dispute cases,
975
 though this actual 
number in reality may be higher.
976
 The National Health and Family Planning 
Commission (NHFPC) aims for MDMCs to be established in 90% and above of the 
county level by the end of 2017.
977
 According to official statistics, MDMCs boast a 
satisfaction rate of 85%
978
 and a success rate of over 85% nationwide.
979
 It is unclear how 
the satisfaction rate was calculated. The success rate means the percentage of cases 
registered at committees that ended in agreement signed by both parties.
980
 In the MDMC 
observed for this study, this percentage also included agreements successfully negotiated 
in hospitals that were finalized at the local MDMC,
981
 which would inflate the success 
rate and in theory could misrepresent the success of mediations actually conducted at the 
MDMC. Parties to the agreement can choose to register the agreement with the local 
court to make the agreement legally enforceable.
982
 Later in the chapter, I include more 
analysis on the measure and meaning of successful mediation.  
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Core Principles of the MDMCs 
 Medical dispute people’s mediation committees are supposed to follow the core 
principles of people’s mediation
983
 as promulgated by the People’s Mediation Law of the 
People’s Republic of China:  
1) Mediating on the basis of free will and equality of the parties concerned; 
2) Abiding by laws, regulations, and policies of the state; 
3) Respecting the rights of parties concerned, and refraining from stopping the 
parties concerned from protecting their rights through arbitration, 
administrative means or judicial means in the name of mediation.
 984
   
 
While these core principles of mediation tend not to be debated in principle, as 
discussed above, in practice the principle of voluntariness has been frequently violated by 
judges and mediators.
985
 Scholars also express a broader concern about the general idea 
of transferring the People’s Mediation Law directly to mediating medical disputes 
because medical disputes require a special level of procedural expertise not warranted by 
other civil disputes like transportation and marital issues.
986
  
Inter-Departmental Responsibilities for Medical Dispute Mediation 
 The 2010 “Opinions” stresses that the establishment and work of the MDMCs 
require coordination from various departments - the Justice Administrative Departments 
and Health Administrative Departments at all levels are expected to communicate with 
other related departments such as Public Security, Insurance Regulatory Commissions, 
Finance, and Civil Affairs. “Opinions” also encourages striving to gain the support of the 
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committees by local Party Committees and governments to establish a medical dispute 
people’s mediation working leadership group to coordinate and clarify work 
responsibilities among the departments and promote people’s mediation work.  This is 
important because when Party leaders place importance on a certain issue, policies to 
address it tend to be implemented better.
987
  
For this among other reasons, implementation of effective interdepartmental 
coordination has varied.
988
 In February 2017, NHFPC released “Bulletin on the 2016 
Work Situation for Protecting Medical Order,” which highlighted inconsistencies in 
implementing interdepartmental coordination and in particular singles out Guangdong 
Province for having poor work coordination between relevant departments.
989
 
Staff of MDMCs 
 Offices must have “in principle” at least three or more full-time mediators that are 
retired medical experts, judges, prosecutors, police officers, and lawyers  “who have a 
strong professional knowledge, relatively high level of mediation skills, and passion for 
the mediation profession.”
990
 Employees who engage in insurance work should have 
relevant experience in that industry. A general issue with mediation committees is that 
the staff of the committees does not have the expert and professional qualifications to 
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assess medical malpractice cases.
991
 There is also high turnover due to lack of formal 
government employment with the committee.
992
   
In the MDMC studied for this project, two out of the five mediators were retired 
physicians. On one hand this is important for having enough expertise to assess cases, but 
on the other hand, it could also present issues of bias towards other physicians. In my 
experience, however, medical backgrounds were not decisive in whether mediators were 
biased; as I explain below, when there appeared to be some bias towards hospitals, it 
seemed to come from repeated interaction with the same fixed set of hospitals in the local 
district over time – naturally the mediators would grow to know the personnel they 
interact with more regularly. Further, as I also show below, one of the retired physician-
mediators did some advocacy work for patients, so the identity of whether or not a 
mediator was a physician, according to my observations, was not decisive in them being 
biased.  
Fees and Financing of MDMCs 
One of the chief principles of people’s mediation is that the services are free, and 
this applies to medical dispute people’s mediation committees as well. “Opinions” 
stipulates basic requirements for MDMCs, from the number and types of rooms they 
should have, minimum number of employees (3) they should employ, and the signs they 
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need to hang outside.
993
 According to “Opinions,” workplace expenses are supposed to be 
covered by the work unit responsible for establishing it – often through the Justice 
Administration, since this is the administration responsible for people’s mediation, 
though in some areas, such as in Guangdong Province, insurance companies have 
sponsored the committees.
994
 The degree of involvement by insurance companies 
represents a heated issue because of the conflict of interest between providing a third 
party mediator and the insurance company acting in its own interest to pay out as little as 
needed – the sections and case studies below further explore this issue. If funds for the 
committees are insufficient, the Justice Departments can apply for subsidies. Committees 
are also encouraged to accept donations and sponsors.
995
 In practice, in some places this 
model of funding by local justice departments coupled with free services has become 
difficult to sustain.
996
 The above-mentioned 2016 work report by NHFPC pointed out 
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Scope of Cases Accepted by Committees   
 Factors considered when accepting cases for mediation include the location of the 
hospital where the incident occurred, the amount requested by the complainant, and the 
type of dispute. According to “Opinions,” the scope of mediation committees should 
include conflicts patients have with hospitals in the committee’s administrative area. So 
for example, if a patient were treated at a hospital in the Putuo District of Shanghai, he or 
his family would apply for mediation at the Shanghai Putuo District Medical Mediation 
Committee. The type of cases that patients and hospitals can bring to the committee, as 
suggested by “Opinions,” includes behaviors of hospitals and medical personnel in the 
course of seeking medical treatment (examination, treatment, nursing), consequences and 
reasons during this process, liability, problems with compensation, and disputes arising 
from a difference of understanding.
998
  
Chen et al. assert that the scope outlined by “Opinions” is too limited, failing to 
address all types of problems that can arise between doctors and patients, such as issues 
in communication, service attitudes, asymmetric information, awareness differences, 
deliberate blackmail, etc.
999
 He said even though mediation has demonstrated a high 
success rate, the limited scope limits the full realization of third party mediation, and 
argues in the future it should cover more.
1000
 However, other scholars favor a more 
narrow definition of scope, arguing that issues of service and ethics fall within the 
purview of the hospital administration and that cases accepted by the medical dispute 
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mediation committee should only concern disputes concerning medical care, medical 
goods, and informed consent.
1001
  
Another component of scope that “Opinions” does not capture is requirements for 
mediation or consideration of mediation based on the amount of compensation patients 
request. For example, in Shanghai when patients or their families request RMB 30,000 or 
more, hospitals should inform them that they have the ability to take the case to 
mediation.
1002
 In Nanjing, if agreements compensate RMB 5,000 or more, then the 
agreement must be notarized by the appropriate MDMC.
1003
 In Tianjin, if the requested 
amount exceeds RMB 10,000, then the case should go to mediation, and public hospitals 
are not allowed to settle privately with patients.
1004
 It would be difficult to set a national 
standard for a compensation limit that requires mediation or settlement outside of 
hospitals because of the vast degree of economic variation between the different 
provinces of China.  
Medical Mediation Process and Procedures 
The 2010 “Opinions” instructs Medical Mediation Committees to carry out their 
procedural work according to the State Council’s “People’s Mediation Committees 
Organization Regulations” and the Ministry of Justice’s “Several Regulations for 
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 both which apply to mediation work more broadly. 
“Opinions” does not specifically lay out many procedures specific to medical mediation 
and broadly encourages persuasion, education, guidance, mutual yielding, and attention 
to details of the dispute, reflecting some of the more traditional styles of mediation that 
have been used in China throughout history.
1006
 It allows for expert reviews of cases, but 
does not require them.
1007
  It has no guidance on calculating the amount to be awarded in 
compensation cases, and instead leaves this to the provinces to decide.
1008
   
 A comprehensive study on the literature on MDMCs found that the lack of unified 
procedures and compensation standards leaves a wide opportunity for arbitrary 
decisions.
1009
 The inability for MDMCs to conduct investigations or entrust another 
organization to conduct reviews also undermines the authoritativeness of their 
decisions.
1010
 Gaps in oversight of the MDMCs further allow for issues that have been 
pervasive and criticized in the past for mediation, such as “low-priced justice” (廉价争议) 
and “plastering over principles for the sake of resolving differences” (和稀泥).1011 
 Despite the lack of specific procedures at the national level, some places have 
issued more procedures for expert review and compensation standards for their MDMCs 
that help to professionalize them. For example, in Shanghai, there must be an expert 
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 for cases if the amount requested in compensation exceeds RMB 100,000, if 
the patient has died, if there is a significant difference in the understanding of the facts of 
the case between the hospital and the patient sides, if the amount to be compensated by 
insurance exceeds RMB 100,000 and the insurance organization advises it, and other 
situations that require experts.
1013
 According to Li et al., these types of limits help to 




Other places even recommend in serious medical mediation cases to have a 
medical review performed.
1015
 A “medical review” here refers to either a Medical 
Accident Review or a Medical Damages Review. Local governments generally endow 
the Chinese Medical Association with the responsibility for conducting these reviews, 
though in court cases judicial inspection agencies can conduct reviews of medical 
damages as well.
1016
 The Medical Accident Review evaluates whether a medical accident 
occurred and if so, the level of that medical accident.
1017
 The Medical Damages Review 
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as was the information provided in this footnote (keeping handbook anonymous for confidentiality 
purposes), but Shanghai City Doctor-Patient Dispute Prevention and Mediation Measures provides some 
information on how experts reviews work. See “Shanghai City Doctor-Patient Dispute Prevention and 
Mediation Measures [上海市医患纠纷预防与调解办法(沪府令 12 号)],” Articles 31 & 32. 
1013
 “Shanghai City Doctor-Patient Dispute Prevention and Mediation Measures [上海市医患纠纷预防与
调解办法(沪府令 12 号)],” Article 30. 
1014
 Li et al., “Comment on the Scope of People’s Mediation in Medical Dispute Mediation,” 70. 
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 Li et al., 70. 
1016
 “Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of the Tort Law 
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 State Council fo the People’s Republic of China, “Medical Accident Management Regulations [医疗事
故处理条例],” Article 4. 
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concerns the degree to which medical negligence caused the damages incurred.
1018
 Li et 
al. note that while conducting reviews may increase the rigor of the evaluation, medical 
reviews take a long time and usually slow down the court process, defeating the point of 





 “Opinions” states that health departments at every level must organize public 
health institutions to join medical liability insurance and to encourage other types of 
medical institutions to do the same. It also states that the insurance regulatory 
departments must encourage leading insurance companies to support medical dispute 
mediation committees and that the mediation agreements represent a valid basis on which 
mediation committees can compensate. 
In 2014 the “three mediations, one insurance” policy emerged following a 
meeting on people’s mediation held in Tianjin and led by leaders of NHFPC, 
Comprehensive Social Control Committee, and the Ministry of Justice.
1020
 The policy 
emphasizes that following dispute settlement, insurance companies should compensate 
instead of hospitals.
1021
 This policy has continued to encourage the linkages between 
people’s mediation and medical liability insurance,
1022
 though there are no requirements 
                                                 
1018
 For example, see: “Jiangsu Province Medical Damages Review Implementation Measures [江苏省医疗
损害鉴定实施细则（试行）],” Nanjing Medical Association, Nanjing Medical Doctor Association, 
March 10, 2015, Article 19, http://www.njyxh.cn/content.asp?cid1=50&cid2=52&contid=589. 
1019
 Li et al., “Comment on the Scope of People’s Mediation in Medical Dispute Mediation,” 70. 
1020
 “Nationwide Medical Dispute People’s Mediation Work On-Site Meeting Convenes in Tianjin [全国医
疗纠纷人民调解工作现场会在天津召开 - 中华人民共和国国家卫生和计划生育委员会].” 
1021
 Wu, “Li Bin: Establishing ‘Three Mediations, One Insurance’ Mechanism to Alleviate Doctor-Patient 
Disputes [李斌：建‘三调解一保险’机制缓解医患纠纷].” 
1022
 “National Health and Family Planning Commission Circular on the 2016 Work Situation for Protecting 
Medical Order [国家卫生计生委办公厅关于 2016 年维护医疗秩序工作情况的通报],” 3.3. 
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on the type of integration between the insurance companies and the mediation 
committees. 






 all have direct integration 
with insurance committees, with insurance companies joining mediation and establishing 
centers for distributing medical dispute compensation, so patients can go there 
immediately once cases are over to start the compensation process. However, in Shanghai 
this is not the case because insurance companies are directly associated with the interests 
of hospitals, which would make the process less fair. While in Shanghai, the medical 
liability insurance companies pay compensation in medical disputes; they do not have 
contact with the medical dispute people’s mediation committees in order to avoid 
conflicts of interest; mediation is supposed to provide an unbiased third party to both 
sides.
1026
  One analysis of Beijing’s system observes that the close financial linkage 
between the medical liability insurance company and Beijing’s medical dispute people’s 
mediation centers has called into question whether mediation is truly an independent third 
party.
1027
 The presence of the insurance company in MDMCs risks turning them into 
extensions of the insurance companies themselves.  
  
                                                 
1023
 Changchao Li, “Empirical Research on the Third-Party Mediation Mechanism in Medical Dispute,” 
Chinese Health Service Management 2, no. 308 (2014): 126. 
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 Liu and Pan, “Current Situation and Countermeasure of the Third Party Mediation on Medical Disputes 
in Tianjin,” 712, 2.4. 
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 Shanghai Legal Employee, Interview No. 36, 6–7. 
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 Li, “Empirical Research on the Third-Party Mediation Mechanism in Medical Dispute,” 126. 
 303 
Legal Effectiveness and Enforcement of Mediation Agreements 
 According to law, mediation agreements are technically legally binding,
1028
 but 
because mediation committees do not have law enforcement capabilities, they cannot 
enforce them should one of the parties renege on the agreement.
1029
 In theory because 
both parties agree to mediation agreements, they should be easier to enforce, though in 
practice this is not necessarily true.
1030
 If parties want the agreements enforced, they can 
apply for judicial recognition of the agreement by the relevant people’s court within 
thirty days of the signing of the agreements, and once this is done, the people’s court can 
enforce the agreement.
1031
 The mediation committee interviewed for this study said the 
majority of parties to agreements do not apply for judicial recognition, although 




The MDMC of District X in Eastern City 
The sections above raise questions about the implementation of the medical 
dispute mediation committees in several areas. While academic research and interviews 
reveal some variations in the abovementioned aspects of medical dispute mediation, to 
the knowledge of this author, no independent study (there are government-published case 
studies) has observed in real time how these committees work on a day-to-day basis. 
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 “The People’s Republic of China People’s Mediation Law [中华人民共和国人民调解法],” Article 31. 
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 Mediation Committee Member, Interview No. 081, 2017. 
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Understanding how the committee’s operate is essential to determining the extent to 
which they follow procedures and principles of mediation. This chapter analyzes three 
full mediation cases as well as three consultations (interactions that mediators have with 
potential complainants or hospitals other than mediations).  
These cases represent those I randomly came across while living in Eastern City 
from September 2015 through April 2016, though I was not always present in Eastern 
City for that entire time. After clearing my research with his supervisor in District X’s 
Justice Bureau, the director of the MDMC gave me permission to stop by the committee 
at any time. I would randomly drop by or send a message asking if there were any 
scheduled cases for the day because often, the committee was completely quiet. On the 
quiet days, I would still sometimes sit in the committee and review policy and 
governance issues with the committee members. The mediators therefore did not 
preselect the cases for me and did not ever discourage me from attending any of the 
mediations – a rare level of access for a foreigner. Even though the sample of cases is 
small, it represents a lens into the reality of these committees without any official 
censorship or editing. I was briefly introduced to patients or physicians, none of whom 
ever seemed to mind my presence since the gravity of their cases far outweighed the 
fascination of interacting with a foreigner. Before I evaluate the individual cases of 
mediations and consultations, below I first provide some basic information about the 
MDMC in District X.  
Set-up of the MDMC in District X of Eastern City 
The Medical Dispute People’s Mediation Committee in District X of Eastern City 
was established in 2008 under the direction of the Provincial Department of Justice and 
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the City Bureau of Justice
1033
 as part of a pilot initiative.
1034
 At the time of its 
establishment in 2008, the Mediation Committee was under the District X’s Bureau of 
Justice’s Grassroots Office.
1035
 Then in 2015, District X’s Doctor-Patient Conflict 
Mediation and Management Services Center (est. 2015) was established and the Medical 
Dispute Mediation Committee came under its jurisdiction.
1036
 This committee was 
established to coordinate the work of peoples’ medical mediation with public security 
bureaus, health bureaus, the courts, the expert review committees, and insurance 
companies in order to ultimately “weiwen” (ensure social stability).
1037
 The center’s 
employees pictured on the wall include specific representatives from the district justice 
bureau, court, and police department. 
1038
  Although not explicitly mentioned in 
interviews about this office, the establishment of the coordination body mirrors the 
overall trend of Grand Mediation to coordinate mediation committees with other 
government bodies in order to better prevent and manage social conflict. In practice this 
newly established center is still managed by the same personnel who oversaw it from 
District X’s Bureau of Justice’s Grassroots Office; the newly minted center in reality is 
just an “additional sign on the door”;
1039
 however, establishing a separate center shows 
that the government has placed special importance on its role.
1040
 The Center has office 
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space in a small room within the Medical Dispute People’s Mediation Committee.
1041
 
Figure 36 (below) shows the organizational layout from the central government down to 
the city district level of the Medical Dispute People’s Mediation Office.  
Staff and Hours 
At the time fieldwork was conducted for this study, the mediation office had a 
staff of six people. Five were mediators – two were retired career mediators, two were 
retired physicians, and one was a recent law school graduate. The committee also had 
receptionist. In addition to the permanent staff, the committee also had a legal expert, a 
retired former judge, who is supposed to come in about once a week, though I never saw 
her. The local district Bureau of Justice pays the employees, though they are not 














                                                 
1041
 Mediation Committee Employees. Author also visited office. 
1042
 Mediation Committee Employees, 43. 
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Figure 36: Administrative Management of District X's People's Mediation Committee 
 
The hours of the office were from 9:00am to 11:00am and 2:30pm to 5:30pm, so 
only 5.5 hours per day, though sometimes hours varied depending on adjustment of 
schedules for mediation. The young lawyer and receptionist were full-time. The 
mediators seemed to have flexible schedules, not necessarily being present every day. 
From the time I visited the committee for the first time in June 2015 to the time I left in 
April 2016, one of the mediators retired from the committee, and two new mediators 
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the “third party” nature of the 
MDMCs 
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were hired on to the committee, both retired women. State policy
1043
 encourages MDMCs 
to hire retired persons, which explains the dominance of retired personnel on the 
committee. 
Integration of Insurance Company 
In October 2016, an employee from a large state-owned insurance company and 
his student intern from a local law school began to join the work of the committee, with 
the intention of them eventually engaging in the work of the committee full-time.
1044
 The 
insurance company employee was a former doctor who later became a lawyer.
1045
 The 
insurance company began to participate as a result of a contract between the insurance 
company and the local health department with the goal of drawing disputes outside of 
hospitals for settlement.
1046
 The province of Eastern City requires all public medical 
institutions at level one and above to purchase medical liability insurance,
1047
 and all 
public hospitals Level 3A hospitals in Eastern City must purchase a medical malpractice 
insurance plan from this particular state-owned insurance company.
1048
 As of April 2017, 
the contract the insurance company signed with Eastern City’s health department expired, 
and they were set to leave the committee.
1049
 There is a possibility of another insurance 
company coming in instead, though at the time of this writing, the mediators of the 
committee remained uncertain about what would happen after the current insurance 
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 If private hospitals mediate and do not have medical 
liability insurance, then they generally pay out of their risk fund (风险基金).1051 
Rules and Procedures of the Committee 
District X’s MDMC clearly displays basic information in posters on its walls 
about its work principles and procedures,
1052
 scope of cases accepted,
1053
 rights and 
responsibilities of disputants,
1054
 responsibility of the committee to protect confidentiality 
of disputants,
1055
 recusal procedures for mediators should they have an interest in the case 
at hand,
1056
 basic materials that applicants must provide,
1057
 and time limits for 
mediation.
1058
 Notable aspects of these rules include the assertion and public display of 
individual rights, which as noted above has been absent for most of Chinese history, as 
well as measures to address potential bias in mediation like the ability of disputants to 
request the removal of mediators and procedures for mediators with conflicts of interests 
to remove themselves from the case. 
However, the procedures for actual mediation are quite rudimentary: to 
understand the situation, analyze and research the case, set the mediation program, 
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facilitate communication and persuade and guide toward an agreement.
1059
 There is 
nothing about providing factual evidence for the case or guidelines for when experts 
should be called in. Methods for how mediators are supposed to conduct mediation are 
also quite vague, but reflect the 2010 Opinions on the issue: “Under the direction of the 
Doctor-Patient Dispute People’s Mediation Committee, using national laws and policies 
and on the basis of social public morality, respecting medicine and science, respecting 
objective facts, persuade and educate, advise and guide, to urge both sides to mutually 




Intake of New Cases and Procedures for Starting New Cases 
 This section documents several cases to observe how mediation was conducted in 
practice in City X. Cases were taken in in an intake book, on which mediators would 
write down the simple details of the case (see Appendix for document): type of dispute; 
dispute number (in order of those recorded in the book); basic information like name, age, 
gender, ethnicity, occupation, workplace or home address; legal person and social 
organization name or legal representative name; and brief summary of the case, date of 
intake, and signature of the person recording the case. Every time someone calls or visits, 
they write down basic notes of the interaction.
1061
 
When mediations began, the mediators were supposed to begin by asserting 
several important points of the people’s mediation law and had a transcript (see Appendix 
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 “Poster ‘Doctor-Patient Dispute People’s Mediation Workflow’” (City District X Doctor-Patient 
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for full text) to guide them to inform the parties of their rights and responsibilities, the 
legal weight of the agreement as well as the ability of parties to seek judicial recognition 
within thirty days of the agreement, and the main principles of mediation (equality, 
voluntariness, on the basis of law, free of charge, and ability of parties to pursue other 
avenues of justice).  
Cases of Mediation and Consultation 
In this section I provide the brief summaries and analyze each of the cases for 
mediation and consultation. I then examine mediations and consultations together to 
make some overall observations about the implementation of these committees. The 
Appendix contains the full transcripts of the mediated cases.  
Case 1: Death of 71-year-old Woman Following Surgery 
On October 21, 2015 a 71-year-old woman had surgery to remove a gastric polyp. 
Several hours after the surgery, she had a fever of 39.3°C (102.7°F), a sign of an 
infection, which according to the doctor, is not uncommon following this type of 
procedure. The patient also complained of lower back and stomach pain. They prescribed 
antibiotics to the patient, and her temperature decreased to 38°C (100.4°F). Doctors 
checked the patient at the end of the first day and at 2:00am early the next morning. 
However, around 8:00am the next morning the doctors saw the patient’s mouth had gone 
dry and realized she had gone into shock. They transferred her to the ICU, where she died 
a little over a week later on November 1, 2015.  
The patient’s family felt that the hospital overlooked the gravity of the patient’s 
worsening situation, and it was not addressed soon enough to save her. Both parties 




  The deceased patient’s family consisted of her elderly husband and their 
middle-aged son. The hospital where the incident occurred is a top, city-level public 
hospital affiliated with a local medical university. From the hospital side, the patient’s 
physician attended the mediation as well as a representative from the hospital’s Medical 
Affairs Office. Once the parties arrive, the mediators separated them to first hear the 
opinions of both sides, and then everyone assembled into one room. After discussion and 
separation again into different rooms, the parties came to an agreement that the hospital 
would cover all medical fees incurred as well as provide compensation of RMB 150,000 
($21,729). Below I identify several points about the process and outcomes of mediation. 
Notifying parties about process and rights of mediation. One of the mediators 
began by explaining how the process worked according to the People’s Mediation Law 
and emphasized the main principles from the law like mutual respect, the right to request 
a different mediator, and the ability to apply for judicial recognition within 30 days of the 
agreement so authorities can enforce it. This is important so parties understand their 
rights during and after the mediation process. 
No reference to medical records. Despite the heated debate over when various 
events occurred (initial discomfort, fever, shock), the medical records were not present 
during the mediation. One of the mediators clarified that medical records are not a crucial 
component for mediating cases because the goal of mediation is not to determine 
responsibility, but to discuss and negotiate an agreement.
1063
 Mediators read the medical 
records prior to mediation, and if they find that the hospital or doctor likely carry 
significant responsibility, then they will raise this issue either during mediation or 
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 Full Mediation (Death of Elderly Woman Following Surgery to Remove Gastric Polyp), Intake Sheet. 
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 Medical Dispute Mediation Committee Member, Interview No. 83, 2017. 
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individually to the hospital only.
1064
 Mediators usually do not mention the likelihood of 
fault when both parties are present because, in the words of one mediator, mediation 
committees are supposed to resolve disputes, and revealing this information in front of 
both parties might intensify the dispute again.
1065
 Mediators tend to judge whether to 
disclose their opinions to one or both parties on an ad-hoc basis.
1066
 
Not revealing insurance company employee’s identity. Another notable 
characteristic about this case is that the PICC lawyer assigned to the committee was 
present at the mediation conversation, but the patient’s family was unaware of the 
identity of this man, likely assuming he was one of the mediators. According to an 
interview with the mediation committee members following this case, they did not inform 
the patient’s family of the insurance company’s lawyer’s because the mediators were 
concerned that if they knew, they would ask for more money.
1067
 This clearly violates the 
principle of mediation based on equality because one the patient’s family did not have 
equal information about the actors present in mediation and the potential bias this could 
bring. This situation also highlights the relationship between resident insurance company 
representatives at the MDMC and potentially creates an unfair setting for the patient.
1068
  
Loose application of 2002 Medical Accident Regulations. In this case, the 
mediators referred to the Medical Accident Regulations to calculate standards for 
compensation. They make an estimate based on these standards by calculating the totals 
for various standards, such as medical expenses, funeral expenses, etc. In this case the 
mediators were estimating that the hospital carried 40% of the responsibility, so they then 
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took 40% of the total compensation owed based on the abovementioned standards and 
then gave that as the estimate for compensation in this case. Even though, as stated 
above, mediation committees do not have the responsibility or the authority to carry out 
investigations that would decide the degree of responsibility, they still consider what this 
responsibility might be based on their own opinions when discussing the amount of 
compensation with the parties involved.
1069
 
The application of the Medical Accident Regulations and calculation of 
responsibility results from a somewhat arbitrary mix of mediators guiding the 
conversations based on these (or other) standards, the hospital’s desired compensation 
amount, and the patient’s and/or family’s expectations for compensation. As 
unsystematic as this process may be, this is also exactly what the MDMC is supposed to 
be doing: offering a faster way to resolve doctor-patient disputes using existing laws and 
regulations as a guide. Speed and the desire to end disputes are achieved at the expense of 
the potential rigor of the court process. 
Actively discouraging use of courts. During this case both mediators and the 
insurance company lawyer all discouraged the patient’s family from taking this case to 
court because it would take too long and represent “another form of hurt.”
1070
 
Discouraging other avenues does not violate the People’s Mediation Law, which 
prohibits mediators from stopping complainants from using other channels for dispute 
resolution.
1071
 However, actively discouraging another form of dispute resolution might 
also distort the complainant’s impression of its potential advantages, such as a potentially 
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 “The People’s Republic of China People’s Mediation Law [中华人民共和国人民调解法].” 
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higher compensation for death if the courts were to find the hospital responsible.
1072
 It is 
important to note that the mediation committee also uses the same compensation 
standards a tort case would (including the death compensation),
1073
 but it is at the 
discretion of the mediators to choose which standards to consider, and ultimately they do 
not have the power to compel hospitals to compensate according to these standards; the 
standards simply act as reference materials.
1074
  
Use of language in agreements that does not cast blame on hospitals. In the final 
agreement for this case, as in almost all mediation agreements, the word for  
“compensation” (peichang, 赔偿) is not used because it implies fault, so instead the 
agreements use a different word for compensation 补偿 (buchang)1075, which carries a 
meaning of compensating for reasons of providing aid or subsidizing. This is used to save 
face for hospitals, an aspect of mediation that has also been identified elsewhere.
1076
 
Fast and convenient dispute settlement, especially for non-residents of city. There 
were only three days that passed between the patient’s death and the mediation, which 
was settled on the first attempt. One of the MDMC staff remarked that in cases of death, 
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 Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China after Mao, 231. 
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such a quick settlement was rare. However, notably in this case the patient’s middle-aged 
son was in town from Shenzhen and it was also in his interest to settle the dispute quickly 
so he could return home. Even though the settlement was convenient for the son and he 
wanted to settle quickly, the hospital’s willingness to agree to the settlement so quickly in 
only a span of three days – far too short to develop evidence for a case – raises questions 
about whether this decision drastically favored the hospital.  
Case 2: Delayed Diagnosis of Colon Cancer 
 The patient was a 58-year-old male who had visited the implicated hospital with 
the symptom of rectal bleeding. The doctor gave him a preliminary diagnosis of 
hemorrhoids. A couple of months later a physician at another hospital diagnosed the 
patient with colon cancer. The patient together with his wife demanded compensation 
from the first hospital for the delayed diagnosis. This first hospital, where the patient had 
initially sought treatment, is a private hospital, and its president is from a well-known and 
influential family of physicians in the city. The responsible physician attended the 
mediation with no other attendant from the hospital.
1077
 The agreement was concluded for 
the amount of RMB 12,000 ($1,738). Whether this number was appropriate is one of the 
primary subjects for the analysis in the proceeding paragraphs.  
Haphazard notification of rights during mediation. A mediator began by 
articulating some of the general principles of the People’s Mediation Law, but unlike the 
lead mediator in the previous case, he did not review as carefully the rights and rules of 
the process, including the ability of complainants to apply for judicial recognition of the 
agreement within thirty days of signing the agreement. 
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 Medical records actively rejected during mediation. Unlike the complainants in 
the previous case, in this case the patient brought the medical records to mediation. 
However, the mediator actively refused to consider them when the patient wanted to use 
them to prove the doctor’s initial, incorrect diagnosis and demonstrate the time that 
lapsed before receiving the correct diagnosis. As mentioned above, mediation does not 
prioritize the facts of cases. 
Rationale for compensation based on sympathy, not laws or responsibility. In this 
case, the final figure for was not based on any laws, regulations, or degree of 
responsibility; it was negotiated based on how much each side was willing to give in. The 
following is an excerpt from the mediation when the complainants and physicians are 
separated into different rooms: 
PATIENT: How much do you think he’s [the physician] able to give?  
MEDIATOR 1: About RMB 10,000 
PATIENT: No way! 
MEDIATOR 1: I am also just estimating. 
PATIENT WIFE: (getting upset) I could go to court.  
PATIENT (to his wife): Don’t get so upset. What do you think they’re 
thinking? He [the doctor] said something about how this hospital has 
[financial] difficulties.  
MEDIATOR 1: That’s a separate issue.  
PATIENT WIFE: I never wrongfully accused him [the doctor]. I want to 
go to court for a medical accident. 
PATIENT: There are two types of mistaken diagnoses: Error in diagnosis 
and delay in diagnosis. I’m very frank and straightforward, regardless of 
the outcome.  
PATIENT WIFE: How much can they afford to pay us?  
MEDIATOR 1: [The question should be] How much should he be 
responsible for?  
 
MEDIATOR 1 picks up his phone and leaves the room. A few minutes later 
back with the patient and his wife, the conversation continues.  
 
PATIENT WIFE: RMB 15,000.  If they don’t give us RMB 15,000, we 
will go to court.  
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MEDIATOR 2: From our perspective, RMB 10,000 is already pretty 
good. 
PATIENT: How can they [implicated hospital] have given me [Chinese] 
medicine for two months to address this problem? Late stage cancer 
chemotherapy is so difficult. I had to do five days of chemotherapy – so 
painful. I usually have really good energy.  
 
Here the patient’s wife threatens to “nao,” as in yinao. 
 
MEDIATOR 1: Don’t go “nao” (cause trouble)。  
 
The patient looks like he is about to cry. MEDIATOR 1 leaves.  
 
MEDIATOR 1 comes back in and pats the patient on the back like the case 
has already been decided. 
 
MEDIATOR 1: [He agreed to] 12,000, so take it.  Mediator pats patient 
on the back.  
 
Everyone seems to suddenly agree that this is okay. There seems to be a 




During the negotiation the factors that were considered from the patient’s side 
was how much the hospital was most likely able to give; not how much they owed the 
patient according to any sort of standard. The mediator highlighted this point to the 
patient, but at the same time, there was not any rigorous evaluation because, as the 
mediator himself emphasized earlier in the mediation, this case would not be viable in 
court because the delay likely did not cause additional harm to the patient. The doctor 
rationalized providing compensation by saying “We can give you some subsidy from the 
perspective of sympathy, but not from the angle of misdiagnosis.”
1079
 One interviewee 
classified this type of compensation as based on humanitarianism [人道主义] or 
humanistic care [人文关怀].1080  
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By rewarding compensation based on sympathy, the same issue of throwing 
money at patients to appease them continues, cloaked in terms of benevolence. The 
danger of this is that patients who experience any sort of problem in the hospital might 
feel entitled to compensation, regardless of whether or not the hospital carries any fault 
and whether that fault caused any harm (the two requirements for a tort claim to be 
valid).
1081
  Compensation based on sympathy continues the culture of yielding to patients 
rather than educating them on what foundations they should seek compensation – a 
culture that that contributed to yinao to begin with. On the other hand it could also be 
argued these patients should have received more money and the mediation committee 
may be a way in which hospitals can avoid higher compensations, but since there was no 
rigorous evaluation of harm done to the patient, it is difficult to ascertain if they were 
undercompensated or should not have been compensated at all.
 1082
  In another section 
below I provide a general analysis on the soundness of this case medically.  
Use of yinao and litigation as threats. The patient’s wife threatened to resort to 
yinao or sue the hospital in court if the physician did not agree to RMB 15,000 ($2,177). 
However, when the physician offered RMB 12,000 ($1,738), the patient and his wife 
agreed to it immediately. The use of the threat demonstrates that even if patients do not 
resort to yinao, it is a tool they can potentially use to threaten hospitals during mediation. 
It also highlights the ability of MDMCs to deter people who might have otherwise 
resorted to yinao; without the MDMC it is possible these patients would have done it. 
The wife’s use of litigation as a threat is also interesting because it resonates with the 
American adversarial suing culture, which is not as often associated with China. Without 
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any other data on the use of this type of threat, it is difficult to interpret what this means, 
but it at least means that the complainants viewed the court as a viable enough alternative 
to use it as a threat; there is not a complete lack of faith in the court system. 
 Insurance coverage and socioeconomic background. This case raises several 
systemic issues about the health care system that affect how patients may pursue their 
cases. For example, patients may pursue cases based on their need to pay medical 
expenses. The patient in this case was an Eastern City resident and a former factory 
worker who had been laid off a few years ago with poor retirement benefits. He held 
residency-based health insurance.
1083
 If he had had a better work unit, he would have had 
better insurance coverage for his illness. Throughout the mediation process, he and his 
wife emphasized the expense of chemotherapy for them: one round of chemotherapy cost 
them RMB 15,000 ($2,173) alone, and they had to pay for 12 rounds of it, totaling RMB 
180,000 ($26,075).
1084
 Assuming this family had been more financially able or if they 
had had better insurance coverage, they may have not pursued mediation if they had 
believed there was no real harm caused by the delay in diagnosis, but for them it was a 
way to potentially help cover their costs. This raises larger issues in China’s health care 
insurance system coverage (covered briefly in Chapter 6).  
Medical rationale for the case. The patient had mid- to late stage cancer,
1085
 and 
thought that if the doctor had detected the cancer sooner, it would have been benign or 
less serious, which, according to the mediator who is a former doctor, does not make 
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sense from a medical perspective.
1086
  If this case had been heard in court, the patient 
would have to show that negligence occurred and that this negligence caused harm to the 
patient;
1087
 both conditions must be met. In this case, even if the doctor had delayed the 
test beyond what prevailing standards recommend for ordering colonoscopies, it would 
have been highly unlikely that delaying the diagnosis by one or two months would have 
harmed the patient, since most colon cancers are slow growing, usually taking around 10 
to 15 years to grow.
1088
 Therefore, in a court of law, this case would probably not have 
been compensated. Despite this relatively clear rationale that the mediator alludes to, the 
patient still receives compensation. Again by doing this, patients are not taught the 
correct reasons for pursuing complaints.  
Quality and standards of care in China. At the same time having mid- to late 
stage colon cancer detected at age 58 may speak to larger issues about medical care in 
China. The dialogue of this case implies that the man had likely never had a colonoscopy 
before, which in the United States, for example, is recommended beginning at age 50 as a 
preventative measure.
1089
 According to the American Cancer Society,  “It can take as 
many as 10 to 15 years for a polyp to develop into colorectal cancer. Regular screening 
can often prevent it by finding and removing polyps before they have the chance to turn 
into cancer. Screening can also find colorectal cancer early, when it is most like to be 
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 While the doctor is not at fault for causing or worsening this patient’s cancer, 
the health care system overall failed this patient by not implementing preventative 
measures that could have potentially given him a much higher survival rate had the 
cancer been detected earlier.
1091
  
Case 3: Woman Seeking Compensation for Fractured Vertebra after Chair in Waiting 
Room Collapsed  
A nanny took a child into the local community health clinic
1092
 for a vaccination. 
After the vaccination, she followed instructions to wait at the health center for 30 minutes 
with the child. But while she waited, the chair she sat in broke, causing a vertebral 
compression fracture. The nanny’s family requested RMB 40,000 ($5794.33) in 
compensation. Due to the fracture, the nanny was placed on bed rest for three months and 
was unable to attend the mediation herself. The nanny’s daughter, who was in her 20s, 
attended the mediation along with a distant middle-aged female relative of the nanny who 
employs her to take care of the child. The director of the community health clinic 
attended the mediation with another female employee and two female insurance 
managers from the People’ Insurance Company of China (PICC), the insurance provider 
for the hospital. Three mediators participated in this session. 
The main point of conflict during the mediation centered on the standards used for 
compensation. The standards published by Eastern City for nursing fees and nutrition 
fees were all well below the market price the family had paid for these services. For 
example, the family hired a nurse to attend to the bed-ridden nanny for RMB 170 ($24.63) 
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per day for three months; however, city guidelines allotted RMB 50 ($7.24) per day. The 
nanny claimed RMB 4,800 ($695.32) in lost income, but because she was paid monthly 
in cash, there was no official documentation of her income, so as a result, the insurance 
company would only compensate to the absolute lowest standard set for Eastern City, 
RMB 1700 ($246.26). The hospital and insurance company agreed to pay for the 
expenses for the three months of bed rest only, but the family expressed concern about 
future expenses due to continuing health problems that may arise due to this issue. The 
hospital and insurance company flatly refused to pay for future cost. The family 
rationalized that because they were already doing their best to save on costs, such as 
refusing a surgery that would have cost RMB 60,000 ($8,691.5), that the insurance 
company and hospital should not shortchange them on other expenses.  
The family wanted RMB 51,200 ($7416.74)
1093
, but the insurance was only 
willing to compensate as much as RMB 15,000 ($2,172.87),
1094
 and the hospital 
expressed willingness to pay additional compensation because they felt some of the 
estimates by the insurance company were also too low when taking market prices into 
consideration.
1095
 This mediation became heated with the older female relative becoming 
so angry she threatened to place the bedridden nanny on the doorstep of the hospital.
1096
 
Eventually the case was settled through the mediation committee after a few more 
meetings for RMB $35,000 ($5,070.04), and the hospital had already paid for previous 
medical expenses prior to mediation.
1097
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Thorough notification about the process and rights of mediation. A mediator, the 
same mediator in the first case, began by thoroughly reviewing the basic principles and 
rights parties had under the People’s Mediation Law and reminded them of their ability to 
obtain judicial recognition within 30 days after signing the agreement. She also 
emphasized that mediation is free and that parties had the right to seek other avenues for 
dispute resolution such as arbitration, administrative mediation, or going to court.  
Issues in medical records not salient. This case was somewhat unusual because it 
does not concern the actual practice of medicine, but an accident within a medical setting 
– a type of “nonmedical” (非医疗) case that this committee has accepted in the past.1098 
Because the facts of the accident itself were clear, the facts in the medical records were 
not as salient to the debate as they were in the previous two cases.  
Debated Compensation Standards. The same compensation standards used for 
tort cases
1099
 were applied to guide estimating compensation for this case. Mediators and 
insurance representatives used provincial and city guidelines to calculate the exact figures, 
such as the standard for nursing fees, nutrition, average income to compensate for lost 
work, etc.
1100
 The case highlights the issue of government-set standards not being in line 
with market prices, which the complainants felt were unfair and added to their frustration. 
Leading role of insurance company during mediation and lack of advocacy for 
complainant side. The clinic came with its insurance company representatives, and, 
unlike in the first case, the patients were aware of the presence of the insurance 
representatives. The insurance company took control of claiming which standards would 
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be used and how they would be compensated. The mediators tried to counter the 
insurance company, disagreeing with some of the standards and low figures they were 
using as well as the RMB 15,000 the insurance company proposed. While the mediators 
tried to moderate the debate and ensure the patients were not treated unfairly, unlike the 
hospital, the patients did not have any professional advocates lobbying on their behalf. 
Mediators are supposed to be neutral third parties and can only represent the patient side 
to a point. They also cannot force the insurance company or the hospital to agree to 
certain standards.  
Lack of understanding of possible compensation that could be awarded in court. 
The insurance company told the patients that the courts would compensate them even less. 
This made the older female relative upset and felt that court still represented another 
option. Again, the problem is that the daughter and JIEJIE did not understand what they 
were legally entitled to, the strengths and weaknesses of pursuing court versus mediation, 
and did not have an informed representative to navigate this system.  
Threatening with yinao. As in the previous case, there is a threat of yinao. The 
female relative threatened to place the bed-ridden nanny in front of the hospital, to which 
the insurance company representative replied, “You don’t want to do illegal things.”
1101
 
Following this threat, one of the mediators remarked that people feel they can get more 
compensation the more trouble they make,
1102
 reflecting the culture of “big commotion, 
big compensation; small commotion, small compensation; no commotion, no 
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 However, the insurance company representative’s admonition to the 
female relative to not engage in this illegal activity also demonstrates the awareness that 
these types of behaviors are now illegal and that the insurance company felt no need to 
appease the patient due to this threat. This may imply that criminalization of yinao not 
only prevents these incidents in large hospitals, but prevents these threats from having 
power over the mediation process, helping to ensure that hospitals do not have to cave 
into patient threats – the common practice used prior to yinao’s criminalization in order 
to preserve social stability. On the other hand, the relative’s use of these types of threats 
demonstrate that citizens may still feel these threats are viable, and it is not general 
awareness that these types of activities are now illegal. 
 Issue of future complications caused by injury. There was also some confusion 
and uncertainty over how to handle future costs incurred by this injury. The clinic 
director and insurance company refused to consider these potential expenses. However, it 
is understandable that this would be a concern for the patient’s family. Surgery, for 
example, might be a consideration upon reexamination of the patient in the future. A 
mediator clarified that in these types of cases if the patient experiences continuing issues 




 Forgiving language used for compensation in agreement. Again, even though the 
clinic is clearly at fault for supplying a chair in so poor of condition that it collapsed, the 
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terminology used in the agreement for compensation is the softer buchang
1105
 instead of 
peichang, the latter of which would imply more fault for being responsible for the 
damages incurred. 
Aggregate Case Analysis 
 To analyze the cases together, I consider their basic characteristics, the procedures 
of the mediation process, and the outcomes of the cases. The table below summarizes the 
different factors in each category. 
Table 18: Mediation Case Analysis 
BASIC CHARACTERISTICS 
  Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Type of Hospital City-level, Public 3A Private Specialty Hospital Community Health Center 
Type of Case Death Delay in diagnosis Non-medical injury/disability 
Patient socioeconomic 
background 
Patient’s family: elderly, retired 
husband and middle-aged son is 
not a resident of Eastern City 
Patient is laid-off former 
worker 
Patient’s family from an 
average economic background 
PROCESS 
  Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Reminder of rights, 
responsibilities, and legal 
effectiveness under people's 
mediation law 
Yes Haphazardly Yes 
Presence of Medical Records No Yes (but not used) Yes (but not debated) 
Presence of Insurance Company Yes (but unknown to patient) No Yes 
Compensation Standards Used Medical Accident Regulations None (based on sympathy) 
Personal Injury Compensation 
Standards 
Medical Expert Consultation No No No 
Actively discouraging patients 
from going to court 
Yes (mediator and insurance) Yes Yes 
Number of mediators present 3 2 3 
Threatened by patient/family to 
nao 
No Yes Yes 
OUTCOMES 
  Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Agreement Concluded Yes Yes Yes 
Time to Make Agreement First time mediation First time mediation 
10 interactions (incl. mediation 
and one-on-one discussions) 
Amount of agreement RMB 150,000 + medical fees RMB 12,000 RMB 35,000 + medical fees 
Compensation word used in 
agreement 
补偿 (buchang) 补偿 (buchang) 补偿 (buchang) 
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Basic Characteristics 
This collection of cases informs us that both private and public hospitals from the 
primary to tertiary level all use their local MDMC. Each of these cases presents a 
different type of issue – from possible negligence causing death, delay in diagnosis, and 
issues of injury while in a hospital setting not related to medical activity. Some scholars 
may dispute whether or not the last case should be handled by an MDMC because it is 
not within the purview of medical care, medical goods, and informed consent,
1106
 but I 
include it because it was handled by the MDMC, reflecting the reality of the cases it 
manages. 
The economic backgrounds of the patients and their families speak to larger 
questions of who uses mediation. The first observation is that families from average to 
strained economic circumstances may take more advantage of mediation than wealthier 
families for a couple of reasons: first, because the process is free; and second, if hospitals 
are still willing to settle for a relatively small amount of money even if there is a 
possibility of no malpractice involved, it is a way for patients and families to gain extra 
money to relieve some financial stress. The families in the latter two cases clearly came 
from average and strained economic circumstances. It is unclear what the financial 
circumstances were in the first case, but the patient’s husband as a retired railroad worker, 
was likely not wealthy. 
 A second observation is that mediation fits the needs of China’s highly mobile, 
internal population. Of all cases, the first case concerning the death of an elderly woman 
following surgery was the most fitting for court: it could have benefitted from a medical 
review to assess when and how the patient went into shock and also could have benefited 
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from the strict application of compensation standards, including death compensation. 
However, pursuing this case was not practical for the patient’s middle-aged son who 
resided far from Eastern City. The patient’s husband was elderly and would likely have 
been unable to pursue the case alone. Mediation thus offers an important option for 
families that cannot be present for court cases. A legal expert involved in MDMCs in 
another city close to Eastern City stated that while only 30% of cases in his city’s 
MDMCs come from patients and families that are not from the city, they comprise the 




 The mediation process itself is important because it represents an indicator of 
whether or not certain standards are being consistently followed throughout the mediation 
process. This represents a type of procedural justice, the idea that “justice should be 
realized through fair procedures,”
1108
 which is an increasingly important element to the 
rule of law.
1109
 If the procedures are consistently applied, then this MDMC can be seen as 
a contributor to procedural justice and thus rule of law, but if not, then the fairness of the 
committees may be called into question. The sections below evaluate whether or not the 
process of mediation was consistent for each case. 
Reminder of rights and responsibilities not always ensured. Whether or not the 
parties to the disputes received information about their rights, responsibilities, as well as 
their ability to apply for enforcement of their agreements depended on the mediator. The 
mediator in Case 1 and Case 3 was particularly attentive to providing this information, 
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while the mediator in Case 2 did not provide as much detail about the rights and 
processes to the parties. This is important because providing both parties equal 
information about their rights and responsibilities is important to achieve the principle of 
equality, one of the core principles of the process. Hospitals likely know their rights and 
responsibilities since they must be familiar with mediation and the court process when 
disputes arise; however, patients may not know about their right to reject one of the 
mediators or ability to apply for enforcement of their agreement. If patients are unaware 
of their rights and responsibilities, then this makes information between the parties 
unequal, violating the most basic principle of equality for the mediation process. 
Notifying parties about their rights and responsibilities during the process not only 
animates the general principle of equality, but it sets the stage for the law to be enforced 
correctly by ensuring the parties understand the process and empowering them to follow 
it or question it should it go awry.  
Varying roles and debatable impact of insurance companies in each case. The 
role of the insurance company in the process differed in all three cases. In the first case, 
the insurance representatives that were part of the new pilot program participated in the 
mediation, but their identities were not revealed to the patient’s family out of concern that 
they would ask for more money. In the second case, no insurance company was present, 
which might have been because the hospital was private and did not have insurance from 
PICC – they paid compensation from their own risk fund.
1110
 In the third case, the 
representatives from the insurance company played a large, formal role in the 
negotiations. 
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While the first case may be an example of deceiving the patient, it is important to 
note that at that point in time the insurance company had just entered the committee, and 
MDMC members were still likely familiarizing themselves with how to manage the role 
of the insurance company. Also in the first case, the insurance company representative 
did not seem to play a primary role in choosing compensation amounts and standards; he 
primarily encouraged resolution through mediation and explained the possibilities of how 
the patient may have died. Further, in the third, mediation, which occurred later, the 
insurance company’s presence formally in the process, indicating that a formal, active 
role was eventually accepted.  
However, the integration of the insurance company raises additional issues about 
upholding equality during mediation as well as the conflict of interests between insurance 
companies and the mission of MDMCs to provide a neutral, third party mediation service. 
Hospitals already attend mediation well prepared and with an arsenal of full-time lawyers 
supporting their position. However, the patient side in all three cases never had 
professional advocates such as a social workers, lawyers, or other types of representatives 
that could knowledgably engage relevant laws and standards to advocate on their 
behalves. Patients are allowed to bring representatives, but at this MDMC they tended not 
to bring lawyers, likely due to costs, and, to the knowledge of this study, there were no 
NGOs in Eastern City who could also counseling for these types of issues. One 
administrator remarked that sometimes those with a high-level of education will bring 
legal representatives, but this was rare.
1111
 This is problematic because the introduction of 
the insurance companies, along with legal support hospitals already have, puts the patient 
at a further disadvantage in mediation as far as their knowledge about what they should 
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realistically expect for compensation according to law. Medical disputes already begin 
with a severe asymmetry of information in medical knowledge, but the gap in legal 
representation for patients and families also demonstrates a serious asymmetry of 
knowledge of legal rights. While in the third case, one of the mediators attempted to 
dispute the low figures given by the insurance company, ultimately mediators cannot lean 
to one side too much or force standards for compensation upon the parties.  
The example of the mediators trying to advocate for the patients when they 
thought insurance companies were being unfair highlights that the active presence of the 
insurance company raises a fundamental issue about the conflict of interest between the 
interests of insurance companies and the mission of the MDMCs. MDMCs are supposed 
to offer a neutral third party to mediate disputes, but as one of the mediators of the 
committee explained, when insurance companies participate in negotiations, they assume 
the contradictory roles of both mediator and compensator at the same time.
1112
 The 
mediator expressed concern that this phenomenon turns the MDMC into a place where 
insurance companies simply mediate based on what they are willing to give, threatening 
the overall fairness and reputation of mediation committees.
1113
 An official from a city 
close to Eastern City also agreed that that MDMCs were not places for insurance 




One of potential advantages of placing insurance companies into mediation 
committees is to streamline the compensation process, but this goal was not realized 
when the insurance company representatives were at the MDMC. According to one of the 
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mediators, the insurance company would say delays in or failures to compensate were 
due to “incomplete materials.”
1115
 However, according to several policy documents, 
mediation agreements are legitimate documents that insurance companies can use as the 
basis for compensation.
 1116
 But in practice, this is often not the case: insurance 
companies require many different documents and then evaluate whether or not the 
compensation was reasonable. However, because mediation does not often require as 
many documents as the insurance companies require to process claims, insurance 
companies often refuse to compensate what the MDMCs reward based on the lack of 
required documentation.
1117
 The integration of the insurance company into Eastern City’s 
District X MDMC thus not only failed to streamline compensation, but also detracted 
from the overall quality and fairness of the mediation process. This is quite different from 
the US where insurance companies see out-of-court settlements as a way to reduce 
costs.
1118
 The insurance company’s temporary contract to be in the committee ended in 
Spring 2017, and District X will pilot other insurance initiatives at the MDMC to explore 
how to improve the reimbursement process.
1119
  
 Issues of arbitrariness in choosing compensation standards continue. All three 
cases referred to different standards for compensation – the first followed the Medical 
Accident Regulations, the second was based on “humanitarianism,” and the third 
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considered the compensation standards for personal injury in tort cases.
1120
 When asked 
about the choice between the Medical Accident Regulations and the compensation 
standards used for personal injury, one of the mediators replied that these two standards 
are not very different or contradictory, though the MDMC tends to use the compensation 
standards for tort cases more often.
1121
  Regardless of the standards used, it is important 
to note that MDMCs are not supposed to strictly apply compensation standards; they 
serve as reference materials for the committee members to help guide the formation of an 
agreement.
1122
 If patients want compensation standards more strictly applied, then they 
would have to go to court.  
The real issue of arbitrariness exists in the choice between compensation based on 
laws and regulations and compensation based on sympathy or humanitarianism, the latter 
of which can be seen as euphemisms for appeasement (息事宁人，xishi ningren) or 
“plastering over principles in order to settle differences” (和稀泥，huoxini).1123 Social 
institutions like MDMCs regulate the behavior between different parties of society and 
are supposed to teach them the rules of interaction. If mediation committees reward 
compensation on the grounds of appeasement or based on the preference for the conflict 
to end, then they continue to teach society that physicians can be held responsible for 
mistakes they have not made.  
Lack of expert consultation. The lack of medical experts to help assess the 
medical validity of the cases makes the decisions about compensation seem arbitrary 
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even when MDMCs refer to legal standards. Most MDMCs, including this one, have an 
“experts database” (专家库) from which they can request “expert” – physicians who 
specialize in the area of the case in question – to medically review the case.
1124
 However, 
the MDMC did not consult experts in any of these cases, but in some cases, without an 
expert opinion, it is difficult to assess responsibility.  
For example, when compensating under the Medical Accident Regulations, the 
following factors should be considered: the level of the medical accident, the degree to 
which medical negligence contributed to adverse consequences, and the relationship 
between the consequence and the original condition of the patient.
1125
  In the first case, 
there was an attempt to determine the degree of fault based on these factors – at one point 
a mediator suggested 40% for the hospital’s degree of responsibility. However, without 
consulting an expert, the final amount, even though it was guided by legal standards, was 
still left to more arbitrary negotiation based on perceived responsibility. While on one 
hand, without expert consultations or more formal medical reviews, these mediations can 
occur more quickly, but on the other hand, a lack of consideration for the reasons 
underlying the decisions calls into question the quality of the MDMCs decisions. This 
tension between truth and the desire to quickly end conflicts represents an important 
tension in the mediation process. 
Not only would expert consultation potentially validate the decisions of the 
committee, but they also provide an opportunity to strengthen doctor-patient 
communication and patient education. In the second case, an impartial medical expert 
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was not there to validate or explain that it was unlikely that a delay in the patient’s cancer 
diagnosis caused any additional harm to the patient. It is not necessarily the responsibility 
of the expert to educate the patient, but it presents an opportunity for this to occur. 
However, the patient in the second case was paying so much out of pocket for his 
treatment, he may have tried to claim damages regardless of whether or not there was a 
rational explanation of the hospital’s responsibility. This speaks to larger issues of 
insurance coverage, and until China has better insurance coverage, hospitals may end up 
paying in these types of situations when patients face significant costs. 
Another issue that detracts from the potential contributions of experts to MDMCs 
is the fact that patients sometimes distrust physicians, feeling that doctors all know and 
protect each other. Until patients no longer feel that way, the presence of experts may 
actually detract from the credibility of mediation – the same issue that has called into 
question the credibility of the medical reviews. A medical expert who attended 
mediations in another city where MDMCs use them more frequently explained that 
during mediation, the hospital, the family, and an odd number of medical experts sit 
around a conference table.
1126
 Each expert offers his or her opinion on how the hospital 
handled the case, and then the experts vote first on whether or not the hospital carries 
responsibility and then again on the degree of responsibility.
1127
 The physician 
acknowledged that by virtue of being doctors, experts are biased toward the medical 
perspective so it can seem like the process favors the physicians more.
1128
 She expressed 
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the need for another form of representative at mediation like a social worker or neutral 
lawyer to balance the situation.
1129
  
 Minor role for medical records, facts, and suspicions of fault. In addition to the 
lack of expert consultation, there is also a lack of using the medical records to decide the 
facts of cases, which would also be helpful for determining the degree of fault, though, 
again, deciding this exactly is not the responsibility of the committee. After the first case, 
one of the mediators who was a retired doctor commented that she felt the hospital had 
responsibility because health care workers did not discover that the patient was in shock 
soon enough – the patient likely had gone into shock two or three hours prior to doctors 
realizing it.
1130
 However, she did not play any significant role in determining the degree 
of fault; the hospital medical affairs office representative led the calculations for 
compensation instead.
1131
 This again speaks to the issue of the tension between decisions 
based on truth and the desire to end the conflict as well as the mediator’s intended neutral 
role – those with medical knowledge are supposed to guide cases but cannot accuse or 
compel hospitals to follow their opinions. As highlighted above, usually in this MDMC 
mediators do not inform the patient directly if they feel the hospital has fault in order to 
avoid intensification of the conflict.
1132
 
 Active discouragement of using courts. In all of the cases, the mediators and 
sometimes the insurance company representative discouraged patients or their families 
from pursuing a lawsuit because it would be long or disadvantageous. There is a lack of 
sophistication in directing different types of cases toward different avenues. For example, 
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some cases such as those that would benefit from a rigorous medical review may be 
much better served in court rather than in mediation (assuming the medical review is 
done fairly and not to protect the interests of local doctors). Citizens are already hesitant 
to use China’s court system and the active discouragement of using it may be a disservice 
to patients whose cases may actually benefit from it.  
 Mediation takes place in a culture of threatening yinao. These cases show that 
mediation exists in the culture of yinao, as complainants resorted to threats in order to 
advance their interests. In the second case, the patients tried to use it as a threat while 
attempting to bargain the amount of compensation. In the third case, the patient’s relative 
left mediation, threatening the hospital with placing the bed-ridden patient in front of the 
clinic. However, in neither case were these threats decisive factors in the outcomes, 
showing that while the culture of yinao still exists, hospitals, at least the two in this study, 
no longer fear it so much that it sways their decisions. In the third case the insurance 
company’s confident admonition to the patient that her threats were illegal demonstrates 
awareness and faith in the criminalization of yinao.  
Outcomes 
Mediation performs strongest in its ability to achieve the desired outcome of 
ending disputes, which is also reflected in official statistics that boast a national success 
rate of 85%
1133
 (percentage of disputes that ended in signed agreements). In all cases 
analyzed here mediation settled the disputes – two were settled on the first attempt. 
Mediation can settle cases that vary in level of severity– from a serious case of accidental 
death to a two-month delay in a cancer diagnosis. It can also settle at a variety of 
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compensation points, from as little as RMB 12,000 ($1,738) to as high as RMB 150,000 
($21,770). While this range may speak to the broad capabilities of the mediation 
committee, it also raises the question of whether or not the committees should be dealing 
with such a range of issues without any expert consultation.  To the knowledge of the 
author, none of the complainants has since revisited the committee to request more 
money since their initial settlements.  
All mediation agreements employed face-saving language for hospitals – using 
buchang instead of peichang. While patients and/or their families did not complain about 
this language in the cases above, this choice of language became an issue in one of the 
consultations discussed further in the sections below. 
Consultations 咨询 
 Most reports about MDMCs focus on mediating, but the committee also provides 
free consultation services for both hospitals and patients who want to better understand 
the medical dispute resolution process and their potential options. Consultations reveal 
other roles filled by MDMCs as well as potential cases that never go to mediation, which 
largely remain unobserved by studies focusing only on data and summaries of 
mediations.  
Consultation 1: Making Official the Agreement for Delayed Diagnosis  
An elderly man accused a private hospital of delaying his diagnosis of colorectal 
cancer by 80 days (this, coincidentally, is the same private hospital discussed in 
Mediation Case 2 – also a delayed diagnosis). The hospital recognized no error, 
especially because the physicians had asked the patient to stay at the hospital for a more 
in-depth examination. However, due to the patient’s strained personal circumstances (his 
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wife was undergoing treatment for breast cancer) and economic hardships, the patient 
decided not to stay at the hospital for the procedure. Later, he went to another hospital for 
his symptoms and was diagnosed with cancer, so he returned to the original hospital 
claiming that they had delayed his diagnosis.  
This case sits somewhere between a mediation and a consultation. The parties had 
already settled the case amongst themselves for RMB 20,000 ($2,897), but hospital 
representatives went to the MDMC for assistance in drafting the agreement. Also, in 
Eastern City, all medical dispute agreements between hospitals and patients for RMB 
5,000 or more must be notarized by the committee.
1134
 Notably, the success rate of 
mediation committees includes these types of pre-settled agreements, which comprise 
more than half of the agreements this MDMC’s success rate.
1135
 This is important to note 
because when official statistics show a high success rate of mediation, many of those 
agreements in those success rates were not mediated. There are several notable points 
about this case. 
Compensation was motivated by government pressure and based on sympathy. 
During the consultation with the hospital representatives, the hospital president said that 
even though there was no negligence in the case, the hospital would still compensate the 
patient out of sympathy for his and his wife’s hardships. But when asked whether the 
hospital would compensate if the family did not face personal and financial difficulties, 
the hospital president replied that they still would compensate regardless of these 
circumstances because the family had called 12345 (the Citizen Hotline discussed in 
Chapter 3).  The city government informed the hospital that it wanted this dispute to be 
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resolved, so the hospital agreed to do this on the basis of “humanitarianism” and 
“compassion” by giving the patient RMB 20,000 ($2,897). The pressure by the city 
government to settle the dispute demonstrates the continuing phenomenon of 
emphasizing “appeasement” (息事宁人). This is the same type of behavior that led to 
yinao – as patients saw hospitals compensate for disruptive behaviors, they had more 
incentive to resort to yinao to obtain money, regardless of the question of fault. When 
MDMCs indulge dispute settlement for the sole reason of ending disputes, they simply 
become a new destination for these types of settlements rather than distinguishing 
themselves as institutions with certain standards for dispute settlement.  
 Use of favorable language toward hospitals makes patients feel the situation is 
unfair. The hospital president and doctor reviewed the agreement carefully and edited it 
to include phrases like, “the hospital expresses understanding and sympathy,” and 
compensation (buchang) is based on “the patient’s circumstances.”
1136
 The following 
week the wife of the patient came to sign the agreement. Even though she signed it, she 
still seemed upset because the agreement indicated that the hospital carried no fault when 
she believed that they did.
1137
 This is important because in a way it detracts from the 
mediation institution itself; mediation committees are supposed to be a neutral third 
parties, but if the only way for patients to receive compensation is to sign agreements that 
they feel favor the hospital in principle, then this might hurt the reputation of the 
committee in the long-run. It also calls into question the idea of “success” as more than 
just a conclusion of the agreement – this case would be considered a success even though 
the patient left somewhat dissatisfied.  
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Medical rationale for the case and need for patient education. This case also 
highlights the failure of mediation or the policy environment in general to provide patient 
education. In interviews for this study
1138
 and other studies
1139
, the lack of patient 
understanding of risk and high expectations was identified as a source of conflict. In this 
case, the patient did not receive the appropriate education on this issue, namely that a 
delay in diagnosis likely did not contribute to or worsen her husband’s cancer.
 1140
 If the 
wife had received education on the issue from a third party, she may have left the 
mediation feeling less dissatisfied with the agreement.  
Physical set up of mediation committees favors hospitals by regularizing 
interactions with hospitals and committee members. This consultation was the first 
interaction with the private hospital and the mediation committee.
1141
 The hospital had 
expressed satisfaction with the MDMC’s service, and by virtue of interacting with the 
head of the MDMC at least a couple of times (once to consult about the agreement, once 
to sign), they had developed some personal rapport with each other. By the next time they 
met for Case 2 (above), they were familiar with each other. Because MDMCs are district-
based and serve only the hospitals in their district, by design they tend to interact more 
often with the same groups of hospital representatives over time, which naturally can lead 
to the development of personal relationships. While this was likely not the intention 
behind the design of the committees, it may endanger their impartiality. 
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Consultation 2: Mother seeking consultation after 13-year-old son dies of leukemia 
A woman in her 30s walked into the office for a consultation after District X 
Health Bureau had sent her there.
1142
 She recounted the story of her 13-year-old son who 
had recently passed away from leukemia. She broke down into tears several times as she 
explained his last few weeks: At the end of her son’s fourth inpatient stay for 
chemotherapy, he showed signs of a lung infection. He was discharged, but when he 
came back for his fifth round of chemotherapy, he had developed pneumonia. He died 
one month later. She questioned why doctors did not address the lung infection sooner, 
and why they had to stop the chemotherapy because of it. Her son had been treated at one 
of the branch hospitals of the city’s provincial-level hospital. She had visited the 
hospital’s Doctor-Patient Communication Office before, but the hospital denied any 
responsibility. She said that they used a lot of technical terms to explain the situation to 
her that she did not understand.
1143
 
The mediator presented her with her options: 1) first to return to the doctor-patient 
office; 2) then pursue mediation if both parties agreed; 3) apply for a medical damages 
review at the Eastern City Medical Association; 4) pursue the case in court. She had a 
difficult time understanding the details of the process, but the mediator explained it 
patiently until she understood. She expressed the desire to do mediation and to apply for a 
technical review of the case.
1144
 
The mediator further explained to her that this hospital, as a provincial-level 
hospital, was powerful. Mediators had mentioned this hospital in past conversations 
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before because it always refuses mediation.
1145
 Because it is a provincial-level hospital, 
the city-level government has no authority over it, unlike in other cases when the city-
level government can pressure city, district-level, or private hospitals to mediate and 
settle disputes. In responding to the statement about the hospital’s power, the mother said, 
“We are just common people. The child is gone. What use is money?” She emphasized 
she did not want money and did not want to create a disturbance or expand the case; she 




The mother also had questions about insurance coverage for her son’s medical 
expenses. The mediator called in the PICC lawyer who had been stationed at the MDMC 
as part of the pilot program to answer some of her questions about insurance. PICC was 
not her insurance provider, but he was able to inform her of some basic information and 
basic rights. The lawyer warned her that her insurance provider would likely try to shirk 
responsibility for the expenses. He said that if the company refused, she should take them 
to court, because once they are taken to court, they must pay. He assured her that the 
court would award compensation because there are some articles in insurance company 
contracts that the courts do not approve of. The insurance company representative, like 
the mediator, very patiently explained all of this information to her.  
After receiving information about insurance coverage and the dispute resolution 
process, the mother felt relieved, taking a deep breath and patting her chest. She said that 
people at the committee had the “heart”[人心] to deal with her. She left her contact 
information with the mediator, who proceeded to call the implicated hospital on her 
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behalf to see if they would be interested in mediation. The hospital refused, and said she 
should go to court. The mediator called back the mother and told her this news, and said 
her next step is to go to the Eastern City Medical Association to apply for a medical 
accident review. 
Analysis  
 This case highlights several important issues about the role of the MDMCs as 
patient advocates (albeit limited), the politics of powerful hospitals, the role of yinao in 
shaming sincere patients and families, and the role of the insurance company as 
information providers. The sections below explain each of these factors.  
  MDMC employees as system navigators and advocates for patient. This case 
illustrates the role in advocacy that the MDMCs can play. The mediator provided 
information about the options that the patient has, which she was initially unclear about 
and needed someone to explain to her several times. He then called the hospital on her 
behalf. This interaction shows that MDMCs can fulfill a needed role of an advocate for 
navigating the dispute resolutions system, which is ever-changing and confusing for 
patients. However, as the mediation cases show above, this advocacy can only be limited 
because in mediation itself, the parties must remain neutral third parties.  
  Professional advice supplied by insurance company. Further, in addition to 
explaining the options to the patient, the insurance company lawyer provided professional 
advice to the patient on how to claim coverage. While this is not directly related to a 
medical dispute, it shows the importance of having professional advice in ensuring 
patients are able to claim what they are rightfully entitled to. While insurance companies 
do not typically fulfill this role for the patients, this unique situation demonstrates the 
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need for reducing the knowledge asymmetry in order to relieve stress on patients and 
their families as they grieve and figure out the costly finances of health care.  
The principle of voluntariness can backfire against complainants who have 
disputes with powerful hospitals. This consultation reveals the likely unforeseen 
consequence of voluntariness, one of the key and celebrated principles of mediation
1147
, 
being a problem; in the past mediation received criticism for forcing parties to accept 
it;
1148
 now powerful hospitals take advantage of being able to refuse mediation. This is 
important because an avenue meant to provide a better option for patients can actually be 
denied to them. Because the MDMC offers a space with employees qualified to moderate 
communication between patients and doctors, this case would have likely benefited from 
mediation because the patient wanted a clearer explanation of what happened and the 
rationale behind the decisions the doctors made. But powerful hospitals in a way have no 
incentive to go to mediation: the costs of pursuing litigation are not as difficult for 
hospitals to bear as they are for patients, so refusing mediation and forcing patients to 
consider pursuing a court case may actually cause patients to drop their cases since 
pursuing them is so difficult.  
 The culture of yinao shames patients and families sincerely pursuing disputes. 
During the interaction, the mother emphasized that she was not there for money or to 
cause a disturbance. Her fear of the mediator distrusting her intentions shows that yinao 
not only has a negative impact on health care workers, but also on patients and families 
with sincere concerns. 
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Consultation 3: Advocacy for Cases with Recurring Issues 
Over the course of several months, one of the mediators managed a case for a 
woman who had already settled a dispute, but needed continuing assistance as she 
experienced recurring medical issues resulting from her medical accident. The woman in 
her early 50s had gone to a military hospital to have minimally invasive surgery to 
remove uterine fibroids. She chose this hospital based on its provocative advertisement 
on Baidu for quick surgical removal of uterine fibroids (hysteroscopic myomectomy). 
The advertisement boasted, “Small incision, quick recovery.”
1149
 Even the mediator who 
was a retired doctor said the advertisement was so convincing that she would believe the 
advertisement if she had seen it.
1150
 The patient decided to do the procedure because she 
reasoned that it would be better to do it in her early 50s rather than wait until she was 
older. However, two things went wrong. First, the laser used in the procedure accidently 
cut through the patient’s small intestine.  Second, when she started having complications 
from this accident, there was a delay in admitting her into the hospital.
1151
 
This military hospital at fault for the accident paid for all of this woman’s 
expenses at the provincial-level hospital, where she had a follow-up surgery to close the 
wound and where she also stayed in the ICU for part of her recovery. Two months after 
she was discharged from the hospital, a second issue arose: she was in pain and vomiting 
due to intestinal obstruction (when digested material cannot pass normally through the 
bowel
1152
) and abdominal adhesions (tissue bands that form between abdominal tissues 
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). For these more recent symptoms, she was receiving care at a third 
hospital. She had not received reimbursement from the initial hospital for these costs, and 
the mediator was trying to help her determine how to claim them.  
The mediator remarked that in this type of case, a one-time compensation is not 
suitable. The woman’s quality of life had been seriously affected by the accident – she 
can only eat liquid or soft foods and cannot sit up for long lengths of time.  
Problem of advertising in medicine and quality of care. This issue brings to 
attention the larger issue of advertising in medicine in China. This case came just a few 
months before the case of Wei Zexi became national news – a young man who recounted 
of how Baidu’s promoted search results deceived him into seeking treatment at a hospital 
that turned out to be a sham.
1154
 Shortly before he died, he documented his experience 
online,
1155
 which led to public outrage against medical advertising on Baidu and an 
official investigation into the matter.
1156
 This issue highlights that while so much of the 
debate around medical disputes focuses on demonizing profit-seeking patients, patients 
are subject to a larger context of injustices in the health care system. Preventing and 
resolving medical disputes, as emphasized in the previous chapter, involves more than 
improving dispute resolution institutions like MDMCs; it necessitates better standards for 
advertising and quality of care.  
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Mediators as advocates in navigating the system. The mediator in this case 
advocates on behalf of the patient, helping her navigate her potential options for dispute 
resolution and managing her communications with the hospital responsible for the initial 
accident. This role of the mediator is extremely important for this woman who is unable 
to lead a normal life due to the accident and therefore unable advocate on her own behalf. 
Again, this example illustrates the importance of MDMCs as places where patients can 
receive information on how to navigate this system. Mediators, like this one, often go 
beyond their job requirements to serve this purpose, and this crucial function they 
perform, to the knowledge of this author, goes unobserved by statistics and current 
studies on their effectiveness. However, it could also be argued that as a third-party 
institution meant to mediate disputes, MDMCs should not provide advocacy services. 
The next chapter explores the potential role of civil society to fulfill this function.  
Conclusion 
The work of the MDMC in Eastern City’s District X provides insight into China’s 
path towards rule of law as well as its progress in improving health care. The above cases 
show that while the MDMC offers complainants increased access to and advocacy in 
medical dispute resolution; it does not consistently ensure equality and procedural justice 
for all parties involved, especially at the expense of patients and their families.   
The MDMC’s free, fast, and convenient services make medical dispute resolution 
more accessible than the relatively longer and expensive court process; however, 
ironically, faithfully upholding the principle of voluntariness actually decreases access to 
mediation for patients and families with disputes against powerful hospitals that do not 
hesitate at the costs of litigation and are not subject to local pressures from city 
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governments to pursue mediation. In some states in the United States, mediation for 
medical disputes is actually required by law before adjudication;
1157
 perhaps medical 
dispute cases are actually well suited for compulsory mediation. In China, if both parties 
are required to mediate at an MDMC before court, this would give all patients and 
families, regardless of the hospitals they have claims against, the ability to access this 
institution. There is of course a difference between compelling mediation to occur and 
compelling outcomes; while requiring the former has advantages for increasing access to 
mediation; the latter should still be kept voluntary in order to avoid coercion in the 
mediation process – an issue that tarnished the reputation of mediation in the past.  
This study also found that the MDMC fell short in providing reliable procedural 
justice to parties to disputes for the following reasons: the MDMC did not consistently 
notify parties about their rights and responsibilities; it did not consistently apply any one 
set of standards or rationale for compensation; and it did not follow or have procedures 
for summoning experts to evaluate cases or for handling facts of cases. Of course it can 
be argued that mediation by nature is not supposed to be as procedurally rigorous as 
adjudication, but this does not mean there should not be any procedures that guide the 
process. Consistently following basic rules builds credibility to the mediation process by 
teaching society the bounds of acceptability for cases and providing citizens reliable 
expectations for the dispute resolution process. For example, if hospitals are not supposed 
to compensate for the purpose of silencing complainants, mediation committees should 
consistently uphold that standard so that over time their repeated refusal to compensate 
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for the sake of appeasement establishes a new set of expectations for complainants about 
legitimate types of claims.  
Admittedly, there are significant challenges to achieving heightened procedural 
rigor in the MDMCs. The most obvious is the weak procedural obligations outlined in 
existing laws and regulations. The People’s Mediation Law says almost nothing about the 
details of the procedures mediators should follow, allowing room for vast discretion for 
individual mediators.
1158
 Local guidelines for this particular MDMC also offer little 
guidance aside from advising mediators to mediate on the basis of equal discussion, 
mutual understanding, and yielding.
1159
 Until recently, these vague guidelines left 
decisions to request expert consultation to the discretion of the mediators. In the province 
where this MDMC is located, new regulations have begun to address this issue, 
stipulating that for claims worth between RMB 20,000 and RMB 100,000, mediators 
should seek expert consultation.
1160
 For cases worth over RMB 100,000, MDMCs should 
organize medical damages reviews with the consent of both parties.
1161
 
Not only does the lack of a strong legal framework prevent MDMCs from 
achieving a greater degree of procedural justice, but also, as seen in the first consultation 
case, pressure from the local government to end disputes even if it means appeasing the 
complainant with money represents an additional challenge to mediation. If local 
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governments continue to exert pressure on hospitals to end disputes in this way, and 
MDMCs must facilitate these agreements, this hurts the credibility of MDMCs because it 
turns them into institutions that appease patients out of fears of social instability. 
MDMCs also displayed an inclination against revealing information to patients in order 
to prevent escalation of conflicts. There needs to be a general cultural shift away from 
fear of short-term instability in order to allow MDMCs to reinforce their procedures for 
dispute resolution. Benjamin Liebman has termed this perceived trade-off between 




The cases above also illustrate that equality, one of the main principles for 
mediation, has yet to be fully realized in MDMCs for several reasons. The presence of 
insurance companies tips the interaction in their favor, as they simply use MDMCs as 
forums to voice the maximum amounts they are willing to give. Even without insurance 
companies, the interaction is still not equal due to the severe information asymmetry 
existing between patients and hospitals – hospitals have both medical knowledge and 
legal knowledge with their legal teams; however patients and their families generally 
have no advocate in dispute resolution. The ability of mediators to be advocates to both 
patients and hospitals in navigating the dispute resolution system represents an important 
contribution of the MDMCs. However, this advocacy can only go so far because as third-
party institutions, the MDMCs are supposed to be neutral, not advocates for either side 
during the dispute resolution process. Until China develops a culture of hiring legal 
counsel or enables a civil society that provides advocates, patients remain at a 
disadvantage during dispute resolution. Further, the city district-based nature of MDMCs 
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increases their chances of having regular interactions with hospitals and developing 
relationships with them, which could over time unintentionally create a bias towards 
hospitals in the district.  
 In the area of quality of care, the cases in this study showed several issues in 
quality. In the first mediated case, the hospital missed the initial signs of the patient going 
into shock. In two cases from the same private hospital, patients complained of delay in 
diagnosis ranging from 60 to 80 days. The third mediated case revealed poor quality of a 
clinic’s facilities, with a chair breaking on a patient. The case of the woman whose son 
died of leukemia showed poor communication between the doctors and the patient’s 
family, with the woman complaining about doctors explaining the situation in terms she 
did not comprehend.  
It is difficult to know whether or how these disputes impacted the quality of care 
in the hospitals where they occurred. One of the mediators was confident that quality 
improvements were made within hospitals after mediation, but uncertain about the extent 
to which lessons learned were shared with other facilities because hospitals want to 
protect their public images.
1163
 Egregious cases in the US are also generally sealed to 
protect reputations of hospitals as well.
1164
 In interviews with physicians and hospital 
administrators, they said that hospitals make quality improvements internally following 
these types of disputes.
1165
 One hospital official gave an example of changing the 
standards of care after a case from orthopedic surgery went to court. In this case, the 
physicians had followed the standard of care, but after the case, they realized the standard 
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needed to be updated and shared this finding at a yearly meeting of orthopedists. As a 




The MDMC in this study does not collect medically relevant statistics on their 
cases – they collect information on the number of people they receive in their office, the 
number of cases registered with them, the number of successfully mediated cases, the 
mediation success rate, and the amount of compensation.
1167
 They report their data to the 




The challenge of linking medical disputes to quality of care is also an issue in the 
American system, which has been criticized for focusing too much on altering laws for 
compensation instead of translating disputes into quality improvements.
1169
 Because the 
Chinese hospital and government system is more centralized, it actually might be more 
poised to collect massive amounts of data, analyze it, and implement system-wide quality 
improvements. Since the MDMCs already collect information on disputes, adding this 
function to their data collection methods would be an easy way to generate more 
information about trends in disputes and could lead to improving the health care system.  
Despite the shortcomings of the MDMCs, they provide a preliminary base on 
which medical dispute resolution can be improved over time. This particular MDMC is 
less than one decade old, so it is important to remember that strong institutions built on 
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procedures and principles take time to develop. The progress already made in access and 
advocacy is notable, and while procedures are still weak, localities have continued to pass 
regulations to improve them, showing promise for continued future reforms to strengthen 
procedural rigor in the committees. 
However, without allowing a more active civil society to flourish, truly equal 
medical dispute resolution may not be achievable. This is because civil society can 
provide patient advocacy independent of the state, which in the current system is not 
attainable. Patient advocacy organizations hold the potential to address many of the 
issues the state alone is unable to fully resolve. These organizations can provide 
education for patients and families on health conditions, raise funds for medical research 
and patients in need, provide legal counseling and advocacy for pursuing a medical 
malpractice case
1170
, and offer places for emotional healing and community around 
illnesses.  
 In the current state of affairs, the Party-state is unable to fulfill these roles as it 
already attempts to do too much– at once it governs hospitals, insurance companies, and 
the court system; oversees mediation committees; and tries to provide some advocacy for 
patients. This observation resonates with scholarship on China being an over-responsive 
state,
1171
 and additionally highlights not only the responsive part of this issue, but the 
breadth of issues the governing system tries to control. As the mediation committee’s 
experience shows, it is difficult to do all of these things well at once due to significant 
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conflicts of interests between these actors and the mission of the MDMC to be a neutral 
third party to mediate medical disputes.  
Using the introductory framework in Chapter 1, the creation of MDMCs to 
respond to medical disputes illustrates adaptation of state institutions along the lines of 
slack and not tetheredness – while the MDMC is technically non-governmental 
organization and has some degree of independence, it still remains inextricably tied to 
government interests, and this limits its ability to move forward in advocacy efforts. 
While the Party-state may see fully independent civil society organizations as potential 
threats, these organizations could actually ease the burden on the state to perform all of 
these tasks, allowing the state to consolidate its institutions and thereby contributing to 
rather than detracting from social and regime stability. The next chapter provides close 




CHAPTER 9: CHINESE SOCIETY RESPONDS TO YINAO 
 
This dissertation aims to understand the adaptability of the Chinese system, a term 
that refers not only to the government of China ruled by the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP), but also to the society it oversees. The previous two chapters explored the Party-
state’s adaptability to address yinao at two levels – at the national level with legislation to 
address yinao and at the local level via the work of one urban, district-level Medical 
Dispute Mediation Committee (MDMC) to provide an improved channel for dispute 
resolution. This chapter assesses the response of Chinese society to yinao. The ability of 
Chinese society to respond and solve problems is crucial to systemic adaptability because 
governments and ruling parties alone cannot address every social problem. 
 There are two main challenges in analyzing the responsiveness of society. The 
first is defining society itself. The state-society dichotomy often used in political science 
implies the notion that state and society are separable. Such complete separability does 
not apply to any political system, let alone in China where according to one official,  
“there is no place where the government is not.”
1172
 Society can be defined in a number 
of ways. First, it can be defined by the individuals that comprise it – in this study, the 
relevant individuals include patients and citizens (who may become patients at any time), 
health care workers, entrepreneurs, lawyers, and activists. There are also informal groups 
of individuals as well as organizations, such as NGOs representing patient needs and 
professional organizations for health care workers. Additionally, society can be defined 
by where it lives – both in the physical world as well as in cyberspace.  
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 There is also the question of how to define the “responsiveness” of society to 
yinao. Responsiveness can be to the direct fallout from individual events – for example, 
thousands of online comments responding to an incident of violence against health care 
workers. Responsiveness can also aim to solve the problems that contribute to yinao, 
covered extensively in Chapter Four and summarized in Table 19. 
Table 19: Problems Contributing to Yinao 
Both types of responsiveness are important. The first type of responsiveness to 
individual events reveals the nature of expression around yinao. Citizens use both online 
and offline spaces to express their feelings about the problem – who they feel is 
responsible, how the issue should be dealt with, etc. Providing space to vent is important 
because it provides a “safety valve” for draining off hostile and aggressive sentiments.
1173
 
It also reveals the extent to which the CCP allows a diversity of expression in response to 
yinao, because what we are able to view online is content that has not been deleted by 
official censors.
1174
 The second type of responsiveness to the issues contributing to yinao 
indicates society’s ability to solve problems, which is necessary for adaptability to occur. 
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Challenges Facing Patients Challenges Facing Clinicians 
 Poor access for rural residents to better health 
care in urban system, for all citizens competing 
to get enough time with physicians in public 
hospitals 
 High out-of-pocket costs  
 Poor health care literacy 
 Dispute resolution system that favors hospitals 
 Poor knowledge about legal rights and justice 
system 
 Unaddressed mental heath issues 
 
 High patient volume 
 Incentives to overcharge patients for 
medicine and tests, undervalue time spent 
with patients, and accept bribes from 
patients and pharmaceutical companies 
 Little to no communication skills training 
 Mistrust facing them generated by media 
coverage of corruption 




 This chapter examines both types of responsiveness in both individuals and 
organizations as well as within physical and cyber spaces. The first two sections focus 
primarily on the ability of individuals to express themselves: the first section covers the 
responses of netizens, while the second section examines the responses of health care 
workers. The last two sections examine how entrepreneurs and civil society groups 
innovate to address the problems contributing to yinao. Admittedly, casting such a wide 
analytical net hinders the ability to deeply cover any one of these areas. The goal of this 
chapter, however, is to provide a broad picture of the relevant social actors and their 
responses as an initial assessment of society’s responsiveness as well as to provide a 
foundation for future research focusing on each of these topics.  
Much of the information used for this chapter comes from Chinese academic 
literature because to my knowledge, there have been very few, if any, studies in the 
English-language literature thus far about social responses to yinao. In addition to 
research by Chinese scholars, I use a number of Chinese Internet platforms and mobile 
applications for this research as well as information gleaned from interviews and news 
media on developments in each of these areas. I argue that individuals and organizations 
(both formal and informal) in Chinese society, despite constraints they may face in social 
organization, are still capable of expressing their opinions about and solving issues 
contributing to yinao; in other words, there is evidence that Chinese society is adapting to 
effectively address yinao and its underlying issues. 
The Debate Online – Netizens React to Yinao Incidents 
                                                                                                                                                 
Expression,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 02 (May 2013): 326–43, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055413000014. 
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 Before launching into the debate around yinao in cyberspace, it is first important 
to understand the different platforms available for Chinese citizens online to express 
themselves. There are social media sites like the popular Weibo (the Chinese version of 
Twitter) and RenRen Wang (the Chinese version of Facebook, though no longer as 
popular as it once was). Since its inception in 2011, WeChat (a sort of hybrid of 
Facebook and Whatsapp), which offers many functions including personal profiles, 
friends’ newsfeed, and instant messaging, has become one of the most widely used social 
media sites in the world, with a reported 938 million monthly active users as of the first 
quarter of 2017.
1175
 Netizens also frequent the bulletin board systems (BBS) websites, 
such as Zhihu, Tianya Club, Xici Alleyway, and Kdnet (Kaidi), to express their opinions. 
On a BBS site, users are not restricted in the length of their posts, as they are on Weibo 
and WeChat, and posts are often location-based (i.e. Shanghai) or topic-based (i.e. yinao).  
 Additionally, Chinese netizens can also comment on news articles from official 
networks like Xinhua News to commercial networks like Tencent News and Phoenix 
News. There are also popular sites such as Netease (Wangyi) and Headlines Today (Jinri 
Toutiao) that aggregate popular news stories from other news networks. Stories from 
these aggregate sites often garner thousands of comments. For example, a news story 
posted on Headlines Today on the brutal murder of Dr. Chen Zhongwei by a former 
patient received over 23,000 comments.
1176
 Readers of these websites often comment 
under usernames, not with directly identifiable information, though most websites now 
                                                 
1175
 “Facebook Hits 2 Billion-User Mark, Doubling in Size since 2012,” Reuters, June 28, 2017, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-users-idUSKBN19I2GG. 
1176
 Chen Yuanyuan, “Guangdong Bei Kan Yisheng Qiangjiu 43 Xiaoshi Hou Qu Shi, Jinji Paicha You 
Qianzai Shangyi Qinxiang Renqun 广东被砍医生抢救 43 小时后去世 当地紧急排查有潜在伤医倾向人
群 [Doctor Stabbed in Guangzhou Dies after 43 Hours of Attempted Rescue, Local Authorities Are 
Compling a List of Potential Groups with Tendencies to Harm Physicians],” Jinri Toutiao (originally from 
Xinjing Bao), May 8, 2016, http://www.toutiao.com/a6281999931759788289/. 
 361 
require registration with a phone number, which can be traced to the individual’s true 
identity. 
Table 20: Platforms for Online Discussion 
Type Subtype Function Examples 
Social Networking 
Microblog Tweeting short comments and 
articles 
Sina Weibo 
Personal Social Networking Adding friends, posting to 
platform thoughts and articles 
that only friends can see, instant 
messaging, online payment 
Weixin, RenRen Wang 
Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) Debate social and community 
topics, can search and view 
without being “friends” with 
other users 
Zhihu, Tianya Club, Xici 
Alleyway, Kdnet 
News 
Official News  Xinhua, People’s Daily 
Commercial News  Tencent QQ, Phoenix 
Aggregate News  Headlines Today, Netease 
  
In a country where it is difficult to conduct public opinion surveys and freedom of 
speech and assembly remain restricted, scholars and even the Chinese government itself 
often look to online debate as a proxy for public opinion. However, the conclusions that 
can be drawn from studies based on Internet expression are limited, not only because the 
Internet is censored in China, preventing us from seeing the full range of discussion, but 
also because online commentary has its own intrinsic limitations in reflecting public 
opinion anywhere. Studies have found that online commentary tends to generate 
negativity, especially if users can post anonymously,
1177
 so researchers using online 
commentary as their sample must consider this negative bias. Further, scholars note that 
that people who tend to respond to certain types of news stories likely have a bias 
towards the topic to begin with.
1178
 Online comments are not like public opinion surveys, 
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in which respondents answer independently of each other - one comment may influence 
the whole string of responses.
1179
 Also, different websites attract different types of users 
based on their sociopolitical views as well as location. Just as liberal-minded users tend 
to read the New York Times and Washingtonians may be more inclined to read the 
Washington Post, Nanjingers may be more inclined to post on the BBS site Xici 
Alleyway
1180
 and a more informed audience may read Phoenix News.
1181
  The sample of 
comments therefore reflects all of these biases.  
Despite the limitations of online discussion for analysis, studying it can still 
increase our understanding of the contours of the debate surrounding social issues. For 
example, in the case of yinao, online debate can reveal whom citizens may blame for 
yinao incidents, and how they feel these incidents should be handled. In China, the 
discussion posted online also shows the scope of acceptable debate around an issue, since 




 There have been several studies around online commentary about yinao responses, 
whose main findings I highlight and analyze in the following paragraphs. The first study 
uses commentary on Tianya Club on four high-profile incidents of violence against health 
care workers: 1) the notorious Wenling incident in which a patient who was upset 
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following his surgery stabbed three doctors, killing one (2013)
1183
; 2) At Zhejiang 
University Second Affiliated Hospital, an angry mother and her daughter beat a nurse, 
resulting in head trauma and near-miscarriage (2016); 3) Two local ranking officials in 
Nanjing beat a nurse, resulting in partial paralysis of her legs (2014); 4) More than 100 
people forced a doctor to publicly march in humiliation for 30 minutes following the 
death of a patient from alcohol poisoning (2014).
1184
  
The authors used a stratified sampling method to create a sample of 400 
comments for analysis and then organized their findings based on the categories of social 
sentiments, social awareness, and behavioral tendencies. The predominant social 
sentiments found in this study were anger and hostility, which were directed towards both 
physicians and assailants. A little under a third of the comments in the sample (123 posts) 
expressed anger towards health care workers, expressing that beating them was the only 
way their attitudes would improve.
1185
 A similar number of netizens (119) expressed 
anger about the violent incidents, feeling that they would only make doctor-patient 
relations worse. Even more netizens (131) in the sample called for strict punishment of 
assailants.
1186
 At the same time, over 30% (143) criticized doctors in general for shirking 
responsibilities, poor attitudes, and accepting red envelopes (bribes).
1187
  
In the area of social awareness, the study revealed a low level of trust towards 
various actors in society. Netizens doubted the objectivity of media coverage of these 
events, suspected that the poor attitudes of physicians instigated these attacks, and 
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doubted the credibility of local justice bureaus.
1188
 Issues with the local justice bureau 
became especially relevant in the Nanjing case because the assailants were officials, so 
netizens felt that the justice system was protecting them.
1189
 Netizens also revealed their 
concerns about differences in social power and inequality, expressing that patients have 
nowhere to turn when medical accidents occur, and that patients are a disadvantaged 
group in society.
1190
 Comments also recognized that nurses also have a low social status, 
so when they face assault, they are powerless in protecting their rights and must submit 
themselves to humiliation.
1191
   
In the area of behavioral tendencies, the authors found that a higher number of 
netizens in the sample tended to advocate using violence to respond to violence (yi bao 
zhi bao – 以暴制暴).1192 Some conveyed the idea that resorting to violence was the most 
effective way to retaliate against physicians, and others even said it would be appropriate 
for physicians to fight back.
1193
 Some netizens also reasoned that making a scene out of a 
medical dispute helps ensure the fair handling of the issue by bringing attention to it.
1194
 
Other netizens also favored strict punishment for assailants (71 posts) and having rational 
discourse about the issue (25), but in this sample, there were about a third fewer of these 
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Another study using online news comments examined the coverage of two yinao 
incidents on two different websites. Both incidents occurred in 2011, one in Shanghai and 
one in Beijing. In Shanghai a deceased patient’s family arranged wreaths and assembled a 
funeral altar at the main door of the hospital and then charged into the hospital, attacking 
health care workers and injuring ten in total.
1196
 In the Beijing incident, a patient stabbed 
his doctor 21 times, but fortunately the doctor survived.
1197
 The authors collected 2,324 
comments in total for four news stories, two for each incident, one from Tencent News 
and one from Phoenix News.
1198
 Their analysis reveals that a plurality of the comments 
(40.36%) recognized that the hospital was responsible for the incident.
1199
 Only 2.71% of 
the comments criticized yinao and 7.92% expressed sympathy for the hospitals.
1200
 Other 
respondents (14.11%) felt the incident reflected broader social issues.
1201
 The authors 
acknowledge that the results of their study may be particularly negative, since the study 
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While online discourse is prone to negativity and extremes, netizens could direct 
their negativity in a number of different directions: towards the assailants, the doctors, 
government departments, the hospitals, etc. These studies show that the online 
commentary is directed at all sides of the issues, demonstrating that that within the online 
debate forums, there is a wide range of voices permitted by the government. There is 
clear disillusionment with official parties involved – the hospitals, the media, the justice 
departments. This disillusionment with official institutions also makes it less surprising 
that many netizens would condone violence, feeling it is the preferable way for dispute 
resolution – in the first study, many advocated yinao and in the second, very few 
condemned it. 
Favoring violence and indiscipline for dispute resolution may be more than just an 
expression of anger; it may be challenge to future legal reform. Choosing violence for 
dispute resolution is certainly not unique to China: Célestin Monga observes in 
Francophone Africa that citizens in authoritarian systems resort to their own crafty ways 
to pursue their needs.
1203
 He argues that this becomes a particular challenge when 
political systems open up because there is a “profound civic deficit,” and the state-
resistant behaviors bred over many years are not so easily changed.
1204
 This idea 
resonates in China’s case because yinao represents a learned behavior to cope with a 
system that has low social trust. This is important because even if China begins to build a 
more credible legal system, there may be a lag in the adjustment of citizen behavior to 
this new system due to the behaviors learned under the old one.  
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1204
 Monga, 363. 
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Health Care Workers Respond 
 Health care workers have responded to yinao through professional organizations 
and networks, changing their clinical behavior, and expressing their opinions and 
frustrations in online forums. While patients are an amorphous group, with members 
constantly fluctuating as they become ill and recover from illnesses, health care workers 
are a more permanent and institutionalized social group. In addition, because many health 
care workers are employed at public hospitals, they have ties to official government 
institutions. The constant and official nature of these groups enables them to organize 
into both formal and informal groups, which also helps facilitate more coherent responses 
to yinao. Of course, independently, physicians also respond online on the social media 
forums described above. 
Organizational Responses of Health Care Workers 
 There are several important official organizations for health care workers in China 
– the Chinese Medical Association (CMA – originally founded in 1915, this quasi-
government association also conducts the controversial medical reviews for malpractice 
claims), the Chinese Medical Doctors Association (CMDA – founded in the early 2000s), 
the Chinese Nurses Association (CNA), and the Chinese Hospital Association (CHA). 
There are also websites and apps where doctors commonly post, read news in their 
profession, and find new information and resources for their clinical specialties. These 
include Lilac Garden (Dingxiang Yuan -丁香园) and Medical World (Yixue Jie - 医学
界).  
In responding to yinao directly, professional organizations have come together in 
public statements condemning yinao and have also conducted research on the issue. In 
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2015 the Chinese Nurses Association and the Chinese Hospital Association released a 
joint statement in response to the nine violent incidents that occurred in a ten-day span 
from late May to early June.
1205
 The statement condemned the violent actions and called 
upon relevant government entities to follow existing regulations to punish those 
responsible for these crimes.
1206
   
These associations have also conducted research to assess the scope and impact of 
medical violence on the health care profession. The Chinese Hospital Association (CHA) 
conducted a nationwide survey specifically about violence against physicians (Survey of 
the Situation of Violent Attacks against Health Care Workers in Hospital Settings).
 1207
 
About every two years since 2009, the Chinese Medical Doctors Association has 
conducted a nationwide survey for its white paper on the state of the medical profession 
in China,
1208
 part of which focuses on medical violence.
1209
  
Health care workers have also participated in their own protests against the 
violent attacks and called for better security. For example, following the Wenling 
incident in 2013, several hundred health care workers from the hospital where the 
incident occurred reportedly participated in a protest.
1210
 These demonstrations have also 
                                                 
1205
 Chinese Doctors Association and Chinese Nurses Association, “Zhongguo Yishi Xiehui, Zhonghua 
Huli Xuehui Guanyu Qianze Baoli Shangyi de Lianhe Shengming [中国医师协会、中华护理学会关于谴
责暴力伤医的联合声明] Joint Statement Condemning Medical Violence from the Chinese Medical 
Doctor Association and Chinese Nurses Association,” Chinese Medical Doctor Association, June 10, 2015, 
http://www.cmda.net/gongzuodongtai/zhinengbumen/2015-06-10/14644.html. 
1206
 Chinese Doctors Association and Chinese Nurses Association. 
1207
 Jing Wu and Nuo Lu, “Survey Shows: China’s Incidents of Violent Injuries against Doctors Are 
Increasing Every Year [调查显示：中国暴力伤医事件逐年递增-法治频道],” Xinhua News, August 15, 
2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2013-08/15/c_116961312.htm. 
1208
 China Medical Doctor Association (中国医师协会), “White Paper on the State of the Medical 
Profession in China《中国医师执业状况白皮书》.” 
1209
 China Medical Doctor Association (中国医师协会). 
1210
 Huai Ruogu and Li Qiumeng, “温岭数百医护人员抗议医疗暴力 [Several Hundred Health Care 
Workers in Wenling Protest Medical Violence],” Beijing Times, October 29, 2013, 
http://epaper.jinghua.cn/html/2013-10/29/content_35619.htm. 
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been reported in other parts of China.
1211
 While it is difficult to trace exactly how these 
activities may have influenced policy decisions on yinao, recent policy decisions to 
increase crackdowns on yinao
1212
 seem to reflect responsiveness to physicians’ 
complaints.  
Behavioral Responses of Health Care Workers 
 The aforementioned survey from the Chinese Hospital Association revealed that 
28.4% of health care workers admitted to a tendency towards prescribing treatments for 
patients that protect themselves from liability, and that almost 40% of health care workers 
have considered or are planning to change professions.
1213
 Yet it is also important to 
point out that these figures are not exceptional; a recent survey of American physicians 
showed that 49% of physicians were often or always experiencing feelings of burn-out 
and that 48% of physicians plan to “cut back on their hours, retire, take a non-clinical job, 
switch to ‘concierge’ medicine, or take other steps limiting patient access to their 
practices.”
1214
 The following sections explore the practice of defensive medicine as a 
result of yinao and potential issues facing the medical profession. 
Defensive Medicine 
                                                 
1211
 “河北一医院患者家属殴打软禁医生，上百医护人员集体游行抗议 Hebei - Hospital Patient and 
Family Assault and Trap a Physician in His Home, Over 100 Health Care Workers March in Protest,” The 
Paper, December 19, 2015, http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1410944; “Henan Luanchuan 
County Healthcare Workers Take to the Streets to Condemn Violent Attacks on Healthcare Workers [河南
栾川县医护人员上街谴责“暴力袭医"],” Tencent News, January 25, 2015, 
http://news.qq.com/a/20150125/006913.htm#p=1. 
1212
 National Health and Family Planning Commission, “Circular on Publication of Special Action Plan for 
Strict Crackdown on Illegal Crimes Interfering with Medical Institutions  [关于印发严厉打击涉医违法犯
罪专项行动方案的通知].” 
1213
 Wu and Lu, “Survey Shows: China’s Incidents of Violent Injuries against Doctors Are Increasing 
Every Year [调查显示：中国暴力伤医事件逐年递增-法治频道].” 
1214
 The Physicians Foundation and Merritt Hawkins, “2016 Survey of America’s Physicians: Practice, 
Patterns, & Perspectives,” 2016, 7, 
http://www.physiciansfoundation.org/uploads/default/Biennial_Physician_Survey_2016.pdf. 
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The practice of defensive medicine
1215
 occurs in health care systems everywhere 
in response to the threat of litigation, but in China violent incidents have also contributed 
to defensive practices.
1216
  In order to better understand the link between yinao incidents 
and how it affects clinical practice, I conducted a series of interviews at a 3A hospital 
with a group interview with hospital midwives
1217
 and the head of the Obstetrics 
Department. I also shadowed a physician of Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) during 
his office hours. 
When I asked the group of midwives why they felt the number of yinao incidents 
had decreased in the past couple of years, they did not mention new laws or increased 
police presence, but instead attributed this change to an increased caution around 
patients.
1218
 In other words, they believe that their behavioral response is the primary 
reason that the yinao issue has improved.  
One of the midwives recounted an yinao story that had traumatized the entire 
department. They had saved a premature baby at 26 weeks after the mother had been in a 
traffic accident. To the horror of the staff, the parents pursued a medical dispute against 
the staff of both Obstetrics and Pediatrics Departments for saving the child since the cost 
of the medical expenses for the premature child and likely continuing costs from further 
complications were impossible for the family to pay. The parents refused to remove the 
child from the hospital when he was ready for discharge. Moreover, the father would lie 
                                                 
1215
 According to Studdert et al., defensive medicine is defined as a “deviation from sound medical practice 
that is induced primarily by a threat of liability.” See: David M Studdert et al., “Defensive Medicine among 
High-Risk Specialist Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice Environment,” Jama 293, no. 21 (2005): 2609. 
1216
 Wu and Lu, “Survey Shows: China’s Incidents of Violent Injuries against Doctors Are Increasing 
Every Year [调查显示：中国暴力伤医事件逐年递增-法治频道].” 
1217
 In China, midwives in hospitals (助产士, zhuchan shi) are specially trained nurses in childbirth that can 
independently deliver children and care for pregnant women. Obstetricians are called in when there are 
complications in the pregnancy or delivery. 
1218
 Ibid, 2.  
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down on the floor at the front desk of Obstetrics Department in protest of the hospital, 
hoping to attract the attention of others. Finally the hospital agreed to settle the expenses 
for the dispute and the parents agreed to take the child. The nurses said some parents 
leave their children in the hospital for several years because of these disputes over the 
costs.
1219
 While a lot of the focus on the patient-doctor relationship in China centers on 
patients’ lack of trust in physicians, incidents like these lead health care workers to 
distrust patients. While the caution bred by mistrust may decrease individual yinao 
incidents, it can ultimately contribute to worsening patient-doctor relations. 
The head of the Obstetrics Department where these midwives practiced also 
echoed the cautious sentiment of her staff, stating that she determines whether or not to 
perform riskier procedures based on her perception of her patients. For example, she 
mentioned she would soon be performing a high-risk procedure on a 36-year-old woman 
who was 26 weeks pregnant with twins and experiencing premature dilation of her cervix 
(cervical incompetence). Without taking any action, the babies would likely not survive. 
One solution to cervical incompetence is to suture the cervix closed, but with twins, this 
procedure becomes much risker, to the point that it is not advised.
1220
 The patient was 
also high-risk because of her age as well as her history of heart problems. However, the 
physician had agreed to perform this procedure because the patient told her directly that 
she trusted her. I interviewed this physician both before and after this procedure, and she 
reported the procedure had so far been successful.
1221
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 Midwives Group, Interview No. 053, 53. 
1220





 Another physician readily admitted that he turns away suspicious-looking patients, 
justifying his actions with an old saying from Mencius: “A wise man does not stand 
beside a collapsing wall.”
1222
 He explained that if he allowed himself to see patients who 
brought him trouble, it would ruin his ability to see other patients in the future; although 
he turns away some patients, by doing so, he is serving more.
1223
 When asked how he 
determined which patients would cause trouble, he said he examines their wu guan (five 
facial sensory features – eyes, ears, nose, mouth, and eyebrows) and from this, he can 
determine their character.  
While I shadowed this physician in his clinical practice, one of the patients did 
really not make eye contact with us and kept shifting his eyes back and forth during the 
consultation. The physician sent him to another department to seek treatment instead. 
Later he said that with these types of shifty people, which he encounters about once or 
twice per week, he adopts the strategy of saying “good-sounding” things to them, 
listening to them, and then telling them their condition is not within his scope of care, 
ultimately sending them away.
1224
 This physician believes that he has never experienced 
yinao first hand because he can detect problematic patients. Further, like the midwives in 




                                                 
1222
 Chinese Attending Physician, Interview No. 054. Saying: Junzi bu li weiqiang zhixia 君子不立危墙之
下. 
1223
 1.31.16, p. 2. 
1224
 Morning Clinic Chinese Medicine, Interview No. 57, 2016. 
1225
 Chinese Attending Physician, Interview No. 054. 
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 Even though the officials have attributed state policies to recent decreases in 
yinao incidents,
1226
 these interviews suggest that it is also possible that part of the reason 
the number of incidents may be decreasing is because health care workers over time have 
become increasingly skilled at practicing defensive medicine and avoiding these disputes. 
Regardless of whether the state adapts its policies or not, the health care workers affected 
by yinao have taken it into their own hands to adapt to the situation, and future policy 
changes must take into account the culture of defensive medicine currently present in 
Chinese health care. 
It is important to note, however, that even though health care workers felt that 
they individually became more skilled at avoiding disputes, it is difficult to assess how 
this form of adaptation impacts the system overall. For example, if one physician tells a 
problematic patient to go elsewhere, even though the problem is no longer his, he simply 
shifts the patient to another physician. It is unclear how this buck-passing may impact 
this system overall: while it may deter some patients who sought to attempt yinao for 
profit, it may make some others even angrier or dismay patients from pursing care at all. 
  
                                                 
1226
 National Health and Family Planning Commission, “2016 年 2 月 24 日国家卫生计生委例行新闻发
布会文字实录 - 中华人民共和国国家卫生和计划生育委员会 [February 24, 2016 National Health and 
Family Planning Commission Routine Press Conference Transcript]”; “National Health and Family 
Planning Commission: Serious Attacks against Physicians and Yinao Incidents Overall Show a Decreasing 
Trend [卫计委：严重伤医和医闹事件总体呈现减少趋势],” China News, February 24, 2016, 
http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2016/02-24/7771034.shtml. 
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Potential Threats to the Future of the Medical Profession 
 Physicians have also expressed in mainstream and social media
1227
 the desire to 
leave the profession and have discouraged others from entering it. In 2013 Dr. Yu Ying 
from Peking Union Medical College Hospital, one of the most prestigious hospitals in 
China, attracted lots of media attention when she resigned, citing both personal reasons 
and issues in the health care system.
1228
 Medical World, one of the most popular health 
care sites and online forums for health care workers, published a nurse’s heartfelt story 
upon her resignation from a public 3A hospital, documenting the hardships of her 
profession and expressing her relief at how she no longer has to fear violent incidents.
1229
 
Physicians on Tianya Club, in postings responding to violent incidents against health care 
workers, expressed that young doctors should quickly leave the profession, and the older 
ones should simply bide their time and retire as soon as possible.
1230
  
However, there is no definitive evidence that there has been a general trend of 
attrition in health care workers due to yinao based on available data.
1231
 Data on 
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 Pan and Hua, “Study on Social Mentality from Internet Public Opinion of Violence against Medical 
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 Li Feiran, “Emergency Department Superwoman Not Playing with the System Anymore [急诊科女超
人不和体制玩了-中国青年报],” China Youth Daily, June 19, 2013, sec. 10, 
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Attack on Doctors Triggers Protest in China - China Real Time Report - WSJ,” The Wall Street Journal, 
October 28, 2013, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/10/28/bloody-attack-on-doctors-triggers-
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 Xiaobing Yan, “A Nurse’s Thoughts and Feelings Upon Resignation [一个护士的辞职心声],” Yixue 
Jie [医学界网站 ], June 11, 2015, http://www.yxj.org.cn/article-46508-1.html. 
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 Pan and Hua, “Study on Social Mentality from Internet Public Opinion of Violence against Medical 
Staffs,” 43. 
1231
 According to the 2016 Health and Family Planning Statistics Yearbook published by the National 
Health and Family Planning Commission, the total number of health care workers (including doctors and 
nurses) and the ratio of health care workers per 1000 people, have in total been increasing over the past 
decade (see Tables 2-1-1 Number of Health Care Workers and 2-2-1 Per Thousand Population Number of 
Health Care Workers). However, these figures do not convey the differences in these rates based on clinical 
specialty, hospital type, or location (though location figures can be gleaned from local-level statistical 
yearbooks), so there were a declining trend in any of these specific areas, summary data obscure them. Yet 
even if these statistics on health care workers were decreasing, this trend could not necessarily be linked to 
yinao without further research since there are other reasons doctors may leave their profession (working 
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physicians per 1,000 people in China show that from 1985 to 2015, there has been a net 
increase in physician density (see Figure 37). The data show large fluctuations over time 
in China’s physician density: double-digit decreases in 1990, 1995, 2001, and 2009 and 
double-digit increases in 1991, 2003, and 2012. 
Figure 37: China's Physician Density (per 1,000 people), 1985-2015 
 
The only change in data collection methodology during this period occurred in 
2002, when a narrower definition for physician was used. Other than that I have found no 
change in methodology that can account for these dramatic changes. Another possible 
explanation is that in 2009, yinao was an especially heated issue in society,
1232
 but it is 
difficult to link the decrease in the physician density ratio during that year to yinao. Even 
if physicians exited due to the public discourse and yinao incidents in 2009, there would 
have likely been lag time between when the incidents occurred and when physicians 
                                                                                                                                                 
hours, salary, retirement, etc). See: National Health and Family Planning Commission, China Health and 
Family Planning Statistics Yearbook 2016《中国卫生和计划生育统计年鉴 2016》. 
1232
 During this year the infamous Nanping incident in Fujian Province occurred (see: “Newest 
Announcement: Progress on the Nanping Yinao Incident  [最新通告：南平医闹事件进展].” The year 
2009 also represented a peak year in Baidu Index for searches on yinao (see Chapter 6 on Sources of 
Yinao).  
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exited the profession, casting doubt on the relationship between yinao and the decreasing 
physician density during that year. Despite the fluctuations in physician density, the net 
increase of the physician density ratio suggests that yinao has not caused an overall net 
decrease from 1985-2015 in physician density in China. 
As a result of yinao and murders of physicians, health care workers have also 
discouraged others from entering the field. An iconic photo emerged on Weibo during the 
protests that followed the 2013 Wenling incident of a man wearing a white coat with the 
following message written on the back of it: “Don’t study medicine. Those who want to 
be promoted and get rich should walk another path. Those who fear death shouldn’t enter 
this door.”
1233
 In a recent online survey of 764 physicians, 57.5% would not advise 
elementary school students to study medicine.
1234
 
 But once again, the data on enrollment and graduation rates do not exhibit 
alarming decreasing trends. Official statistics show mostly positive growth in both 





). For enrollment in medical majors at the undergraduate, master’s and doctoral 
levels, there was a -3% growth rate in 2007 and almost no growth from 2011 to 2012, but 
it would be difficult to attribute these drops to yinao. 
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 Yimaitong (Medlive), “作为医生，你会鼓励身边的孩子当医生吗? [As a Doctor, Would You 
Encourage Children to Become Doctors?],” Yimaitong (Medlive), June 1, 2016, 
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 Data for Figure 38 based upon: National Health and Family Planning Commission, China Health and 
Family Planning Statistics Yearbook 2016《中国卫生和计划生育统计年鉴 2016》, Table 2-13-1  
Students Newly Enrolled and Currently inMedical Major. 
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Medical Major Graduation Figures. 
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Figure 38: Number of Students Enrolled in Medical Majors  
At Institutions of Higher Learning 
 
Figure 39: Number of Graduates in Medicine  
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Besides concerns about enrollment, graduation, and attrition in the medical 
profession, there are also concerns that the most outstanding students no longer choose to 
become physicians, as the minimum standards for test score standards to enter into 
medicine has at times dropped and some medical programs cannot fill their slots.
1237
 
Fudan University School of Medicine Vice Dean Wang Ling cautions that this is 
generally not the case for prestigious schools.
1238
  
 The discussion above has shown that health care workers have responded to 
yinao by practicing defensive medicine and expressing the desire to leave the practice or 
advising others not to enter. Though it is difficult to assess the full scale and impact of 
these actions, their potential consequences on China’s health care system are negative. 
Practicing defensive medicine can lead to higher costs for patients, breed mistrust, and 
make it difficult for high-risk patients to obtain care. While current available data cannot  
corroborate whether there is a relationship between yinao and fluctuations in physician 
density, medical school enrollment, and medical school graduation, if currently practicing 
physicians continue to advocate leaving the profession or outstanding students refuse to 
enter it due the dangers yinao has posed, China may not be able to meet the health care 
demands of its population in the future. The responsiveness of individuals in a society 
ultimately reflects the system the state has given them, and the types of responsiveness 
discussed above by physicians are not indicative of a system that enables healthy forms 
of problem solving and adaptation. Rather, such responses encourage self-preservation 
for survival in system that has largely failed to empower them. 
Entrepreneurial Responses 
                                                 
1237
 “Are Outstanding Students Still Willing to Study Medicine? [优秀学生还愿意学医吗？],” 
BIOONNEWS, May 4, 2014, http://www.bioon.com/trends/comment/595537.shtml. 
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 “Are Outstanding Students Still Willing to Study Medicine? [优秀学生还愿意学医吗？].” 
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 But the outlook is not so grim when examining how entrepreneurs have attempted 
to innovate ways to resolve the many issues contributing to yinao that government policy 
has been unable to address. Mobile applications and websites have provided a number of 
avenues to relieve pressure on the health care system. Table 21 provides some examples 
of these apps and the services they provide, and the subsections below explain how they 
address different issues in China’s health care system and even yinao directly. 
Comparable apps in the US would include Zocdoc or WebMd, though as the sections 
below illustrate, these medical apps, unlike their Chinese counterparts, do not provide 
functions that are as essential for accessing the medical system in the US. 
Reducing frustration of waiting via online appointment booking. Instead of 
waiting for hours for an appointment ticket number or being at the mercy of ticket 
peddlers selling overpriced appointments, patients can now take a number online or 
schedule appointments through mobile applications and websites like Weiyi (by the 
popular website Guahao Wang – literally “Take-a-Number” website) and Jiuyi160. It is 
important to note that not all clinical appointment hours are available via these apps (they 
tend to be available only for specialists),
1239
 so the inconvenience of waiting and ticket 
peddlers still exist, but these apps help reduce these issues. 
Increasing Access to Physicians. Mobile apps also increase accessibility and 
thereby potentially decrease in-person patient volume by offering patients the ability to 
talk with physicians on the phone or to send them an instant message for a fee. The fees 
for phone calls can range depending on the experience and popularity of physicians. A 
highly rated gynecologist in Shanghai, for example, charges RMB 299 ($43.99) for a 10-
minute phone call or RMB 190 ($23.54) for a question (can include text and photos) to be 
                                                 
1239
 Shanghai Legal Employee, Interview No. 36. 
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answered via instant message.
1240
 This may seem expensive at first glance, but it offers 
patients access to top physicians located anywhere in China. 
Table 21: Examples of Mobile Applications and Their Functions to Improve Health Care  































✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Taking a number 
during clinic hours 
✓ − ✓ − ✓ 
DIRECT 
COMMUNICATION 
Chat with doctors 
online 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Call/video call 
doctors  
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Video Call with 
doctors 
− ✓ ✓ − ✓ 
FEEDBACK 
Rate physicians ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Purchase gifts of 
praise (bouquet, 
banner) 






✓ − ✓ ✓ ✓ 
View questions and 
answers of other 
users 
✓ − ✓ ✓ ✓ 
ARRANGING SURGICAL 
PROCEDURES 
Request to schedule 
a surgery 
✓ ✓ − − − 












− − ✓ − − 
Search for caretaker − − ✓ − − 
Take out a loan − − ✓ − − 
Arrange to receive 
medical treatment 
abroad  
− − ✓ ✓ − 
SELF-DIAGNOSIS TOOLS 
Self diagnosis 
(similar to Web MD 
Symptom Checker) 
− − − ✓ ✓ 
 
                                                 
1240
 See profile of Dr. Wang Qing (汪清) (Zhuren yishi – Chief Physician) of Shanghai Hong Fangzi 
Hospital (Obstetrics and Gynecology Hospital of Fudan University) on Hao Daifu Zaixian (好大夫在线) 
mobile application (as of July 14, 2017).  
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Encouraging long-lasting relationships with health care providers. Even though a 
family doctor system in China is being developed,
1241
 patients typically do not have long-
term relationships with general practitioners. When patients fall ill, regardless of severity, 
many immediately seek out the best specialists. The app Green Apple was launched in 
2013
1242
 as an app whereby doctors and patients who met each other in clinic can keep in 
touch – the idea is to establish continuing relationships between physicians and patients 
that have already met.
1243
 If patients need to follow up with the physician to ask questions 
or need to be referred to someone in another specialty, they can ask the physician they 
have already met and by doing so, begin to set up their own network, which was built on 
a positive interaction with a physician to begin with. By providing a platform for better 
communication and maintaining a relationship, the app aims to ultimately improve the 
patient-physician relationship in China.
1244
 
Placing Value on Doctor-Patient Interactions. In addition to increasing patient 
access to physicians, these mobile applications also directly reward physicians for the 
time they spend with patients. Physicians in public hospitals typically do not get paid 
more or less for the time they spend with patients in their offices. For example, the ticket 
price for a chief physician at a public 3A hospital in Guangzhou is RMB 7 (a little over 
$1); the time he spends with patients is undervalued, and his promotion and title do not 
                                                 
1241
 “Notice on the Publication of Guiding Opinions on Family Doctor Contract Service [关于印发推进家
庭医生签约服务指导意见的通知],” National Health and Famil Plnanning Commission System Reform 
Department, June 6, 2016, 
http://www.nhfpc.gov.cn/tigs/s3577/201606/e3e7d2670a8b4163b1fe8e409c7887af.shtml. 
1242
 “Record of Development and Major Events,” Green Apple Health, accessed June 17, 2017, 
http://www.qpgjk.com/history.html. 
1243
 “Exclusive Interview: The Person behind ‘Pledge of Respect for Doctors’ Xu Jiazi,” Xinsheng Dai, 
September 9, 2015, http://www.le.com/ptv/vplay/23500034.html?ch=baidu_s. 
1244
 “Exclusive Interview: The Person behind ‘Pledge of Respect for Doctors’ Xu Jiazi.” 
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depend on his time with patients.
1245
 However, the mobile applications change this 
dynamic because it places high value on the time physicians spend with patients. By 
adding value to the time physicians spend with patients, physicians likely have a greater 
incentive to offer better services. 
Empowering patients and rewarding good service. Patients can also use these 
apps to search for and view ratings of doctors, which empowers them to gain knowledge 
on their potential providers and incentivizes doctors to provide better service. In addition 
to basic ratings of physicians, apps also offer patients a range of ways to express their 
gratitude for physicians. Spring Rain doctor allows patients to send small sums of money 
from RMB 2 ($0.30) to 288 ($43.24) to thank them for their service. For RMB 20 ($3) 
each, We Doctor (Weiyi) allows patients to send physicians different symbols of thanks 
(bouquet, hands of a healer, benevolence, medial ethics, Hua Tuo – famous doctor of the 
Han dynasty). Jiuyi160 offers a similar service with different types of symbols that vary 
in price – from a digital bouquet of flowers for a good attitude at RMB 6 ($.90) to a 
banner that reads “Superior Medical Ethics” at RMB 68 ($10.21).
1246
 The ability to 
express and receive gratitude arguably also facilitates a better relationship between 
physicians and their patients. 
Empowering patients with more information about health. By enabling patients to 
ask questions to top physicians and providing informational articles about diseases, these 
apps also offer patients ways to gather more information about their illnesses, addressing 
the issue of poor health care literacy in China. Green Apple CEO Xu Jiazi emphasized 
that while doctors are not allowed to diagnose, treat, and prescribe online, they can offer 
                                                 
1245
 Morning Clinic Chinese Medicine, Interview No. 57. 
1246
 In order to see this function in these mobile applications, on many physicians ‘profile there is an option 
called song xinyi (送心意), which means to send [a token] of one’s appreciation. 
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more information about illnesses to patients about a disease they already have.
1247
 She 
highlights that this is important because most Chinese people lack general health 
awareness and need more channels to obtain reliable information.
1248
  
Directly taking action to raise awareness and prevent violence against doctors. In 
July 2015, Green Apple launched the “Pledge of Respect for Doctors” campaign.
1249
 
When the CEO of Green Apple Xu Jiazi was asked how she thought of this initiative, she 
replied, “Because Green Apple Health is a communication platform for patients and 
doctors, one of the original intentions when we started this company was to improve 
doctor-patient relations. Last year there were so many violent incidents toward doctors, 
there were a lot of incidents of patients not understanding doctors, hurting doctors, and 
stabbing doctors, so we hoped to launch a campaign that would call upon the masses to 




Green Apple launched the campaign with a video in which doctors from 
prominent hospitals in Beijing in Shanghai spoke candidly about both the hardships and 
sense of accomplishment they feel from their profession.
1251
 The pledge reads:  
I swear to: 
Respect doctors, Respect life. 
Reasonably communicate, resist violence. 
Mutually trust each other, mutually understand each other. 
Defend life, fight together! 
 
                                                 
1247
 “Exclusive Interview: The Person behind ‘Pledge of Respect for Doctors’ Xu Jiazi.” 
1248
 “Exclusive Interview: The Person behind ‘Pledge of Respect for Doctors’ Xu Jiazi.” 
1249
 Green Apple Health, “Pledge to Respect Doctors,” Green Apple Health, 2015, 
http://www.qpgjk.com/drvow.html. 
1250
 “Exclusive Interview: The Person behind ‘Pledge of Respect for Doctors’ Xu Jiazi.” 
1251
 Green Apple Health, “Pledge to Respect Doctors.” 
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Within the first month of the campaign, its Weibo account was viewed 9.13 million times 
and 1.3 million people signed the pledge.
1252
 Prominent social figures supported the act, 




In other countries, providing reliable information to patients and starting social 
movements to pledge support for a cause tend to be launched by formal civil society 
organizations. For example, in the United States patients with cancer and their families 
can turn to the American Cancer Society or the many other organizations surrounding 
various types of cancers, for more information about whether or not the care they are 
receiving accords with prevailing standards of practice. They can also participate through 
these organizations in activism to raise money and awareness surrounding cancer-related 
issues. Though the next section discusses the role of civil society organizations in 
responding to yinao, it is important to highlight that while at first glance it may seem that 
a lack of civil society organizations may appear to hinder the development of social 
movements or resources that advocate for patients, private companies can and have filled 
these roles as well. 
Civil Society Organizations 
Civil society organizations have the potential to alleviate many of the health and 
legal issues contributing to yinao that the public and private sectors cannot resolve alone. 
The concept of civil society in China differs from Western conceptions
1254
 of it due to the 
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Violence, Over 1.3 Million People Have Signed,” The Paper, July 24, 2015, 
http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1355857. 
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 Green Apple Health, “Pledge to Respect Doctors.” 
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 Renowned scholar on democracy Larry Diamond defines civil society as the “realm of organized social 
life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a 
legal order or set of shared rules.” It involves “citizens acting collectively in a public space to express their 
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Chinese government’s role in the establishment and oversight of civil society 
organizations (CSOs) – a term more fitting than NGO to more broadly describe relevant 
organizations, since many of them have some degree of government involvement. The 
late Karla Simon, in her seminal work Civil Society in China, observes that civil society 
in China “encompasses a variety of organizations and people, serving both mutual and 
public benefit.”
1255
 She includes organizations that are both registered and unregistered 
with the state, those that have close ties and are essentially organized by the state 
(government-organized NGOs – GONGOs) and quasi-nongovernmental organizations 
(QUANGOs), which tend to have more autonomy and were initiated privately.
1256 
She 
further includes large private foundations founded by wealthy individuals, small local 
charities, and religious organizations working within the official legal structure for 
religion as well as underground faith-based organizations that are not legal.
1257
 
This chapter uses Simon’s broader conceptualization of Chinese civil society as a 
starting point to explore the degree to which Chinese civil society solves issues in the 
health and legal sectors that contribute yinao. Health-related CSOs are poised to provide 
education, credible and patient-centered information about diseases, community, and 
additional funding to address the issues of poor health care literacy, lack of credible 
information about conditions for patients, lack of emotional and community support, and 
high out-of-pocket costs. All of these solutions decrease potential frustration with the 
                                                                                                                                                 
interests, passions, and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the state and 
hold officials accountable.” Civil society, according to Diamond, thus excludes “individual family life, 
inward looking group activities, profit-making enterprise of individual business firms, and political efforts 
to take control of the state. See: Larry Jay Diamond, “Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic 
Consolidation,” Journal of Democracy 5, no. 3 (1994): 5, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1994.0041. 
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 Simon, Civil Society in China: The Legal Framework from Ancient Times to the “New Reform Era,” 
xxxiii. 
1256
 Simon, xxxiii. 
1257
 Simon, xxxiii. 
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health care system that contributes to conflicts between patients and health care workers. 
CSOs engaged in legal work can aid both patients and health care workers through the 
dispute resolution process, raising their awareness of and access to non-violent dispute 
resolution institutions.  
 Yet several challenges exist in assessing the degree to which CSOs operate in 
the health care and legal spaces. The first barrier is gathering data on CSOs. Officially the 
Chinese government categorizes CSOs into three areas: social organizations, private non-
commercial institutions, and foundations.1258 According to the most recent draft 
legislation on social organizations, social organizations are defined as “non-profit 
organizations voluntarily founded by Chinese citizens to realize their collective 
aspirations and carry out activities according to their charters.”1259 Private non-
commercial institutions (referred to as minfei in Chinese for short) are “social 
organizations engaged in non-profit social service activities organized by enterprises and 
institutions, social organizations, and other social forces and individuals who use non-
state assets.”1260 Minfei generate their own income through fees that they charge for 
services and other activities instead of depending on grants and donations, unlike social 
organizations.1261  They include not-for-profit organizations that provide social services 
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 Leslie Shieh, “Private Non-Commercial Institutions Registration and Management Provisional 
Regulations,” Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, October 25, 1998, 54, 
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 Shieh, “Private Non-Commercial Institutions Registration and Management Provisional Regulations,” 
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 Leslie Shieh, “Non-Governmental Organizations in Contemporary China: Development of Community-
Based Social Service Organizations,” in Facing China as a New Global Superpower: Domestic and 
International Dynamics from a Multidisciplinary Angle, ed. Huhua Cao and Jeremy Paltiel (Singapore: 
Springer Singapore, 2016), 55, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-287-823-6_3. 
 387 
like community elder care organizations, hospitals, and private schools.1262 Foundations 
refer to non-profit entities that use property contributed by individuals or organizations 
with the goal of engaging in public welfare activities.1263 Figure 40 below shows official 
data from the Ministry of Civil Affairs on each of these types of organizations in the 
health and legal sectors. The number of minfei is particularly high because they include 
many non-profit hospitals, schools, and other service-based organizations. 
Figure 40: Civil Society Organizations in Health and Legal Sectors (Official Data) 
 
While these data provide a starting point for understanding social organization in 
issue-areas relevant to yinao, official data only display registered CSOs. Due to financial 
as well as bureaucratic barriers to registration, many CSOs,
1264
 likely millions of 
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 are unregistered. Guosheng Deng argues that unregistered NGOs are allowed to 
flourish because there are “hidden rules” governing them: the government has an 
unofficial policy of “no recognition, no banning, no intervention,” which enables 
unregistered organizations to operate as long as they do not threaten state security or 
social stability.
1266
 With this in mind, in addition to providing official data from the 
databases of CSOs at national and local levels provided by the Ministry of Civil Affairs’ 
Social Organization Administration Bureau, I have also gleaned information from China 
Development Brief’s NGO Directory, academic sources, social media, and interviews to 
supplement official data with information on unregistered activities. But even with this 
supplemented information, many small, informal organizations likely still remain unseen 
beyond the communities they help. 
 In order to assess the responsiveness of civil society to issues contributing to 
yinao, I first consider the degree to which they exist to begin with, examining their 
numbers and geographic coverage. I also consider the scope of their activities based on 
their stated missions, their initial endowment, and their social media presence when this 
information is available to help assess their social impact. For social media presence, I 
consider whether these organizations maintain official WeChat accounts and their 
following on Sina Weibo or Tencent Weibo (both Chinese versions of Twitter). Due to 
the popularity of these platforms among China’s netizens, understanding the presence and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Comments on ‘Regulations on the Registration and Administration of Social Groups’ (Draft Revision for 
Soliciting Comments).” 
1265
 For a summary of the various estimates on the likely number of NGOs, see Guosheng Deng, “The 
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no. 1 (2010): 188. 
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following of these organizations on these platforms enables us to gauge how involved 
and popular these social organizations are in Chinese society. 
Table 22: Types of Health-Related CSOs 
However, it is also important to 
note that financial endowment and social 
media presence are not good measures 
for grassroots organizations targeting 
only local communities (rather than a broader regional or national audience), so 
evaluating them based on high social media following and large endowments would be 
inappropriate. For this reason, in addition to the difficulty of obtaining information about 
CSOs in China more generally, assessing the responses and impact of CSOs remains a 
challenge. With these challenges in mind, the next two sections assess CSOs in the health 
and legal sectors. I examine these sectors by looking at more formal, registered 
organizations as well as informal groups and, in some cases, individuals who help resolve 
issues contributing to yinao. 
Health-related CSOs 
 Health-related organizations have the potential to alleviate many of the issues in 
the health care system that cause friction between patients and health care workers: poor 
health care literacy, lack of emotional and community support, and costs for patients and 
their families. During disputes, they also hold the potential to offer independent, credible, 
and patient-oriented information about illnesses for patients seeking to better understand 
their condition and the course of treatment they are receiving.
 1267
 This is important 
because this capability potentially mitigates conflict due to asymmetry of information 
                                                 
1267
 Thanks to Dr. Charles Wiener for articulating this role of patient organizations. 
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 International NGOs 
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 “Illness-friend” groups (hospital- and patient-
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 Grassroots Community-based Organizations with 
Health Programs 
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regarding standards for treatment between patients and physicians and empowers patients 
to better assess whether issues they are experiencing are actually due to negligence. 
National-level Organizations: Focusing on Education and Reducing Out-of-Pocket Costs  
 National level-organizations are CSOs overseen by the government (usually by 
one of the central ministries). Those involved in health-related work tend to be registered 
under the National Health and Family Commission and mainly dedicate their funds to 
providing financial assistance for patients, education, and health services related to 
poverty reduction. Examples of funding they provide include the Chinese Red Cross’s 
financial support and educational programs for AIDS patients and their dependents,
1268
 
the Chinese Red Cross Foundation’s “Little Angels” program to cover medical expenses 
for poor households with a child suffering from leukemia,
1269
 and the Chinese Cancer 
Foundation funding for various types of medicines and treatments.
1270
 
Despite these programs, there are indications that these organizations do not have 
a high level of social following, suggesting that their overall impact on society may not 
be strong. One study found that among families of children with leukemia in Beijing, 
patients were often unaware that financial assistance was available from organizations 
like the Chinese Red Cross Foundation. Thus, even though these foundations can 
decrease the financial burden on families, their impact will remain weak until they 
strengthen their efforts to raise awareness about their programs for those eligible to apply 
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 Social media following also enables us to assess the degree to which 
these organizations are known in society more generally. Table 23 shows that only two of 
these organizations (China Red Cross Foundation and the mobile eye clinic Lifeline 
Express) have over one million followers. China’s Population Welfare Fund has over 
150,000 followers and the Chinese Foundation for Hepatitis Prevention and control has 
over 40,000 followers. The rest of these organizations have fewer than 10,000 followers 
or have no social media presence at all. In a country with such a large population that is 
active on social media, one would expect higher social media following. In the United 
States, for example, the American Cancer Society has over one million followers on 
Twitter while its Chinese counterpart apparently has no social media presence on similar 
Chinese social media platforms.
1272
  
Interviews with Chinese social organizers confirm that national organizations tend 
not to be the most important for organization around disease because people tend not to 
trust them as much.
1273
 This is because they are associated with the corruption rampant in 
government, with one infamous case being a Chinese Red Cross employee displaying her 
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Table 23: Health-Related National CSOs (all affiliated with NHFPC) 
Basic Information Health Care System Problem-Solving (based on stated mission) Social Traction 
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International NGOs and Health 
 Although this chapter focuses on responses by Chinese social actors, I briefly 
consider the role of International NGOs (INGOs) in addressing issues contributing to 
yinao. INGOs have long played an important role within Chinese society by employing 
Chinese nationals, alleviating some of China’s most pressing development and disaster-
relief issues, and funding and building capacity for local NGOs. INGOs often operate in 
western, rural areas,
1275
 and have provided care for issues commonly associated with 
developing countries: maternal and child health, basic primary care, surgical procedures 
for cataracts and cleft lips/palates, and care for communicable diseases such as 
tuberculosis, hepatitis, HIV/AIDS, and other STDS.
1276
 They address both supply-side 
and demand-side issues in the Chinese health care system, from improving quality of care 
by training providers and building new health-care facilities to providing needed health 
care goods and services, reducing costs for patients, and providing support and advocacy 




While international organizations have contributed greatly to improving health 
care and advocacy for western and rural areas and for neglected groups of diseases, their 
activities have not focused as much on targeting the structural issues and types of 
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diseases that often foment yinao, such as the chasm in access to advanced care between 
urban and rural areas and non-communicable diseases that require invasive procedures at 
these advanced facilities.
1278
 Of course this is not to suggest that international 
organizations have played no role in addressing these types of issues; the World Bank, 
for example, has contributed significant research to addressing China’s structural issues 
in health care.
1279
 But because we are interested in the response of Chinese society, 
responses of international organizations are not the main focus of this study. 
Chinese Social Organization around Health Issues  
While China’s health-related CSOs at the national level have focused their efforts 
primarily on providing funds for patients and health-related educational programs, locally 
based Chinese CSOs have become increasingly active over the past two decades
1280
 to 
provide community support and advocacy for both communicable diseases like 
HIV/AIDS and hepatitis and non-communicable and chronic conditions like various 
types of cancers, often breast cancer and leukemia, diabetes, and kidney disease.
1281
 The 
proclivity to organize around chronic or more long-term conditions is a common 
                                                 
1278
 While the majority of INGOs in the China Development Brief databases are not dedicated to these 
causes, this does not mean that INGOs have not provided these types of advanced-care services at all. For 
example, Yale-China Association’s partnership with hospitals in Changsha and Kunming seek to improve 
high-level care in those areas. Even though they are not rural, they are in parts of China that have less 
developed health care than others. See “Yale-China: Health,” accessed September 17, 2017, 
http://www.yalechina.org/health.  
1279
 “Report Recommends Deeper Healthcare Reforms in China,” Text/HTML, World Bank, accessed 
September 17, 2017, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/07/22/report-recommends-
deeper-healthcare-reforms-in-china. 
1280
 Over two thirds of Chinese health-related CSOs in the China Development Brief were founded after 
2000. 
1281
 The dominance of these diseases in social organization appear both in academic publications on this 
topic in these disease areas as well as through data gleaned from MCA’s local NGO database. 
Organizations with names that are not directly related with their cause are more difficult to find since this 
database only searches the name of these organizations. Bearing this in mind, searches on specific disease 
areas and using terms like “patient” and “patient group” yielded the most results in the diseases mentioned 
above: kidney disease (72 organizations), diabetes (201), breast cancer (12), leukemia (10) Cancer 
organizations are slightly more difficult to search due to restrictions on search terms and attributes of the 
Chinese language. 
 395 
phenomenon as their long-term nature more readily facilitates organization.
1282
 The role 
of locally based NGOs is extremely important because unlike their national and more 
obviously government-affiliated counterparts, if they are perceived to be independent 
from government influence, or even more importantly, the medical community’s 
influence, then patients may be more likely to perceive the information they provide as 
credible. These organizations also stand to foster community-based support for patients. 
While it is beyond the scope of this study to consider the activities of all the 
organizations relevant to many chronic and long-term conditions, I examine CSO 
involvement in breast cancer. I choose breast cancer because it is a disease that tends to 
lend itself to organization worldwide,
1283
 likely because it almost exclusively affects 
women and its high incidence rate among them,
1284
 so given these factors, it is reasonable 
to expect that China has also developed social organization in this area. 
CSOS FOR BREAST CANCER 
Organization around breast cancer in China has increased in recent years, but it 
still remains sparse when compared to organization around the illness abroad
1285
 and 
when considering the increasing annual incidence rate of breast cancer in China.
1286
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Table 24 lists all of the breast-cancer related organizations found in the MCA Bureau of 
Social Organization Administration database. In addition to these organizations, I also 
include the Pink Ribbon Campaign, which is a popular activity, but not a formal social 
organization and More Than Aware, a breast cancer NGO founded by expatriates in 
Shanghai. As Table 24 shows, most of these organizations were founded within the last 
decade, are located in Eastern China, and have small endowments. Most do not have 
official websites or significant following on social platforms. 
Two of the better-known campaigns in this list for supporting breast cancer 
patients that were founded by individuals outside of the government or the health care 
system are the Pink Ribbon Campaign (中华粉红丝带乳腺癌防治活动基金会)1287 and 
Angel Care Breast Cancer Foundation (粉红天使专项基金会).1288 The Pink Ribbon 
Campaign is affiliated with the global pink ribbon campaign and within China, the 
popular magazine Trendshealth spearheads the campaign. Trendshealth recruits 
celebrities to raise awareness for breast cancer to pose on its magazine cover.
1289
 
Both of these organizations offer a range of services intended to help mitigate 
some of the issues in breast cancer care. The Pink Ribbon Campaign offers information 
on preventative and daily care, mental health care for breast cancer patients, lectures, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Tu Jun, “China Breast Cancer 10 Year Incidence Rate Rose by 37%, 中国乳腺癌发病率 10 年增长 37%
，Breast Cancer PET Scan Has Arrived in Shanghai,” The Paper, May 3, 2017, 
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consultations, and health trainings.
1290
 The Shanghai-based Angel Care Breast Cancer 
Foundation (established 2011) offers classes, patient activities, funding to cover costs, 
and information on breast cancer.
1291
 While these two organizations have the most social 
traction of their fellow breast cancer CSOs in China (See Table 24), they seem to have 
comparatively little traction compared to their counterparts abroad. For example, the 
most prominent American breast cancer foundation, the Susan G. Komen Foundation, has 
124,000 followers on Twitter,
1292
 whereas Angel Care has only 252 followers on Sina 
Weibo
1293
 and Pink Ribbon Campaign has 9,044
1294
 followers. While the number of 
Weibo followers does not necessarily indicate the impact of these organizations and may 
indicate that activism is more dispersed locally than concentrated in larger foundations, 
the reach of these organizations is scant in comparison to the Chinese population, reports 
of increasing cases of breast cancer,
1295
 and the widespread use of social media in China. 
While breast cancer has increased in recent years, available data on existing organizations 
suggest they are inadequate to provide the amount of patient-driven information and 
community support likely needed nationwide. If social organization in an area that has 
received so much national and international attention still remains weak, it is likely that 
social organization in other disease areas that generally do not garner as much attention is 
even sparser. 
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Bingyou “Illness-Friend” Groups 
Formal organization around illness, however, is not the only way for society to 
provide support for patients; there are also informal, smaller groups that can provide this 
type of support as well. In China, organization around illness also occurs in bingyou 
groups. Bingyou, literally “illness friend,” can mean a both a hospital ward-mate as well 
as someone who has the same illness. Bingyou form bingyou associations, bingyou clubs, 
bingyou study clubs, and bingyou exchange groups at various levels of formality. 
Hospitals and patients both form them, and while some hospital-based bingyou groups 
are registered, many others are informal and organized by patients online or within 
hospitals. Thus, there is not a lot of existing data on them, other than what can be gleaned 





                                                 
1296
 These organizations were found with the search term “bingyou” in the MCA Bureau of Social 
Organization locally registered database. The search function searches the names of the organization only, 
so it is likely there are more than the organizations in this list that have less-direct names about their 
organization’s purpose.  
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Table 25: Official Registered Bingyou Associations (MCA local database) 
 
HOSPITAL-ORGANIZED BINGYOU GROUPS: EDUCATION AND COMMUNITY ON- AND OFFLINE 
 Hospital-based bingyou groups often provide education and community support 
for patients by launching group classes and activities. Again, breast cancer represents a 
popular area with hospitals for organizing various educational and community-building 
 401 
activities: lectures given by renowned specialists and nurses about topics in recovery,
1297
 
poetry readings by health care workers,
1298
talent shows performed by both health care 
workers and patients,
1299







 and skits performed by patients conveying the high and 
low points in fighting breast cancer.
1303
 Research has found that these types of activities 
and courses have a positive impact on patients, but there are generally not enough of 
these types of activities to meet the needs of the Chinese population.
1304
 Moreover, while 
hospital-organized bingyou groups may help connect patients with each other, because 
these groups are hospital-organized, it is doubtful that they can provide credible third-
party information for patients should they have doubts about the treatment they are 
receiving. 
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PATIENT-ORGANIZED SUPPORT GROUPS: PATIENT-CENTERED INFORMATION AND 
COMMUNITY ONLINE AND OFFLINE 
 Smaller, unofficial, and unregistered communities of patients are the most 
difficult to track, but at the same time they are potentially the most impactful types of 
patient organizations since patients themselves organize them based on their needs and 
interests.
1305
 This is important because even though there are numerous national health-
oriented foundations and organizations, their ties to the state, medical community, and 
reports of corruption
1306
 about their activities at times has called into question their 
credibility and motives. Self-established patient groups are also completely patient-driven, 
meaning that the information they provide is meant to be for patients; there is no ulterior 
motive, so the information is likely to be perceived as credible.  
One example of an increasingly active patient group online for leukemia is Warm 
Little White Home (暖小白屋). The group’s introduction statement provides an apt 
example of patient-oriented information and community:  
We are a group of xiaobai (“little whites” – a playful name for leukemia 
patients), positively moving forward, we all have the same illness but we 
don’t pity each other. We also can tease each other and laugh at life. 
Together we walk towards health. We don’t have money and cannot give 
you direct material help. However, we have experience, we have time; all 
of what we have, we are willing to share with everyone. We hope this 
group can be noticed by all of society. We hope all of our fellow leukemia 
friends can obtain the most appropriate treatment, and we hope that they 
do not go down the wrong roads. We want them to understand more and to 
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experience less delay. We hope everyone can be healthy and happy. This 




The group has over 4,463 followers on Weibo
1308
 and recently launched a new 
website and mobile application in 2017.
1309
 This organization provides a forum for 
discussion, information on medicine, general information about the illness, lectures by 
experts on topics related to the illness, discussion threads, and information on pediatric 
leukemia. The website also posts on both its Weibo and its website various articles and 
relevant news updates about treatments, such as posting a notification from the Chinese 
Cancer Foundation on the termination of one of its aid programs for a medicine used to 
treat leukemia.
1310
 This group, which is not listed as registered, thus provides patient-
driven community support and patient-driven information about the illness. 
Informal patient groups also form offline. One academic study focused on the 
phenomenon of the communities created by families from outside of Beijing seeking 
treatment for their children with leukemia in Beijing hospitals. As highlighted previously, 
due to the gap in quality of care between urban and rural areas, many people seek care, 
especially for serious illnesses, in large cities. The study found that patients and families 
from outside Beijing who find themselves at the same hospital depended on each other 
for emotional support, information about how to find housing, information about the 
                                                 
1307
 “The Most Primary Warmth We Give to You - Nuan Xiaobai Wu [最初的温暖 献给你们-暖白小屋],” 
Nuan Baixiao Wu 暖白咲舞, February 25, 2017, https://nuanbai.wohenok.com/article/58. 
1308
 “The Most Primary Warmth We Give to You - Nuan Xiaobai Wu [最初的温暖 献给你们-暖白小屋].” 
1309
 “白血病病友会 Baixue Bingyou Hui,” 2017, http://site.henizaiyiqi.com/widget/Shuo/view/id/8967. 
1310
 “China Cancer Foundation Notification on Terminating Sprycel Patient Aid Program 中国癌症基金会
关于终止施达赛患者援助项目的通知,” Nuan Xiaobai Wo, June 26, 2017, 
https://nuanbai.wohenok.com/forum/thread/1664. 
 404 
illness, and information about potential charitable funding.
1311
 These informal bingyou 
groups, both on- and offline, are perhaps the most directly influential on patients lives 
because they provide close-knit communities that offer information tailored to patient 
needs. At the same time, because they are not officially registered as organizations, they 
may be difficult for patients to find, so their overall impact on providing patients with 
credible information about illnesses and community and emotional support is unclear. 
Grassroots Community-based Organizations  
 Additionally, other community organizations not directly established for health 
purposes also provide important services to patients. These local community 
organizations are poised to offer communal support and funding for patients as well as 
care tailored to the needs of specific communities. For example, the Yi community in 
Sichuan’s Liangshanzhou has been hit heavily by AIDS, primarily through intravenous 
drug use.
1312
 While there are many prominent official and international organizations in 
the area providing aid, there are also local Liangshan Yi minority NGOs such as the 
Liangshanzhou Civil Anti-Drugs Association and the Liangshan Yi People Women’s and 
Children Development Center.
1313
 The Women’s and Children Development Center 
provides aid for medical fees and for orphans, disseminates information about 
government aid policies and educational information on HIV/AIDS prevention, and 
supplies basic food provisions and materials for orphans to attend school.
1314
 The 
Liangshanzhou “Civil Anti-Drugs Association,” according to Yi customs, formulates 
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local rules and regulations, runs a village “anti-drug patrol group,” and organizes classes 
for HIV/AIDS patients who are drug addicts, focusing on overcoming addiction.
1315
  
Community organizations can thus play important roles in providing funding to 
reduce costs for patients and providing health information marketed in a way that is likely 
better understood by local communities. They are also likely more credible because they 
have direct visibility within the communities they serve, adding more accountability for 
donations and other benefits they provide. However, just like the informal bingyou 
groups discussed above, it is unclear the extent to which these groups operate throughout 
China. Moreover, if they tend to focus on communicable diseases only, they are likely 
not making a large impact upon areas in which patients need to undergo high-risk 
procedures and therefore may not be as instrumental in addressing issues related to the 
sources of yinao. 
Civil Society – Legal Advocacy 
No matter the strides achieved in the health care system by NGOs, private 
companies, or the government, disputes will remain inevitable and so there will always 
be a need for legal advocacy for patients. Yet in the last couple of years, legal advocacy 
in China has become increasingly controversial, as there have been more arrests of 
human rights lawyers.
1316
 In January 2017 the new and more restrictive Foreign NGO 
Law went into effect, which arguably poses the greatest challenge for NGOs in the areas 
                                                 
1315
 Li Guangyong, 161. 
1316
 Human Rights Watch, “China: On ‘709’ Anniversary, Legal Crackdown Continues,” Human Rights 
Watch, July 7, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/07/china-709-anniversary-legal-crackdown-
continues; “U.N. Denounces China Crackdown on Lawyers, Seeks Release,” Reuters, May 5, 2017, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-rights-un-idUSKBN18111D; Journal, “China’s Latest Crackdown 
on Lawyers Is Unprecedented, Human Rights Monitors Say”; Ford, “China’s Widening Crackdown on 
Lawyers”; Jacobs and Buckley, “China Targeting Rights Lawyers in a Crackdown.” 
 406 
of human rights and law.
1317
 As a result, the American Bar Association, which promotes 
its Rule of Law Initiative in China, moved its office from Beijing to Hong Kong.
1318
 
While the Chinese state aims to decrease the role of NGOs and individual lawyers in 
pursuing legal rights in China, at the same time it is expanding its own government-run 
legal aid program, which offers legal services to poor and disadvantaged groups.
1319
 
While evaluating the entire government’s legal aid program is beyond the purview of this 
project, it is clear from these recent developments that the government is trying to claim 
more of the space over legal advocacy by expanding its own programs and shutting down 
others or arresting independent legal advocates.  
Chinese academic research specifically on how NGOs directly help patients in 
medical disputes is scarce. Existing research on the topic tends to focus on how NGOs 
can theoretically fill in the gaps in the dispute resolution process and highlights where 
both government and market forces have been unsuccessful in addressing the many issues 
that exacerbate conflict between patients and doctors.
1320
 This includes areas such as 
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providing patients with a reliable third party for medical information,
1321
 offering legal 
consulting for potential cases,
1322
 representing patients during the dispute resolution 
process,
1323
 engaging in fundraising activities for families particularly in need,
1324
 and 
potentially establishing new avenues for dispute resolution.
1325
 
Available data collected from the Ministry of Civil Affairs’ Social Organization 
Administration Bureau show that nearly all of the registered CSOs offering services 
related to doctor-patient disputes are medical mediation dispute committees (MDMCs) or 
variations of them,
1326
 which are discussed at length in the previous chapter. Most of 
these MDMCs are founded under the auspices of local governments, though sometimes 
they are established by insurance companies that charge disputants for their use. This 
trend reflects the statement above that the government is attempting to occupy the formal 
space for legal advocacy in China. This is a problem because MDMCs are not advocacy 
organizations; they are intended to be third parties to disputes and not supposed to 
advocate on behalf of the patients. Below I consider several other types of organizations, 
groups, and individuals that can provide legal counsel for patients, but the overall 
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conclusion is that there are few independent organizations where patients and families 
can receive advocacy. 
MDMC-Sponsored Legal Counseling for Medical Disputes (Government-sponsored NGO) 
In 2015 the first legal consulting center specifically established for medical 
disputes, the Hubei Province Medical Dispute Legal Consulting Services Center, was 
established in Wuhan, Hubei province.
1327
 The Center was jointly established by a local 
law firm (Hubei Weili Law Firm) and Hubei Provincial Jiangtai Medical Dispute 
People’s Mediation Committee (MDMC) and is located within the MDMC.
1328
  The 
Hubei Provincial Health and Family Planning Commission provides regular oversight of 
the center, the Hubei Justice Department provides overall guidance for the center’s work, 
and the Hubei MDMC and Weili Law Firm are responsible for legal consulting services 
and providing experts to the center.
1329
 The center shares its Internet platform with the 
Hubei Provincial Jiangtai MDMC, and it has a 24-hour phone line open to receive reports 
of cases.
1330
 To my knowledge, the only data that has been published on the work of this 
center are from its first week of operation when the Center received phone calls and visits 
for over 50 cases from both inside and outside the city of Wuhan.
1331
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Because the Center is located within and co-administered by an MDMC, which is 
supposed to promote mediation, it is likely that it pushes this form of dispute resolution. 
This would make the legal consultation provided by the Center biased towards the state’s 
policy to encourage mediation, rather than providing objective advice based on the 
specific facts and needs of the case. In other words, it does not advocate based on the best 
interest of the patient. Since the Center’s inception, the site has not posted further news 
on its operations,
1332
 so it is difficult to determine how widely used it is and whether 
complainants are satisfied with the services they receive.  
NGOs On- and Offline 
As observed above, I have found no evidence of independent legal NGOs 
specifically dedicated to advocacy during medical disputes. There are, however, 
organizations dedicated to furthering rights for certain patient groups, usually in anti-
discrimination cases, for those with HIV/AIDS, hepatitis, and disabilities. But there is 
also evidence suggesting that in the recent crackdown on legal advocacy over the past 
couple of years, some of these organizations may have been shut down.
1333
 There are also 
organizations that offer legal aid and consultation more generally for a broader range of 
cases that can include medical disputes. One such organization is Da An (English: My 
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Case), run by one of China’s most prominent lawyers and legal scholars Xu Xin, who has 
over 31 million followers on Weibo.
1334
 After receiving an overwhelming number of 
requests for his legal advice, Xu Xin established Da An in 2013 to provide large-scale 
legal consultation.
1335
 There are over 1,000 legal volunteers (200 active) that help to 
manage the platform and answer questions.
1336
  Anyone can post their cases and 
questions, and volunteers aim to answer questions within 24 hours of receiving them.
1337
 
While not specifically targeted to medical disputes, this organization does not have any 
apparent restrictions on the cases it receives. However, the organization did not respond 
to an inquiry about the degree to which they accept medical disputes. Ultimately patients 
and families have a limited number of options for medical disputes. 
“Little Experts” 
Likely much of the truly independent advocacy available for patients and families 
during medical dispute resolution comes from individuals who have navigated the 
medical dispute resolution process themselves. These individuals can offer legal advice to 
others based on their experiences. Mary Gallagher observed this phenomenon while 
studying legal aid for labor disputes, finding that former plaintiffs became “little experts” 
and helped others in their communities with similar disputes.
1338
 Because this type of 
advocacy is community-based and informal, it is very difficult to measure its extent. I had 
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the opportunity to interview one such “little expert” who has been pursuing several legal 
cases related to a medical malpractice dispute and whose story has been neglected by 
official media. This plaintiff’s case is unique in that he himself is a prominent doctor in 
an urban 3A hospital. At the time of the interview in early 2016, he was pursuing a 
malpractice suit against another hospital for negligence in administering a medication to 
his mother that she had a known allergy to and that, according to the plaintiff’s claim, 
ultimately caused her death. Unlike most plaintiffs, he has the medical knowledge to 
evaluate cases and has experience with the legal system both from pursuing his mother’s 
case and from his administrative role at his own hospital related to Party discipline and 
inspection.
1339
 When asked about patients and their families seeking his advice on their 
cases, he responded: 
These past few years many people have come to my office, seeking my 
knowledge to help them pursue court cases. I have helped many people and have 
pursued cases many times; moreover, in half of them, plaintiffs have received 
compensation. I’m constantly doing this public service, which is, as a citizen, 
helping the disadvantaged groups in society – the patients – clarify whether [they] 
have suffered harm and whether they need compensation. There are some people, 
as soon as I meet them, I tell them, you should get compensation. There are others 
I tell them this [issue] probably won’t merit compensation; it is not the doctor’s 
fault. In this way I am helping the hospital defuse many problems that they either 
need to resolve or do not need to resolve. In reality this is doing public good, 
meaning we clarify what is true and what is false. There are some people [after 
talking to me], they don’t make commotion anymore. They think, after listening 





 This physician’s experience reveals several important aspects of “little experts.” 
The first is that even though he is not an NGO, he is technically providing the services 
that NGOs would ideally provide: unbiased expertise that patients believe to be credible. 
Impartiality and credibility, which are related to and build upon each other, are two 
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qualities that government-related institutions, by virtue of being part of either the official 
medical or justice system, struggle to provide. The second notable point is that patients 
are accessing these important services, but not through traditional NGOs, but rather 
through individual networks based on personal references or Internet forums. Even 
though there may appear to be a dearth of patient organizations, this does not mean that 
patients do not receive unbiased and professional help. However, it is difficult to see and 
measure the extent to which these individuals and their networks exist. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter began by discussing two different types of responsiveness – 
expression and problem solving. The above analysis shows that citizens have outlets for 
expressing their opinions about yinao – patients and citizens express a full range of 
thoughts online from anti-official sentiments to pro-violence sentiments. Health care 
workers have also done the same and have even protested against yinao in order to solicit 
better government policies to ensure their security.  
One lingering question concerns why there has been no mass collective action 
from patients and citizens to advocate for their rights and interests in medical disputes. 
While exploring the absence of collective action would necessitate a separate research 
project, I hypothesize that there are at least two main issues that have made collective 
action difficult. The first is that medical disputes generally arise as individual cases, not 
as collective cases. If someone’s relative dies from surgery, while it may be recognized as 
an injustice, it is not an issue that directly and urgently affects an entire community in the 
way that other issues, such as a contaminated water source, would. Another hypothesis 
for the absence of collective action on behalf of patient interests relates to the question of 
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where to direct their anger, which was illustrated by the diversity of Internet comments 
blaming officials, hospitals, and health care workers. Yinao, as I have emphasized 
throughout this study, is a complicated problem that involves many issues in the health 
care, justice, and public security systems as well as the current stage of social and 
economic development in China. If patients were to organize collectively to express their 
needs, do they organize against hospitals, doctors, police, or government agencies? 
Because the issue is so complex, and there is not one obvious culprit (unlike a company 
contaminating a community’s water source), this type of issue may be more difficult for 
collective expression and action. There are also other arguments, such as restrictions on 
protest, that may be used to explain the lack of collective action. But with so many 
instances of protests in China occurring every day, the official restrictions are unlikely to 
be the primary reason for the lack of social organization around patients collectively 
expressing their interests around yinao-related issues.
1341
 
In addition to examining expression, I also chose to focus on problem solving as a 
form of society’s responsiveness based on the assumption that a healthy society is able to 
address issues the government is unable to solely resolve. While this study found that 
entrepreneurs and NGOs have created innovative resources to ease burdens on both 
patients and health care workers, it also found that a society’s ability to solve problems 
and adapt does not always move it in a positive direction. This was most evident in the 
responses of health care workers practicing defensive medicine, expressing desires to 
leave the profession, and discouraging others from entering the profession. Most people 
in the United States associate defensive medicine with the threat of ligation; in China, 
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even before its litigation system has developed widespread acceptance, already it is 
seeing the practice of defensive medicine because of the threat of violent and chaotic 
medical disputes. 
Civil society is a difficult area to assess, but preliminary analysis suggests that 
while there have been many organizations emerging over the past couple of decades to 
provide important funding, community building, educational services, and advocacy in 
health care, in the area of law, independent advocacy for dispute settlement remains 
limited if not declining due to the recent crackdown. Yet despite the strides made in 
organization around health care issues, organization in both areas still appears inadequate 
when considering the low social presence and attention these organizations receive online 
and the limited number of organizations meant to serve such a large population. Further, 
in both areas the most credible actors are likely small, patient-driven, independent 
organizations or individuals with low visibility due to their lack of registration and 
formality. The lack of visibility of these organizations and individuals make access to and 
awareness of them difficult. However, access to this type of support is crucial for 
providing credible patient-oriented information and for increasing awareness of the rights 
and resources available to patients and their families grappling with medical conditions 
and disputes. 
Despite these challenges, this chapter has shown that actors in Chinese society are 
responsive and adaptive to the issues they face. Perhaps the more pressing question is not 
whether they are responsive or adaptive, but whether or not the Chinese state has given 
actors in society enough latitude to make the changes necessary to adequately resolve 
these pressing social issues. But how much latitude is enough? It is a vague and difficult 
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question to answer. Entrepreneurs have been given latitude to experiment with different 
ways of pricing services and increasing access, but without a better health care system 
that has a more rational income and pricing system, better insurance coverage, and better 
access in rural areas, there cannot be full progress on the factors that contribute to yinao. 
The government still plays a pivotal role and must decide which areas to give to the 
private sector to resolve. 
In the area of NGOs, even though there are “hidden rules” that allow many NGOs 
to unofficially operate, the fact that they are unregistered not only limits our ability to 
study them, but also, as emphasized above, makes them less visible to people who need 
them. For example, the only truly patient-oriented legal resource for medical disputes this 
study found was “little experts,” which are perhaps the most unofficial and least-
publicized source for help. The absence of a more flexible registration system thus 
hinders the ability of NGOs to help the government with the issues it is least able to 
tackle itself, namely providing patient-oriented community, advocacy, and information.  
The question of latitude is likely one that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
constantly grapples with. As Chinese society continues to develop and face social issues 
such as yinao, the CCP must decide the degree to which it maintains control over a 
plethora of social issues. This is the ultimate conundrum facing the Chinese governing 
system today: deciding how much power over society it must relinquish in order to 
maintain legitimacy with its citizenry, while at the same time, ensuring that it does not 




CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this study was to understand how the use of protest in dispute 
resolution becomes a national phenomenon and how authoritarian states and societies 
respond to these behaviors and better adapt their institutions to better address the causes 
of these protests. This dissertation makes two arguments through analyzing the 
development of and Chinese state and society responses to yinao. First, I have argued that 
while many factors in the existing health care and dispute resolution systems have 
contributed to fomenting yinao, one of the most significant factors that turned yinao into 
a national phenomenon is increased access to Internet because it quickly spread the idea 
that certain types of behaviors are effective and legitimate.  
In the second part of the dissertation, which in many ways is the core of this 
project, I argue that while the Chinese state has become innovative and responsive in 
policymaking, it still only adapts through small, incremental changes within its system’s 
constraints because even if it attempts to make broader strides, it trips over its 
interconnected web of institutions and interests, rendering it unable to fully realize its 
goals for reform. While actors in Chinese society have become effective problem-solvers, 
the desire of the Chinese state to become a bloated actor in civil society, especially in the 
legal space, hinders meaningful and much-needed independent advocacy and the 
adaptation of government institutions that would make that possible.  
I developed the first argument in Part One of the dissertation, Chapters 4 through 
6. Chapter 4 provided a sketch of the entire complaint and dispute resolution system from 
when a complaint occurs within a clinic to the possibility of pursuing a case in court. It 
made two important, broad observations about the system. The first is that the Chinese 
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system heavily advocates for complaints, incentivizing and cultivating this behavior by 
providing many channels for complaining and by being responsive, sometimes hyper-
responsive, to it. Yet while the system encourages and cultivates complaining behaviors, 
it provides no advocacy for patients and their families during the dispute resolution 
process; in fact, the system makes a full turnaround, becoming the opponent against 
which the patient is trying to fight. This is a paradox of the Chinese Party-state system: it 
is ostensibly on the side of the people, until the people’s interests and grievances slam 
into its bureaucratic interests. In this way the system sets itself up for disappointment. 
This theme of the system running into itself appears in the second main point articulated 
in Chapter 4. Not only are local medical review boards by design biased in favor of local 
hospitals because their board leadership is directly drawn from them, but this pro-hospital 
bias
1342
 extends far beyond the health care bureaucracy itself. Since leaders of top 
hospitals hold high Party ranks, they are tied to other similar-ranking leaders in other 
government departments through their participation together in Party meetings, further 
interlocking hospitals and their interests into the governing system. Meaningful reforms 
would need to untie this. 
The system described in chapter 4 paves the way for chapter 5’s analysis of yinao. 
In Chapter 5 I demonstrate that yinao represents a wide range of behaviors from violent 
to nonviolent behaviors, rendering yinao a particularly difficult policy issue since no one 
solution is appropriate for the variety of behaviors exhibited; it calls for a sophisticated 
group of policies that touches upon the many sources and manifestations of yinao. I 
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further show in Chapter 5 that available data on yinao suggests that hundreds of 
thousands of these incidents have likely occurred annually, and further, that yinao 
represents a viable form of dispute resolution because when compared to other dispute 
resolution institutions, it is used at least as often. The frequency with which yinao is used 
for dispute resolution also demonstrates that yinao has become a socially legitimate 
method for medical dispute resolution.  
 Chapter 6 tackles the question of why yinao became a social phenomenon by 
examining the many sources of yinao. It argues that yinao became a nationwide social 
phenomenon due to the increase in Internet usage in China during the early 2000s. Yinao 
has existed since 1986 and while many factors contributed to its development, the 
Internet helped to quickly perpetuate the idea that yinao represented an effective and 
socially legitimate way to pursue grievances against hospitals. Chapter 6 also adds 
cogency to the process that leads to yinao by showing how health care, justice system, 
law enforcement, and media variables are interrelated. The visualization of this process 
builds the foundation for the evaluation of policy responses in Part II: policy responses 
must address the wide range of variables such as media, health care, justice, and law 
enforcement, that contribute to yinao in order to resolve it.  
 Part Two, chapters 7 to 9, examine state and society responses to yinao directly as 
well as the sources that contribute to it. Chapter 7 on state responses at the national level 
argued that state policy in response to yinao has exhibited an increase in sophistication in 
the number and type of agencies involved, type of policy documents issued, and breadth 
of yinao-related sources addressed by the policies. Yet interviews revealed that in spite of 
the increasing policy sophistication over time, two themes in Chinese politics remain the 
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same: the ongoing dominance of Party directives, not government documents or laws, in 
being the decisive factor in adopting policies and the dominance of individual, local 
leaders in implementing them. Further empirical analysis on the implementation of yinao-
related polices show that while they tend to achieve shallow implementation, they lack 
deep or quality implementation: policy responses like mediation committees, required 
medical liability insurance for hospitals, and hospital police offices have all been rolled 
out, but the quality of each of these institutions has varied and often fallen short. The 
concept of shallow implementation, or, put more bluntly, “box-checking implementation” 
is an especially important one in China where national leadership rolls out massive 
nationwide goals (hospitals need to buy medical malpractice insurance, medical dispute 
mediation committees need to achieve nationwide coverage, etc.). Scholars of policy 
implementation have long known the cross-regional variation, bureaucratic conflict, and 
increasing pluralization of actors involved in both policymaking and implementation.
1343
 
My analysis highlights that the depth of implementation also deserves additional attention 
because it may not be evident in available data or even immediately verifiable through 
observation. Assuming building strong institutions is an important goal for lasting 
stability in China, the capacity to assess the depth of policy implementation is extremely 
important. 
Chapter 8’s dive into one medical dispute mediation committee (MDMC) further 
demonstrates this point. Three mediated cases show that while the MDMC offers 
complainants increased access to medical dispute resolution and frequently facilitates the 
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settlement of cases; it does not always abide by a consistent set of standards for 
procedures, expert evaluation, and compensation. Three consultations – question and 
answer sessions between mediators and complainants that have not gone to or will not 
reach mediation – further show that well-intentioned policies run up against systemic 
constraints. For example, the MDMC’s purview falls over cases from hospitals in a 
designated geographic area (district, county, etc.), so MDMCs have repeated regular 
interactions with a certain set of hospitals, creating the potential for bias towards 
hospitals. Further, while abiding by the principle of voluntariness in theory represents a 
progressive step away from coercively compelled mediation characteristic of the past, 
voluntariness can actually backfire against patients when powerful, wealthy hospitals that 
do not fear lawsuits refuse to mediate. Lastly, mediators who advocate for patients play a 
much-needed role, but because they are ultimately neutral third-party mediators, they 
cannot advocate for patients in dispute resolution – this job must be provided by society.  
Chapter 9 addresses how Chinese social actors are responding to yinao and the 
issues in the health and legal systems that contribute to such responsiveness. I divide 
responses into 1) expression – immediate reactions to yinao; and 2) problem-solving – 
the factor that ultimately shows us whether society has the capacity to address issues 
affecting it. Netizens tend to express anger around yinao, blaming a full range of the 
actors involved in these incidents, from those committing yinao to the corruption of the 
government and hospitals. There is evidence that health care workers have responded to 
yinao by practicing defensive medicine to reduce their chances of treating patients who 
may be more predisposed to resorting to yinao. Health care workers have also 
discouraged others from practicing medicine, though the extent to which this has 
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translated into attrition of health care workers, decreases in medical school enrollment 
rates, and worsening quality of enrollees in medical school remains unclear. 
In the area of problem solving, mobile technology has alleviated many issues that 
cause frustration in China’s health care system, such as increasing access to physicians, 
allowing physicians to set their own rates, and reducing waiting times.
1344
 However, 
innovations by mobile technology can only go so far and issues such as insurance 
coverage and realigning value of goods and services in the Chinese health care system 
remain a challenge.  
Preliminary analysis of civil society organizations suggests that in the area of 
health care, there has been many organizations emerging over the past couple of decades 
to provide important funding, community building, educational services, and advocacy; 
in the area of law, however, independent advocacy for dispute settlement remains limited 
if not declining due to the recent crackdown on public interest lawyers. Yet social 
organization in both health care and legal spaces still appears inadequate when 
considering the low level of social media presence and attention these organizations 
receive online and the limited number of registered civil society organizations meant to 
serve China’s large population. It is likely that the most credible actors for health and 
legal advocacy are small, patient-driven, independent organizations or individuals. 
Because these types of individuals and institutions are informal, they lack visibility, 
making it difficult to access and be aware of them. 
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Implications for Theory on Adaptation 
 This dissertation offers two concepts based on the preceding analysis for 
understanding the Chinese system’s capacity for adaptation. The first is tetheredness – 
the extent to which Chinese Party-state institutions are tied together. Think of Chinese 
government and Party agencies as well as hospitals and mediation committees as people 
standing in a long line with their shoes tied together. The entire line can move forward 
without tripping only by making small incremental steps forward together, but if one 
individual wants to run out in front of the others, he will likely trip as he is pulled back by 
his laces. This element explains many of the dynamics discussed above: the intention of 
the Party to advocate for the people, but always falling short because it cannot prosecute 
itself; attempting to professionalize medical malpractice case reviews through the 
Chinese Medical Association (CMA), but failing to establish credibility because the 
CMA is ultimately tied to the Party-state; achieving only shallow implementation 
because institutions like MDMCs operate within a fabric of embedded hospital-political 
and state-owned enterprise insurance interests; and even more independent business and 
social organizations not able to realize their full potential since the government insists on 
controlling the health care and legal advocacy spaces they seek to occupy. 
But tetheredness is not the only dimension of adaptation; there is also the issue of 
what I call slack - the laces tying an individual to the line of institutions can be loosened 
(given slack), so he can run out a little further without tripping or pulling down the rest of 
the line. Slack explains the type of adaptation seen in China – the incremental reforms – 
that allow institutions to remain tied to the system but with a bit more freedom to operate 
 423 
on their own. My analysis implies, however, that giving institutions slack may not be 
enough and the real issue of adaptation for China’s future may be cutting off some 
institutions – their tetheredness – completely.  
Implications for Practice 
Adaptation is thus a game of understanding how to move forward while adjusting 
levels of tetheredness and slack and facing the challenges (or advantages) that they bring.  
Untethering State Institutions  
First, the Party-state needs to withdraw some of its oversight of public hospitals. 
The Party still selects the presidents of public hospitals, which directly ties hospitals and 
their interests to the Party-state and its interests. Public hospitals also maintain Party 
offices, which manage personnel selection and human resources issues, and while these 
functions are important, they can be devolved from the Party. By removing direct Party 
control over the hospitals, hospitals automatically become less politicized in their 
influence, helping to level the relationship between hospitals and patients and their 
families during medical disputes. Under Xi Jinping, however, the Party’s dominance has 
only become increasingly reinforced. Based on my own research, I cannot compare how 
hospital political environments changed before and after Xi Jinping since I only 
conducted research during the Xi administration, but if the general political context 
provides any guidance on Party control in society, it does not seem that political trends 
would favor untethering hospitals from the Party-state. 
The Chinese Medical Association (CMA) also needs to be severed from the 
National Health and Family Planning Commission. The CMA and its local affiliates need 
to be completely untethered and turned into fully professional associations in order to 
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build credibility. But untethering is not enough; there also needs to be some distance 
created between disputes and the local hospital network where they occur. The locally 
based medical review boards need to be dissolved; however, the idea of drawing expert 
witnesses from a pool of qualified specialists could actually still be useful if the pool of 
experts were larger and experts were better reimbursed for their time. Experts should be 
drawn from a wider regional pool, should not serve on cases from within their own 
provinces, and should be required to recuse themselves from cases if there are other 
conflicts of interest. So for example, under this system, a specialist from Anhui Province 
would assess cases in neighboring Jiangsu Province.  
The reason why I propose specialists from nearby provinces and not within 
provinces is because tight provincial university networks feed into the ranks of hospitals 
and the health administrative offices across the provinces. It is highly likely for example, 
if someone goes to medical school in Nanjing that he will practice medicine in Nanjing or 
somewhere in Jiangsu province. This also should be applied to the judicial inspection 
physicians(fayi, 法医) because they are all trained in the local hospitals as well, so when 
a dispute arises the hospital presidents can reach out to the judicial inspection physicians 
directly because they consider them their former students.
1345
 
There also should be an untethering of direct administrative oversight of local 
health bureaus over hospitals because having both oversight and quality evaluation roles 
makes health departments appear as part of a self-interested conspiracy when medical 
disputes emerge. Separating these functions also arguably would allow for greater room 
for quality improvements since it would allow for more independent evaluation. Shanghai 
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helped to resolve this issue by outsourcing quality inspections to a third-party agency.
1346
 
However, it is also important to note as in the CMA situation above, local hospital and 
university networks also influence quality inspection since the people from the provincial 
inspections know and fraternize with the personnel in hospitals; there is less pressure 
during inspections. Quality inspections should therefore also be outsourced to an 
independent party that has more distance from these local networks.
1347
 
Untethering Parts of Society 
Another area from which the government needs to untether itself is from the 
insurance industry and civil society. The government needs to untether itself from its 
desire to be so involved with legal aid and leave it to credible, third party, civil society 
organizations and public interest lawyers and health care organizations that possess a 
wealth of patient-oriented knowledge. While I am in no position to suggest how the 
government should design an insurance program, this study suggests that having 
insurance attached to mediation and having SOE insurance tied to local governments 
reduces the credibility of mediation (even to mediators!) and also reduces the credibility 
of mediation insurance in the eyes of hospitals. Allowing these parts of society to 
function more independently would not threaten the Party’s legitimacy or stability – at 
least I cannot think of any viable explanation for why they would; in fact having more 
credible mediation and better insurance would only be advantageous.   
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Limitations 
 There are several important limitations to this study; while I have flagged many of 
the them in Chapter 3 on Methods as well as throughout the dissertation, I would like to 
highlight a few here. 
 The first main limitation is the obvious lack of data on yinao – a topic explored 
extensively in Chapter 4 (Data and Definitions of Yinao). Having this data would have 
given me another way to test my findings from the qualitative analysis in Chapter 6 on 
the sources of yinao. It would have also been helpful to have data on yinao to see its 
possible relationship to access to information and education on health and legal issues to 
see if it was associated with increases and decreases of yinao events, which also would 
have been helpful for supporting (or disproving) Chapter 9 on Social Responses, which 
argues that information and education from civil society offers potential to decrease 
misunderstandings between patients and physicians. 
 A question I have been asked at least a couple of times about this research is the 
following: What if this is all just about China’s health care
1348
 being really bad? This is a 
fair question, especially as my dissertation deals only minimally with the quality of 
China’s health care. On the surface this is because I am not qualified to assess quality of 
care, but even if I were a clinician, the project of assessing quality of care is still 
extremely challenging, especially in China where one might argue that data from quality 
assessment institutions have been compromised by local fraternizing. The poor quality of 
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communication and the patient-doctor relationship is well known, but the standards of 
care itself may be harder to understand. Anecdotally, my own experience being 
hospitalized in China during her fieldwork (unintentionally) suggested to her that even 
though on the outside 3A hospitals look advanced, on the inside they lack some important 
medical capabilities, such as sourcing appropriate equipment and supplies and training 
enough skilled physicians. Research on the impact of quality and patient safety on 
medical disputes and yinao should be on the agenda for future research. But it is 
important to emphasize that poor health care itself does not cause violence and protest; 
there must be other factors involved for patients to make that choice and these other 
factors is what my dissertation has attempted to tease out. 
 Above when discussing the first limitation, I lament the lack of quantitative data 
on yinao, but at the same time, I also wish I had more, deeper qualitative data, especially 
interviews with patients, families, and professional yinao protesters. This limitation was 
due to access – I had asked the mediation committee if I could ask patients and families 
who used the committee if they would be willing to exchange their contact information, 
but I was (quite understandably) denied. I also had broached this topic with one of the 
hospital field sites, but there are many issues around interviewing patients to begin with – 
this is not a “China issue,” but a general confidentiality and privacy issue that would be a 
challenge in the US as well. If I had had more time, I would have expended greater effort 
applying to the necessary bureaucracies to gain access. There are several things this type 
of data would have provided more insight into: 1) the decision-making process of 
patients, families, and professional yinao; 2) desired outcomes (money, apology, mixture 
of outcomes, etc.); 3) perception of credibility of institutions; 4) hidden data – things I 
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have not yet identified; 5) personal stories – these are highly emotional and personal 
stories, and quantifying them into yinao data often removes this critical factor, which is 
not only important on a human level, but also on an explanatory level for people’s 
motives and decisions. 
 One particular piece of important hidden data I gathered was an interview with a 
family member in a medical dispute who had been beaten by hospital staff and he, who 
himself works in a hospital, said that this was quite common: “[Average citizens] are 
frequently beaten [by hospitals] because average citizens, when they speak, frequently 
are not very careful [about what they say], so as soon as they become upset, the [hospital] 
beats you. Average citizens in hospitals, aren’t they the ones who have experienced 
unfair treatment? Of course they are upset, and then the hospital says that you are “yinao” 
and uses force, including the security guards, the security guards beat you.”
1349
 
 If it is true that hospitals frequently use force against complaining patients in the 
name of yinao, this is an incredibly frightening and understudied human rights issue. 
Moreover, it represents a possible landmine for further social discontent because even if 
progress is made in health care, a system that fails to hold hospitals responsible for their 
abuses against patients will continue to suffer from mistrust and credibility issues.  
Future Research  
 The limitations above imply areas for future research, such as better quantitative 
data collection and analysis, stronger assessment of the impact of quality of care on yinao, 
and collection of deeper qualitative data from the patient, family, and professional 
protester perspectives. Additionally, there is also a great need for research and policy 
direction around developing a good malpractice insurance system in China, untethered 
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from SOEs, and actually effective in paying patients directly. China is actually in an 
advantageous position because it is basically building its medical liability insurance 
system from scratch and can learn from the mistakes of more established medical 
malpractice insurance and litigation systems like that of the US. 
 I also encourage future research to test and refine my conceptual contributions of 
the mechanisms of tetheredness and slack for authoritarian adaptation. I am unsure 
whether they apply to other countries, but my instinct is that for Communist governments 
like Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, and Laos, they will be useful for understanding how 
these states are or should be adapting to their changing societies. I am less certain, 
however, how these concepts apply to other types of governments that are (clumsily) 
classified as “authoritarian,” such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, or Sudan. Most importantly, I 
hope these concepts will be used as analytical tools by policymakers and researchers 
when weighing potential reforms: should institutions be cut off completely from 
government oversight or allowed more independence within the scope of the state? 
Moreover, what is the impact that society can or could have on the state’s ability to 
relinquish some of its responsibilities? Authoritarian adaptation is ultimately not about 
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